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Introduction: British Literary Modernism and Economics
So, first of all, my basic reaction to discussions about What Minsky Really Meant — and,
similarly, to discussions about What Keynes Really Meant — is, I Don’t Care. I mean,
intellectual history is a fine endeavor. But for working economists the reason to read old books is
for insight, not authority; if something Keynes or Minsky said helps crystallize an idea in your
mind — and there’s a lot of that in both mens’ [sic] writing — that’s really good, but if where
you take the idea is very different from what the great man said somewhere else in his book, so
what? This is economics, not Talmudic scholarship.
—Paul Krugman, Op-Ed in the New York Times1
Economics plays too important a role in society for its study to be confined to economics
departments.
—Brook Thomas2
Mulk Raj Anand’s 1935 novel Untouchable is not usually read as a work of economic
theory. For one thing, novels simply aren’t theory, economic or not. Of course, novels deal with
ideas and can represent academic fields, but the fact that they are not theoretical works
themselves is one of the things that separates novelistic writing from theoretical writing of
various kinds. And then, there’s the subject-matter of Untouchable itself: for most of the novel,
Anand represents the daily life of Bakha, a low-caste street sweeper, in minute detail, taking us
through a catalog of deprivations and injustices that mark his passage through a single day in
colonial India. In the final fifteen pages, however, Anand’s novel takes a dramatic turn: Gandhi
appears, and the reader joins Bakha in listening to the great man’s speech calling for the
abolition of untouchability. And it is at this point that the novel’s interest not only in the
economic conditions of India, but in economics itself, suddenly emerge. For Anand uses
Gandhi’s speech to move from the particular details of Bakha’s day to a broader consideration of
the political and economic future facing an India on the verge of becoming independent. He does

1

Paul Krugman, “Minsky and Methodology (Wonkish),” The New York Times, March 27, 2012.
Qtd. in Michelle Chihara and Matt Seybold, “Introduction,” in The Routledge Companion to Literature and
Economics, ed. Matt Seybold and Michelle Chihara (New York: Routledge, 2019), 10.
2
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so by presenting a conversation between a Muslim-Indian “democrat” and a Hindu “poet,” who
Bakha overhears debating the meaning of Gandhi’s speech. It quickly becomes clear that both of
these men have been educated in England and have returned to India, a career trajectory that they
share with Anand himself. But we can also immediately see from Anand’s labels for them—
“democrat,” “poet”—that they, like him, are not experts in economic theory: they are in fact
amateurs and, in the conversation that follows, amateur economists. 3
We are introduced to the pair as they begin arguing about Gandhi’s speech, a discussion
that quickly leads to economics—and, via George Bernard Shaw—to England. The democrat is
critical of Gandhi, accusing him of “running counter to the spirit of our age, which is democracy.
He is in the fourth century BC with his swadeshi and his spinning-wheel. We live in the
twentieth.”4 His companion objects, arguing that
He [Gandhi] has his limitations but he is fundamentally sound. He may be wrong in
wanting to shut India off from the rest of the world by preaching the revival of the
spinning-wheel, because, as things are, that can’t be done. But even in that regard he is
right. For it is not India’s fault that it is poor; it is the world’s fault that the world is rich!
The democrat interrupts: “You are talking in paradoxes. You have been reading Shaw.” 5 In the
context of a novel that has to this point focused exclusively on the daily life of a street sweeper
in India, the sudden appearance of famous playwright and infamous Fabian Socialist Shaw’s
name is jolting. It also works in several different ways in this passage and indeed in this novel.
The democrat is tying to Shaw the poet’s “paradoxical” accusation that it’s the world’s fault that
it is rich, referring to Shaw’s famous penchant for witticisms. But the paradox in question is

3

For a detailed consideration of recent critical work on amateurism, see my first chapter below. In the context of
this introduction, I am using the word “amateur” in the way it is conventionally used: a person who has a passionate
interest in a topic or field in which they are not a professional. And by “professional,” I mean someone who has a
degree in a subject or who is paid to work in a particular field.
4
Mulk Raj Anand, Untouchable (1935; New York: Penguin, 2014), 132.
5
Anand, Untouchable, 132-133.
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really an economic one: who is to blame for India’s poverty? Shaw’s name is thus also standing
in for the broad range of economic questions about inequality, social welfare, and the eradication
of poverty that motivate his work, and that the Fabian Society of which he was such a crucial
part sought to answer. The poet’s economic paradox, in turn, is related to questions of modernity
and modernization, but explicitly to questions of economic modernization: contemporary debates
in India over the feasibility of protectionism (shutting a country off from international trade with
the rest of the world) that were motivated in part by the worldwide depression during the thirties,
as Anand was writing the novel. And finally, these economic and international relations
questions are related, by the “democrat,” to political questions about “the spirit of our
age…democracy.” In the context of India’s struggle for independence in the 1930s, Shaw
signifies as a shorthand for all of these interrelated concerns, even at a moment when Shaw
himself was turning resolutely away from democracy and toward Stalinist authoritarianism. 6
Shaw resonates in all of these ways here, but it is only the beginning of Anand’s
presentation of the poet as a figure who is deeply concerned with economic questions, despite a
notable lack of expertise in the subject. “Oh, forget Shaw!,” the poet exclaims, “I am not a
decadent Indian like you to be pandering to those European film stars!... But you know that it is
only in terms of economic theory that India is behind the other countries of the world. In fact, it
is one of the richest countries; it has abundant natural resources.” 7 Suddenly, the poet takes Shaw

6

Shaw visited Russia in 1931 and famously expressed his admiration for what he saw there. Prior to that visit,
however, he had already aligned himself with Lenin in the 20s; he also admired Mussolini and Hitler at various
points in their respective careers. The common thread tying these figures together, as I will discuss in Chapter 2
below, is their anti-democratic stances. The democrat here is thus pressing on a particularly fraught subject in this
discussion of Shaw.
7
Anand, Untouchable, 133. We can hear an echo in this dichotomy between “theory” and “resources” of a concept
central to Social Credit, one of the most famous heterodox economic theories of the 1920s and 30s. For devotees of
Social Credit, the wealth of the nation comes directly from its natural resources, and the role of the government is to
ensure an equitable distribution of the material wealth generated from those resources to each citizen of the nation.
This concept is the basis of Social Credit’s idea of the National Dividend.

3

in several other directions: apparently he thinks of him as a “film star,” and associates him with
decadence—but decadence in an Indian context: Anglophilia, an issue that Anand treats in detail
elsewhere in Untouchable.8 Nevertheless, the association between Shaw and decadence is
perhaps more apt than the poet realizes, given Shaw’s dramatic and economic output during the
decadent final decade of the nineteenth century, while his construal of Shaw as a movie star links
him to the new media of film. Referring to Shaw as a decadent, European film star, then,
establishes that “Shaw” is functioning here as a stand-in for the range of cultural production that
would come to be known as British modernism, and the poet’s emphatic rejection of Shaw points
to some antagonism between his perspective and the British modernist influences he may have
picked up in his time in England.
However, the phrase that really stands out here is “economic theory.” The poet is
accusing India of being backward in economic theory, and in what follows he offers a sketch of
the kind of economic theory he thinks the nation should adopt. Importantly, the poet echoes not
Shaw but Oscar Wilde in observing that India’s theoretical deficiency stems from the fact that
it has chosen to remain agricultural and has suffered for not accepting the machine. We
must, of course, remedy that. I hate the machine. I loathe it. But I shall go against Gandhi
there and accept it. And I am sure in time all will learn to love it. And we shall beat our
enslavers at their own game.9
Evoking Wilde’s argument in The Soul of Man Under Socialism (1891) that liberation from
constant labor will come from increasing technological advances, the poet here argues that
“[r]ight in the tradition of those who accepted the world and produced the baroque exuberance of
Indian architecture and sculpture, with its profound sense of form, its solidity and its mass, we

8

Most notably in Bakha’s love of English clothing, including his fantasies about stealing an abandoned hat in the
British barracks. Cf. Anand, Untouchable, 86-89.
9
Anand, Untouchable, 133.
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will accept and work the machine.”10 Unlike the colonizing English, the poet claims, India will
“steer clear of the pitfalls” of the economic growth that machines will bring because “[l]ife is
still an adventure for us. We are still eager to learn. We cannot go wrong. Our enslavers muddle
through things. We can see things clearly. We will go the whole hog with regard to machines
while they nervously fumble their way with the steam-engine.” 11 In this way, we can see the poet
laying out a vision of a specifically Indian version of an industrial revolution.
In response to this statement on the machine, the democrat challenges the poet to bring us
back to the topic of Gandhi’s speech (and the novel in which it appears): untouchability.
Importantly, the poet argues that the reconsideration of economic theory is inextricably linked to
untouchability, and to the reformation of Indian society more broadly: “When the sweepers
change their profession, they will no longer remain Untouchables. And they can do that soon, for
the first thing we will do when we accept the machine, will be to introduce the machine which
clears dung without anyone having to handle it—the flush system.” The democrat mocks this
response: “In fact…greater efficiency, better salesmanship, more mass-production,
standardization, dictatorship of the sweepers, Marxian materialism and all that!” “Yes, yes, all
that,” the poet replies, “but no catch-words and cheap phrases. The change will be organic and
not mechanical.” The poet’s phrase is striking, given that he has been talking about accepting
machines as a way of modernizing the Indian economy. And yet, the final emphasis on the
“organic” nature of the shift he is describing is appropriate: for the poet, crucially, the economic
theory that he is espousing is part of an organic whole—nothing less than Indian society, in all of

10

Cf. Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under Socialism, (1891; London: A.L. Humphreys, 1912).
Anand, Untouchable, 135. Coming at the end of a novel that depicts an awful lot of “muddling through things”
carried on by characters of all races and castes, the poet’s statement here certainly doesn’t have Anand’s full
support. But it is also clear that the poet is to some degree a stand-in for Anand, since Anand gives him such an
uninterrupted monologue and positions it as the capstone of his book.
11
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its complexity. He sees economics as inseparable from the Caste system, the Raj, the national
character, the dream of a democratic India. Moreover, he is taking the economic theories that he
has acquired from European sources—Shaw, Wilde, Marx—and putting forth a distinct version
that takes into account the context of pre-independence India. And he is doing it all with a
modernizing goal in mind: “the old mechanical formulas of our lives must go, the old
stereotyped forms must give place to a new dynamism.”12 This is a statement not merely of a
modernizer—one who seeks to bring an institution or a society up to date—but of a modernist:
one who is hyper-focused on the present-ness of the present, and of the dynamic energy
contained in the present moment.
Opening with this reading of Anand offers several crucial insights for my project, which
rereads some of the most notable, white, canonical British modernists through the lens of their
investments in economic theorization. Shaw, Pound, Eliot and Woolf all produced much of the
work I examine here before Anand had published Untouchable, his first novel, and Anand thus
comes after the figures on whom I base my arguments about modernism and economics in this
dissertation. However, Anand helps, I think, to throw the contours of my project into relief in a
way that is useful in this introduction. As a clear example of a postcolonial writer, who, to some
extent, fits the model of “writing back” first articulated by Salman Rushdie, 13 Anand helps
illustrate both the transportability of some of the economic interests and aesthetic practices we
associate with metropolitan British modernism and the limitations of that modernism. For one of
the major groups to which he is “writing back” is the Bloomsbury Group specifically and the
London modernist scene more generally. 14 Ben Conisbee Baer begins his essay “Shit Writing:
12

Anand, Untouchable, 137.
Cf. Salman Rushdie, “The Empire Writes Back With a Vengeance,” The Times, July 3 1982, 8.
14
See Peter Kalliney, Commonwealth of Letters: British Literary Culture and the Emergence of Postcolonial
Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), for an account that includes Anand’s relationship with various
13

6

Mulk Raj Anand’s Untouchable, the Image of Gandhi, and the Progressive Writers’ Association”
with a helpful reading of the final lines of Untouchable, which are a play on the tradition of
naming the place in which the novel was written: “Simla – SS Viceroy of India – Bloomsbury.”15
Baer writes:
The novel’s placing describes the arc of a hyphenated international trajectory. It is a
novel on the move. Simla: Himalayan summer capital of the British empire; S.S. Viceroy
of India: Peninsula and Oriental’s ultra-modern flagship ocean liner of the 1920s and 30s
on the Bombay to London line; Bloomsbury: heart of the British literary avant-garde, and
a milieu to which Anand was, more or less ambivalently attached.
These places are deeply meaningful, Baer argues: “The itinerary moves from the clubbish
leisure-spaces of the colony’s center to the artistic heart of the metropolis, via a vehicle
appropriately carrying the title of the representative of sovereign power in the subcontinent.” 16 I
would add that the tripartite “location” with which Anand frames his novel echoes Joyce’s final
words in Ulysses (“Trieste – Zurich – Paris”),17 itself surely a model for Untouchable in its focus
on the single day of, for the most part, a single character, wandering his city—a description that
of course fits several works by Bloomsbury modernists as well, including Woolf’s Mrs
Dalloway.18 In any case, naming “Bloomsbury” as one end of the colonial route he traces in this

figures in the Bloomsbury milieu including T.S. Eliot. See also Mulk Raj Anand, Conversations in Bloomsbury
(1981; Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995) for Anand’s account of his conflicted relationship with the
Bloomsbury group as a “conversation.”
15
Anand, Untouchable, 139.
16
Ben Conisbee Baer, “Shit Writing: Mulk Raj Anand’s Untouchable, the Image of Gandhi, and the Progressive
Writers’ Association,” Modernism/modernity 16, no. 3 (2009): 576.
17
James Joyce, Ulysses (1922; New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 644.
18
Baer reads several other parallels between Untouchable and Ulysses: “The capital ‘U’ of Untouchable is readable
as an intertextual tribute to Ulysses—both as a claim on it and an inscription within its discursive space of a figure of
the untouchable boy.” Moreover, “According to his own account, Anand had set out to transpose what he calls the
‘stream of consciousness’ staged in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Ulysses into a different colonial
context and into a subaltern figure who would be ‘the very opposite of Joyce’s.’ Anand attempted to translate
Joyce’s deconstructive intervention within novelistic representation into a voiced restitution of a fragmented
subalternity: ‘I would rescue from the obscure slums of the British Indian cantonment, a man of real flesh and blood
. . . I would include all the contradictions of his temperament.’ The desire is to show and voice (to focalize) the
colonial everyday—‘the hell . . . the truth of his subhuman life’—not from the position of the colonist, nor from the
position of the caste Hindu, but from the ‘contradictory’ and inherently multi-voiced, textualized place of
subalternity: ‘reminiscence, instinctive awareness, and intuition indicated in certain phrases, symbolic words and
truncated thoughts.’” Cf. Baer, “Shit Writing,” 51-2.
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concluding moment—which comes directly after the extended conversation I have just
discussed—constitutes an accusation (Bloomsbury has blame to bear for the current situation in
India) and an homage (the things Anand learned in Bloomsbury, both aesthetic and economic,
help make his book what it is).
If we read Untouchable as a pastiche of the modernist day novel, and as a novel that is
itself thinking about modernism more or less explicitly, one of the key elements of that pastiche
is the way Anand engages with economics within it. Indeed, one thing that Untouchable shows,
especially in the conversation between the poet and the democrat that concludes it, is that there is
a transportable element of modernist approaches to economics. Specifically, the common
impulse toward considering economic questions in terms of specific, broader cultural contexts
that I locate in each of the modernists I discuss in this dissertation proves, in Anand’s handling,
to be applicable in contexts other than London or even Europe. Anand’s poet is performing the
same kind of synthesizing work as many of the British modernists I examine in this dissertation,
but the content of that work looks different because of the dramatically different context of preindependence India. What is the same, in my reading, is the approach: the urgent need to collect
disparate bits of economic theory, cultural context, and historical event and combine them into
an economic theory that meets the specific needs of the present—the very present—moment.
That Anand’s novel comes after much—though not all—of the modernist economic
theorization I examine in this dissertation helps show, in retrospect, the widespread nature of that
theorization, and its status as a relatively unexamined feature of British modernism in the period
from 1890 to 1950. During that period, many canonical British modernist writers developed
diverse interests in a range of economic theories, from the orthodox theories being developed in
the new economics departments in Cambridge and Oxford to the heterodox, crankish theories
8

like Distributism and Social Credit being espoused by figures such as Major C.H. Douglas in The
New Age.19 The modernist writers I study here took their interests in economics in vastly
different directions—from Shaw’s Fabianism to Eliot’s Christian Society, and from Woolf’s
anti-fascist feminism to Pound’s irrational devotion to Mussolini—but mirror each other in
combining their newfound economic interest with their modernist aesthetic experiments. In this
dissertation, I argue that the conditions that gave rise to the wave of literary experiments we now
call modernism also opened a moment of possibility for economic theory—and for models of
economic organization that were radically different from the status quo. In incorporating these
heterodox economic theories into their modernist literary production, the figures I study here
created diverse literary and critical works of amateur economic theorization that suggest ideas
and theories that even the heterodox economists with whom these theories originated would not
fully recognize. Plenty of people were interested in heterodox economics during this time period.
The special interest of this dissertation lies in considering those figures who explored heterodox
economics within the idiosyncratic, aesthetic frameworks of literary modernism, articulating
non-traditional economic ideas alongside and within experimental literary production. I term
these figures “Modernist Amateur Economists”: modernist literary figures who, though nonexperts in Economics as it was developing during the period, combined bits of heterodox

19

I will discuss the various currents of heterodox economics that were active during the period I am examining in
Chapter 1 below. Briefly, though, “heterodox economics” is an umbrella term that describes any economic theory
that falls outside the main line of the classical/neoclassical tradition. The religious terms “heterodox” and
“orthodox” were very much in use in the context of economics in this period as well. Viz, for instance, the title of
heterodox economist J.A. Hobson’s memoir Confessions of an Economic Heretic as well as Pound’s dismissive
account of hearing “one of the chief and most despicable fakers describe himself as an ‘orthodox economist’.
‘Orthodox’ and subsidized physicists condemned Galileo.” See Ezra Pound, ABC Of Economics (Tunbridge Wells,
UK: The Pound Press, 1933), 73 and J.A. Hobson, Confessions of an Economic Heretic (London: Allen and Unwin,
1938). For an overview of trends in heterodox economics, and especially of the way in which “the range of
approaches [to economic theory] began to narrow significantly” in the period following the late 1930s, see Roger E.
Backhouse’s section on “Heterodox Economics,” in Roger E. Backhouse, The Penguin History of Economics
(London: Penguin, 2002), 313-316.
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economic theorization with broader intellectual cultural concerns in their modernist literary
work, resulting in something new.
The phenomenon I am describing comes through in Anand’s novel in several ways. First,
in the figure of the poet, we can see Anand presenting a Modernist Amateur Economist. As we
have seen, the poet is combining bits of heterodox economic theory—a Wildean enthusiasm for
technology, a Marxist framework of analysis—with his own other interests and perceptions
about the Caste system, the history of the translation of the Vedanta, etc., to create a new vision
of an economic program that he thinks India should pursue—embracing the machine. At the
same time, although Anand gives us some indications that he does not fully support what the
poet is saying,20 this concluding scene helps throw Untouchable itself in relief as a work of
Modernist Amateur Economics. We see, as we read the poet’s words, how the events of Bakha’s
day—his morning work in the latrines, his run-ins with higher caste individuals and abuse at
their hands, his visit to the English barracks, his near escape from a Christian missionary—build
up a picture of contemporary India that accords with the poet’s discursive (and even didactic)
summation. It becomes clear that, for Anand, the question of untouchability is at the center of the
larger questions of Indian independence and of what India will do with its newfound economic
independence after the end of the Raj. The only clear answer we get comes from the poet, whose
near-monologues stand, even with qualification, as an expression of Anand’s economic ideas.
Anand, writing near the end of the period I study in this dissertation, emerges as a self-conscious
figure of the Modernist Amateur Economist, both representing the figure itself in his novel and
adding to the range of Modernist Amateur Economic theory a consideration of economics,
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potential practical concerns.
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empire and India. Like Anand in pre-independence India, the writers I address in this dissertation
bring to their literary works a vein of heterodox economic thinking and sense of possibility that
carries underacknowledged implications for the way we read British modernism.

Modernism
But what do I mean by “modernism?” There is a long history in modernist studies of
debating both the meaning of the term modernism and the contours of the field that that word
describes. Especially in the period following 2008, when Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz
published their famous essay “The New Modernist Studies” in PMLA, “modernism” has come to
be used by various scholars to describe different things. 21 Mao’s very recent follow-up to this
essay, his introduction to the essay collection The New Modernist Studies (2021), further
underscores the ways in which debates over the definition and purview of “modernism” and
indeed “modernist studies” have been “front and center in the new modernist studies’ already
considerable body of self-scrutiny.”22 I want here to lay out three general ways that the word
modernism is used in Modernist Studies today to help triangulate what I mean by the term. The
first of these comes directly from Mao and Walkowitz’s call for “expansion” in “what we might
think of as temporal, spatial, and vertical directions.”23 Implicit in this call for expansion is, as
Paul Saint-Amour has observed, “a steady weakening of [the field’s] key term, modernism” 24 in
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Cf. Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, “The New Modernist Studies,” PMLA, 123, no. 3 (2008): 737–748.
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promise, and blind spots.” Cf. Douglas Mao, “Introduction: The New Modernist Studies,” in The New Modernist
Studies, ed. Douglas Mao (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 6.
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studied.” Cf. Mao, “Introduction: The New Modernist Studies,” 3.
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Paul Saint-Amour, “Weak Theory, Weak Modernism,” Modernism/modernity, 25, no. 3 (2018): 441.
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order to allow for scholars to push these temporal, spatial, and vertical boundaries outward. A
positive result of this expansion has been what is termed the transnational turn: the thoughtful
consideration of what modernism looks like in countries and regions other than Europe and the
United States. Works such as Jessica Berman’s Modernist Commitments: Ethics, Politics, and
Transnational Modernism (2011), Jed Esty’s Unseasonable Youth: Modernism, Colonialism, and
the Fiction of Development (2011), and The Oxford Handbook of Global Modernisms (2012),
edited by Mark Wollaeger and Matt Eatough, exemplify the transnational turn, and indeed a full
list of important works seeking to expand the field in this way would be too long to include
here.25
This transnational turn has gone hand in hand with other scholarly efforts to center
variously marginalized figures in modernist studies. Extensive attention has recently been paid to
modernism and gender, as signaled by the recent creation of the journal Feminist Modernist
Studies and Cassandra Laity’s manifesto-like introduction to its first issue.26 This event
represents a crystallization of a longer-term shift in the discipline beginning in the mid-1990s
with work by scholars such as Rita Felski and Bonnie Kime Scott and continuing in the present
in works by Kristin Bluemel and Phyllis Lassner, Anne E. Fernald, Sonita Sarker, and Melanie
Micir.27 The extensive critical literature on modernism and gender frequently intersects with
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work on modernism and queerness by scholars such as Berman, Micir, and Elizabeth English. 28
And the transnational turn has also helped scholars recognize the ways race has shaped
modernist literature in national settings other than just the United States, building on work by
Paul Gilroy and including scholarship by Urmila Seshagiri and Len Platt. 29
All of these kinds of expansion are surely to the good: works that have received scholarly
attention likely would not have without the New Modernist Studies’ impulse to expansion—an
eventuality which undoubtedly would have impoverished our understanding of literature writ
large. And yet the theoretical weakening of “modernism” that has helped facilitate these
welcome expansions have also threatened to render the designation “modernist” essentially
meaningless. This danger is most apparent in some of the boldest recent writing on modernism,
especially Susan Stanford Friedman’s work that culminated in her book Planetary Modernisms:
Provocations on Modernity Across Time (2015). In an extreme example that points to the larger
problem I am describing, Friedman argues that we can view work done in the eighth century in
China as “Tang modernism” because it was produced “as a reaction to wide-scale tranformations
in economic, political, agricultural, family, and religious life during the Tang Dynasty (618-907
CE).”30 Friedman’s claim presents a conundrum to modernist studies: if we have weakened the
term “modernism” so that it simply means “work being produced in response to modernity”—
“modernity” itself only a vaguely defined term in many cases—does “modernism” as a term do
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any meaningful work? If everything is modernism, what distinguishes the field of Modernist
Studies from any other field? Or, as Saint-Amour has it, “[w]hen a field expands so dramatically,
and along so many axes at once, it rightly raises the question of expansionism—of the extent to
which by opening up it might encroach on adjacent fields.” 31 My sense, shared by many in
Modernist Studies,32 is that the expansion Friedman suggests is squarely on the wrong side of the
line between “expansion” and “expansionism,” even if it does present a provocation to the field
that might ultimately be interesting or valuable.
A second common usage of “modernism” in modernist studies helps balance this will to
expansion advocated by Mao and Walkowitz: the self-conscious return to understanding
modernism as a literary period, defined by the years 1890-1940, with some but not unlimited
room for expansion on either end. David James and Urmila Seshagiri’s “Metamodernisms:
Narratives of Continuity and Revolution” (2014) stands as an important attempt to theorize
modernism in this way. There, James and Seshagiri explicitly position their claim that
“[p]eriodization, … amplifies, rather than constrains, scholarly discourse about modernism”
against Friedman’s vision of the field, arguing that “once modernist becomes an epithet for
evaluating expressive reactions to modernity, whether at the beginning of the seventeenth
century or the dawn of the twenty-first, whether in Berlin or Bombay, it loses a degree of traction
and threatens to betray its own need to be replaced.”33 Moreover, weakening our definition too
much leads us to “dull modernism’s particular brilliance” in our drive to “dissolve it into a
collective of techniques comparable with what other writers have practiced at other points in
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history.”34 Work like Friedman’s, James and Seshagiri argue, exemplifies the point that in the
New Modernist Studies “[t]he term modernism—pluralized into modernisms, preceded by wideranging adjectives—is now connotative rather than denotative”; 35 being used to evoke an illdefined phenomenon or grouping of texts rather than in any specific way. For James and
Seshagiri, it is essential for Modernist Studies to reverse this trend, to embrace an understanding
of “modernism as an era, an aesthetic, and an archive that originated in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.”36 I generally agree with James and Seshagiri that restoring a sense of
the specificity of modernism is important to doing meaningful work in the field, but I would
offer a few caveats to their argument and to my statement here.
First, while I say that a well-theorized (or, in Saint-Amour’s terms, strongly theorized)
modernism is necessary to do meaningful work in Modernist Studies, I do not mean to suggest
that such work need be exclusive of other subfields of interest in the time period 1890-1940.
Indeed, there is a long tradition in Modernist Studies of treating modernist works as special—a
tradition to which James and Seshagiri contribute in their description of “modernism’s particular
brilliance.” Of course, one of the foundational concepts in literary studies is that literary works
are special in some way, and therefore deserving of study. The problem for Modernist Studies is
in elevating works that are modernist—and in using the designation “modernist” to elevate
works—above other literary work from the period in question. Such a practice has marked
Modernist Studies since its inception and has led to issues ranging from an implicit acceptance of
the objectionable politics of some of modernism’s biggest names to the very exclusions of
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marginalized figures that the New Modernist Studies is now seeking to redress. Rather than
thinking of modernist works as linked together by a “particular brilliance,” I want instead to
think of them as sharing a quality or qualities: characteristics that can be described and defined.
This conception of modernist works as exhibiting specific, shared qualities brings me to
my second observation about James and Seshagiri’s essay: although they wish to define
modernism in terms of “an era, an aesthetic, and an archive,” the middle term here does not
appear in their essay in a fully fleshed-out way. Moreover, I don’t know that “aesthetic” is the
correct term: what does The Pisan Cantos share aesthetically with, say, Between the Acts?
Rather, I follow Vincent Sherry’s argument in his recent introduction to The Cambridge History
of Modernism in understanding modernism as a “sensibility, temperament, disposition, attitude,
outlook” that manifests a “demonstrably self-conscious involvement in [the] modern condition.”
Sherry is particularly keen on preserving “a distinctive temperament of ‘modernism’ within the
‘modern’ period,”37 an understanding at which James and Seshagiri gesture in their essay and yet
do not clearly define. Sherry’s description of modernism as a sensibility is the third definition of
modernism that I am tracing here and is the one that I find most useful in framing my project, in
combination with James and Seshagiri’s period designation of 1890-1950.
If modernism, then, can be described as a sensibility within this period, and specifically
as a sensibility that relies on constant demonstration of its own awareness of the present-ness of
the present moment, what does modernism “look” like? The shortest version is
“experimentation,” but even the smallest amount of pressing on this word reveals that it cannot
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be a sufficient condition for something to be modernist. 38 Experimentation is a practice that does
not—indeed cannot—belong to any single moment or movement. Daniel Defoe is experimenting
just as surely as Geoffrey Chaucer is, and James Joyce, in this context, is merely another turn of
the wheel. There must be something specific about the kind of experimentation that constitutes
modernism. Sherry again provides some guidance here: modernist experimentation can be seen
in the representation, through various formal means, of “a self-conscious awareness” of “a
special present, a brink of time, a precipitous instant, all in all, a crisis time.” 39 More than that,
though, disruptions even in understandings of time itself led modernists to have an experience of
time that “moves beyond one of crisis time to one of time itself in crisis.” 40 This notion of time in
crisis can be seen in dozens of modernist works, including Conrad’s fractured representation of
the attempted destruction of the Greenwich observatory (the symbol of the newly-instated
Greenwich Mean Time) in The Secret Agent, Woolf’s spatialization of time through the figures
of St. Mary Woolnoth’s and Big Ben in Mrs Dalloway, and H.D.’s attempts to capture frozen
moments of time in her imagist poems. And while these are literary examples, this sensibility
towards time can be seen across the imaginative arts, in cubist visual art, futurist “happenings” in
performance art, and modernist music and ballet, such as Nijinsky’s performance in Stravinsky’s
Rites of Spring. The diversity of fields of cultural production that can be meaningfully linked in
this understanding of “modernism” is part of what facilitates the conceptualization of modernism
and (and in) economics that I offer in this dissertation.
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So, while experimentation writ large cannot be claimed as the province of modernism
alone, modernism does represent a sort of critical mass of experimentation that centers on this
new conception of time, and of “newness” itself. But, of course, this “newness” springs not from
a random intellectual trend or fashion, but from the concrete conditions of what we might call the
time of modernism. While the period in which modernism flourished varies from country to
country, this dissertation focuses on British modernism, and thus the period from 1890-1950. In
the British context, the establishing conditions of the modernist temperament range from fin de
siècle energies;41 to the “discovery” of continental modernist visual art (in Roger Fry’s second
impressionist exhibit in 1910); to the Great War from 1914-1918; to the intense period of the
1930s, including the Great Depression, the rise of continental and domestic fascism, and the
advent of World War II. If we accept the definition of modernism as a sensibility that
consistently demonstrates a self-consciousness of the present-ness of the present, paying
attention to the specific events that were happening in that present is the only way to recover that
sense of urgency today, a century or more later.42
While this imperative—that historical context is crucial to understanding modernism—
has been taken up by modernist scholars for many years now, the early construal of modernist
literature as primarily highly aestheticized and fundamentally disengaged with political events
continues to cast a shadow that scholars are still working to escape and which this dissertation
explicitly refutes. Perhaps more pernicious still is that when modernism was associated with a
general political leaning by scholars, it was invariably with radical or at least liberal politics, an
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association caused in part by the New Criticism’s insistence on reading works without
substantial reference to their contexts and in part by the zeal of early modernist scholars who
wanted the literature they loved to express the politics in which they believed. 43 Recent (and
indeed, at this point, not-so-recent) work on modernism has pushed back on this view of
modernism as either apolitical or left-leaning, and (especially in the past five years) the hardright stances of many of the most important British modernists have come into focus variously as
objects of critique and as cautionary tales. 44 The present study, which reads works by Pound,
Eliot, Orage, and Shaw, all of whom held repugnant political views in varying degrees across the
spectrum, participates in this project of coming to terms with modernism’s ugly political history.
As Sherry notes, “[t]he absolute Now” a focus on which he identifies as the key characteristic of
modernism “could point Left or Right on the metaphorical spectrum of political opinion if not
backward or forward on its figurative clock”: just as “experimentation” is not the sole province
of modernism, modernist experimentation that focuses on the radical present is not necessarily
radical in a political sense as well. 45 A dissertation that considers the Fascism of Pound, the Left
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Totalitarianism of Shaw, and the Bloomsbury Liberalism of Woolf and Keynes in the same space
is fully cognizant of the range of possibilities that attends modernist political commitments.

Literature and Economics
While the critical context of attempts to account for these modernist political
commitments forms an important backdrop to the concerns of my own project, I am more
interested here in a different story that scholars are just now beginning to tell in a coherent way:
the story of modernism and economics. To get to that story, however, we must first attend to the
larger subfield of which it is a part: Literature and Economics. The subfield of Literature and
Economics was first described as such by Martha Woodmansee and Mark Osteen in the 1999
essay collection they edited, entitled The New Economic Criticism. Like the term “the New
Modernist Criticism” that would come after it, Woodmansee and Osteen’s designation represents
an attempt to draw on the then-current critical trend of the New Historicism, and mirrors the
larger claims and practices of New Historicism by insisting on the importance of understanding
the economic contexts in which literary works were produced. Woodmansee and Osteen spend
much of their introduction retroactively describing the “old economic criticism,” focusing
especially on work by Marc Shell, Walter Benn Michaels, Deirdre McCloskey, and Jean-Joseph
Goux,46 that, predictably, draws on the critical schools of thought most prevalent at the time. 47
Or, to be more specific, for Woodmansee and Osteen,
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any adequate theoretics of literary economics must begin with the axioms of Saussurian
linguistics and post-structuralist theory—that all signs are arbitrary and related
syntagmatically—and then address the similarly fictive or constructed nature of money
and finance. Writers like Shell, Jean-Joseph Goux and Walter Benn Michaels have thus
exposed and analyzed the historical and philosophical parallels—usually termed
homologies—between economic and linguistic systems. Their work has laid the
foundation for virtually all of the literary economic criticism that has followed. 48
This reading of the “old” economic criticism, and especially this final statement, calls into
question the very division Woodmansee and Osteen are making here between old and new. Even
if, as they argue, the New Economic Criticism “may be characterized as a branch of New
Historicism, itself a tributary of that wide stream called Cultural Studies,” 49 it is clear that
Woodmansee and Osteen—and the many contributors to their volume—see major continuities
between the old and new economic criticism. 50 This continuity begs the question of just how
“new” the “new economic criticism” is. Moreover, the years since the publication of The New
Economic Criticism have failed to deliver on its promise of a coming “wave” of economic
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criticism. While more economic criticism has certainly been produced, it is unclear whether it
can be accurately defined as a “movement,” that shares anything other than a subject.
We find this sentiment explicitly stated in a much more recent essay collection, The
Routledge Companion to Literature and Economics (2019), edited by Matt Seybold and Michelle
Chihara. There, with the benefit of hindsight, Chihara and Seybold observe that “few ensuing
attempts have been made to sustain New Economic Criticism as a coherent and collaborative
community of scholars” and that “New Economic Criticism has largely disappeared from the
academic lexicon.”51 Part of the failure of the term, in Chihara and Seybold’s account, is that “it
was never entirely clear how New Economic Criticism distinguished itself from ‘old’ economic
criticism by Lukács, [Raymond] Williams, Rehard Floyr, and William Charvat, nor why it tried.”
Beyond the theoretical weakness of the term, Chihara and Seybold point to the fact that “the
interdisciplinary collaborations that seemed so promising in 1990 failed to materialize in the
following decade,” a failing that they lay firmly at the feet of economists. Specifically, the
discipline’s “inability to question the ‘legitimacy of neoclassical microeconomics’” has led it to
reject cultural and literary critiques that point out the theoretical inadequacy of neoclassical
economics—a longstanding feature of the discipline, as we shall see. 52 The intellectual gap
between the fields of economics and Literary or Cultural studies has proven fatal to attempts at
collaboration in the present, but is also precisely the gap that the modernist writers I study in this
dissertation aimed to bridge with their modernist amateur theorization.
One of the main reasons for Woodmansee and Osteen’s optimism that the field of
economics was becoming open to interdisciplinary critiques—which would have enabled a more
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meaningful impact of work in literature and economics on the field of economics itself—was
Deirdre McCloskey’s 1985 book The Rhetoric of Economics. McCloskey was a member of the
economics department at the University of Chicago in the 1950s and 60s, and therefore a
founding figure in what is known as the Chicago School of Economics. The Chicago School is
responsible for a range of economic atrocities, especially supply-side economics (trickle-down,
or Reaganomics) and consistent advocacy for deregulation and corporate tax cuts. For a member
of the Chicago School to write a book that calls for attention to be paid to the rhetoric used in the
field, with an aim to making economists realize that they have become “scientists who don’t
know even now that their science has become a boy’s game in a sandbox,” 53 naturally was
exciting. Moreover, McCloskey’s overall purpose in The Rhetoric of Economics is, she writes, to
“lead economists and noneconomists to see the field as it is, as part of the larger conversation of
humankind,” and to emphasize that “Economics is unsuccessful as social weather forecasting, a
role forced on it by the rhetoric of politics and journalism. But it is strikingly successful as social
history, or would be if it would stop sleepwalking in its rhetoric.” 54 McCloskey’s own rhetoric
here is intentionally inflammatory, clearly aimed at awakening the sleepwalkers in her field, and
we can see why Woodmansee and Osteen would see it—and the enormous, if negative, response
it inspired—as a sign that Economics might be ready to come to terms with its cultural
embeddedness and reliance on literary and rhetorical tropes.
And yet this reckoning has not occurred, even with the successions of financial crises
over the two decades since The New Economic Criticism was published, as Chihara and Seybold
are quick to observe. McCloskey, too, in her afterward to the revised edition of The Rhetoric of
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Economics (1998) asks: “Well, has it worked? Since the first edition in 1985, and before it the
philosophically oriented paper in 1983, have economists paid attention?” In short, she answers,
“No.”55 And why not? Although she claims that “[t]he purpose of thinking about how
economists converse with each other is to help the field mature as a science, not to attack it,” 56
it’s clear that economists did feel attacked. And, it turns out, the easiest way to defend against an
attack of this kind is to ignore it, as the field of economics has done since its inception. 57 While
McCloskey in her introduction construes herself as “Aunt Deirdre, the Marianne of modern
economic science,” perhaps Cassandra would be a more apt comparison. 58 The result, as
McCloskey bitterly points out in her afterward, is that “[e]conomists are still unaware of how
they talk. I failed. Oh well, keep trying.” 59 We can see McCloskey’s attempt to persuade
economists of their cultural situatedness as belonging to the same lineage in which I position the
modernist literary figures I discuss in this dissertation. Her critique, like theirs, remains valid
even if it also remains unheard.60
Writing twenty-one years later, Chihara and Seybold are even more critical of the state of
economics than McCloskey, and their vehemence casts doubt on the possibility of collaboration
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between literary studies and economics. “Contemporary econo-literary criticism,” they write, “is,
paradoxically, energetically engaged with the history of economic thought and methods of
economic analysis and openly hostile toward economics’ prevailing disciplinary hegemony and
its perceived program of institutional and cultural imperialism.” 61 For Chihara and Seybold,
economics as a discipline has been, “For at least as long as it has been legitimized by integration
into Western governance and academia,” complicit in perpetuating the worst abuses of the
capitalist system, “the protection of affluence and excess at the expense of institutional violence
and the creation of poverty by the willfully inefficient distribution of resources.” Throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they write, economists have been “routinely called upon to
rationalize limitations of access to education, healthcare, and legal protection which
disproportionately disadvantage minorities and enable harmful upward redistributions of
wealth.” And in more recent years, “[e]conomists have put the stamp of (pseudo-)science on
austerity measures, executive compensation packages, deregulation that facilitates fraud and
exploitation, and other forms of subsidized graft.” “So far as they are concerned,” Chihara and
Seybold conclude, “the proceeds do trickle down.”62
Whatever we think of the particulars of this argument, it is clear that if this is the way the
discipline of English views the discipline of Economics, and vice versa, there are few if any
grounds for conversation or collaboration between the two fields. And indeed, that is not what
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Literature and Economics is, in Chihara and Seybold’s view. Instead, citing Brook Thomas’s
comment that “[e]conomics plays too important a role in society for its study to be confined to
economics departments,” Chihara and Seybold present an understanding of Literature and
Economics that points in one direction only. 63 In this conception, Literature and Economics
consists of examining literary understandings of economics and the economy and focusing on
economic history and on the intellectual history of economics, rather than on the conglomeration
of abstract models and mathematical formulas that currently make up the field of economics.
Without necessarily endorsing the total dismissal of institutional economics that Chihara and
Seybold put forth here, I do want to situate my project and my methodology firmly in the field of
literary studies, in the way they suggest. My dissertation is not interested in doing economic
work in a way that that discipline would understand. Instead, I am arguing that paying attention
to how modernist literary figures both approached economic questions of the day and insistently
contextualized them within their aesthetic works can help us to broaden our understanding of
modernism and of economics, in precisely the way that Thomas describes: as a subject that is not
and cannot be ceded entirely to economics departments.

Modernism and Economics
If the most striking element of Chihara and Seybold’s essay collection is the fiery
polemic that introduces it, another, more subtle shift that the collection registers as a whole is an
increased interest in specifically modernist literature and economics. In their 1999 volume,
Woodmansee and Osteen note a relative lack of work on modernism and economics, writing:
“the treatment of relationships between aesthetic Modernism and Modernist economics has been
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handicapped by a vestigial formalism and a squeamishness about the distasteful politics of some
of the period’s luminaries.”64 In the two decades since The New Economic Criticism was
published, this situation has changed to a rather large degree. Adding to important work by
Jennifer Wicke65 and Michael Tratner,66 the years since 1999 have seen valuable studies of
various aspects of modernism and economics by scholars such as Michael Szalay, Jed Esty, John
Xiros Cooper, Carey James Mickalites, and, most recently, Ronald Schliefer. 67 Alongside this
list of scholars who have written monographs or chapters of monographs dedicated to
modernism and economics, we can add a number of contributions to anthologies and essay
collections, including Seybold’s essay on Keynes in The Routledge Companion, Mary Poovey’s
essay “The Modernist Trajectory of Economics” in the recent collection Reconnecting
Aestheticism and Modernism (2017), and Schleifer’s contribution to The Bloomsbury Companion
to Modernist Literature (2018), “A New Sense of Value: Literary Modernism and Economics.” 68
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Moreover, where all of these examples represent attempts to think about modernism and
economics at a macro level, the number of studies of individual modernists and their economic
interests has continued to grow over the last two decades as well. 69 And, finally, work that
focuses on modernism in relation to economic history forms an important body of criticism
within larger attempts to historicize the field. 70 It’s fair to say, given this extensive list, that
modernism and economics is a growing subfield that is producing work increasingly crucial to
understanding the state of modernist studies writ large.
Nevertheless, scholarly work on modernism and economics has been limited in part by a
terminological issue; namely, that when economists and economic historians use the word
“modernism” they universally do not mean the same thing that we do in literary studies. 71
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Moreover, this issue has been incompletely recognized and reckoned with in literary-critical
work on modernism and economics. We might use John Maynard Keynes, the economist most
associated with the conjunction between modernism and economics, as a sort of litmus test to
illustrate what I mean. Keynes is a central figure in two of my chapters here and stands as the
exemplary modernist economist because of his intimate association with the Bloomsbury group
and the way that ideas circulating in that group influenced his economic theorization. It is
striking, then, that the most recent literary-critical monograph on modernism and economics,
Ronald Schleifer’s A Political Economy of Modernism, holds up earlier figures such as Alfred
Marshall and Thorstein Veblen as model modernist economists and in fact does not mention
Keynes by name at all! The problem becomes even more perplexing when we find in
McCloskey’s provocatively-titled chapter “The Poverty of Economic Modernism” the claim that
“the Keynesian revolution in economics would not have happened under the modernist
legislation for science,” since “[t]he Keynesian insights were not formulated as statistical
propositions until the early 1950s.” McCloskey observes: “Modernist methodology would have
stopped all this cold in 1936: where was the evidence of an objective, controlled, and statistical
kind?”72 Clearly, something odd is going on here. If “modernism” can stand as diametrically
opposed to Keynes, where does that leave Keynes? And where does that leave “modernism?”
And, drawing McCloskey and Schleifer together, how can “modernism” signify, on the one
hand, the generation after Keynes and, on the other, the generation before?
Three essays in the recent collection Modernism and the Social Sciences (2017) help lay
out this issue more clearly. In the volume’s introduction and the essays “Economics” and
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“Econometrics,” the way “modernism” is used paints a full picture of what economists and
economic historians mean when they say modernism—and indicate the disjunction between their
usage and mine. In the introduction to the volume, then, political scientist Mark Bevir defines
modernism in this way:
Modernism was generally atomistic and analytic. It broke up the continuities and gradual
changes of earlier evolutionary narratives. It divided the world into discrete,
discontinuous units, whether these were empirical facts or single propositions. It made
sense of these units through mathematical rules and analytic schemas. It used synchronic
models, calculations, typologies, systems, and structures to explain the nature and
behavior of the atomized units.73
This description should be jarring to anyone who studies modernist literature. Although certain
modernist literary works could be described in this way, especially in terms of the tendency to
“break up continuities” and to challenge “evolutionary narratives,” it seems clear that what Bevir
is describing here is something closer to positivism—the belief that things can be known only
through scientific or mathematical verification.
This perception is strengthened by Bevir’s conclusion, in which he claims that
modernism is a methodology or paradigm shared by essentially all social scientists:
Many social scientists have lost any sense of the contingency and contestability of this
modernism. They see it as common sense or as synonymous with good social science.
Their most heated debates concern the rigor, appropriateness, and compatibility of
various quantitative and qualitative methods within a modernist perspective that they take
for granted. When they evoke history, they treat it as a source of data, and they explain
these data using formal modernist strategies and modernist tropes—models, correlations,
classifications, functions, and mechanisms. Modernism has, at least for now, won the
day.74
Bevir’s phrases here—“formal modernist strategies,” “modernist tropes,” “modernist
perspective”—all assume a definition of modernism that is clearly at odds with the literary
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understanding of a sensibility I have advanced above. Moreover, it is clear from Bevir’s usages
here that he is using the word “modernism” associatively or descriptively rather than with a
specific definition behind it. Indeed, Bevir’s “modernism” clearly has nothing to do with the
present-ness of the present, and while “experimentation” is important to both literary and socialscience usages of the term, “literary modernism” does not designate a group of writers interested
in thinking about their literary works as scientific experiments—as is the case with literary
naturalism, for instance.
Eminent economic historian Roger Backhouse brings Bevir’s broad definition of
modernism in the social sciences to bear on economics specifically in his contribution to the
volume, a chapter titled “Economics.” It is Backhouse who uses the term “methodological
modernism,” and his argument in this essay is that “the main methodological disputes in
twentieth-century economics were disputes within modernism [...] Modernist conceptions of
economic theory competed with modernist empirical work.” 75 The key figure in this shift, he
argues, is Alfred Marshall, and one of the main subjects of his chapter is “the Age of Marshall,
the period during which historicist and modernist ideas coexisted both in the discipline and in the
mind of Alfred Marshall, its leading representative.” 76 Here again, I would suggest, Backhouse is
using the word “modernism” instead of the term he actually means, which in the context of this
chapter is “neoclassical economics,” itself a form of positivism. That such an identity exists
between neoclassical economics and positivism is due to the mathematization of economics
represented by the turn to econometrics (the heavy use of statistics and mathematical modeling in
economics) in the 1930s and 40s.
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Accordingly, the final point in the triangulation of the term “modernism” I am outlining
here is Thomas A. Stapleford’s essay “Econometrics.” 77 Although Stapleford is less declarative
and more cautious than Backhouse, he also further muddles the terminological issue by his
recurring use of the phrase “epistemic modernism,” 78 a term he does not attempt to define.
However, it seems from context that he again means something akin to “positivism,” as we see in
his explanation of how econometrics “fit neatly with [the] goals” of “epistemic modernists [who]
sought to construct new forms of knowledge that could ameliorate or contain threatening social
or economic instability” because “it promised to be deeply empirical…while its reliance on
statistical data would allow it to treat aggregates (social groups, industries, nations) through more
than anecdotes or general intuitions.” The appeal to data, empirics, and “new statistical tools
(namely regression analysis)” all indicate that the features Stapleford claims made econometrics
appealing to “epistemic modernists” were also those that would align the discipline with
positivism.79 And yet I say that Stapleford is less declarative than Backhouse because he spends
much of his essay trying to puzzle through the fact that despite the obvious attraction of
econometrics to “epistemic modernists,” the mathematization that econometrics represented was
met with no small amount of hostility by figures such as Keynes, “a perfect example” of the
“epistemic modernist.”80 This contradiction leads Stapleford to argue that whereas most
economists see the “the dominance of econometric tools as a logical result of modernism,” that
story looks different “if we treat epistemic modernism as a historical category, defined by the
actors at the time and not through a kind of transcendental Hegelian logic.” 81 Ultimately,
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Stapleford doubles down on his usage of “epistemic modernism,” but ends on an uncertain note
that, I argue, reveals some slippage in the term:
Though commitment to empiricism, mathematics, and statistical analysis formed a
common part of epistemic modernism, econometric tools did not gain equal prominence
in every setting. Epistemic modernism was a response to the crises of the time in the
contexts of the time, and it took divergent paths. 82
Stapleford’s concession here about the contingency of the present—an outcome of past events
that was never certain or inevitable—opens the door to a major critique of economics, which
treats its own mathematization and reliance on econometrics as the natural endpoint of a
teleological process.
Taken together with the way Bevir and Backhouse seem to mean “positivism” and
“neoclassicism,” respectively, when they use the word “modernism,” the unresolved tension in
Stapleford’s essay between “epistemic modernism,” which he presents as fully stable and welldefined, and his concluding claim that it “took different paths” in different settings—an
implication that it is culturally and historically contingent instead—suggests that there may be
other ways of understanding an economics that can be usefully called “modernist.” While I am
not attempting in this dissertation to define “modernist economics,” I am centrally interested in
what happened—and what continues to happen—when we approach economics through the lens
of modernist literary figures. While these figures would not have been thinking of themselves as
“modernist,” the sensibility that I sketched above—the hyper-awareness of the present-ness of
the present, of “a crisis time and a time in crisis”—led them to engage with economic theory and
incorporate it into their modernist aesthetic creations. However, the result would not be
recognizable as “modernist” to someone using that word as it is used in economics, a fact that
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has limited critical conversation between the fields, even if and when such conversation is
welcome.83
To come to such a conclusion is to recognize that we are at something of an impasse. If
the disciplines of Economic History and of Literary Studies cannot agree on basic terminologies,
and if the discipline of Economics is fundamentally uninterested in hearing what an
understanding of the cultural fields surrounding economics might bring to the discipline, what is
the purpose of such a study? It is at this point that I want to turn to the field of Literature and
Science, a field that has, throughout its history, navigated an even more pronounced version of
this issue of “the two cultures.”84 A full consideration of this field is out of my scope here, but it
does provide an example of an interdisciplinary field—or “interfield” 85—that I think is fruitful
for my project. In his recent introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Literature and
Science, Steven Meyer helpfully outlines a history of the field that divides it into two “waves,”
each of which can be further divided into two phases: in the first wave, work focused initially on
the study of the impact of science on literature, then on the study of the impact of literature on
science. In the second, following the larger critical turn to structuralism and poststructuralism,
work within the field of Literature and Science focused on breaking down “the Two Cultures”
paradigm first in terms of a single culture and then (as presently) in terms of a plurality of
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cultures—and pluralism itself.86 In the context of the present discussion of modernism and
economics, an important feature of Meyer’s account is that Literature and Science has arrived at
a productive pluralism in no small part by returning to work by figures who predate the field
itself.
For Meyer, Alfred North Whitehead stands as the central figure in this understanding.
Most famously in his Science and the Modern World (1925), Whitehead called for a “widen[ing
of] the scientific scheme in a way that is useful for science itself,” 87 specifically with a goal
toward developing a scientific practice that “would take no less seriously the criticisms of
traditional scientific conceptualization made by the British romantic poets William Wordsworth
and Percy Bysshe Shelley than, somewhat less controversially, it would take the patently
nontraditional aspects of scientific innovations of the past century or two.” 88 Crucially, too,
Whitehead’s project is a modernist one, coming as it does from the perception that
[t]he progress of science has now reached a turning point. The stable foundations of
physics have broken up: also for the first time physiology is asserting itself as an
effective body of knowledge, as distinct from a scrap-heap. The old foundations of
scientific thought are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether,
electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration, structure, pattern, function, all require
reinterpretation. What is the sense of talking about a mechanical explanation when you
do not know what you mean by mechanics? 89
For Whitehead, this breakdown of received understandings demanded a response that could
account for it, that would push beyond old, defunct understandings of science as unified and as
fundamentally different from the rest of the cultural field to which it belonged. It demanded, that

86

Cf. Meyer, “Introduction,” 3-5.
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, qtd. in Steven Meyer, “Futures Past and Present: Literature and
Science in an Age of Whitehead,” in The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Science, ed. Steven Meyer
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 263.
88
Meyer, “Introduction,” 2-3.
89
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, qtd. in Meyer, “Futures Past and Present: Literature and Science in an
Age of Whitehead,” 258.
87

35

is, a recognition of pluralism.90 Understanding the current state of the field of Literature and
Science—but also of Science or even Culture more broadly—as constituting an “Age of
Whitehead,” as Meyer does, shows how Literature and Science has achieved a range of
important interdisciplinary work with or without the collaboration of scientists. 91 The successes
of Literature and Science as a field point to the potential of similar successes that could come
from the field of Literature and Economics or, within that, Modernism and Economics.
That said, the parallels between Science and Literature and Economics and Modernism
aren’t perfect. For one thing, the issue of trying to fit a range of disciplines under the single
umbrella “science”—or “literature,” for that matter—doesn’t apply to a field such as economics
that clearly thinks of itself as fully unified. 92 For another, as we have seen above, it seems like
there is greater mutual hostility between English and Economics than there is between English
and the natural sciences.93 I want now to turn to two critical texts that suggest ways forward from
the apparently unbridgeable gap between literary studies and economics in the context of
modernism.
The first is Mary Poovey’s recent essay “The Modernist Trajectory of Economics,” in
which she offers a fairly standard account of the mathematization of economics. The main
interest of Poovey’s essay, however, comes from two terminological choices: first, she
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“translates” the standard account of the growth of economics in the 1930s and 40s into language
more frequently encountered in literary studies, and second, she never uses the word “modernist”
or “modernism” outside of her title. The first terminological choice allows Poovey to lay out the
problem of hostility within the field of economics toward literary-cultural fields. In Poovey’s
account, mathematization can be termed “formalism,” and for neoclassical economists,
the alternative to formalist accounts and mathematical language consisted of what they
called ‘literary’ accounts and ‘natural’ language. The former supposedly offered clarity
and precision; the latter were considered suspect because they allowed ambiguities and
subjective biases to colour a dispassionate reporting of economic facts. 94
These two types of accounts, which Backhouse calls, respectively, “historicist” and
“modernist,”95 map for Poovey onto inductive and deductive modes of argumentation. 96
“Formalism,” “‘literary’ accounts,” “‘natural’ language,” inductive and deductive reasoning—
these are all terms that literary scholars can readily understand. This terminological translation
enacts a—potentially hostile—takeover on Poovey’s part of her subject-matter here, moving it
from the realm of economics to the province of literary criticism.
And yet the word “modernist,” which could have been central to this kind of move, is
conspicuously absent in Poovey’s essay. Nevertheless, it is clear from her title that Poovey is
working with it, but implicitly—a move that, paradoxically, heightens the impact of what she is
saying. Although “modernism” hovers in the background throughout the essay, it comes to the
fore in Poovey’s final paragraph, where she declares: “The foundational assumption of modern
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economic analysis—that the economy is as law-governed as the natural world—confronts the
discipline with a methodological tension that is ultimately unresolvable.” However, she reminds
us, “this is a historically specific situation, born of economists’ ambition to emulate natural
scientists.” Moreover, she argues, “[a]s the example of literary writers from the same period
demonstrates, it was possible in the early twentieth century to generate kinds of knowledge that
captured discrete particulars and abstract form.” Again, Poovey doesn’t explicitly use the word
“modernism” here, but it’s clear that modernism is the referent of “literary writers from the same
period.” Poovey’s formulation is provocative, implying that whereas economists shaped their
field by increasingly limiting its purview to only “abstract form,” literary modernists were able
to create aesthetic works that did that and maintained concrete connections to the real world.
“Such works did not aspire to be scientific, of course,” Poovey wryly comments, “but that is
another difference between economic theory and art.” 97 Poovey’s last paragraph here is biting,
insisting as it does that the field of economics is an imposter in the realm of the Sciences, with an
“ambition to emulate natural scientists” and, by implication, the aspiration “to be scientific”
despite the fact that it is not. Beyond this cutting critique, though, Poovey’s implicit formulation
of literary modernism as combining the method of economics (abstraction) with a focus on
“discrete particulars” puts forth a vision of a literary modernism that stands, not in contradiction
to, but in addition to economic modernism. The central provocation that Poovey offers in her
essay, then, is that literary modernism forms an umbrella that has the capacity to contain
economic modernism within it, resulting in a privileging of the literary over the economic in the
respective disciplines’ claims to being able to represent the world fully.
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The implicit, unspoken negotiation Poovey is performing in her essay between different
meanings of “modernism” is laid out more clearly in an essay she cites, Dorothy Ross’s
“Introduction: Modernism Reconsidered,” in her edited volume Modernist Impulses in the
Human Sciences, 1870-1930 (1994). There, Ross argues that we can understand the apparently
opposite ways “modernism” is used in literary studies and the sciences as stemming from
divergent responses to a common phenomenon, the “recognition that no foundation for
knowledge or value exists outside the meanings that human beings construct for their own
purposes.” This recognition came from
[t]he implications of evolutionary theory and the [way that] critique[s] of knowledge
mounted by philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche and Ernst Mach were destroying the
belief that science yielded unequivocal knowledge of nature. Ambivalence over the
character of modern society, the accelerating tempo of historical change and the
relativistic implications of historicism were robbing historical thought, too, of its power
to generate certain knowledge and values. 98
We can see in Ross’s description the establishing grounds for the definition of modernism I have
given here, of a shared sense of a crisis time and a time in crisis, and a hyper-awareness of the
present-ness of the present. That said, there is a gap between that sensibility and the description
of modernity that Ross describes here. The self-conscious, aesthetic response to that modernity is
what differentiates modernism from modernity itself.
Ross picks up on this distinction as well, arguing that the shared perception that there
were no reliable, underlying structures governing nature or even human rationality “produced
very different consequences in different areas of culture.” Specifically,
[i]n the arts and in some areas of philosophy, [this perception] generated deep skepticism
about the capacity of rationality to serve as a guide for modern life, and faith instead in
the power of aesthetic creativity. In other areas of philosophy and of the human sciences,
it led to efforts to reconstruct the bases of knowledge and value upon the historicity of
meanings. In those sciences committed to positivism, knowledge was most often
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grounded not in the contingencies of history but in a universalistic method or logic that
would preserve the privileged status of science. 99
The radical turn to positivism in the natural sciences, then, and the rejection of positivism in the
social sciences and the arts can all be traced to the same cause: modernity. Whereas many
modernist literary figures responded to the crisis of modernity by exploring themes of chaos,
disintegration, and fragmentation, many scientists responded by doubling down on positivism. If
the old science and the old natural laws had failed, the only way to recover from that state, in the
positivists’ view, was to discover new ones through ever-increasing scientific rigor. Because
both of these responses arose from the same set of modern conditions, both were retrospectively
called “modernist” by their disciplinary descendants in the mid-century, even if that word
designated two sensibilities that are essentially opposites. And it is for this reason that the
terminological contradiction that I have been tracing here came to be.
Understanding the shared origins of the term “modernism” in the sciences and the
aesthetic fields is useful to my project because economics as a field thinks of itself as a natural
science, as I have shown. Ross’s essay, however, is dealing principally with the social sciences,
and her contextualization of the way the social sciences use “modernism” is similarly instructive.
If Ross places the arts and the sciences on opposite ends of a spectrum between a rejection of
rationality and positivism, she places the social sciences somewhere in the middle via her term
“cognitive modernism.”100 For Ross, “cognitive modernism” is a catch-all term of sorts that she
defines as “the turn-of-the-century recognition of the subjectivity of perception and cognition.”
Ross contrasts this term with “aesthetic modernism,” of which she writes: “Although aesthetic
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modernism captured the generic ‘modernism’ for itself, I will use the compound term to
designate the composite of cognitive modernism, alienation, and aesthetic response that our
commentators have so far located primarily in the arts.” 101 Ross here is anticipating Poovey in
implicitly privileging the aesthetic above the social scientific, since her “aesthetic modernism”
contains “cognitive modernism” within it. She is also making the same distinction that I am: if
“cognitive modernism” is a “recognition” of the conditions of modernity, “aesthetic modernism,”
which is what I mean when I say “modernism,” necessarily contains an element of response to
that recognition—an aesthetic response, naturally. At the same time, though, Ross’s argument
that the social sciences are largely continuous with aesthetic modernism—as opposed to the
positivist natural sciences—suggests that we should be able to talk about a social science such as
economics through a literary-critical lens. The field of economics’ mischaracterization of itself
as a natural science adds, however, a further layer of difficulty in discussing it in relation to
literary modernism.
Returning to the historical period 1890-1950, as I do in this dissertation, helps us get
around this issue. During that period, economists still thought of themselves as social scientists.
Even Marshall, who bears no small amount of the responsibility for the mathematization of the
field, did not wholly endorse abandoning empiricism and social and cultural considerations in
economic analysis. Certainly Keynes stands out clearly as an example of a figure who embodies
at least Ross’s concept of “cognitive modernism,” and the vehemence with which he opposed the
total shift of the field to econometrics helps clarify the way that pre-1940s economics—which
was, through Keynes at least, conversant with literary modernism—is discontinuous with the
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changes in the discipline that are now identified within economics as modernist. Understanding
this history and the shared origin of these opposite meanings of “modernism” is immensely
clarifying to my discussion in this dissertation of economics and modernism and helps me define
what I mean when I use the term “modernist,” specifically in relation to economics. To use
Ross’s terms, then, I mean “aesthetic modernism” when I say “modernism,” even when I am
talking about economics. I am consistently approaching “modernism” from the literary side, in
the full knowledge that a present-day economist would be thinking of basically the opposite of
what I mean when I use the term. Moreover, when I say “modernism” in relation to economics I
am referring to experimental theorization that rejects the false claims to empiricism and
positivism that began to shape the discipline in the latter half of the 19 th century and that fully
took it over in the years following Keynes’s death. Thinking of modernism in economics in this
way frees the category of “economics” or “economic theory” from the strictures of the discipline
as understood in the university context. If economics is the study of the allocation of scarce
resources, it stands to reason that the methods used to study that allocation don’t necessarily
follow a single methodology.
Broadening “economics” in this way also allows us to see how many of the modernist
figures I discuss in this dissertation insist in various ways on placing their considerations of
economics within larger discursive fields. Economics cannot be separated from larger cultural
factors, concerns, and phenomena, as neoclassical economists were attempting to do through
mathematization and abstraction. For this reason, the amateur economic theorization being
carried out by the figures I consider here does not always immediately signify as economic.
There are rarely if ever considerations of mathematical models, conventional uses of technical
terms, or citations of work by orthodox economists. However, drawing on a contemporary
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understanding of the amateur as public intellectual, 102 I argue that this lack of mathematical rigor
should not be taken as an indication that these figures weren’t taking their subject seriously—to
the contrary. The various acts of combining economic theorization with aesthetic creation that I
consider here demonstrate how crucial these modernist writers considered economics to be—as
well as how keen was their perception that the current way of doing economics was missing the
heart of the matter: the way in which economics exists only in the context of a society.
Ultimately, I argue, by studying the diverse ways that modernist writers incorporated economic
theorization into their aesthetic work, we can discern common (if not shared) commitments to
realizing the project that McCloskey, writing more than half a century later, describes as
“bring[ing] economics, that glorious conversation since Adam Smith, back into the conversation
of humankind.”103

The Two Faces of Modernism
Thus far, I have established the contours of what I mean by “modernism,” as well as a
sense of the state of the field of modernism and economics. This dissertation participates in both
of these conversations, but it is also interested in what modernism has come to signify and how it
has affected culture in ways that are still being felt.104 More specifically, I am advancing here an
understanding of modernism and its afterlives that Raymond Williams has described as “the two
faces of ‘Modernism.’”105 For Williams, modernism is characterized by, on the one hand,
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“innovative forms which destabilized the fixed forms of an earlier period of bourgeois
society”—i.e. the intense experiments with form that reflected the new awareness of the presentness of the present that I have outlined above—that “were then in their turn stabilized as the most
reductive versions of human existence in the whole of cultural history.” For Williams, this
second “face” of modernism is due to the domestication of “the dynamic compositions of artists”
by “the centres of corporate power.”106 And this domestication has been possible because of the
normalization of the conditions against which modernists themselves reacted:
the dynamic charge of the first shocks of recognition of a reduced and dislocated
humanity was eventually transformed into the routines of a newly displayed normality.
Thus the very conditions which had provoked a genuine Modernist art became the
conditions which steadily homogenized even its startling images, and diluted its deep
forms, until they could be made available as a universally distributed ‘popular’ culture. 107
Crucially, in Williams’s account, this push toward domestication is a post-facto one. Williams
locates this movement in the canonization of modernism, and, ultimately, in academia, in “the
post-war settlement and its accompanying, complicit academic endorsements.” 108 Once
modernism—and especially those modernist works that fit Marxist understandings of alienation
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and estrangement—had been ratified by academia as central not only to the discipline, but to our
understanding of modernity and culture itself, modernism, in Williams’ words, “quickly lost its
anti-bourgeois stance and achieved comfortable integration into the new international
capitalism.” Ultimately, for Williams, “[t]he painfully acquired techniques of significant
disconnection are relocated, with the help of the special sensitivity of the trained and assured
technicists, as the merely technical modes of advertising and the commercial cinema.” 109
Williams here paints a grim picture of a modernism that has been used instrumentally by badfaith actors, intent on wresting it away from its original, anti-bourgeois status, 110 to instead serve
the very forces of homogeneity and international capital that formerly stood as instantiating
provocations to modernist experimentation and art.
It goes without saying that Williams here is advancing an explicitly Marxist
understanding of modernism, indebted to other prominent Marxist arguments by figures such as
Lukács who see modernism as entailing a valorization of alienation and isolation, as opposed to
the promise of connection and community that is characteristic of realism. 111 This view of
modernism depends on a conception of it as a coherent, monolithic movement. Even the effort to
construe modernism’s political stance as “anti-bourgeois,” with the recognition that such a stance
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could come from either the far right or the far left, implies a level of generalization that erases
crucial (and obvious) discontinuities between the political worldviews of modernist figures. And
political differences are just the beginning. As Sherry’s careful history of the term “modernism”
indicates, recent understandings of modernism have emphasized the degree to which modernism
is not monolithic. Taking a cue from Peter Nicholls’ terminological shift from “modernism” in
the title of his Modernisms (1995),112 the best recent modernist criticism has presented
modernism as fragmented, disparate, and diverse. Sherry’s understanding of modernism as a
sensibility or temperament, with the corresponding insistence that the ways in which this
temperament were expressed were incredibly different from each other, offers a critique of
efforts like Williams’s to describe “the politics of modernism.”
However, part of the enduring interest of Williams’s essay collection (the first essay of
which Sherry cites extensively in his own introduction) is that his concept of “the two faces of
‘Modernism’” does ring true, even if in a less comprehensive way than he presents it. Williams’s
concept has proven quite influential on my own presentation of modernism in this dissertation,
but while he locates the second “face,” as it were, as originating in the institutionalization of
modernism in the post-war period and its succeeding commercialization, I am more interested in
locating the push towards standardization and institutionalization within modernism itself. In the
vein of these more recent critical understandings of “modernisms,” however, I emphasize that
these efforts at self-institutionalization represent only one impulse among many within the group
of figures we can now describe as modernist. Moreover, as we shall see, several of the figures I
discuss were pro-institutionalization in some ways (and in some disciplines) and antiinstitutionalization in others, at different times and in different contexts. So, in Chapter 1 I
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discuss T.S. Eliot’s early essays as contributing in a definitive way to the development of the
English department, while in Chapter 3 I examine some of his later writings in the context of
their calls for widespread amateurism and anti-professionalism in economics. Here, the “two
faces of ‘Modernism’” are worn by the same figure at different times, a phenomenon that
militates against monolithic understandings of the field and breaks down, perhaps, some of our
received narratives of how it developed and how it has been institutionalized across fields.
If Williams’s concept of “the two faces of ‘Modernism’” has been influential to the
account of modernism I give here, The Politics of Modernism also stands at a central point in the
development of this project in another way. Appropriately, my inspiration for this study of
Modernist Amateur Economists springs from the juxtaposition of two essays, not explicitly
related, in this posthumous collection of writings. In “Culture and Technology,” Williams writes
powerfully about the development of radio. His argument here is that at no point was the
outcome of that development—namely, “radio telephony and broadcasting”—inevitable or
assured. To assert the opposite is to read history backwards, to miss the arbitrary, fortuitous
nature of historical “progress,” and thus to fail to attend to the unimaginable range of possible
futures that extend out of the present moment as well. Williams concludes, “[i]n whose interest
can it then be to reduce the real history, in all its complexity but also its openness at each stage,
to the meaningless proposition that ‘the invention of radio changed the lives of millions’?” 113
This conception of a past historical moment as possessing a radical “openness” has been
expressed in many ways—and indeed stems from Herbert Butterfield’s The Whig Interpretation
of History (1931)—but proves especially provocative in its juxtaposition with the following
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essay, “Politics and Policies: The Case of the Arts Council.” 114 This essay is about John Maynard
Keynes’s efforts to establish the Arts Council in the year following the war (and preceding his
untimely death). In Williams’s reading, Keynes’s vision for the Arts Council was that it would
(indeed must) foster an understanding of high culture that was “beyond prejudice and habit, and
with its characteristic and essential quality of openness.” 115
Now, Williams is not talking about Keynes in terms of his economic theories here, nor is
he talking about economics in “Culture and Technology.” But the yoking together of Keynes
with dual conceptions of “high culture” and historical event as radically and essentially open,
combined with a knowledge of the state of economic theory in the first half of the twentieth
century, provided a spark for me. The story that this dissertation tells, then, is one that balances
an understanding of modernist writers as simultaneously interested in exploring particular
pressure-points of cultural “openness” through experimentation and in making sure that
institutional understandings of all cultural fields will be shaped to conform to modernist (as
opposed to earlier, received) understandings of those fields. The realization that Keynes
represents just one of the many modernist figures who bridge the fields of the arts and economics
generally, and modernist literature and economics specifically, combined with this conception of
aesthetic and theoretical “openness,” stands at the center of this study.
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Chapters and Organization
In this sense, the general shape of my dissertation mirrors the shape of the field as I am
describing it here. While I begin with a consideration of the institutionalization of Literary
Studies and Economics in the period in Chapter 1, I put that institutionalization in tension with
evolving conceptions of the amateur and of the public intellectual. Then, in focusing on Bernard
Shaw and A.R. Orage in Chapter 2, I show how this tension between professionalism and
amateurism inheres in my concept of the Modernist Amateur Economist itself, as Shaw and then
Orage oscillate between texts that attempt to shape economic and political institutions with their
economic theories and works of aesthetic creation that take on more speculative, heterodox
stances. Next, in Chapter 3 I consider the divergent paths taken by Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot in
their later-career engagements with economics. There, I destabilize the understanding of Eliot as
primarily interested in institutionalizing modernism that I put forth in Chapter 1, showing how
his interest in heterodox economic theorization helped push him away from the modernism that
he helped institutionalize and toward his conception of the Christian Society. Eliot’s trajectory
there is in tension with Pound’s, who stubbornly refuses to let the institutionalizing forces close
down his modernist experimentation. The end-points of these two careers that are so frequently
linked—with Pound institutionalized until the last years of his life and Eliot a Nobel Prize
winner—help emphasize how the “two faces of modernism” played out in different ways in the
post-war period, while also showing that the face that points toward experimentation and
“openness” is not by definition “good” insofar as that experimentation often led to reprehensible
political views. And finally, Chapter 4 shows how the two faces of modernism can operate
simultaneously in the same work, Keynes’s The General Theory, and how even after the
institutionalizing “face” may seem to have achieved ascendency, the opposite face—here
exemplified by Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas—can continue to
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provide provocative challenges to that institutionalization. If, in my account, the moment of
openness represented by institutional and economic instability was largely closed down
following World War Two, that impulse toward experimentation and openness still stands as one
of the enduring, valuable contributions of modernist literary works today.
Beyond this general shape of the field, the chapters of my dissertation are organized in
such a way as to emphasize the “two faces of modernism.” The first chapter, “Modernism,
Amateurism, and Professionalization: Eliot and Richards, Keynes and Marshall,” focuses
primarily on the dual institutionalization of Literary Studies and Economics in the British
university in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It therefore points mainly toward
the particular “face” of modernism that strove to recreate institutions along lines and according
to values held by certain modernists. That said, I argue as well that this impulse toward
institutionalization represents only some modernists. After all, as I have shown already,
modernism should not be seen as monolithic or as an institution in itself. The other major thread
in this first chapter, then, focuses on amateur responses to this institutionalization, including the
vast body of heterodox economic theory that sprang up in opposition to the professionalization of
economics. Bringing the concept of the amateur, which has recently garnered much critical
attention, into conversation with the fields of economics and Literary Studies as they were being
created in the first half of the twentieth century provides a necessary context for the studies of
pairs of modernist figures that make up the rest of my chapters. At the same time, by recovering
an historically specific understanding of the amateur as public intellectual, my first chapter
shows how and why the figures I consider in my other chapters, whom I term Modernist
Amateur Economists, saw themselves as important contributors to contemporary conversations
about economic theory.
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My second chapter, “Modernism and Socialism: Shaw, Orage, and the Modernist
Amateur Economist,” focuses on two important Modernist Amateur Economists, George
Bernard Shaw and A.R. Orage. In this chapter, I put forth the example of Shaw to explain what I
mean by my term, showing through a consideration of some of his economic and dramatic
writings how he consistently—and insistently—combines literary, rhetorical, and dramatic
modes of writing to expound his Fabian-inspired economic theories. I consider Shaw in light of
Richard Wagner’s concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk, the total work of art, both to offer a reading
of Shaw as a modernist writer and to help describe his Modernist Amateur Economic practice. I
then turn to A.R. Orage, editor of the important modernist little magazine The New Age. Founded
in 1907, in part by Shaw, as a mouthpiece for the Fabian Society, The New Age swiftly moved
away from Fabian orthodoxy and embraced a series of increasingly heterodox economic theories,
including first Guild Socialism and then Social Credit. Orage’s New Age, I argue, expands upon
the model established by Shaw by combining, at the level of the magazine issue, heterodox
economic theorization with modernist literary experimentation. Focusing on two series of
articles, “Towards Socialism,” written in 1907, and “Notes on Economic Terms,” published
between 1916 and 1917 in support of the heterodox theory of Guild Socialism, I illustrate how
Orage’s editorial practice results in the kind of re-contextualization of economic theory within
larger cultural fields that I identify most closely with the figure of the Modernist Amateur
Economist. Beyond considering Orage’s writing itself in these terms, my project in Chapter 2
includes extending the historical narrative I began to draw in Chapter 1, showing both how The
New Age—intentionally or not—brought Shaw’s Modernist Amateur Economist practices into
the “main stream” of British Literary Modernism and how the magazine proved crucial in
exposing other modernist writers to heterodox economic theories.
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In Chapter 3, “T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and Heterodox Economic Theory,” I consider a
classic modernist pairing, Pound and Eliot, in light of their shared interest in heterodox economic
theory. Where much of the most well-known criticism that discusses Pound and Eliot together
focuses on their earlier careers, when they were more demonstrably linked, my account focuses
on the later 1920s into the 30s and 40s. If Pound is undoubtedly the modernist literary figure
most commonly associated with economics, and thus the clearest example of the Modernist
Amateur Economist, there is much to learn from analyzing his works, especially the ABC of
Economics and The Pisan Cantos, through that lens. At the same time, in my account T.S. Eliot
emerges as a somewhat surprising figure in the context of economic theory. By reading a series
of articles from his magazine The Criterion, as well as his lesser-known pageant play The Rock, I
present an Eliot whose interest in heterodox economic theory proves highly influential on his
later-career social writing. Given that I am looking specifically at later Pound and Eliot, I place
my readings of them in the context of critical work on “Late Modernism,” a term that I find
fruitful in understanding the divergence of Pound and Eliot in this period. Ultimately, I suggest
that we can see Pound and Eliot, specifically in the context of their economic theorization, as
exemplars of the “Two Face of Modernism” that Williams describes. At the same time, although
Pound and Eliot differ wildly from Shaw and even Orage in their political leanings, reading them
together reveals that they, too, are centrally interested in repositioning economic questions within
broader discursive fields, including theology for Eliot and poetry, history, and culture for Pound.
My final chapter, “Woolf and Keynes: Unemployment, Feminism, Modernism,”
considers three major modernist prose works, Keynes’s The General Theory and Virginia
Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas. Although most critical work that reads
Woolf and Keynes together focuses on stylistic or homological similarities between them—
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especially, and most famously, Jennifer Wicke’s “Mrs. Dalloway Goes to Market”—I argue that
A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas are in part direct responses to and critiques of
Keynes’s economic theories. Specifically, I claim that Woolf is performing economic analyses of
the problem of women entering the professions based on her understanding of Keynes’s theories,
implicitly critiquing Keynes for his complicity in leaving women out of economic theory. For
Woolf, this theoretical problem inexorably points to the fact that even as capacious a thinker as
Keynes has attempted to abstract economics from the larger cultural field of which it is a part.
Woolf’s essays, in this reading, stand as exemplary works of Modernist Amateur Economics. But
we can only come to this understanding of Three Guineas and A Room of One’s Own by reading
them in the context of Keynes’s contemporary work. Accordingly, I consider Keynes’s pamphlet
The End of Laissez-Faire (1926) and The General Theory (1936) at length both in relation to
Woolf’s responses to them and in terms of my concept of the Modernist Amateur Economist.
Drawing on the understanding of this concept that I have developed throughout the dissertation, I
show how The General Theory exemplifies both of the “two faces of modernism” in drawing
heavily upon heterodox economic theorization and topics of interest in the Bloomsbury Group,
such as Freudian conceptions of the individual, while also standing as a work of economic theory
that would prove instrumental in closing down possibilities for heterodox economic theorization
going forward. Although, as many have argued, the integration of Keynes’s theories into the
mathematization of economics proceeded against his explicit arguments, The General Theory
still stands as the work that both epitomizes Modernist Amateur Economics and begins the
process of rendering that amateur theorization obsolete—or at least of forcing it out of the public
eye. Nevertheless, I give Woolf the last word in this chapter in my reading of Three Guineas, an
organizational decision that emphasizes that despite the shutting-down of possibilities of cultural
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and economic “openness” signaled by the post-WWII period and midcentury institutionalization,
modernist literature retains its capacity for provocation and critique of the status quo.
I then conclude my dissertation with a coda, “The Return to Keynes and the Afterlives of
Modernist Amateur Economics.” Using the post-2008 revitalization of Keynesian economics as a
provocation to think about the relationship between the contemporary moment and the moment
of modernism, I think as well about the difference that the concept of Modernist Amateur
Economics makes for our understanding of Modernist Studies and the field of Contemporary
Literature. I close with a reading of Zadie Smith’s extended engagement with E.M. Forster’s
Modernist Amateur Economics in On Beauty (2005), her novelistic rewriting of Forster’s
Howards End (1910). Ultimately, I consider what Smith’s return to Forster tells us about the
legacy of Modernist Amateur Economics in the contemporary moment.
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Chapter 1: Modernism, Amateurism, and Professionalization: Eliot
and Richards, Keynes and Marshall
Literary instruction in our ‘institutions of learning’ was, at the beginning of this century,
cumbrous and inefficient. I dare say it still is. Certain more or less mildly exceptional professors
were affected by the ‘beauties’ of certain authors (usually deceased), but the system, as a whole,
lacked sense and co-ordination. I dare say it still does.
—Ezra Pound, “How to Read,” 19291
7. If any of the author’s opinions are wrong he will be only too glad to change ’em on proof
being adduced to their contraries, but he will not alter them merely to please gunmakers’ touts or
subsidized economists who for twenty or more years have done nothing save their utmost to
wrap up the subject in tissue paper, and to involve it in mystery. Their opinions are suspect
because of probable motives, and they never meet open statement by open statement but solely
by avoidance or by running off at a bias.
I personally heard one of the chief and most despicable fakers describe himself as an
‘orthodox economist’. ‘Orthodox’ and subsidized physicists condemned Galileo.
—Ezra Pound, ABC of Economics, 19332
I open this chapter with a juxtaposition of passages from two polemical pamphlets by
Ezra Pound criticizing the state of literary studies on the one hand and of economics on the other.
Specifically, Pound here is taking aim at the academic instantiations of these two disciplines, and
these quotations come from writings in which he attempts to put forth alternative understandings
of them. While the disapproving tone of these passages themselves is important in establishing
Pound’s orientation toward the way the professions of both literary criticism and economics were
becoming institutionalized in the late twenties and early thirties, the parallel attempts to influence
apparently unrelated fields is the most interesting thing here. This parallelism is even clearer
when we consider that Pound wrote a longer version of “How to Read,” ABC of Reading, in
1934. The repeated phrasing of the titles of his 1934 and 1936 manuals emphasizes that Pound
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Ezra Pound, “How to Read,” in Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, ed. T.S. Eliot (1929; New York: New Directions,
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Ezra Pound, ABC Of Economics (Tunbridge Wells, UK: The Pound Press, 1933), 73.

saw both fields as lying within his expertise, and he took it upon himself to make an effort to
shape both disciplines.
John G. Nicholls, in his essay “Intellectuals and the Amateur: Advice to the Outsider,”
writes about the post-twenties trend of the advice manual, the genre to which Pound’s pamphlets
belong. As Nicholls explains,
as the professionalization of the modern university began to take shape, a range of
intellectuals sought to fashion and mobilize an amateur class of cultural workers. Beyond
calling for an amateur spirit or conscience, they advocated and took part in the training of
individuals who would stand alongside and replace, even challenge, those in positions of
professional power.3
Importantly, many of these “intellectuals” were amateurs themselves, at least in the fields for
which they were advocating.4 This is obviously true of Pound’s ABC of Economics, but even his
apparent authority on literary matters comes not from professional training, but from his status as
a successful writer, making a living (by the 30s) from his writing. As Nicholls observes, “a
culture of advice, and the intellectual who dispenses advice, depends, on some level, on a notion
of expertise supported by the tenets of professionalism.” 5 But at the same time, “the amateur
offers a powerful counterpoint to the professional through a supposed reluctance to specialize, a
suspicion of institutions, and an embrasure of the ideal of learning for learning’s sake. Moreover,
the amateur offers an outsider’s perspective on the profession.” 6 In both “How to Read” and ABC
of Economics, Pound is attempting to occupy both of these positions at once. He gives his critical
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assessment of the field as an outsider; an amateur. But then he presents his suggestions for
reform as a professional, as one who knows better.
The balancing act Pound is performing here strikes at the heart of my consideration of
professionalism and amateurism in this chapter. However, not all of his contemporaries were
impressed. F.R. Leavis, in his rejoinder to Pound’s “How to Read,” How to Teach Reading: A
Primer for Ezra Pound (1931), makes it abundantly clear that he views Pound as an amateur in
precisely the way Nicholls describes. And, while Leavis appreciates the amateur critique Pound
levels at university-based literary study, he dismisses Pound’s attempt at professionalism in
terms of the recommendations he offers. Indeed, in Leavis’s estimation, Pound “exhibits in
himself with rare and illuminating conspicuousness certain deficiencies that are a large part of
the futility that he deplores in academic literary education.” 7 That said, Pound’s pamphlet, Leavis
argues, represents a “challenge” to the field of literary studies that “was badly needed.” 8
Specifically, for Leavis, “Mr. Pound dismisses with scornful, but not too scornful,
unceremoniousness the academic handling of literary education. He sees that the kind of
accumulation represented by university ‘Arts’ courses is not education at all, but rather
disablement.”9 Leavis’s approval of Pound’s scornful, provocative tone seems to be based in the
kind of appreciation of the amateur that Nicholls mentions, the amateur’s “suspicion of
institutions” and “outsider’s perspective on the profession.” 10 Leavis’s objection, though, is to
the characteristically idiosyncratic—and again, amateurish—curriculum Pound suggests to
replace the current practices in the field. Leavis takes particular exception to what he sees as
Pound’s half-baked conception of Great Literature as “language charged with meaning to the
7
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utmost possible degree,” paired with his omission of Shakespeare—who is, in Leavis’s words,
“the greatest master of that art known to us” 11—from his curriculum. Ultimately, Leavis argues,
Pound suffers from a too-great sense of self-importance (a charge with which we must have
some sympathy!), and Leavis dismisses him as “an amateur of abstractions.” 12 If, as I suggested
above, Pound is trying in these pamphlets to yoke together a critique only possible from an
amateur perspective with critical prescriptions that can only come from a professional, Leavis in
his pamphlet argues that Pound is in fact an amateur all the way through, and that the value of his
broad amateur critique should be separated from the amateur curriculum he lays out, which
should be dismissed out of hand.
Leavis’s pamphlet is fascinating in the context of this chapter’s interest in
professionalism and amateurism, as a shining example of a professional (and key
professionalizer) engaging with an amateur in an effort to shape the discipline. But the modern
reader will perceive that, in hindsight, Leavis hasn’t gotten it quite right: Pound’s “amateur
abstractions” have continued to be studied, at least in the context of understanding his own and
T.S. Eliot’s poetic practices.13 More to the point, part of the purpose, not to mention outcome, of
Pound’s “How to Read” is to theorize modernist literature itself. If Pound is an amateur here, he
is not one whose intervention can be dismissed simply by using that word. This dynamic—
broadly the interrelation between amateurism and professionalism, but more specifically the link
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between modernist amateurs and the institutionalization of the academic fields of literary studies
and economics—stands in many ways at the center of this dissertation.
So how is it that Pound is able (successfully or not) to have it both ways in these advice
manuals, written to students in two apparently disparate disciplines? And, moreover, what does
Pound’s debate with Leavis have to do with his and other modernists’ surprising interest in and
widespread engagement with economic theory in the period? The answer lies, I argue, in the
interplay between the history of the modernization of the British University in the first half of the
twentieth century and changing understandings of the place of the amateur in relation to that
modernization and institutionalization. The figure of the amateur—and the concept of
amateurism—has recently begun to receive critical attention within literary studies, usually in the
context of meditations on the discipline itself.14 Marjorie Garber, in her book Academic Instincts
(2001), outlines a history of “amateur” by linking it to a series of related terms: “The dabbler, the
dilettante, the virtuoso, the ‘man (or even ‘woman’) of letters,’ the book reviewer, the belletrist,
the polymath. And that current favorite, the ‘public intellectual.’” 15 In her overview of these

14

In particular, a set of three related essays published in 2017 in New Literary History (Saikat Majumdar, “The
Critic as Amateur,” New Literary History 48, no. 1 (2017): 1-25; Aarthi Vadde, “Amateur Creativity: Contemporary
Literature and the Digital Publishing Scene,” New Literary History 48, no. 1 (2017): 27-51; and Frances Guerin,
“The Ambiguity of Amateur Photography in Modern Warfare,” New Literary History 48, no. 1 (2017): 53-74.) This
series of essays was followed by Melanie Micir and Aarthi Vadde, “Obliterature: Toward an Amateur Criticism,”
Modernism/modernity 24, no. 3 (2018): 517-549, an essay produced as part of a special issue of
Modernism/modernity on weak theory. This rash of publications in major journals culminated, for the moment, in
the publication in 2019 of The Critic as Amateur, ed. Saikat Majumdar and Aarthi Vadde (New York: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2020). These recent contributions draw on older critical interests in amateurism by figures such as
Roland Barthes, Edward Said, Bruce Robbins, Marjorie Garber, and Carolyn Dinshaw, among others. However,
they represent a new critical mass of interest, whereas these older progenitors tended to be writing more in isolation.
While much of this new wave of critical interest in amateurism does deal with modernist writers—Woolf is one of
the two central figures in Micir and Vadde’s essay, for instance—notable recent essays that focus specifically on
modernists include Jennifer Spitzer, “On Not Reading Freud: Amateurism, Expertise, and the “Pristine
Unconscious” in D.H. Lawrence,” Modernism/modernity 21, no. 1 (2015): 89-105 and Laura Heffernan,
“Abstraction and the Amateur: De-Disciplining T.E. Hulme,” Modernism/modernity 21, no. 4 (2015): 881-898.
15
Marjorie Garber, Academic Instincts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 20. Garber’s book has formed
something of a touchstone for the more recent critical conversation about amateurism. I might add to her list the
term flaneur, which Walter Benjamin famously positions as the key figure of modernity in Walter Benjamin, “On

59

synonyms for “amateur,” Garber emphasizes that throughout the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth, they would have connoted both wealth and aristocracy. As Derek Attridge puts it, “as
a gentleman (and it was unquestionably a masculine accomplishment) you demonstrated your
superiority to the lower echelons of society by doing naturally what they had to work diligently
and obviously at.”16 Attridge insists on an understanding of the amateur that stretches further
back than does the term itself, specifically in a British context:
The prizing of the amateur has been in evidence in British culture (and many other
cultures) over a long period. The enduring Romantic ideal of organic wholeness
influentially advanced by Schiller is opposed to the specialization that cultivates only one
aspect of human potential, while Wordsworth’s related attack on the meddling intellect
that murders to dissect has had numerous echoes since the beginning of the nineteenth
century. The Victorian age was the great era of the prominent amateur; the men we call
the ‘Victorian sages’ did not acquire their eminence through any professional association
or endorsement but through their own achievements.17
As much as many modernists wanted to rebel against the worldview put forth by these
“Victorian sages,” those figures still provided the model by which they could make their own
intellectual interventions.
As academic disciplines such as literary studies and economics became increasingly
institutionalized in the early part of the twentieth century, however, it became increasingly
difficult for amateurs to lay claim to expertise, and thus to intellectual authority. If the amateur
would have been understood in December 1910 as the wealthy aristocrat, the dilletante who, by
virtue of his access to education in the form of private tutors and public schools, simply knows
things about intellectual fields that members of the working class must labor for years to
understand, it is immediately obvious that understandings of the term have undergone a major
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shift since then. As a contemporary idiom, the “amateur” is overwhelmingly seen as inferior to
the professional. The opposite of the expert, the amateur is at best an unserious or non-rigorous
enthusiast—the amateur photographer, the amateur golfer—and at worst, the conspiracy
theorist—the amateur climatologist, virologist, president. 18 The contemporary critical discourse
on amateurism is largely interested in recovering a sense of the amateur as valuable—a sense,
indeed, that most contributors to this conversation argue has never fully gone away—but also in
outlining and understanding the historical process that has resulted in the shift in the term from
laudatory to derogatory.19
Importantly, this shift happened slowly, over the course of the period 1890-1950 on
which I am focusing in this dissertation. So, while the figures I discuss here did perceive this
shift as it occurred, the figure of the amateur retained a measure of its potency—as, indeed, it
still does today. Garber provides a useful working-through of the ways in which amateurism and
professionalism have interacted historically in her discussion of amateurism in relation to literary
studies. There, she argues that “like the terms of any binary opposition, amateur and professional
(1) are never fully equal, and (2) are always in each other’s pockets. They produce each other
and they define each other by mutual affinities and exclusions.” 20 Garber envisions the two terms
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as locked in a perpetual—and dynamic—struggle, in which they “circulate to make the fortunes
of the one rise higher than the fortunes of the other, while determinedly resisting the sense that
one is always the necessary condition for the other.”21 Applying Garber’s abstract description to
the particular historical context I am examining here, one claim that I make is that certain of the
modernists I discuss actively wielded amateurism in an effort to shape the respective professions
of literary studies and economics as they became institutionalized in the university, in the face of
what they could see as a coming rise of the fortunes of the term “professional.” 22 If modernists
like Keynes and Eliot could not forestall a shift in favor away from the amateur and toward the
professional—which, indeed, they did not even necessarily want to do—what they could do was
influence what shape those professions would take.23
Phrasing this argument in this way is potentially provocative, suggesting an image of a
group of modernists sitting down together and hashing out a plan to pit the virtues of modernist
amateurism against the ossifying forces of professionalism in the university. I certainly am not
claiming that anything like this happened: as I have emphasized in my introduction, my
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conception of modernism is not one of a unified movement. Nor do I think that even those
modernists who may have been unified in wanting, say, to push the discipline of literary studies
toward Practical Criticism had a shared perception that the university posed a threat to
amateurism. I am also not claiming that T.S. Eliot, for instance, intentionally seized on a moment
of crisis in the institutionalization of literary studies to ensure that “modernism” snuck its way in.
However, I am arguing that many modernists, not just Pound and Eliot, wielded their amateurism
in an effort to shape the fields of literary studies and/or economics, in the sense that any public
intellectual who perceives themselves as such “wields” their status and their intellectual insights.
The figures on whom I focus in this chapter—Eliot, Richards, Marshall, and Keynes—actively
sought to leverage their respective statuses as amateurs and as professionals to push the fields in
which they were most interested to reflect their values. In the case of Eliot, Richards, and
Keynes, those values were widely shared by a subset of modernists, and it is in this sense that I
claim that these and other modernist figures sought to shape a range of academic fields to accept
aspects of thought and aesthetics that we now identify as modernist.
In the context of this moment of flux, both in the rapidly-changing university and in the
status of amateur and professional claims to expertise, the tension I have illustrated above in my
discussion of Pound and Leavis begins to make more sense. Pound, it seems, understands
himself as continuous in some way with the Victorian Sage that Attridge discusses. And Pound is
just one indicative example: modernists such as Shaw, Pound, Eliot, and even Woolf clearly felt
that there was no incongruity in writing and publishing pieces of both literary and economic
theory without having had any formal training on the subject whatsoever, relying instead on their
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own accomplishments to give their writings authority. 24 Leavis, on the other hand, represents the
university-trained professional class, and his attempt to weaponize the word “amateur” to
undercut Pound’s intervention draws from a later understanding of “amateur” as novice, albeit
one who makes a few good points: Leavis’s Pound brings an energizing critique to the discipline,
but his attempt to provide professional recommendations about a course of study is not to be
taken seriously. As the period progressed, and as the disciplines continued to solidify, this
second understanding of the term amateur began to have more force. As I turn now to that
institutional history, it is with an eye to preserving a sense of the active negotiation that was
happening between professionalization and amateurism. The picture that emerges is of a moment
of potential and openness in both Economics and Literary Studies that the figures I examine here
sought to manipulate to their own ends. And, in the context of my broader argument in this
dissertation, this moment of openness gave rise both to an institutional, institutionalized
modernism and to the figure of the Modernist Amateur Economist.

English and the Rise of the Modern University
Tracing the nineteenth-century development of the English department and taking
account of its privileged place in the larger transformation of the English university as a whole
will show how this moment of institutional instability came to be. 25 English was one of the first
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disciplines to be split off from the traditional degree programs, limited until the 1850s to Classics
and Mathematics at both Cambridge and Oxford. 26 There are several reasons for English’s
primacy here. First, as Jo McMurtry argues in English Language, English Literature: The
Creation of an Academic Discipline, the Industrial Revolution of the late 1700s and early 1800s
created a new middle class who suddenly “found themselves with more parlors, more bookcases,
more hours for social conversation and private pursuits.” 27 While there was a lag between this
socio-economic shift and the change in the university in the 1850s, nevertheless “the ground was
prepared in middle-class cultural life for an increasing appreciation of the native product [i.e.
English literature].”28 Moreover, many academic reformers saw the teaching of this “native
product” as the ideal way to impart a distinctively English “cultural heritage” that could act as an
important antidote to “the social and moral evils of the Industrial Revolution” that had arisen
among the new industrial classes.29 This motive for teaching English literature persisted in
rhetoric calling for the establishment of English departments through at least the 1920s, as
exemplified by the enormously influential Newbolt Report of 1921, 30 and was central to
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arguments for excluding modern literature from the curriculum against which critics like Eliot
and Richards positioned themselves. 31 Even in the mid-century, literary critics were able to
deploy an understanding of English literature as containing a distinctive, linear “English mind
and character”32 as “a stick with which to beat Modernist poets who, as a result of ‘an abrupt
break with tradition’, now ‘seem to be speaking only to themselves.’” 33 English studies was thus
from the beginning an extremely conservative, anti-modernist field, centrally associated with the
preservation of traditional English culture in the face of unprecedented social change. This
association would only grow over the course of the period. 34
If English studies began as a way to inculcate the middle and lower classes with a sense
of traditional English values, it quickly became equally important as a means of impressing those
English values on England’s colonial subjects. As Chris Baldick argues in The Social Mission of
English Criticism, mid-century changes in the English Civil Service Exam, occasioned by the

believe that those who have not studied the Classics or any foreign literature must necessarily fail to win from their
native English a full measure of culture and humane training. To hold such an opinion seems to us to involve an
obstinate belittling of our national inheritance.” Cf. Henry Newbolt et. al, The Teaching of English in England:
Being the Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed by the President of the Board of Education to Inquire
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31
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East India Company Report of 1855, helped further the cause of the English department. Having
“outlined plans under the 1853 India Act to open the most lucrative and prestigious
administrative posts in the empire to competitive examination,”35 the Report helped forge a
conceptual and institutional link between university education and the administration of the
colonies. Put simply, in their report, the British East India Company claimed that the best way to
make the Indian colony more profitable was to spread British ideals and British culture among
the native populations. This concept of a “civilizing mission” of course fit well with thencontemporary religious rationalizations of imperialism as well as with jingoistic conceptions of
the moral and intellectual superiority of English culture. English literature being perceived as a
portable, teachable distillation of that culture, it thus became a priority for prospective colonial
administrators to be well-versed in it. 36 The result was that within the English department, an
identity arose between English literature and an explicitly conservative conception of
“Englishness” or English national character. Such conceptions were precisely the kinds of
received understandings that many British modernists sought to challenge in their works. The
fact that they were built into the very fabric of the English department helps explain why
modernists like Pound were so antagonistic to it in the first third of the twentieth century.
Another way of framing this point about the conservatism of the nineteenth-century
English department is to say that English derived much of its early institutional support from the
fact that it was an important instrument of social control. This aspect of the early English
department comes through as well in the gender politics that surrounded it. Most students of
35
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English literature in the second half of the nineteenth century were women, 37 and the discipline
was viewed by men as a relatively “safe” discipline for women to study. Baldick, for instance,
points out that “[m]any of the movement’s [i.e. the movement to provide women with training in
literature] promoters saw their job in fact as a ‘homeopathic’ attempt to forestall any more
profound change in women’s traditional position…These classes for women were not designed
to emancipate, but to confirm women in their established roles.” 38 However, this effort had a few
unintentional effects. First, women refused to be limited to the field of Literary Studies alone:
once given a foothold within the institution, women were able to leverage their new access to
education to open more departments of the university to women. 39 Second, the massive
popularity of English courses among women within a British patriarchal society that regarded
women as intellectually deficient gave rise to questions in the early part of the twentieth century
about the “seriousness” of the discipline. As McMurtry writes, “while women helped put English
on the map by providing bodies to fill the classroom, they became an implicit liability when it
came to demonstrating how hard the new subject was.” 40 In the context of this chapter, the influx
of women, routinely construed not as “amateurs” but in fact as “rank amateurs,” proved an
obstacle to the discipline as it sought to establish rigorous standards for training a professional
class.
The demographic makeup of most English classrooms was not the only double-edged
sword the discipline was negotiating in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The century-long
emphasis on the “civilizing” effects of literature on the working-classes and that argument’s
more contemporary application to the colonies also resulted in an association between English
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and the intangible—i.e. such concepts as the “English spirit,” “good morals,” etc. This
association framed the subject as an entirely subjective enterprise, which raised questions of how
a student could be evaluated on his or her mastery of it: how, in short, could one differentiate an
amateur student of literature from a professional? One answer was provided by the use to which
English was put in the Civil Service exam: reduced to the reproduction of dates, authors, and
other forms of rote knowledge, English studies was associated from the 1850s onward with
“cramming.”41 At the University level, on the other hand, the main response to these issues was
to maintain the long association between English literature and philology, the scientific study of
language itself. For advocates of an autonomous discipline whose primary focus was literary
criticism, the conflation with philology was intolerable. 42 The outcome of the struggle between
these two visions of the discipline was the appointments of Walter Raleigh and Arthur QuillerCouch at Oxford and Cambridge, respectively. Although these two figures differed in many
ways, their shared conception of literary criticism as its own, non-scientific discipline helped
establish the English department in the early part of the 20th century.
That said, both Raleigh and Quiller-Couch had a narrow conception of their discipline,
endeavoring in their lectures and their writings to convey an appreciation of English literature
and an understanding of its history, rather than approaching literary texts as things to be
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interpreted as cultural or historical documents. 43 Indeed, both of these professors are aligned very
neatly with the terms of Pound’s complaint in “How to Read”: they were “[c]ertain more or less
mildly exceptional professors” who “were affected by the ‘beauties’ of certain authors (usually
deceased),” and considered their jobs to be to pass an appreciation of those “beauties” on to their
students. Raleigh and Quiller-Couch, then, exemplify the kind of professional the nineteenthcentury English department created; the kind of professional needed to educate the various kinds
of “amateur” populations I have outlined here. The institutionalization of English, in other
words, created both an amateur class—students who would learn an appreciation for literature
and for the strong English national qualities expressed in works by authors like Milton and
Shakespeare (for it was naturally to poetry and drama to which the early English department
turned)—and a smaller professional class—often bound for India—trained to propagate such a
view of English literature to those audiences. 44 In the first decades of the twentieth century, then,
the field of literary criticism had succeeded in carving out a place for itself in the university but
did not much resemble the modern English department. Specifically, it lacked both a coherent
body of theoretical underpinnings and, perhaps more importantly, a unified methodology. 45 To
put it another way, by the time it was being critiqued by modernist literary figures in the 1910s
and 20s, the English department had been developing for nearly a century without yet reaching a
point of full methodological or institutional stability.
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T.S. Eliot and The Perfect Critic
It is as a response to this state of the field, I claim, that we should read Eliot’s early
critical essays. Besides explicitly targeting certain figures and tendencies in contemporary
literary criticism—particularly Arthur Symons and what Eliot terms “impressionistic
criticism”46—these essays attempt to fill the theoretical void by putting a series of concepts into
circulation that would lead directly to the methodology of Practical Criticism that I.A. Richards
would create in the late 1920s. Moreover, in these essays Eliot is self-consciously adopting the
position of the amateur, coming at the subject of best practices for literary criticism from the
perspective of a poet, rather than from within the professoriate. I argue, however, that this
position is tactical rather than genuine: to borrow Stanley Fish’s terms, 47 by positioning himself
as an anti-professional, Eliot is in fact making the very professional move of putting forth his
own conception of literary studies in an effort to replace the existing model of the English
department. It is also clear that, as others have noted,48 Eliot’s theoretical concepts were
exceptionally friendly to the kind of literature that he and some of his modernist peers were
producing. My claim here is not that Eliot was attempting to open up the academy to all modern
or even all modernist literature—far from it. Rather, in his critical essays we can see Eliot putting
forth as theoretical concepts aesthetic values that he and a fairly narrow range of modernist
writers—early Pound, Joyce, etc.—considered to be important. These concepts appear in their
most explicit forms in four essays published between 1919 and 1921: “Tradition and the
Individual Talent” (1919), “Hamlet” (1919), “The Perfect Critic” (1920), and “The Metaphysical
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Poets” (1921).49 Rather than giving extended space to each of these familiar essays in turn, I
want to enumerate the theoretical concepts they put forth and trace how they, taken together,
constitute a radical, modernist, and amateur reconceptualization of literary studies. 50
Eliot’s interventions generally fall into three interrelated conceptual categories: a version
of literary history, an account of modern(ist) aesthetics, and a set of guidelines for what the
literary critic should be. Eliot’s version of English literary history has two main components.
First, he claims that the “main” line of development of English poetry was interrupted in the
second half of the seventeenth century by poets such as Milton and Dryden. This “dissociation of
sensibility” diverted the course of English poetry from the line established by the metaphysical
poets like Donne and Marvell and, with the exception of some brief moments in the Romantics,
remained “off” until the present day.51 The implication, of course, is that it is up to the current
generation of English poets, Eliot included, to restore the great line of English poetry to its
proper place.52 This resolutely revisionist history of English poetry fits well with the second part
of Eliot’s literary history, which is his famous theory of the effect of a new work of literature on
the literary canon as a whole. For Eliot, each new work of genuine literary merit subtly changes
the entire order of literature that preceded it: “what happens when a new work of art is created is
something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The existing
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monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the
new (the really new) work of art among them.” 53 Importantly, for Eliot, the only poets who can
produce work that is “really new” are those who can apprehend this state of affairs as if
instinctively—those, that is to say, who are like him, amateurs in the older sense of the word.
Eliot frames his conception of the “truly new” poet in terms of a rejection of the current
state of literary studies, arguing that “it is not desirable to confine knowledge to whatever can be
put into a useful shape for examinations, drawing-rooms, or the still more pretentious modes of
publicity. Some can absorb knowledge, the more tardy must sweat for it.” 54 As I have mentioned,
one of the chief criticisms of the English department at the time was that since the exams
consisted mainly of regurgitating names, dates, and received interpretations of literary works, it
was largely a subject of memorization. It is also notable, though, that Eliot’s dismissal of degreetaking students is fully consistent with the conception of the amateur that Attridge defines in his
essay: “as a gentleman … you demonstrated your superiority to the lower echelons of society by
doing naturally what they had to work diligently and obviously at.” 55 Eliot here is thus
contrasting the poet, who “can absorb knowledge,” with the hapless student of literary criticism,
who must “sweat for it,” and who, wrongly, equates knowledge of a subject with the sweating
itself. Implicitly, Eliot is here positioning amateurs such as himself as the true experts when it
comes to literary criticism, while simultaneously casting aspersions on those students of names
and dates that the discipline currently designates as “professionals.” At the same time, he is
explicitly advocating for the abolition of that class of professionals, and their replacement as
professionals by people like himself.
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If Eliot’s ideal professional in literary studies is a poet like him, the literary matter that
that critic is best suited to study is, naturally, the kind of literature produced by people with
Eliot’s aesthetic sensibilities. Part and parcel of Eliot’s attack on the current state of the
profession, then, is his related attempt to redefine the literature most worth studying in terms
favorable to his own reception and legacy. That re-definition begins with Eliot’s concept of
impersonality. For Eliot, the modern poet is not expressing himself through his poetry—he is
using poetry to express some impersonal emotion (that he doesn’t even have to be familiar with
personally).56 This doctrine of impersonality is related to Eliot’s concept of the “objective
correlative,”57 which posits that the poet creates objects—related to but not exactly symbols—
that stand in for emotional complexes (to borrow an Imagist concept which Eliot doesn’t use but
which he likely has in mind). Both of these characteristics of the modern poet fall clearly under
the third point of Eliot’s theory, which is that “poets in our civilization, as it exists at present,
must be difficult”58—difficult, presumably, for readers (such as the “crammers” Eliot denigrates)
to understand.
This notion of difficulty brings us full circle in implying that there must be critics who
are up to the challenge of comprehending the modern, difficult poet. Unsurprisingly, it is Eliot’s
modern poet, with his special sensibility and ability to achieve impersonality and objectivity,
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who is also his “perfect critic.”59 For Eliot those critics who are not poets are too tempted to
inject creative elements into their criticism, whereas the poet has their poetry as a creative outlet,
allowing them to be more objective.60 Eliot contrasts this objective critical approach with what
he construes as two opposite but equally ineffective modes of contemporary criticism: pseudoscientific, on the one hand, and “impressionistic,” on the other. 61 Following the negative example
of impressionistic criticism, Eliot argues for an extension of his doctrine of impersonality to the
critic, who “should have no emotions except those immediately provoked by a work of art.” 62
This appeal to impersonality and to objectivity of course stands in direct contrast to the state of
the field at the time Eliot is writing, and offers a rough outline of what Eliot thinks a
methodology of literary studies should endeavor to accomplish: the dispassionate, objective
contemplation of literature, combined with an ability to explain how the text worked to
“provoke” emotional responses from the critic.
If we take Eliot seriously here, it is clear that he is calling for a sizable shift in how the
English department should function. If the contemporary English department produces critics
like Raleigh and Quiller-Couch, a department that would instead develop “poet-critics” would
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surely bear little resemblance to the current version. And yet, his “call” is a rhetorical, conceptual
one: he is not interested in taking on the project of effecting institutional change himself, as his
rejection of several academic job offers suggests. 63 Rather, Eliot seems to have thought that his
essays—as well as his editorship of such major modernist publications as The Criterion, which
began shortly after the publication of these essays—were the best way to shape the field; he had
no desire to get inside the academic institution and do the practical, administrative work that was
needed. And, given Eliot’s consistent self-positioning as the outsider, the amateur, this desire to
remain outside the institution should come as no surprise. On a deeper level, though, Eliot’s
“anti-professional professionalism”64 illustrates the extent to which he viewed himself as a public
intellectual along the lines of the Victorian sage, even as the content of his writings sought to
undermine understandings of the discipline inherited from those figures. In this way, Eliot stands
as, if not the perfect critic, the perfect example of the modernist as amateur, public intellectual.
His success in shaping the discipline from this position helps show how and why modernists saw
this mode of self-presentation as a legitimate one to inhabit, even deep into the first half of the
twentieth century as the influence of the public intellectual continued to give way to the authority
of the professional.

I.A. Richards and Practical Criticism
If Eliot stands as an example of a modernist with a clear impulse toward shaping the
institutionalization of the field of Literary Studies within the university, I.A. Richards figures as
the necessary second half of the equation: a modernist figure who worked to formalize Eliot’s
theories and critical suggestions within the growing English department. While Richards is well-
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known for developing the methodology of close reading and for influencing the later New
Critics, it is perhaps not immediately apparent that he can be called a modernist in the sense I am
using the term here.65 An examination of Richards’s best-known book, Practical Criticism
(1929), and a consideration of his impact on the field more generally, helps Richards come into
focus as an important modernist who is also interested in manipulating distinctions between
professional and amateur.66
Richards began as an amateur literary critic himself, but he, in much more concrete ways
than Eliot, focused on elevating the discipline of literary studies to a more recognizably
professional status. Richards had a degree in Moral Sciences, not English, from Cambridge,
where, due largely to health issues and to the precarity of the discipline at the time, he taught
intermittently between 1915 and 1930.67 His early work, especially Principles of Literary
Criticism (1924), exhibits the influence of his training in philosophy, dealing not strictly with
literature, but rather with a wide range of modes of cultural production. At the heart of this book
is Richards’s attempt to set forth a theory of value that would guide the discipline of literary
criticism going forward.68 Although Richards is thus elaborating his own theory, it is clear from
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the beginning that he owes much to Eliot, and especially to Eliot’s theory of impersonality. 69
Richards frames his intervention as a response to the kind of “impressionistic criticism”
embodied for Eliot by Symons, arguing that while there is a place in criticism for emotion, the
current form of literary criticism has become emotional to the point of irrelevance. Echoing
Eliot’s call for a more careful and objective deployment of emotion, Richards argues that we
need “purer science and purer poetry” before we can combine criticism and emotion again. 70 In
the book that follows this framing, Richards argues for a literary criticism based upon the
“science” of psychoanalysis in an effort to place the discipline on a solid, objective footing. 71
If psychoanalysis provided Richards with such a theoretical footing, it remained for him
to develop a methodology to establish the discipline in its modern form. Practical Criticism
(1929), Richards’ best-known book, put forth close reading as that methodology. Indeed,
Practical Criticism constitutes major interventions in three areas of literary criticism: it
establishes a methodology, further refines and expands Richards’s theory, and presents a
compelling case for the dire need of specialized training in methods of interpretation. The bulk of
the book, consisting of excerpts from Richards’s students’ comments on anonymously presented
poems, as well as Richards’s comments on those comments, addresses the first and last of these
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issues. Richards performs close readings of his students’ attempts to close-read, picking apart
details of syntax and word choice to show just how incapable his students were of making
literary judgements without the benefit of historical context or name recognition. Richards thus
simultaneously demonstrates the methodology he is calling for and illustrates the failure of the
present system of literary education to teach that methodology to students. To use the terms of
the present chapter, Richards is asserting his own professionalism by highlighting the
amateurism of his students. Given his starting point as an amateur literary critic, we can see
Richards’s appeal to professionalism here as a rhetorical move, aimed at shaping the field
through the very assertion that his methodology represents a “professional” approach.
Besides establishing his own professionalism, Richards’s analysis of his students’
amateurish inability to read and understand literature helps him paint a picture of a field in crisis.
And he ties that sense of crisis to familiar aspects of modernity that inspired modernist aesthetic
experimentation. Richards points to the confusions brought into language by rapid globalization,
arguing that “a decline can be noticed in perhaps every department of literature” because of “the
increased size of our ‘communities’ (if they can still be so called, when there remains so little in
common), and the mixtures of culture that the printed word has caused.” The result of the
enlarged range of cultural reference is, for Richards, perceptible in the details of the day to day:
“[o]ur everyday reading and speech now handles scraps from a score of different cultures.” This
polyglossia, variously celebrated and decried in modernist literary works, Richards construes as a
“threat” which “can only grow greater as world communications, through the wireless and
otherwise, improve.” Plainly, in the face of this crisis, brought on by modernization and
modernity itself, the old methods will no longer do. As Richards argues, “[s]ince mere practice
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under these conditions is insufficient, we must look to theory to help us.” 72 For Richards, that
“theory” is the Practical Criticism of his title, what we now call close reading.
But Richards moves beyond Eliot or even Pound in showing how that theory can be
applied in the classroom. Translating the close-reading of literary texts into the broader concept
of “interpretation,” Richards insists both that “[interpretation] is a craft…it can be taught” 73 and
that interpretation is a “key-subject”—a subject that everyone must learn thoroughly before one
can learn any other subject properly. 74 Richards is thus making an attempt to position literary
studies, now generalized for the first time (in what has become a very familiar move) to signify
not the study of literature but rather the teaching of critical reading practices (and thus critical
thinking practices), as the central discipline in the university. At the same time, Richards’s focus
on teaching interpretation, rather than names and dates, represents an attempt to bring the kind
of relationship to literary texts that Eliot assigns to the cultured, amateur poet to both the
professoriate in literary studies and the students that those (professional) professors teach.
It would be difficult to overstate the influence that Practical Criticism had on the
discipline of literary criticism and on the university as a whole. In the years that followed,
literary criticism—especially in its role of “interpretation” and “critical thinking”—did become a
major pillar of the university, even as the discipline developed far beyond Richards’ and Eliot’s
visions for it. At the same time, under the influence of Richards and Eliot, modernist poetry and
fiction became central to the discipline.75 Specifically, I claim, modernism’s privileged place in
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the English department is in no small part due to Eliot’s ability to wield his amateurism to define
what “expertise” looks like in literary criticism, and then to Richards’s success in theorizing and
implementing a curriculum that would create a professional class that could lay claim to that
expertise. Because Richards’s practical criticism grew directly from Eliot’s modernist
reinterpretations of literary history and from his own understanding of the mid-1920s as a
moment of a crisis of interpretation, the field grew in such a way as to value works that displayed
elements of the modernist sensibility: temporal paradoxes and responses to temporal crises; rich
depictions of interiority and irrationality; and highly aestheticized, impersonal contemplations of
“objective correlatives” and “emotional complexes in an instant of time.” 76 By the end of the
period I am discussing, then, both Eliot and Richards had been successful in promoting their
respective versions of literary criticism and literary history, and their success undeniably
benefitted others of the modernists—especially, and infamously, Pound.
While the impact Eliot’s theories had on Literary Studies is thus in large part due to the
chord they struck with Richards and later with the New Critics, Eliot nevertheless provided a
significant model to other modernists, showing that modernist literary figures could influence the
trajectories of institutions from the outside, as amateurs. There are, of course, many examples of
modernist literary figures doing exactly this in the context of a range of cultural institutions.
While Eliot stands as an indicative case, he is far from the only modernist writer whose critical
pronouncements can be seen to have influenced aspects of the English department. However, the
main point of interest in this chapter, and indeed in this dissertation, is that and how modernist
literary figures took a particular interest in the field of economics, a discipline apparently
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unrelated to literary studies. If the spectacle of modernist writers manipulating distinctions
between amateur and professional to influence the field in which their original work falls is
interesting but not surprising, the collective modernist urge to intervene in a field in which they
were truly amateurs is substantially more compelling. But this is only half of the story; even if
we concede that these modernist writers took it as a matter of course that they could write about
economics, the question becomes why? Why economics?
The answer is complicated, of course, but lies, I argue, in the history of how economics
developed as a discipline. If, as I have argued, Literary Studies holds a privileged place in the
history of the university, by the early part of the twentieth century virtually every discipline
within the university was undergoing similar changes. The university modernized itself by
specializing and by professionalizing its various fields. And while modernist writers naturally
had a particular interest in the progress of literary studies, they were frequently interested in
other disciplines as well: the sciences, psychology, anthropology, history, etc. In most of these
disciplines, modernist amateur speculations were met by a newly developed yet coherent
professionalism. Because of the specifics of how economics developed, however, it was unable
to provide satisfactory answers to the questions that modernist amateurs were asking of it.
Understanding some of those specifics and the theoretical weaknesses in economics that arose
because of its course of development, as well as some of the heterodox challenges to the
developing Economics department during the period, will show how Economics as a discipline
helped produce the conditions for a generation of (modernist) amateur economists.

Alfred Marshall and the Creation of the Economics Department
While there are some distinct similarities between how British English and Economics
departments developed—for instance, by the beginning of the twentieth century, both had
82

managed to establish themselves as disciplines separate from the traditional degree programs of
natural sciences and moral sciences—the two fields did not look particularly similar to each
other in 1900. Where English suffered from accusations of unseriousness and excessive
subjectivity, Economics had, from the late 1870s on, a fully-formed theory and methodology
and, most crucially, someone working within the institution who was determined to see the
creation of a fully autonomous discipline. That person was Alfred Marshall, who held a chair in
political economy at Cambridge from 1885 to 1908. Marshall was responsible for two major
interventions in the field during his time at Cambridge: the publication of the textbook of
neoclassical economics, Principles of Economics, in 1890 and the creation of the Economics
Tripos in 1903.77 Each of these interventions reverberated throughout English economics, and
together they had the effect of largely creating the modern Economics department. Nevertheless,
as I will show, the institutional and methodological stability of the Economics department was
achieved only by narrowing its focus and excluding dissenting voices, limitations that would lead
to significant problems for the discipline in the 1920s and 30s.
In the mid-to-late 1870s, economics (or, as it was then still called, political economy),
went through a major theoretical shift. 78 Prior to the work of political economists such as
William Jevons, economics was still a subject based on principles derived from empirical
observation (albeit observations made largely at the end of the 18 th century) and on the writings
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of classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill, whose book
Principles of Political Economy (1848) served as the textbook for the discipline until 1890.79
Jevons and others of his school, Marshall included, endeavored to shift political economy onto
stronger theoretical ground by moving from such “principles” to mathematical models. 80 Their
chief innovation was the introduction of marginal analysis, 81 which Jevons is widely credited
with establishing in the English context in 1871 with his publication of The Theory of Political
Economy.82 From the beginning, marginal theory received a good deal of criticism. Many
economists resisted the implications of putting economics—perceived as a social discipline—on
a mathematical basis. Their critiques by and large fell on two identifiable lines. One group,
generally identified with socialisms of various stripes, accepted the value of marginal theory, but
objected to the totalizing manner in which it was used: if mathematical models can be useful in
analyzing the economy, they do nothing to address economic problems like poverty and income
inequality. Another group, known as underconsumptionists, criticized marginal analysis itself for
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its inability to account for situations in the labor market that did not result in equilibrium. More
specifically, marginal theory did not account for the possibility of involuntary unemployment.
For marginal theory, and thus for neoclassical economic theory more broadly, unemployment
could only result from wages being too low to convince workers to sell their labor. It did not—
could not—explain a condition where workers were willing to work for the going wage but were
unable to find work, a condition, of course, that marked a substantial portion of the period from
1890-1950.83
In Marshall’s view, the promise of institutional stability offered by centering marginal
theory within the discipline outweighed the risk of ignoring these critiques. As John Maloney
argues, “between 1880 and 1914…economic orthodoxy [read: Marshall], accused on all sides in
the 1870s and 80s of both theoretical inadequacy and social irrelevance, resolved this position
not by a successful answer to these criticisms, but by capturing a dominant position in which it
could largely ignore its critics.”84 What is more:
If critics (some economists, some not) accused economics both of theoretical weakness
and of inapplicability, they went on doing so right up to 1914 and beyond. The
disagreements over methodology, admittedly, suffered an abrupt diminuendo after the
early 1890s: but, so far as other basic controversies became less conspicuous, that was
only because critics of orthodoxy came to look less and less like economists, and noneconomists came to look less and less like qualified critics. 85
To translate Maloney’s point here into the terms with which I am working in this chapter,
Marshall’s successful definition of the contours of the field resulted simultaneously in the
creation of a professional class of economists and in a parallel category of amateur economists.
The main tool Marshall used to define the field in this way was his Principles of Economics,
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which can and should thus be read as both a (successful) attempt to forge a complete identity
between marginal analysis and economic theory and as a statement about the coherence of the
discipline that Marshall could then use to further the institutional interests of that discipline.
Because Marshall was able to achieve this level of focus for the discipline, bypassing the kinds
of theoretical and methodological debates that were plaguing English at the same time, he was
able to establish a Tripos in economics in a relatively short time, by 1903. 86 This institutional
shift was initially unique to Cambridge, but it quickly had reverberations throughout England. 87
Although other universities maintained, for example, some of the associations between
economics and history,88 the establishment of the Tripos at Cambridge went a long way toward
establishing economics as an autonomous field of study. And, of course, Marshall’s Principles of
Economics was the textbook of that new field, and marginal analysis its theory and methodology.
In the wake of these achievements, “professional economist” became well-defined as someone
who had been educated using Principles of Economics and had passed the Tripos at Cambridge
or one if its peer institutions.89 Everyone else, even university-educated economists who refused
to accept marginal analysis and its conclusions, like J.A. Hobson, was by definition an amateur,
cast into the same category as full-blown economic cranks, like Major Douglas.
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As the period wore on, however, this professional class of economists increasingly
struggled to assert claims to expertise, giving these amateurs the space to challenge the
legitimacy of the field as it was defined within the university. Because of its status as the
standard economics textbook during the period I am discussing, Principles of Economics
provides a useful picture of the state of the field. Returning to Marshall’s book, and especially to
the prefaces he wrote for the original 1890 edition and eighth 1920 edition, respectively, will
take us to the heart of why institutional, orthodox economics was unable to respond to the
critiques being leveled at it by those it had designated as amateurs. Notably, Marshall’s language
in these framing moments of the respective editions does respond to the historical contexts in
which they were produced. In the 1890 preface, Marshall draws on Victorian conceptions of
progress and continuity to assert that even as the field of economics is taking its newfound place
in the university, it remains continuous with the field as understood by the classical economists.
Marshall claims that although new work in economics may seem to contradict the theories of the
political economists of the 18th and 19th century, they actually “involve no real breach of
continuity in the development of the science. The new doctrines have supplemented the older,
have extended, developed, and sometimes corrected them, and often have given them a different
tone by a new distribution of emphasis; but very seldom have subverted them.” 90 Alongside this
claim for the continuity of economics as a discipline with its precursors, Marshall insists that
traditional distinctions between such economic topics as rent, capital, and wages actually rest
upon differences of degree rather than kind. This argument culminates in a quasi-theological
claim about supply and demand, as Marshall reckons that “as, in spite of the great differences in
form between birds and quadrupeds, there is one Fundamental Idea running through all their
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frames, so the general theory of the equilibrium of demand and supply is a Fundamental Idea
running through the frames of all the various parts of the central problem of Distribution and
Exchange.”91 Marshall’s trust here in structure, continuity, progress, and the stability ensured by
God’s design clearly speaks to a Victorian—not to mention Whiggish—sensibility.
Marshall’s framing of economics as continuous culminates in his conception of time. In a
moment that crystalizes the anti-modernist bent of this 1890 preface, Marshall states that “the
element of Time, which is the centre of the chief difficulty of almost every economic problem, is
itself absolutely continuous.”92 As I have discussed in my introduction, this understanding of
time as continuous is one of the major “received understandings” that began to break down under
the conditions of modernity, and experimental works that take this new sense of crisis time and
time in crisis are foundational to my understanding of modernism. For modernists influenced by
thinkers like Henri Bergson and T.E. Hulme, the conception of time as linear gave way to one of
time as chaotic.93 To be sure, as Tim Armstrong argues, there is no straightforward or unified
definition of “modernist time.” Rather, “[t]he temporal imaginary of modernism…includes
clockwise and counterclockwise movements, emphasizing both the master narrative of advance
and a contrarian understanding of regression.”94 One manifestation of this new perception of
time is a conception of time as cyclical, a concept that became increasingly relevant to
economics in the twentieth century, largely through Keynes’s efforts to lessen the impact of
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recessions and depressions by combatting the business cycle. That such a view was utterly
foreign to Marshall, and thus to economics as a field, in 1890, highlights the limitations placed
on the field by the late-Victorian worldview of which Marshall is a spokesman here.
By 1920 Marshall’s preface for the eighth edition of Principles of Economics picks up on
the sorts of cultural changes that provoked much modernist innovation, notably shifting from an
insistence on continuity to an embrace of dynamism. Marshall defends neoclassical theory’s
reliance on two-dimensional diagrams against charges of being overly static, claiming that his
volume “is concerned throughout with the forces that cause movement: and its key-note is that of
dynamics, rather than statics.”95 Later, in a more expansive gesture, Marshall states: “the main
concern of economics is thus with human beings who are impelled, for good and evil, to change
and progress…the central idea of economics, even when its Foundations alone are under
discussion, must be that of living force and movement.”96 The shift is striking: from continuity to
change, from “the Fundamental Idea” to “living force and movement.” By Marshall’s own
admission, even as economics itself became increasingly institutionalized, its subject-matter,
“the normal conditions of life in the modern age,” 97 led to an unmooring of certainty mirrored in
the social upheaval of the 1900s and 1910s in England and Europe that, by many accounts,
inspired modernist art and literature.
Perhaps the most striking thing, then, about the contrast between these two prefaces is
that the shift in focus in the latter is not accompanied by a dramatic change in the body of the
text itself. Rather, Marshall is attempting to reframe the contents of his book, which are
themselves after all a set of “principles,” without actually responding to the economic problems
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of the 1910s and 20s that those principles could no longer address. In changing the framing but
keeping the body of the text unchanged, Marshall is making an implicit claim that feeds into all
of the problems with neoclassical theory that I am illustrating and to which the Modernist
Amateur Economists I discuss are responding: that economics is a (natural) science, whose
methods of analysis are immune to changing social and cultural conditions. Indeed, Marshall’s
prefaces are making a claim that is fundamental to neoclassical economics: that the economy can
be abstracted from the society in which it exists, reduced to mathematical principles that are not
culturally conditioned or determined. As the twenties wore on, bringing debates over the gold
standard, the 1926 General Strike, and eventually the Great Depression of the 1930s, it became
increasingly clear that this was a fatuous claim, that the economy is always part of a broader
culture, subject to factors and events that cannot be abstracted away. The increasingly obvious
nature of neoclassical economics’ failure to respond to the economic upheaval of the early
twentieth century, implicit in the disjunction between Marshall’s two prefaces and the body of
the text they introduce, point directly to the flourishing of heterodox economic theories that I
trace in this dissertation.

Heterodox Economics
I have identified socialism and underconsumption as the two main schools of thought that
produced the heterodox economic theories of the period; taking a closer look at some of the
individual theorists and specific arguments that they were making will help give a sense of the
widespread popularity of heterodox economic theory, and thus of the pressing nature of the
threat those theories posed to the authority of neoclassical economics. While both of these
strands of heterodox theory run throughout the period 1890-1950, socialist groups were more
coherent earlier in the period. As Raymond Williams has shown, socialist economic theory has
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been a part of English culture for a long time; the socialist movements he traces in Culture and
Society date from essentially the same moment as Adam Smith’s first theorizations of
capitalism.98 But the last decade of the nineteenth century takes on a particular significance in
this history because it saw a concentrated flourishing of socialist societies and movements,
coinciding (significantly) with the marginal revolution in economics and with Marshall’s
successful institutionalization of economics as a discipline. The largest and most influential of
these societies was the Fabian Society, which differentiated itself from the welter of Marxist
groups that were active in the 1880s and 90s, including William Morris’s Socialist League, the
Social Democratic Federation, and the Independent Labour Party, by basing its social critique on
neoclassical economics, rather than on Marx.99
And so, during the period when Marshall and his ilk were purging Marxist theory from
economic orthodoxy, the Fabian Society was able to lay claim to a large degree of respectability
by incorporating that the new neoclassical orthodoxy into their program. Nevertheless, while the
Fabian society based its analysis on neoclassical methods like marginalism, it diverged from
neoclassical economics in rejecting the idea that markets at equilibrium would guarantee
equitable distributions of resources. Fabians thus frequently called for government intervention
in the economy, a position that orthodox economists rejected as small-minded and unrigorous.
Despite constant ridicule from within academia, the Fabian Society was able to have a major
impact on British society, founding the London School of Economics and the Labour Party in
1900. The mainstream status of the Fabian Society helps indicate the widespread popularity of
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explicit challenges to orthodox economic theory at the end of the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth.
In the early part of the twentieth century, younger, more radical members of the Society
tried variously to wrest it away from the gradualist methods preferred by the “old gang” 100—
Beatrice and Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw, and others—and to split off from it to pursue
more radical politics and theories. The most famous of these radical Fabian dissenters was H.G.
Wells, who nearly succeeded in taking over the society and sending it in the more radical
direction he favored.101 However, several different strands of heterodox offshoots of the Fabian
Society are more central to the story of modernism and economics that I am telling here. The
first of these began in 1903 when Arthur Penty, Holbrook Jackson, and A.R. Orage founded the
Leeds Arts Club, a Fabian-adjacent group that focused on the intersection between socialism and
the arts. After moving to London and founding the Fabian Arts Group in 1906, Jackson and
Orage bought The New Age with help from George Bernard Shaw (a story to which we will
return in Chapter Two). More important here is Penty’s growing interest during this period in
Guild Socialism. Penty’s version of Guild Socialism is medievalist in orientation, based on a
concept that he termed “The Economic Cul-de-sac,” 102 which states that “[e]verything in modern
life is congested—our politics, our trade, our professions and cities have one thing in common:
they are all congested. There is no elbow-room anywhere, and, as I have said, there can be but
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one path of escape, and that is backwards.” 103 “Backwards,” for Penty, involves a dual return to
the Catholic religion and to the medieval Guild system, in which industry would be controlled by
the workers themselves, banded together in industry-specific guilds which would dictate such
things as wages, amount of goods to be produced, and working hours. Although Penty’s
conclusions are thus explicitly anti-modern, and even anti-modernist, they came as a response to
a feeling of crisis in modernity, and proved influential on modernists like T.S. Eliot. 104
Indeed, Penty’s Catholic, medieval Guild Socialism garnered sympathy from outside of
Fabian circles, even if his former compatriots in the Leeds Arts Club were less enthusiastic. Key
here are the duo of Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, a partnership dubbed “Chesterbelloc” by
Shaw in The New Age, and their theory of Distributism.105 Belloc defines Distributism in
historical terms in The Servile State (1912), arguing that it was the economic system prevailing
in England just before the reformation, in which “the determinant mass of families were owners
of capital and land…in which production was regulated by self-governing corporations of small
owners; and…in which the misery and insecurity of a proletariat was unknown.” 106 This
historical location, combined with Chesterton’s later argument in The Outline of Sanity (1926)
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that one major result of a Distributist system would be “that we [would] hold ourselves free not
only to cease worshipping machines, but to cease using them,” 107 places Distributism in a direct
line with the Luddites, as an explicitly reactionary economic system. Following the publication
of The Servile State, and of debates in The New Age between Shaw and Wells on one side and
Chesterton and Belloc on the other, Penty gave up his concept of Guild Socialism and joined the
Distributists as well. Of course, this conservative socialism was explicitly at odds with the
progressivism of the Fabian society and with other socialist movements at the time. And indeed,
one of the lessons that an examination of heterodox economic theory in the first half of the
twentieth century teaches is that economic heterodoxy is certainly not the same thing as
economic radicalism. The most famous conservative heterodox economic theory, after all, is
Fascism.
But objections to the Fabian Society were not only conservative in nature. As
Distributism came into focus in the teens and twenties, The New Age split from the Fabian
Society in a different direction, advocating for a different brand of Guild Socialism than Penty
had outlined, instead arguing for a system theorized by historian and detective novelist G.D.H.
Cole. Where Penty’s treatise on Guild Socialism is almost entirely negative—a perceptive
criticism of the existing system, coupled with vague and ominous hints of what must be done to
replace it—Cole’s Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic Democracy,108 by contrast, is what it
claims it is: a positive plan for how a Guild Socialist society would be organized, as well as how
it could come about. Cole (like Penty) is heavily influenced here by William Morris’s News
From Nowhere (1890), a text that resonates throughout much heterodox theorization in the
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period.109 Cole addresses the utopian aspect of his project head-on, referring to himself as one of
“many writers of Utopias.”110 Following Morris, and in consonance with Penty, Cole advocates a
return to the “spirit” of the medieval Guild system. 111 But, by contrast with both of them, Cole
claims that “Clearly, we cannot seek to restore the mediaeval—that is, the communal—spirit in
industry by restoring the material conditions of the Middle Ages. We cannot go back to ‘town
economy,’ a general regime of handicraft and master-craftsmanship, tiny-scale production.” 112
Rather, he argues, “our present problem is, taking the conditions of production substantially as
we find them, to reintroduce into industry the communal spirit, by refashioning industrialism in
such a way as to set the communal motives free to operate.” 113 It was this forward-looking form
of Guild Socialism that filled the pages of The New Age in the pre-World War I period.
As is perhaps clear, the heterodox theories that variously made up left- and right-leaning
socialism were invariably created by amateurs. Not one but two detective novelists, Cole and
Chesterton, amateur theologians Chesterton and Belloc, former school teacher-turned-artenthusiast A.R. Orage, and even lawyer and amateur political theorist Sidney Webb—not one of
these architects of Fabianism, Guild Socialism, and Distributism had university training in
economic theory. And yet despite the different directions in which they took socialist heterodox
theories, they drew upon shared conceptions of the amateur as public intellectual, as indicated in
the self-assured ways in which they put their theories forth through books, magazine articles,
and, in Webb’s case, in parliament. Moreover, these heterodox theorists were unified in their
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refusal to concede expertise in economic matters to university-trained economists, who remained
unable to answer their critiques with the tools available under neoclassical economic theory.
Nevertheless, there would seem to be a meaningful difference between this collection of
socialist thinkers who made no claim to technical or professional knowledge of economics and
those examples of heterodox economists who were explicitly excluded from the discipline by
Marshall and his followers. John Maloney discusses a representative list: Edwin Cannan, Joseph
Shield Nicholson, William Cunningham, Henry Dunning Macleod, and John Beattie Crozier. 114
These university-trained economists represent a range of lines of critique of neoclassical
economics, from a questioning of over-mathematization to a refusal to give up historicist
methods. However, the most important economist Maloney describes is J.A. Hobson, both
because he himself proved influential to some of the modernist amateur economists I discuss
here and because of the importance to other heterodox economists of his concept of
underconsumption. Put most simply, underconsumption is the idea that involuntary
unemployment and recessions occur when there is inadequate demand relative to the supply.
Hobson’s argument is slightly more technical than this, however: in his book The Physiology of
Industry (1889), Hobson argues that Say’s Law is critically flawed. 115 Say’s Law states that
supply creates its own demand: people produce goods in the expectation of buying other goods
with the proceeds. Therefore an equal amount of demand is created when a supply of something
is created, albeit demand for a different product. Say’s Law is a cornerstone of laissez-faire
economic theory: if supply creates its own demand, the market will always be in balance
between supply and demand; no government intervention is necessary to achieve equilibrium.
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Hobson’s argument is that this situation does not in fact occur in most cases. The usual state of
things, for Hobson, is one of underconsumption: more things are being made than consumed;
there is usually less demand than supply. Applied to the market for labor, this insight explains
how unemployment can occur—a phenomenon that is theoretically impossible under Say’s Law.
I go into some detail on Hobson’s theory here to emphasize that he is making this
argument about underconsumption in an explicitly academic way, with reference to a pillar of
classical economics, Say’s Law. Especially when he wrote The Physiology of Industry, Hobson
was very much considered a professional economist. Indeed, as Maloney notes, the Physiology
was “the ideal book at the ideal time to launch a career as an economic pariah,” and its
publication served in very explicit and immediate ways to usher Hobson down that path. 116 The
doors of prestigious economic societies, academic posts, and teaching opportunities were all
sharply closed against him, forcing him to adopt the position of the outsider, the amateur. 117 And
yet, as time went on, it became increasingly clear that Hobson’s critique of Say’s Law was
correct, at least in principle. Especially during the Great Depression, itself a key factor in the
widespread interest in heterodox economic theory in the thirties, neoclassical economics’
insistence that markets would always self-adjust and that involuntary unemployment was
impossible became not only untenable but in fact laughable.
Although Hobson published his theory of underconsumption around the same time as
Marshall’s Principles, it took the historical circumstances surrounding first World War One and
then the General Strike and Great Depression to push the theory into the mainstream of
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heterodox economics—if such a thing can be said to exist. And while, in Hobson’s hands,
underconsumption is formulated as a critique from within the profession, heterodox
underconsumptionists like Silvio Gesell and Major C.H. Douglas took it in a decidedly amateur
direction. For instance, Douglas’s version of Hobson’s claim that supply did not create its own
demand came from the observation that he made in an airplane factory during the war that the
sum total of wages paid to workers in the factory was not enough to buy the airplane they made
there.118 While Douglas put this perception into the form of a mathematical equation, the A+B
Theorem, the attempt is distinctly amateurish, as critics like John Maynard Keynes were quick to
point out. Nevertheless, Douglas’s theory of Social Credit gained a notable following, both in
and out of modernist circles. Even Keynes had to concede that Douglas’s theory had such
success because “orthodoxy [had] no valid reply to much of his destructive criticism.” 119 In
excluding Hobson’s more respectable, professional critique along these lines in the 1880s, the
neoclassical orthodoxy had only itself to blame for Douglas’s success.
To push this point further: by founding itself upon a series of exclusions, neoclassical
economics left itself open to a range of heterodox critiques. Because those critiques for the most
part began from valid perceptions, Economics departments were unable to debunk them
completely. And because the field had emerged by excluding people like Hobson who were
making professional critiques, the field as it was constituted in the university had lost the ability
to claim expertise over those areas of economics, ceding it instead to figures it had explicitly
labeled as amateurs. Income inequality and underconsumption in the form of widespread
unemployment emerged in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as very visible social
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problems. My claim in this chapter is that the visibility of these economic problems, combined
with the obvious theoretical insufficiency of professional economics to address those problems,
provided the grounds for the amateur economic theorization that many modernists produced.
Following the non-modernist heterodox theorists I have surveyed here, and drawing on older
understandings of the amateur and of the public intellectual, modernist writers took it as a matter
of course that they had valuable things to say about economics—or at least things as valuable as
those being said by professional economists.

Keynes’s Amateur Biographies
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that it would take the most famous figure who was
centrally involved in both a British modernist milieu (the Bloomsbury Group) and academic
economics,120 John Maynard Keynes, to close the loop opened by Marshall’s exclusion of
theories of underconsumption and of socialism from orthodox economics. 121 Keynes’s position
between modernist literary circles and economics made him particularly suited to understanding
the value in the heterodox theories that his friends and acquaintances such as Shaw, Eliot, and
the Woolfs were so interested in and bringing them into mainstream economic theory without
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being labeled a crank himself. This last aspect of Keynes’s accomplishment should not be
understated, and we can discern in the way he prepared the ground for his theoretical works a
certain anxiety on his part that he might be cast aside without having the chance to make his
theory heard. Intriguingly, Keynes turned to the quintessential Bloomsbury literary form, the
biography, to do this preparatory work, and the biographical and historical narrative of the field
that he ultimately crafted mirrors in many respects the shape of Eliot’s own attempts to reshape
the English literary canon to ensure the acceptance of his own poetry.
The collection on which this chapter focuses, Essays in Biography (1933), appeared at a
key moment in Keynes’s career. The early part of that career is largely unexceptional: Keynes
graduated from Cambridge in 1906, a convert of Marshall’s from mathematics to economics. He
served in the Civil Service in India following his graduation, resulting in his first book Indian
Currency and Finance (1913). He then became active in the economics community in the teens,
publishing several articles, lecturing in economics at Cambridge, and editing The Economic
Journal. Keynes didn’t emerge as a public figure, however, until 1919, with the publication of
his incendiary book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace. This book, a “literary
sensation,”122 was Keynes’s trenchant response to the Treaty of Versailles and announces the
author’s disdain for the incompetent leadership of the allied nations as well as for their lack of
understanding of economic realities. At the same time, however, The Economic Consequences is
a reaffirmation of the neoclassical economic doctrine that Keynes learned at Cambridge. 123 Over
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the course of his writings in the twenties and thirties, Keynes’s perspective on neoclassical
theory would change.124 In the period from 1923 to 1936, Keynes published significant tracts
arguing for, among other things, the abolition of the gold standard (A Tract on Monetary Reform,
1923, A Treatise on Money, 1930), a radical re-evaluation of the validity of neoclassical
economics (The End of Laissez-Faire, 1926), and the establishment of a welfare state through
government spending (The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 1936).
These were discipline-shaking interventions that necessitated a major conceptual and
pedagogical shift in economics in the thirties and forties. In brief, Keynes’s contributions
resulted in the creation of macroeconomics, essentially doubling the theoretical purview of the
discipline.125 Moreover, those truly new elements of Keynes’s work that came to be known as
“Keynesian Economics” have provoked many of the theoretical arguments in economics since
the second world war.126 Although Keynes’s legacy rests on more than just one book, it remains
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true that The General Theory did the most to achieve the shift in the field for which he is known.
Crucially, as I will argue in Chapter 4, Keynes was able to ensure the impact of The General
Theory by establishing it as a critique from inside the discipline—rather than as yet another
heterodox theory with no basis in the established economic orthodoxy. 127 While Keynes does
much of that work in The General Theory itself, his self-positioning in relation to the field really
comes into focus in the book that preceded it, Essays in Biography.
One of the immediately striking things about Essays in Biography is its genre: why is a
major economist writing a volume of biographical essays? On the surface, the answer is simple:
Keynes was also a central figure in the Bloomsbury group, a milieu that not only encouraged
informal biographical writing to be presented and discussed at its famous Thursday Nights, but
that also counted among its members such important biographers and theorists of biography as
Lytton Strachey and Virginia Woolf.128 Essays in Biography is divided into two parts, the first a
collection of nine shorter essays of the kind that would have been passed around the Bloomsbury
Group, entitled “Sketches of Politicians,” and a second, much longer part, “Lives of
Economists,” containing four biographies of well-known economists. 129 Keynes’s biographical
style in volume immediately begs comparison to Strachey’s in Eminent Victorians: subtly ironic
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portraits of his subjects punctuated by moments of slightly more acerbic commentary. This
stylistic similarity is particularly pronounced in the first part of the volume, especially in
Keynes’s portrayal of Lloyd George, which he had omitted from The Economics Consequences
of the Peace because of “a certain compunction.” 130 But the second part of the volume also
engages in the kind of biographical project that Strachey outlines in his preface to Eminent
Victorians:
It is not by the direct method of a scrupulous narration that the explorer of the past can
hope to depict that singular epoch [i.e. the Victorian Era]. If he is wise, he will adopt a
subtler strategy. He will attack his subject in unexpected places; he will fall upon the
flank, or the rear; he will shoot a sudden, revealing searchlight into obscure recesses,
hitherto undivined. He will row out over that great ocean of material, and lower down
into it, here and there, a little bucket, which will bring up to the light of day some
characteristic specimen, from those far depths, to be examined with a careful curiosity. 131
Indeed, without putting too much pressure on the comparison, we might construe the second part
of Essays in Biography as attempting to do for the field of Economics what Strachey’s book did
for a modernist cultural understanding of the Victorian era: exposing, through the choice of
“characteristic specimens,” the contours of the field and, most importantly, a shared fatal flaw
that runs through it. Whereas, for Strachey, that flaw might be summarized as an excessive
reliance on Christian morality, for Keynes, it’s the excessive desire for theoretical elegance at the
expense of empirics—as well as the unwillingness to let new developments in understandings of
time have an impact on economic theory.
While Strachey’s framing of Eminent Victorians is suggestive for our understanding of
Essays in Biography, Keynes’s volume also comes into focus as modernist in the context of
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Virginia Woolf’s more explicit theorization of “The New Biography” in her 1927 essay of that
title.132 Woolf’s essay, a review of Harold Nicholson’s Some People, traces a brief history of the
biography and attempts to theorize the “new” biography of the title. Interestingly, Woolf echoes
Eliot in identifying a sort of dissociation of sensibility in the history of the genre, arguing that
Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson (1791) occasioned a permanent shift in what a biography was
or could do that was only partially, inadequately taken up by the Victorian biographers who
followed him.133 Moreover, Woolf echoes Strachey in pointing out that while Victorian
biographers followed Boswell in writing biographies of thinkers and cultural figures rather than
solely of politicians and military figures, by and large the Victorians substituted for the preBoswell “tale of battle and victory” an inevitably narrative of “goodness.” The result, Woolf
observes, is that “the Victorian worthies are presented to us” as “[n]oble, upright, chaste,
severe.”134 In the twentieth century, however, writers like Strachey have returned to Boswell’s
example and have corrected the dissociation of sensibility. Woolf identifies this shift as
continuous with modernism in other literary genres (although she of course does not use the
term): “[w]ith the twentieth century, however, a change came over biography, as it came over
fiction and poetry.”135 For Woolf, “the most visible sign” of this shift “was in the difference in
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size,” but “the diminution of size was only the outward token of an inward change. The point of
view had completely altered.”136 Specifically,
the author’s relation to his subject is different. He is no longer the serious and
sympathetic companion, toiling even slavishly in the footsteps of his hero. Whether
friend or enemy, admiring or critical, he is an equal. In any case, he preserves his
freedom and his right to independent judgment. Moreover, he does not think himself
constrained to follow every step on the way. Raised upon a little eminence which his
independence has made for him, he sees his subject spread about him. He chooses; he
synthesizes; in short, he has ceased to be the chronicler; he has become an artist.
For Woolf, then, the “new” biography consists in a return to the ethos of Boswell, the intuition
that the interest of a biography lies in personality rather than in actions alone, but in combining
that ethos with “independent judgment” and, more importantly, art.
As we shall see, Keynes certainly approaches his principle figures in Essays in Biography
in this way, as “an equal,” there not merely to present but also to critique. In introducing his own
critiques, moreover, Keynes embodies a final point that Woolf identifies as key to the “new”
biography: “by the end of the book we realize that the figure which has been most completely
and most subtly displayed is that of the author.” 137 Woolf is writing specifically about
Nicholson’s book here, but it is clear that she is laying out a general tendency of modernist
biography—another, incidentally, that it shares with Boswell’s Life of Johnson. As I am arguing
here, we can see in Keynes’s selection of economists and the elements of their lives and
intellectual interventions that he highlights that Keynes is engaging in an autobiographical
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exercise. In the context of his friend Woolf’s theorization of modern biograph here, we can see
this self-positioning as intentional, and as deeply significant.
Nevertheless, Keynes’s familiarity with Bloomsbury conversations about biographical
form and the parallels between his book and Strachey’s only provide partial answers to the
question of why he used biography to make this kind of critique. By 1933, Keynes was certainly
not shy about writing polemical essays. Why use the indirect form of biography to argue about
these shortcomings in the current state of the field? One answer lies in the field’s treatment of
Hobson that I have discussed above: while Keynes had made important interventions in
economics by 1933, the argument he was about to make in The General Theory in 1936 was
along the lines of Hobson’s in 1889. In that context, I read Essays in Biography as Keynes’s
attempt to situate himself in a lineage of orthodox economists in an effort to avoid Hobson’s fate.
In following Woolf’s theory and Strachey’s example in using the form of the biography to
accomplish this self-positioning, Keynes is also attempting to lay claim to the means through
which Strachey made his powerful modernist statement about the Victorian era. Keynes, in
hewing much more to Strachey’s side from a stylistic perspective, and in following Eliot’s selfpositioning in the content of his biographical essays, comes into focus as a modernist biographer
in Essays in Biography.138
While the opening collection of “Sketches of Politicians” is interesting in its own right,
Essays in Biography is most clearly modernist in form and content in its second half, “Lives of
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Economists.” The three major essays take Robert Malthus, Alfred Marshall, and Francis
Edgeworth for their subjects, apparently because Keynes takes Marshall and Edgeworth to be the
founders of the modern schools of economics at Cambridge and Oxford, 139 respectively, and
because he views Malthus as the unacknowledged founder, in an intellectual sense, of the field of
economic study that these later figures inherited and formalized.140 Importantly, the essay on
Malthus, which clearly frames the section and gives it a degree of narrative coherence, is the
only essay that was written afresh for the volume, indicating that Keynes is thinking of his
“Lives of Economists” as connected, as needing framing. Containing extended engagements with
the principle innovations of each of the title economists as well as constant reference to other
economists that Keynes clearly deemed important for complicating, challenging, or continuing
their work, these essays function as a record of what we might call Keynes’s economic canon in
the years during which he was making his own contribution to the field—in many cases in such a
way as to render some of the contributions of the economists about which he was writing
obsolete.141 Notably, Keynes’s canon is quite standard: he engages with the major figures of
classical theory—Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, John Elliott Cairnes and
Malthus—important neoclassical economists—Marshall, Edgeworth, J.N. Keynes (his father),
William Jevons, Carl Menger, and Arthur Pigou—and Victorian intellectuals whose ideas greatly
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influenced economics—Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx. As I will show, Keynes’s intervention
here comes not from the selection of his economic canon, but rather in the unusual emphasis he
gives to certain figures within it.
Taken together, these essays show us Keynes attempting to prepare the ground for his
own economic innovations of the thirties. In a move analogous to Eliot’s in “Tradition and the
Individual Talent” and “The Metaphysical Poets,” Keynes in these essays puts forth a carefully
(re)constructed version of economic history, one that, importantly, paves the way for his
innovations in The General Theory to become almost instantly institutionalized. By linking his
new macroeconomics to the neoclassical tradition, Keynes lessens the radical connotation of his
ideas without lessening their impact. In Essays in Biography, then, we see Keynes performing an
Eliotian two-step: first, he constructs a version of economic history that emphasizes those
elements of that history that best mirror his own innovations and then he shows—by implication,
of course—the ways in which his work will build upon that economic tradition.
Keynes’s historical narrative emerges mainly via two oppositions: first Malthus and
Ricardo, then Marshall and Edgeworth. In the essay on Malthus, Keynes argues that economics
would look much different today if Malthus was treated as its central figure rather than
Ricardo.142 Importantly, Keynes’s prioritizing of Malthus over Ricardo is not typical—accounts
of the intellectual history of economics tend to trace the main line as originating in Adam Smith,
who is then modified and clarified by Ricardo, who is then filtered through Bentham and refined
by Mill, and finally distilled into Marshall’s Principles.143 Malthus is generally relegated to the
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footnotes, even if he may be given a generous share of those. The reason for both Malthus’s
marginalization and Keynes’s attempt to recover him are plain: Malthus represents empirics over
theory, while the orthodox line of economics is actively engaged in raising the theory to the level
of a science for the reasons I have related above. Given that Keynes’s major contribution in The
General Theory was to address a real-world phenomenon (unemployment) that abstract
neoclassical theory could not even concede existed,144 his repositioning of Malthus and thus
empirics at the center of economic theory is a self-legitimizing move. As Keynes writes in his
assessment of Malthus and Ricardo’s correspondence:
Here, indeed, are to be found the seeds of economic theory, and also the divergent
lines…Ricardo is investigating the theory of the distribution of the product in conditions
of equilibrium, and Malthus is concerned with what determines the volume of output day
by day in the real world. Malthus is dealing with the monetary economy in which we
happen to live; Ricardo with the abstraction of a neutral money economy. 145
For Keynes, Malthus’s focus on “the real world...in which we happen to live” represents a
divergent strain of economics to which Keynes himself wants to return. And to read Keynes’s
move here in the context of Eliot, Malthus is Keynes’s Donne or Marvell, while Ricardo is very
clearly his Milton.146
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Keynes’s valorization of empirics-based economics continues in his essays on Marshall
and Edgeworth, which I read as a linked pair. 147 In the former essay, Keynes presents Marshall
as striking a balance between the theoretical and the empirical. He is “the founder of modern
diagrammatic economics” but,148 Keynes argues, Marshall never lost sight of the fact that his
theoretical models were theoretical and required constant reference to empirics to correct their
failings.149 Edgeworth, on the other hand, in Keynes’s view, maintained a hopelessly theoretical
approach to economics.150 Contrasting the two figures, Keynes writes: “Marshall’s interest [in
economics] was intellectual and moral, Edgeworth’s intellectual and aesthetic. Edgeworth
wished to establish theorems of intellectual and aesthetic interest, Marshall to establish maxims
of practical and moral importance.”151 This distinction between theorems—rigid, mathematical
models—and maxims—flexible, functional rules of thumb—further emphasizes the point
Keynes is making about the necessity of an economic theory that can respond to the real world.
The narrative of economic history that Keynes lays out in Essays in Biography thus
emphasizes a certain element in that history—empirics—that Keynes believes has fallen out of
the account and that he wants to restore. Like Eliot, Keynes is in these essays operating at the
level of the general/disciplinary and specific/individual simultaneously. Indeed, at the same time
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that he is developing this historical narrative, Keynes is also using these essays to lay out some
of the specific ways in which he plans to restore empirics to economic theory and practice going
forward. Unsurprisingly, most of these moments occur in the essay on Marshall, his teacher and
mentor. Early in the essay, Keynes begins to hint that he sees himself as Marshall’s heir in a
variety of ways, starting with temperament. For Keynes,
the master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. He must reach a high
standard in several different directions and must combine talents not often found
together. He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher—in some degree.
He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular in
terms of the general, and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He
must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. 152
Claiming that “[m]uch, but not all, of this ideal many-sidedness Marshall possessed,” 153 Keynes
positions his master as a model to be emulated but also improved upon. Moreover, by
generalizing Marshall’s particular intellectual gifts into those of “the master-economist,” a title
which Keynes clearly wants to claim for himself, Keynes positions himself as the economist of
the contemporary generation who can best improve upon Marshall’s example—just as Eliot’s
“perfect critic” turns out to be, predictably, Eliot himself.
This subtext is clearly present as well in Keynes’s musings on the importance of
Marshall’s Principles of Economics. Before launching into his interpretation of the Principles
and its place in economic history, Keynes pauses to weigh the pros and cons of writing “An
Economic Treatise” versus “the pamphlet or the monograph.” 154 Arguing that Jevons was able to
steal a good deal of Marshall’s thunder, as it were, because of his “willingness to spill his ideas,
to flick them at the world,”155 Keynes maintains that, nevertheless, “An Economic Treatise may
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have great educational value. Perhaps we require one treatise, as a piéce de résistance, for each
generation.”156 Having up to this point in his career (i.e. 1924, when he wrote the essay on
Marshall) largely followed Jevons in publishing shorter works, Keynes is preparing the way here
for his two major treatises of the 1930s, A Treatise on Money and The General Theory,
positioning them as generation-defining works before they have even been written.
Having hinted at his ambitions to surpass Marshall as a great economist, Keynes proceeds
to point out several specific weaknesses in Marshall’s Principles, two of the most explicit of
which form the basis of his own contributions to economics in the thirties. The first area is in the
fuller realization of the significance of time to economic theories. Commenting on Marshall’s
many innovations with time and economic analysis, Keynes argues that “All of these are pathbreaking ideas which no one who wants to think clearly can do without. Nevertheless, this is the
quarter in which, in my opinion, the Marshall analysis is least complete and satisfactory, and
where there remains most to do.”157 In light of the limited conception of time that we noted in
Marshall’s preface to the Principles, Keynes’s reservations here are perhaps unsurprising.
Indeed, while Keynes praises Marshall for introducing the concepts of the short-term and longterm into economic analysis, he would use that distinction to new ends in macroeconomics,
which thinks about time in a different way than does microeconomics. Most notably, Keynesian
macroeconomics is a response to the business cycle, a concept that introduces a metaphor for
time that does not mesh with Marshall’s insistence on linearity in his preface. 158 Added to this
emphasis on the cycle is an increased focus on the immediate present, most eloquently expressed
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in Keynes’s famous observation that “it is a disadvantage of ‘the long run’ that in the long run
we are all dead.” As Matt Seybold notes, Keynes would later write:
I could have said equally well that it is a great advantage of ‘the short run’ that in the
short run we are still alive…If we are at peace in the short run, that is something. The
best we can do is put off disaster, if only in the hope, which is not necessarily a remote
one, that something will turn up.159
Keynes’s description of the Short and Long runs in economics here encapsulates the clockwise
and counter-clockwise movements Armstrong identifies with “the temporal imaginary of
modernism,” on the one hand focusing with optimism on the power of the present instant, the
“short run,” while conceding the likelihood of a “regression”—or perhaps recession—to come in
the long run.160 While Keynes does not include the specifics of his critique in his essay on
Marshall, he uses his account of Marshall’s work on time to open the space for these innovations
that are to come.161
Keynes’s second major criticism of Marshall also involves a repudiation of a major tenet
of classical economics: Adam Smith’s concept of laissez-faire, the idea that the market will
achieve a maximally efficient distribution of resources if it is left alone entirely. Again, Keynes
suggests that Marshall began the process of questioning this long-held economic belief—
“Marshall’s proof that laissez-faire breaks down in certain conditions theoretically, and not
merely practically, regarded as a principle of maximum social advantage, was of great
philosophical importance”162—before arguing that here, too, “Marshall does not carry this
particular argument very far, and the further exploration of that field has been left to Marshall’s
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favorite pupil and successor, Professor Pigou.” 163 Pigou is best known for his contributions to the
field of welfare economics,164 and for being Marshall’s hand-picked successor at Cambridge.
Keynes is doing several things simultaneously here: first, he is making a radical critique of
neoclassical theory in arguing that laissez-faire needs to be reevaluated. At the same time, he
pulls back from the radical import of that critique by linking it to the work of two of the most
well-established figures in English economics, Marshall and Pigou. And yet, by arguing that
neither of them has gone quite far enough, he clears the way for his own innovations in the
thirties all while implicitly claiming that those innovations fit within a recognizable neoclassical
tradition.
If Keynes’s self-positioning in these essays is reminiscent of Eliot’s strategy of laying out
reasons why “the perfect critic” can only be a poet like him, Keynes’s echoing of Eliot comes
through even more clearly in a moment late in his essay on Marshall in which we see him
explicitly reflecting on the process of constructing an economic theory that responds to and
revises the existing canon. Keynes arrives at this moment via a reading of Marshall’s treatment
of previous economists. According to Keynes, Marshall’s Principles reveals a belief that “those
individuals who are endowed with a special genius for the subject and have a powerful economic
intuition will often be more right in their conclusions and implicit presumptions than in their
explanations and explicit statements.”165 Keynes reads Marshall’s tone in his writings as
implying that rather than “discovering” anything for himself, he is merely applying the theories
of his predecessors in a new way that has the effect of showing the ways in which they had
already made the “discovery” for him. The dynamic inherent in this method mirrors that
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described by Eliot in “Tradition and the Individual Talent”: innovations in the present subtly
reorient works of the past in relation to the field as a whole, and nothing is obliterated.
Importantly, though, it is Keynes, not Marshall, who is applying this lens to Marshall’s work. It
is Keynes’s manipulation of Marshall here, I would claim, that most clearly puts him in parallel
with Eliot.
At this point, we can come to some more informed answers to the question: why
biography? To do so, I want to return to the framing terms of the chapter, professionalism and
amateurism. First, it is clear that by 1933 Keynes is a professional economist and an amateur
biographer. Moreover, my argument in this section is that in writing Essays in Biography,
Keynes is looking to make a professional intervention: he is offering pointed critiques of the
discipline as it stands by focusing on some of the key figures in the history of the discipline who
have brought it to this point. This was not the kind of argument being made in theoretical texts in
economics at the time. While the field had not fully embraced mathematization—that would
happen increasingly after 1937—economic history was increasingly becoming its own field. One
reason for Keynes to use the biographical form, then, is that the kind of historical critique he
wanted to make could not be made using the conventional forms of the discipline of economics.
Moreover, by using a form in which he was an amateur, Keynes is able to inhabit the subjectposition of the amateur to make his critiques—just as Pound sought to do in ABC of Reading and
ABC of Economics. Keynes’s use of a literary form in Essays in Biography, then, strikes at the
heart of the negotiation between amateur and professional occurring in the period that I am
discussing here. Like Eliot, Keynes was able to wield his amateurism to help establish a new
direction for the discipline with which he is so centrally associated.
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Conclusion
Keynes’s careful endorsement of most of Marshall’s economic orthodoxy implies that he
approves of his teacher’s general strategy of shaping the discipline through exclusion. His
discussion of heterodox economic theory in The General Theory makes this point explicitly:
Keynes is particularly hard on Marx and Douglas throughout his late writings, construing
Douglas’s Social Credit as “mere mystification” 166 and “Marxian socialism” as “mere logical
fallacy,” indicative of an “inability to analyse a process and follow it out to its conclusion.” 167
Like Eliot, whose “perfect critic” was not all modernist writers, but rather those who thought as
he did, Keynes’s late writings indicate primarily an impulse to replace the exclusions made by
his progenitors with a new set of his own making—one that recognizes the contributions of
Malthus and of Hobson, specifically. 168 By designating a slightly different set of economic
theories and theorists as amateur than did Marshall, Keynes was able to shift the discipline away
from the line of thought started by Ricardo and, by bringing Malthus back into the mainstream,
influence the creation of macroeconomics.
And yet, in the time between Marshall and The General Theory—and between Arthur
Quiller-Couch and Practical Criticism or even Leavis’s The Great Tradition—there was a
moment of radical openness and possibility, where amateurs really thought that they could
influence the literary and economic direction of England. In this moment, just before the older
meaning of the term “amateur” gave way fully to the new one, there was a sense that these
disciplines—and uniquely these disciplines, in many ways—were truly up for grabs. But, as my
overview of heterodox economic theories in the period indicates, this spirit was not in any way
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exclusively felt by modernists. Anti-modernists like Chesterton and Belloc and Penty,
conventional Edwardian figures like G.D.H. Cole—unconventional ones like H.G. Wells, too,
for that matter—and late Victorians like Oscar Wilde and William Morris all produced pieces of
heterodox economic theorization of one kind or another. My argument in this dissertation is not
that modernists generated all of these heterodox theories or that all heterodox theories are
themselves modernist. Rather, it has to do with how modernists interacted with these theories,
how they incorporated them into their modernist literary production, and the results—literary,
cultural, and economic—of that intersection between modernist aesthetics and heterodox
economics.
We see some of that in Keynes’s Essays in Biography, and even more, as we shall see, in
Pound’s ABC of Economics, which provides one of the epigraphs to this chapter. In the case of
Keynes, though, one of the reasons Essays in Biography deserves the kind of extended attention I
have given it here is that it is a literary text in which Keynes incorporates elements of heterodox
economics into a reshaping of the field —even if valorizing Malthus is a light enough form of
heterodoxy that it doesn’t result in Keynes’s expulsion from the discipline. But his deployment
of the biographic form stands as an intervention in economics too: calling attention to the lives of
“great” economists and showing how their own idiosyncrasies and predilections have influenced
the course of a discipline that wants to think of itself as free of such subjective influences. Even
here, then, we see a productive mixture of heterodox (and amateur) economic theory and
modernist literary-biographical experimentation.
Despite this experimental element of Essays in Biography, though, what bringing
together these texts by Eliot and Keynes and these histories of the English and Economics
departments ultimately shows is that against this expansive moment of heterodox, amateur
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possibility, there was a reciprocal movement, driven by these two major modernists in these
respective fields, towards institutionalization and formalization. Nevertheless, as Keynes and
Eliot illustrate, the figures I am discussing can occupy both positions at once. Eliot’s push for his
vision of the English Department did not lead him to abandon his own interest in amateur
economic theorization. And Keynes, fully committed to re-making the Economics department,
took the opposite view on cultural matters. In the last year of his life, in his role as the first head
of the Arts Council, Keynes declared: “The task of an official body is not to teach or to censor,
but to give courage, confidence and opportunity…New work will spring up more abundantly in
unexpected quarters and in unforeseen shapes when there is a universal opportunity for contact
with traditional and contemporary arts in their noblest forms.” 169 Even these figures who were so
invested in professionalization and institutionalization, then, also believed in these “unexpected
quarters,” “unforeseen shapes,” and, in Raymond Williams’s phrase, a commitment to “high
culture in its only important sense, beyond prejudice and habit…with its characteristic and
essential quality of openness.”170
This tension between the closing-down of possibilities through standardization and
institutionalization and the quality of openness afforded both by a modernist, experimental
understanding of culture and by the moment of institutional instability I have outlined here
provides much of the dynamic energy of the period I am discussing in this dissertation. The yin
and yang of amateurism and professionalism, always, as Garber has it, “in each other’s pockets,”
drives the modernists I discuss in developing their interests in economics and in creating their
experimental responses to it. The result, the work of figures I have termed modernist amateur
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economists, represents an understudied and underappreciated aspect of what we have come to
understand as modernism.
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Chapter 2: Modernism and Socialism: Shaw, Orage, and the
Modernist Amateur Economist
“You can study the Utopian Socialism of Sir Thomas More, the Theocratic Socialism of the
Incas, the speculations of Saint Simon, the Communism of Fourier and Robert Owen, the socalled Scientific Socialism of Karl Marx, the Christian Socialism of Canon Kingsley and the
Rev. F.D. Maurice, William Morris’s News from Nowhere (a masterpiece of literary art which
you should read anyhow), the Constitutional Socialism of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and of the
highly respectable Fabian Society, and several fancy Socialisms preached by young men who
have not yet had time to become celebrated. But clever as they all are, if they do not mean
equality of income they mean nothing that will save civilization.”
—George Bernard Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s
Guide to Socialism and Capitalism, 1928.1
“The truth is that Mr. Shaw, wrapped in reverential awe at the seeming omnipotence of our
currency system, is afraid to venture into new forms of credit. His social theories have reached
the end of their tether; he steps out of the hurly-burly before the economic revolution has begun.
Good-bye, Mr. Shaw! But new ideas and new methods are not at a stand-still because the Fabian
leaders have stopped thinking. Nor will the currency system cease developing when Mr. Shaw
has gone peacefully to sleep.”
—A.R. Orage, The New Age, January 25, 1917.2
BARBARA: “Well, take me to the factory of death; and let me learn something more. There
must be some truth or other behind all this frightful irony.”
—George Bernard Shaw, Major Barbara, 1905.3

At first glance, most of the terms and personalities in my title to this chapter seem
incongruous. This feeling begins with the conjunction of George Bernard Shaw and A.R. Orage.
Shaw, who was born in 1856 and had his most successful run as a playwright during the late
1880s and 1890s, is typically treated as an (admittedly eccentric) Victorian. Orage, on the other
hand, is known as the editor of the important modernist little magazine The New Age during its
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most important period, 1907-1922. Beyond publishing the early work of modernist writers such
as Katherine Mansfield and Ezra Pound, The New Age is famous for its devotion to a series of
heterodox economic theories, and especially for supporting Major C.H. Douglas’s theory of
Social Credit. Focusing on these aspects of Shaw and Orage’s critical legacy, there can be little
justification for comparison. Moreover, it seems clear that the first two terms in my title,
“Modernism” and “Socialism” can each be applied only to one of these figures: Shaw is a Late
Victorian, not a modernist; Orage is a right-wing economic crank, not a socialist. And yet, Shaw
and Orage do share an important moment of historical overlap. Before he was the editor of The
New Age, Orage was involved with the radical wing of Shaw’s Fabian society, as co-founder of
the Leeds Arts Club and later the Fabian Arts Group. And, in 1906, Shaw put up half of the
necessary money to buy The New Age for Orage and his editorial partner, Holbrook Jackson.4
This historical conjunction helps begin to resolve the apparent tensions and contradictions in my
title: before Orage was a Social Creditor, he was a Fabian socialist. And while Shaw couldn’t
have anticipated quite how far The New Age would diverge from its Fabian beginnings, he did
see fit to put a considerable sum of his own money behind a magazine that would function not
merely as a mouthpiece for Fabian propaganda, but also for bringing new (modernist) literary art
together with radical economic theorization.
Jackson and Orage make these priorities clear in the first issue of The New Age, which
they introduce as “a weekly Review devoted to the intelligent discussion and criticism, both of
existing institutions and of plans and organisations for their reform.” 5 Despite the Fabian origins
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of the magazine, Jackson and Orage insisted from the beginning on “rallying round themselves
the services of the ‘men of good intent’ of every shade of opinion.” Rather than sticking solely to
“dogmatic statements of a too hastily formulated Socialism,” Orage and Jackson commit to
“maintain[ing] the right of intelligence to challenge and revise any existing formulation.” Central
to their purpose as well was the mixture of economic theory and literary writing that I have
already mentioned. So, following their perception that “Socialism being in its largest sense no
less than the will of Society to perfect itself…it follows that all social institutions, together with
the great forces of literature, art, and philosophy, are to be tested and valued by their service to
this end.”6 As Orage would write later in the magazine’s run, “Every part of THE NEW AGE
hangs together…the literature we despise is associated with the economics we hate as the
literature we love is associated with the form of society we would assist in creating.” 7 This dual
commitment to presenting political and economic opinions with which the editor(s) did not agree
and to publishing literary works alongside pieces of economic theory set The New Age apart
from its contemporaries, and helped it develop into one of the major modernist little magazines.
Both aspects of this commitment are evident in the most famous event in the early history
of The New Age: the acrimonious debate over socialism between H.G. Wells and Shaw on the
one side and Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton on the other. I want to trace this debate in some
detail here for several reasons. First, the exchange perfectly encapsulates Orage’s editorial
method in The New Age of actively curating debates while remaining largely behind the scenes
himself. And second, the way in which this debate unfolded helps bring together the matrix of
terms I have introduced in my title: Modernism, Socialism, Shaw, Orage. And finally, what has
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become known as the “Chesterbelloc” debate pushes us toward understanding both Orage and
Shaw as Modernist Amateur Economists.
First, the bare outline: Belloc began the debate in December 1907 with his article
“Thoughts about Modern Thought,” in which he walks through an earlier issue of The New Age
and explains why he disagrees with each point made in each article. Chesterton swiftly followed
this provocative essay in January 1908 with one of his own, “Why I am not a Socialist,” in which
he argues that Socialism entails the destruction of democracy, writing: “I am not a Socialist, just
as I am not a Tory; because I have not lost faith in democracy.” 8 H.G. Wells replied to both of
these articles the week after Chesterton’s in an article entitled “About Chesterton and Belloc,”
arguing that socialists should try to find common ground with them, since their own economic
theory “involves practically seven-tenths of the Socialist desire,” and that “to fight now is to let
the enemy in.”9 After cordial replies from both Chesterton and Belloc, 10 Shaw leapt into the fray
on the side of Wells with his article “Belloc and Chesterton,” and the tenor of the conversation
changed.11
Where the exchanges among Wells, Chesterton, and Belloc mostly amount to polite
disagreements over whether Englishmen will tolerate collectively owned property or whether
they will insist on being able to buy each other beer, Shaw’s article immediately devolves into ad
hominem attacks on Chesterton and Belloc. Shaw’s first move is to question the pair’s
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Englishness, implying as well that Chesterton may have been an illegitimate child. 12 He then
proceeds to make fun of Chesterton’s weight and Belloc’s Catholicism, ultimately caricaturing
their shared economic and political outlook in the form of the “Chesterbelloc,” a monster with
Chesterton’s hindquarters and Belloc’s face:
Wells and I, contemplating the Chesterbelloc, recognise at once a very amusing
pantomime elephant, the front legs being that very exceptional and unEnglish individual
Hilaire Belloc, and the hind legs that extravagant freak of French nature, G. K.
Chesterton. To which they both reply “Not at all: what you see is the Zeitgeist.” To which
we reply bluntly, but conclusively, “Gammon !”13
While most of the article is devoted to fleshing out the caricature, Shaw’s main point of
engagement with Chesterton and Belloc’s arguments comes through in this passage as well. For
Shaw, the pair are making a false claim to representing the “Zeitgeist.” In Shaw’s analysis, this
claim is born out of the common trait of anti-Socialists, which is that they “all have a secret
dread that Socialism will interfere with their darling vices.” For Belloc and Chesterton, Shaw
claims, these “vices” are “the pleasures of the table.” 14 Whether Shaw’s attack is justified or not
(and I think we can safely say that it was not, at least in its particulars and its mean-spiritedness),
it was certainly successful. As Carol DeBoer-Langworth notes, the “term [Chesterbelloc] stuck
to the two writers ever after, as they labored to convince England of the psychological and moral
dangers of big government, technology, and science.” 15 Indeed, while Chesterton made a direct
reply to Shaw and Belloc attempted to get the conversation back on track by bringing it back to
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economic theory,16 Shaw succeeded in forever branding Chesterton and Belloc as The
Chesterbelloc, essentially bringing the conversation, in The New Age at least, to an end.
On the surface, the Chesterbelloc affair stands mostly as a showcase of Shaw’s ability to
blow up a debate through the skillful use of rhetoric. More than that, it shows Shaw’s facility
with navigating public-facing print media, both in his deployment of his public persona,
“G.B.S.,” and in the timing of his intervention. Indeed, the whole exchange revolves around
Shaw’s deep understanding of branding. 17 He creates “the Chesterton-Belloc chimera” through
an extended contrast with his own personal brand, “[t]he celebrated G.B.S.,” which, he admits,
“is about as real as a pantomime ostrich.” The difference, Shaw proposes, is that “I have played
my game with a conscience. I have never pretended that G.B.S. was real: I have over and over
again taken him to pieces before the audience to shew the trick of him.” The implication is that
Chesterton and Belloc are without conscience and are willfully misrepresenting themselves to
score political points. But of course, the self-deferential, self-referential nature of “G.B.S.” is
Shaw’s branding. That he is able to use that element of his self-branding to foist the
Chesterbelloc brand on his enemies establishes Shaw’s article as one of his many rhetorical
triumphs. Importantly, though, another aspect of Shaw’s victory is the timing of it. Rather than
replying immediately to Chesterton or Belloc, as Wells did, Shaw waited for the respective sides
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to exchange several salvos, ensuring that the readership of The New Age was fully invested in the
debate (the “Letter to the Editor” sections of the issues of the magazine during this time illustrate
just how interested the readership was). Then, when the buzz was the greatest, Shaw struck with
perfect dramatic timing. In this way, we can see that Shaw was able to use The New Age’s
commitment to presenting dissenting voices to his advantage. First, he relied on Orage to print
articles by Belloc and Chesterton—and to encourage responses to these articles by a range of
voices. Then, knowing full well that the socialist audience of the paper would be sure to dislike
the points Belloc and Chesterton were making, Shaw was able to bypass the particulars of those
arguments and rout them with a triumphant flex of his rhetorical muscle.
And yet, I would insist, there is more going on here. Shaw is manipulating his audience,
yes, and he is capitalizing on Orage’s editorial methods to do so, clearly. But, if we look more
closely, another figure comes into focus in this debate: Orage himself, not merely as editor, but
as something more active, as (modernist) arranger. Orage emerges in two related ways here: first,
and most obviously, as the orchestrator of the debate, a role we can see reflected in the many
references to him in the articles in question. And second, through the arrangement of the
magazine itself: the editorial choices that Orage made in framing each article in the debate; the
texts and paratexts that surround especially Chesterton and Belloc’s anti-socialist arguments.
We can discern the first of these tendencies by looking more closely at the series of
articles in question. So, Belloc, in his “Thoughts About Modern Thought,” pauses in his procolonial argument about the Belgian Congo to state: “I trust THE NEW AGE will print this, for I
do not know of any other English paper which would have the courage to do so just now.” 18 And
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indeed, as his article is a point-by-point critique of a previous issue of the magazine, it is
remarkable that Orage would have printed it; it is clear that his commitment to publishing
dissenting opinions is a real one. Belloc hits upon this point in his “Not a Reply” as well, while
simultaneously giving the clearest indication that Orage was actively encouraging the
Chesterbelloc debate:
The Editor of The NEW AGE has pointed out to me that Wells has been writing upon
Chesterton and me and that to the remarks I made some weeks ago various answers more
or less violent have appeared; and he also points out to me that Chesterton in turn has
written in answer to Wells. He wants to know whether I have any “answer” ready. I don’t
think I have; but THE NEW AGE being the one really interesting paper now published
(because it seems to me to be the only one with some idea of intellectual freedom), it
seems a shame to keep out of its columns.19
So, Orage’s commitment to representing diverse perspectives is not limited merely to a
willingness to consider such pieces; he actively seeks them out, looking to foster debate in The
New Age. Naturally, Orage was in part motivated by commercial reasons: people enjoy reading
spirited debates, and any argument involving Chesterton, Belloc, and Wells was sure to be that.
We can see concrete evidence of this motivation in his editor’s note to Shaw’s “Belloc and
Chesterton,” in which he requests “that not more than 20 lines in all be quoted from this article
without permission,”20 a clear indication that Orage fully realized the stir that Shaw’s piece was
going to cause, and had a certain desire to capitalize on the “scoop” of Shaw’s reply for The New
Age. And certainly, Shaw’s essay helped the young magazine sell more than a few extra copies.
Through all of these direct references (which amount only to a partial list), we can see Orage as
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an active participant in the Chesterbelloc debate, not merely a passive printer of Shaw’s
controversy.
Seeing Orage as a commentator on the debate, though, requires a more subtle reading,
hinging on an examination of the physical layouts of the various issues of The New Age that
contained these articles. Again, Belloc’s first article in the series stands as an indicative example.
So, Orage follows Belloc’s essay with part VI of Shaw’s series on “Driving Capital Out of the
Country,” a polemical piece offering a Fabian perspective on current issues involving tariff
reform and questions of protectionism. Then, he immediately precedes Belloc’s article with an
advertisement for the next meeting of the Fabian Arts Group, which, as I have mentioned, was
part of the radical wing of the Fabian society. And finally, he places a series of advertisements in
the right column opposite the final four paragraphs of Belloc’s essay: a large ad for the works of
Nietzsche, a smaller one for a line of luxury illustrated works by Tennyson and Ruskin, and a
coupon for a series of “Books on Socialism and The Land Question,” most of them by famous
heterodox economist Henry George. Belloc’s anti-socialist article, then, is surrounded on all
sides by references to art, literature, and socialist economics that are quite hostile to it. Without
over-reading Orage’s arrangements here, the context in which he chose to publish Belloc’s
article certainly works to undermine the content of it.
This is not an isolated phenomenon: as the debate continued Orage persisted in framing
pieces by Belloc and Chesterton with particularly striking pieces on socialism and controversial
literary work. So Chesterton’s “Why I am Not a Socialist” appears just before Part VIII of
Shaw’s series and a Nietzschean poem by Frederick Richardson; his rejoinder to Wells appears
just after a manifesto-style explication of socialism by Hubert Bland, “The Faith I Hold,” and
immediately before the ninth and final part of Shaw’s series; and Belloc’s final “Question” is
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arranged immediately before a poem by infamous occultist Aleister Crowley called “The
Pentagram”—a striking counterpoint to the militantly Catholic Belloc. Throughout, it does seem
that Orage is being consistently, if silently, antagonistic toward Chesterton and Belloc through
his arrangement of the magazine. Added to the explicit indications that we get from article to
article that Orage is actively orchestrating the exchange, Orage’s agency in arranging The New
Age causes him to come into focus as an active participant in the debate he is apparently merely
presenting.
What emerges, then, from this analysis, is a picture of Shaw and Orage coming together
in critiquing the anti-socialist arguments of Chesterton and Belloc, albeit through methods that
could not be more different. Indeed, the gap between Shaw’s egotistical declarations and Orage’s
subtle undermining could be taken as indicative of their radical divergence, as a kind of proof
that attempting to yoke them together under the descriptors “modernist” or “socialist” would be a
fool’s errand. And yet the Chesterbelloc debate also forever connects Shaw and Orage, in ways
that Orage at least would later want to disavow. Moreover, as I will argue in this chapter, the
method that Orage begins to display here, and that would form the backbone of his editorial
practice in The New Age, is actually derived from Shaw. In his commitment to “presentation”
over “representation,”21 Orage carried forth a central Fabian—not to mention Shavian—aesthetic
practice.22 In what follows, I trace this (perhaps surprising, given his reputation as a
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propogandist) subtle tendency in some of Shaw’s important essays and plays, ultimately showing
how we might think of Shaw and Orage together under the umbrellas not only of “modernist”
and “socialist,” but “Modernist Amateur Economist.”
Reading Shaw and Orage this way holds a few important implications for our
understanding of modernism and of modernism and economics. First, in focusing on textual
forms that are not usually the primary object of study in literary studies—Shaw’s prefaces and
political essays and Orage’s magazine articles and individual issues of The New Age—I am
following other scholars, especially those primarily interested in modernist little magazines, in
showing that the range of literary forms that demonstrate modernist experimentation is greater
than we have traditionally thought. 23 Second, the special temporal components of these forms—
the moment of performance in Shaw, the news of the week for Orage—implies the type of
hyper-focus on the present moment that I have identified as the key sensibility of modernism.
However, this sensibility only comes through because of the content of these writings—I am
certainly not claiming that every weekly publication or play is modernist. Rather, it is Shaw and
Orage’s urgent focus on what they see as the economic crisis of modernity, and their repeated
urge to pair that sense of economic crisis with literary experimentation that helps us see their
writings as meaningfully modernist. Seeing these figures and their writings as modernist
especially because of this dynamic ultimately expands our understanding of modernism,
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especially in relation to Shaw. In his connection to Orage and to The New Age, Shaw as
Modernist Amateur Economist emerges as a figure who provides a more robust link between
modernism and late-Victorian anti-establishment thinking than many modernist writers—and the
first few generations of scholars of modernism—wanted to admit.

Shaw, Modernism, and Socialism
In what sense, then, is Shaw a modernist? He is certainly a difficult figure to categorize,
for many reasons. For one, he lived for 94 years, and wrote constantly for most of them,
spanning the late-Victorian era to the post-WWII period, a fact that makes him difficult to pin
down as Victorian, Edwardian, or Modernist. 24 While many of his most famous plays, such as
Mrs Warren’s Profession (1893), Arms and the Man (1894), and Man and Superman (1902),
were first performed in the 1890s and early 1900s, he continued writing plays until his death in
1950, including such major works as Major Barbara (1905), Pygmalion (1912), Heartbreak
House (1917), Back to Methuselah (A Metabiological Pentateuch) (1918-1920), and Saint Joan
(1923). Several of these later plays are, I would argue, clearly modernist. Heartbreak House, for
instance, draws on Chekhov, Ibsen, and, as Christopher Innes has argued, Wagner, 25 and stands
as a highly abstracted, allegorical representation of British society during the first World War.
Back to Methuselah, by contrast, is a sprawling, ambitious attempt to represent human evolution,
employing Shaw’s unique blend of continental philosophy and interest in eugenics to probe the
nature of humanity itself. Readers of either of these plays will have little trouble seeing in them
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the kind of formal experimentation inspired by a sense of crisis time that I have identified as the
sensibility of British literary modernism.
And yet, Shaw is usually excluded from accounts of British modernism. In his overview
of Shaw criticism from 1950 to the present, A.M. Gibbs observes that while Shaw remained
popular as a cultural figure, he was “largely ignored in the dominant critical discourses of the
mid-twentieth-century.”26 Gibbs cites important works by F.R. Leavis and Raymond Williams as
setting the tone for Shaw’s standing in mid-century academia. Leavis, uncritically endorsing
D.H. Lawrence’s dislike of Shaw, argues that Shaw’s work is too strongly based on the concept
of “the triumph of reason,” a philosophical stance that leads to “the automatism, the emptiness
and the essential irreverence—all that makes Shaw boring and cheap; the emotional nullity.” 27
Williams, on the other hand, performs some unflattering close-readings of Candida and Saint
Joan and concludes that “the emotional inadequacy of [Shaw’s] plays is increasingly obvious.” 28
Leavis’s construal of Shaw as overly committed to ideals of reason immediately positions him
against modern conceptions of humans as fundamentally unreasonable that proved so influential
on modernist aesthetics. And his and Williams’s shared critique of the lack of emotional depth in
Shaw’s plays similarly positions Shaw as antithetical to modernist depictions of interiority and
intensely felt subjectivity. Taken together, Leavis and Williams’s criticisms amount to
accusations that Shaw is not a modernist—a charge that was equal, in the mid-century, to saying
that he is not worth reading or engaging with.
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That Leavis’s dismissal of Shaw comes from an essay on Lawrence emphasizes that
much of this critical dismissal comes from following the lead of modernist writers. As Lawrence
Switzky writes, “many English modernists saw Shaw less as a chameleon than as a relic, a
malingering Victorian.”29 Along with Lawrence—in a rare point of agreement—T.S. Eliot also
worked to “[oust Shaw] from the country club of experimental formalism,” decrying the
protagonist of Saint Joan as “a ‘great middleclass reformer’ and ‘a disciple of Nietzsche, Butler
and every chaotic and immature intellectual enthusiasm of the later nineteenth century,’” a
reading that amounts to “a broadside against Shaw himself.”30 Switzky goes on to outline the
considerable animosity between Shaw and Wyndham Lewis, relating an encounter where Shaw,
acting as Chair for a lecture series on “Modern Tendencies in Art,” embarrassed Lewis by
“put[ting] on and [taking] off four different pairs of glasses” to distract him during Lewis’s twohour lecture, repeatedly referring to him as “Mr. Wyndfield Lewis,” and publicly humiliating him
after his lecture “by calling attention to ‘the regrettable conditions of democratic society which
force an artist to spend his time talking about his art.’” 31 Lewis and his friend Ezra Pound did not
take this demonstration lying down: in the first page of the first issue of Blast, Pound and
Lewis’s vorticist manifesto, the authors reserve a special “blast” for “a ‘London Coliseum
Socialist-Playwright,’ usually identified by critics as Shaw.” 32 In the context of my argument in
Chapter 1, it is clear that at least part of Shaw’s exclusion from the modernist canon can be laid
at the feet of this group of modernist writers—with Joyce, identified in Lewis’s phrase as “the
men of 1914”33—led by Eliot in shaping that canon in their own image.
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Other modernists, however, took a more favorable view of Shaw. One example is
Virginia Woolf, in her essay “Character in Fiction” (1924). In this less-familiar version of “Mr.
Bennet and Mrs. Brown,” Woolf follows her “arbitrary” dating of the beginning of modernism in
“about the year 1910” by identifying the shift in literature as beginning “in the books of Samuel
Butler, in The Way of All Flesh in particular” and asserting that “the plays of Bernard Shaw
continue to record it.”34 Woolf’s designation of Shaw’s work as reflecting the shift in human
nature that she identifies with the modernist writing she and her contemporaries are continuing to
produce inaugurates a critical tradition that goes against that established by Leavis and Williams.
Switzky, in turn, cites W.B. Yeats as another modernist whose comments on Shaw provide a
direct counterpoint to the specific critiques raised by Leavis and Williams. Yeats, too, finds
Shaw’s work lacking in emotional depth, but differs from these later critics by not equating such
depth with literary value. Rather, Yeats views Shaw through the lens of Vorticism, and
especially in comparison with Jacob Epstein’s sculpture Rock Drill, with its “prewar…
glorification of the machine,” a perspective that he equates with “what he takes to be the
dehumanizing aspects of Shaw’s playwriting.” In Switzky’s analysis,
Vorticism conferred legibility on Shaw’s maneuvers for Yeats, serving as shorthand for
the paradoxical combination of exuberance and mechanicity he perceived in Shaw’s
work. While Yeats considered Shaw a politically effective thinker, he lacked the
exploration of alienated subjectivity, and its concomitant emotional outpourings, that
Yeats frequently championed. Yeats’s comparison of Shaw to a famous Vorticist
sculpture both clarifies and mystifies Shaw, accentuating certain aspects of his art
through the use of a ready-made category while effacing others. 35
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In other words, we can see Yeats’s comparison of Shaw to the Vorticists as apt and perhaps even
prescient in certain ways and obviously limited in others: especially formally, there is essentially
no basis for comparison between Shaw and Lewis or Pound.
This conundrum brings us back to the definition of modernism I offered in my
introduction: a sensibility, spurred by a sense of crisis time and time in crisis, resulting in a wide
variety of formal experiments. In this context, that Shaw may share some of the sensibilities that
inspired Vorticism while sharing none of the formal aspects of Vorticist art should not be
surprising. But it also seems clear that even if Shaw shared with the Vorticists “a combination of
exuberance and mechanicity” that his animosity toward Lewis and Pound (and vice versa) stems
from more than merely formal differences. Switzky makes a compelling argument on this count
that helps Shaw come into focus as a writer intensely interested in some of the central
provocations that drove modernism: the manifest failures of progress narratives in the Victorian
era and the sense of the present as a moment containing revolutionary potential at every turn. For
Switzky, Shaw stands, in part due to “his own personal longevity,” as “a figure both inside and
outside the teleological narratives of modernism, both a Fabian bureaucrat and a militant
counterinsurgent in the avant-garde.”36 Importantly, though, Shaw was intensely conscious of his
temporal position. Switzky argues that this is the most important thing to consider in evaluating
Shaw: “what we must attend to in discussions of Shaw’s plays and his self-fashioning is how
deliberately Shaw leveraged his perceived untimeliness.” In Switzky’s estimation, Shaw in the
teens and twenties was speaking “for a future that was projected from some point in the past: a
retro-future that claims equal viability with the ‘futures’ of the present, or those who claimed to
speak for the present”—a perspective that he describes in a wonderful phrase as “an outdated
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Futurism.” But it is ultimately Shaw’s play with this temporal positioning—his “gamesmanship
with time and contemporaneity”—that makes him legible as a modernist. 37
Unlike Switzky, I am not centrally concerned with placing Shaw within the context of
Futurism or Vorticism in this chapter, but his essay is useful both in establishing some grounds
for including Shaw in the modernist canon and for explicating his critical engagement with these
modernist movements. Ultimately, in Switzky’s analysis, Shaw is interested in adopting a
position of “untimeliness” as a way to critique what he sees as Futurism and Vorticism’s naïve
beliefs in progress. This perspective goes against some conventional wisdom on modernism,
which is frequently construed as a rejection of progress narratives, but Futurism and Vorticism
do rely on glorifications of machines, and a conception of themselves as being able to jolt or
“blast” contemporary society into a present moment that is “better,” more alive, more vital. For
Shaw, even as he revels in the revolutionary potential of the machine, the failures of his Fabian
economic theories to make material differences in English society show that that potential is very
likely hollow. As he remarks in a 1933 note on his original preface to Mrs Warren’s Profession,
“It is amazing how the grossest abuses thrive on their reputation for being old unhappy far-off
things in an age of imaginary progress.”38 Ultimately, then, Shaw’s vision of “a future that was
projected from some point in the past” is tied directly to his economic theory, and his growing
frustration with the ineffectiveness of those theories.
Framing the question of Shaw’s relation to modernism in this way allows us to see him as
an exemplary Modernist Amateur Economist. Indeed, in this account, Shaw’s modernism inheres
largely in the pervasiveness of his amateur economic theorization in his literary
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experimentation—the details of which I will discuss below. And yet, my formulation here raises
the question: if Shaw’s modernism comes from his economic theorization, in what sense is
“amateur” a necessary third point in Shaw’s case? If, as I have established in my first chapter,
Modernist Amateur Economists are thinking of “amateur” in the sense of “public intellectual” or
“Victorian sage,” it would make sense that Shaw, himself a contemporary of those sages, would
approach socialist economics in this way. And, as we shall see, his early economic writings are
clearly coming from a perspective in which he has no doubts about his own authority on the
issues he is discussing, despite his lack of formal education on economics. The second half of
this equation, though, is my claim that the central unifying characteristic of the Modernist
Amateur Economist is an insistence that economic questions not be abstracted away from the
social and cultural matrices that shape and define them. What, then, are the specifics of the larger
discursive field within which Shaw wants to situate economics?
Put simply, my answer to this question is “continental philosophy,” and specifically many
of those philosophers who are routinely cited as important influences on modernism: Nietzsche,
Schopenhauer, and Bergson, for starters. In Shaw’s case, we must also add the two most
important dramatist-philosophers of the period, Ibsen and Wagner, not to mention the
Englishman Darwin. Indeed, much of Shaw’s interest in continental philosophy can be seen
through the lens of his obsession with evolutionary theory, spurred by Darwin but quickly
encompassing a range of continental attempts to incorporate Darwin’s theories into larger
philosophical treatises. John R. Pfeiffer positions evolutionary theory as “the founding trope for
Shaw’s ideas and beliefs about mankind” and provides a representative list of works of
continental philosophy that helped shape Shaw’s idiosyncratic engagement with that theory:
“Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s Zoological Philosophy: Exposition with Regard to the Natural History
137

of Animals (1809-30); Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea (1818-1844);
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883-5); Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1907);
and Emmanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1887).”39 Shaw’s explicit disavowal
notwithstanding,40 his debts to these continental philosophers are obvious and pervasive. From
the titles of some of his plays—i.e. Man and Superman—to book-length essays on Ibsen (The
Quintessence of Ibsenism) and Wagner (The Perfect Wagnerite), to his constant emphasis on
eugenics and human evolution, each of these important European figures contributes to the
backdrop against which Shaw works through economic questions in his plays and essays.
A consideration of two of Shaw’s major economic writings, one early and one late in his
career, will help show how Shaw’s interest in continental philosophy helped shape his amateur
economic theorization. The first is Shaw’s essay “Economic” in the volume Fabian Essays in
Socialism, which he edited in 1894.41 On the surface, the essay is Shaw’s attempt to explain the
economic basis of Fabian socialism in layman’s terms—a perspective that puts Shaw in the role
of expert, explaining economic theory to the uninitiated. But if we pay close attention to Shaw’s
method of explaining Fabian economics, as well as the intellectual framework in which he
situates it, we can see the Shaw of “Economics” as the public intellectual; the amateur.
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This sense comes through first in Shaw’s attempts to contextualize Fabian economics
within the field as it stood in 1894. While Shaw toes the Fabian party line in situating Fabian
economic theory within the lineage of neoclassical economics and especially marginal analysis,
his essay consistently reads as the work of someone who has been told which books to read but
not trained to understand what he will find there—as the work of an amateur. Thus, while Shaw
cites an array of classical and neoclassical economists by name—specifically Mill, Fawcett,
Marshall, Sidgwick, Ricardo, and Smith—his critiques of neoclassical theory remain rhetorical
rather than technical in nature, as he concludes dramatically that “[t]he science of the production
and distribution of wealth is Political Economy. Socialism appeals to that science, and, turning
on Individualism its own guns, routs it in incurable disaster.” 42 Shaw’s invocation of “science” is
pure rhetoric: there is no attempt in his essay to be “scientific.” He is merely deploying the word
here for its connotations of authority, objectivity, and, ultimately, professionalism.
This sense of economic amateurism deepens as we pay more attention to the formal
aspects of Shaw’s argument. In formal terms, then, Shaw diverges widely from contemporary
economic theory (such as Marshall’s) in employing extensive literary and rhetorical techniques
to make his points, rather than mathematical models or theoretically abstract “principles.” While
economics has always included some narrative elements—indeed much contemporary work on
“the rhetoric of economics” insists on this point43—Shaw’s use of literary techniques goes
beyond the norms of the discipline. Moreover, Shaw’s reliance on literary techniques is
connected directly to his use of continental philosophy, as the narratives and metaphors he uses
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to make his economic points seem irresistibly to bring in his other philosophical interests as well.
All told, the narrative-based, philosophically-backed nature of Shaw’s essay helps establish it as
the work of an amateur, while also offering an early-career example of Shaw’s devoted interest
in resisting the abstraction of economic theory out of the social context in which it properly
belongs.
An example from early in the essay will help show what I mean. Shaw begins his
argument in an explicitly narrative mode by introducing the character of Adam. Shaw’s Adam is
from the beginning both the biblical Adam and Adam Smith: “Imagine then the arrival of the
first colonist, the original Adam, developed by centuries of civilization into an Adam Smith,
prospecting for a suitable patch of Private Property.” 44 Shaw belabors this comparison, going on
to describe “other Adams” who “bring their Cains and Abels, who do not murder one another,
but merely pre-empt adjacent patches [of land].”45 This short, pointed reframing of the Fall in
terms of the rise of capitalism introduces a complex sub-narrative about the then-popular
obsession with cultural decadence that Shaw pursues in parallel with his more properly economic
arguments. This theme becomes explicit later in the essay when Shaw discusses decadence in
relation to the socialist theory he is advancing: “That our own civilization is already in an
advanced stage of rottenness may be taken as statistically proved. That further decay instead of
improvement must ensue if the institutions of private property be maintained is economically
certain.”46 From the very beginning, then, we see Shaw using powerful literary methods of
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narrativization and mythmaking to combine his presentation of economic concepts with current
social criticism and theory.
Having written this narrative allegory, Shaw strengthens the triangulation of the Fall, the
rise of capitalism (and of capitalist economic theory), and the cultural decadence of the 1890s
that emerge from that allegory by deploying another literary method: manipulating Adam
Smith’s famous image of the invisible hand. Interestingly, Shaw recontextualizes this image in
terms of the greatest moment of cultural rupture that has occurred since 1776: the publication
and popularization of Darwin’s theory of evolution. Shaw writes:
It was pleasant to believe that a benevolent hand was guiding the steps of society;
overruling all evil appearances for good; and making poverty here the earnest of a great
blessedness and reward hereafter… But utilitarian questioning and scientific answering
turned all this tranquil optimism into the blackest pessimism. Nature was shewn to us as
‘red in tooth and claw’: if the guiding hand were indeed benevolent, then it could not be
omnipotent; so that our trust in it was broken: if it were omnipotent, it could not be
benevolent; so that our love of it turned to fear and hatred. 47
Here Shaw begins with Smith’s conception of the Invisible Hand as the hand of God and
immediately conflates it with Darwin’s theories of natural selection. Of course, these two
concepts were at this time considered to be utterly at odds with each other, and Shaw is working
the uneasiness of their conjunction here. Indeed, Shaw’s point is that Darwin’s theory of
evolution should have obliterated any conception of the natural world—or political economy—as
running along lines laid out for it by the hand of God; that “the Invisible Hand” remains a
powerful cultural symbol must, then, point to some measure of intellectual dishonesty.
Who is to blame for the persistence of “the Invisible Hand” and its companion, laissezfaire economics? Shaw does not leave us in suspense for long: it’s “the old school of political
47
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economists.”48 In Shaw’s analysis, these mainstream economists, perceiving the threat posed to
their hold on the discipline by the death of God and the widespread acceptance of evolutionary
theory, quickly worked to re-define Smith’s “Invisible Hand.” No longer was that hand the hand
of God, it was now the hand of Nature; “Nature at it again—the struggle for existence—the
remorseless extirpation of the weak—the survival of the fittest—in short, natural selection at
work.” In applying Darwin’s terms to the “ecosystem” of the modern capitalist economy, “the
old school of political economists,” in Shaw’s analysis, attempted to prove that socialism was
“too good to be true: it was…merely the old optimism foolishly running its head against the
stone wall of modern science.” 49 In the face of this state of things, Shaw, speaking for the
Fabians, insists that the neoclassical school is using a false comparison. While nature may run
according to the laws of evolution, the form of human society is a product of human choices:
“there is no cruelty and selfishness outside Man himself; and…his own active benevolence can
combat and vanquish both.”50 This, for Shaw, is the promise of Fabian socialism: that humans
can, to a great extent, control their own evolution.51
On the surface, the point Shaw is making here is that mainstream economists have
cynically used the cultural impact of Darwin’s theories not to revise an economic theory that is
now based on a false premise (the existence of God and of a just afterlife), but rather to double
down on the (obsolete) principles of the free market. But of course Shaw is also writing to an
audience that is very much still in the throes of working through this major cultural-religious
upheaval (a struggle to which he nods in his quote of Tennyson’s famous statement of
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ambivalence on this issue, “nature red in tooth and claw”). Shaw thus leverages his audience’s
feelings of anger at economists’ dishonest use of Darwin, hoping to persuade them to accept the
position on Christianity vs. Darwin on which his version of socialism rests: that while Darwin’s
theories hold true for nature, humans are able to rise above the principles of natural selection and
make their own decisions. In the end, Shaw’s argument for socialist economics amounts to an
emotional appeal that he brings about by working literary and rhetorical techniques of narrative,
allusion, and metaphor, rather than a technical argument that relies on well-defined principles
and straightforward argumentation.
Another way of making this last point is to say that Shaw’s argument in “Economic” is at
least in part made through purely formal methods. But one of my main points in reading this
essay is that Shaw’s repeated appeals to Darwin here are not typical of the Fabian society writ
large; they are his own philosophical interests, here combined with Fabian economic theory to
produce something new. Focusing on the way Shaw is deploying Darwin and evolutionary
theory here helps us see how the combination of a heterodox economic theory with one of
Shaw’s idiosyncratic, modernist interests makes a concrete difference to how that theory is
represented. But Darwin is only one of the philosophical influences that Shaw brings to bear on
his understanding of Fabian socialist theory—as my reference to Nietzsche’s concept of the
death of God begins to suggest in the context of this early essay. By blending his economic
analysis with post-Darwinian cultural studies, moral philosophy, economic history, and literary
analysis, Shaw puts his amateurism on display. At the same time, however, this effort to
synthesize several different methodologies and bodies of knowledge—some Fabian, some not—
suggests from the very beginning the often-conflicting range of intellectual interests that would
lead Shaw to abandon the Fabian society in the second decade of the twentieth century.
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Although my reading of the conjunction of Shaw’s evolutionary and economic theories
has begun to suggest why he eventually found Fabian economic orthodoxy to be at odds with his
own beliefs, the true keynote of Shaw’s post-Fabian economic theory was his concept of equality
of income. After resigning from the executive of the Fabian Society in 1911, Shaw would
expound this theory in great detail in 1928 in The Intelligent Women’s Guide to Socialism and
Capitalism. Where the Fabian Society was interested in creating equality of opportunity—a
phrase Shaw deplored52—through parliamentary action and the legislative creation of social
welfare programs, Shaw proposes in The Guide the much more radical plan of redistributing
income from the rich to the poor such that all incomes in England would be equal. This is a
political as well as an economic difference: Shaw’s plan would have involved a shift to a much
more centralized form of government than would have the Fabian society’s, but the economic
goals of the respective policies are also clearly different. As Shaw himself obliquely puts it in his
discussion of trade unions,53 the Fabian society’s plans would have amounted to achieving a
form of capitalism that was controlled to a greater degree by workers than by capitalists. His
plan, on the other hand, would effectively eliminate capitalists and capitalism entirely. 54
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While Shaw’s radical version of income equality may suggest a sort of ideal version of
economic democracy, in reality the Guide begins to hint at the sharply anti-democratic turn that
Shaw—anticipating other Modernist Amateur Economists—would take in the late twenties and
early thirties.55 This direction of Shaw’s thought comes through in a growing distrust of the
ability of ordinary people to make sound economic and policy decisions and in his openness to
both eugenics (the inevitable outcome of his earlier interests in “creative evolution”) and statesponsored violence. The first of these tendencies finds its clearest expression in Shaw’s chapter
entitled “Why We Put Up With It.”56 “Taking it in the lump,” Shaw writes, “I should say that the
evil of the corruption and falsification of law, religion, education, and public opinion is so
enormous that the minds of ordinary people are unable to grasp it, whereas they easily and
eagerly grasp the petty benefits with which it is associated.” 57 Shaw’s implication here is clear:
“the minds of ordinary people” are not fit to have a say in their own government, since they
cannot comprehend the stakes of the issues about which they are voting. This anti-democratic
thread continues throughout the volume, culminating in the section “Current Confusions,” in
which Shaw unabashedly holds up the “Discipline for Everybody and Votes for Nobody”
systems in Spain, Italy, and Russia as inevitable, rational, and even desirable “reactions of
disgust with democracy.”58 The tone of this chapter—the penultimate of the book—conveys
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Shaw’s frustration with democracy even more clearly than this quote does, as he cautions his
imagined audience of “Intelligent Women” that his book will likely cause them to be “irritated”
at every turn by “the newspapers and…commonplaces of conversation on the subject” of
economics and politics.59 This “irritation” is of course Shaw’s own.
I devote some space to Shaw’s anti-democratic politics in this discussion of his
economics for two main reasons. First, there is a clear link between Shaw’s turn to
totalitarianism and his frustration (or “irritation”) with the fact that his economic theories have
been largely ignored—and certainly not implemented in any systematic way. And second,
several of the Modernist Amateur Economists that I examine in this dissertation seem to arrive at
this point: that the mass of the people is simply too stupid, too easily swayed by essentially
irrelevant concerns, for radical economic changes ever to be implemented. Pound is the famous
example, but Eliot also adopts anti-democratic positions, as does Orage, albeit to a lesser degree.
The counter-examples of Woolf and Keynes do much to decouple Modernist Economic
Amateurism from Totalitarianism, but the parallels between figures like Shaw and Pound are too
striking to ignore completely in this dissertation. More specifically, as I turn to a consideration of
some of Shaw’s dramatic works, I want to suggest that there is a connection between the
aesthetic imperative to represent economic concerns within literary works, an amateur
understanding of economics, and a tendency toward totalitarian politics. Now, this trajectory
should not be taken as inevitable: Shaw did not have to support Stalin or Hitler simply because
he became interested in a heterodox economic theory in his relative youth. The relationship
between Shaw’s art and his totalitarian politics is complex, has been discussed extensively
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elsewhere,60 and is ultimately out of my scope here. Nevertheless, one contribution that I seek to
make here is in helping us perceive the economic element of these totalitarian political leanings
that mark much of British modernism. Taking Shaw as an exemplary case, specifically in the
context of his literary works, can help us make new connections and come to a fuller
understanding of the dark side of modernism.61

Shaw, Wagner, and Modernist Amateur Economics
Thus far, I have argued that Shaw’s amateur economic theory emerged primarily through
his combination of continental philosophy and Fabian socialism and, further, that that
combination is in part responsible for Shaw’s eventual turn to totalitarian politics. In the context
of the non-fiction works I have considered thus far, that trajectory has been fairly
straightforward, and it has been clear that and how Shaw should be classified as an amateur
economist. Moreover, my discussion of Shaw’s unique blend of interests and discursive fields, as
well as his engagements with other modernists, have established how we might see Shaw as a
modernist. As I turn now to a reading of some of Shaw’s plays, my main objective is to bring
these three terms—Modernist Amateur Economist—together in the way I have defined it thus far
in this dissertation. Specifically, I want to show how Shaw, in bringing his economic theories
into his literary writings, and in combining them with these elements of continental philosophy
that I have discussed, uses his dramas as creative spaces that both help him develop his economic
ideas and frequently raise more questions than they provide answers. 62 It is this dynamic, in
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which Shaw brings his modernist aesthetic practices to bear on his economic theories, thereby
pushing those theories in new and often unexpected directions, that allows us to see him most
clearly as a Modernist Amateur Economist.
As we move from Shaw’s prose to his plays, then, it is appropriate to consider two of his
principle dramatic influences, Ibsen and Wagner, both of whom stand as important contributors
to continental philosophy as well as to European drama. Shaw’s plays readily exhibit Ibsen’s
influence: his “discussion plays” are clearly formally similar to Ibsen’s “problem plays,” which
enact often ambivalent considerations of specific social problems, such as traditional gender
roles within marriage in A Doll’s House. On the other hand, Shaw’s plays would seem to bear
very little resemblance to Wagner’s grandiose operatic spectacles such as The Ring Cycle.
However, Shaw’s book-length essays The Quintessence of Ibsenism (1891) and The Perfect
Wagnerite (1898) establish that he viewed himself in the context of these continental progenitors,
encouraging us to read his plays in part as interpretations or extensions of their works. 63 While
Wagner is usually subordinated to Ibsen in discussions of Shaw’s dramatic influences, 64 I argue
that focusing on Wagner is more useful to a consideration of Shaw as a modernist playwright.
Specifically, approaching Shaw’s dramatic output through the lens of Wagner’s concept of
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Gesamtkunstwerk, the Synthetic or Total Art Work, helps us see Shaw’s combination of
philosophy, economics, and dramatic influences as meaningfully modernist.
This point begins to emerge in Shaw’s The Perfect Wagnerite, which represents Shaw’s
attempt to read Wagner’s Ring Cycle as a socialist critique of capitalism. The essay itself thus
stands as another example of the kind of prose work I have examined above, as an attempt to
combine two apparently distinct discursive fields, Fabian socialism and Wagnerian aesthetics.
But, as Christopher Innes argues, The Perfect Wagnerite is not merely a work of literary
criticism, fully separable from Shaw’s own literary writing. Instead, it provides a theorization of
Wagner’s cycle that Shaw was in the process of carrying through in his own dramatic
production. Where The Perfect Wagnerite aims to abstract Wagner’s operas as socialist
commentary, in Innes’s reading, Shaw’s plays Widower’s Houses (1892), Mrs Warren’s
Profession (1893), Major Barbara (1905), and Heartbreak House (1919) endeavor to translate
that commentary into the context of contemporary England, as pastiches of the four operas that
make up the Ring Cycle.65 For Innes, in these plays, “where Wagner’s mythical Gods, Giants,
Dwarves and Human Heroes refer indirectly to the social structure of nineteenth-century
industrial capitalism, Shaw’s modern plutocrats, arms manufacturers and shareholders relate subtextually to the archetypal figures of Wagner’s Ring.” As a result, “[t]he effect of Shaw’s
parallels is to emphasize that the realistic and contemporary individuals in his plays have a wider
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status. Glimpsing their mythic aura, we see them as representatives of Capitalism. They become
no less significant in the history of humanity than Wagner’s superhuman beings are in the rise
and fall of the whole of creation.”66
Shaw’s attempt to imbue his characters with a “mythic aura” that reaches far beyond the
specifics of their situations within the play and establishes them simultaneously as
“representatives of Capitalism” and actors in a sweeping picture of “the history of humanity”
irresistibly calls up the concept with which Wagner is most famously associated: the
Gesamtkunstwerk. Innes’s comparison between The Ring Cycle—itself Wagner’s most ambitious
version of the Gesamtkunstwerk—and some of Shaw’s best-known plays allows us to see them
as more modernist than they might appear at first glance. At the same time, as Shaw’s reading of
The Ring Cycle begins to suggest, his insistence on including socialist economics in his versions
of the Gesamtkunstwerk shows us how Shaw is adapting Wagner’s concept to further his own
Modernist Amateur Economic project—allowing us to see the Gesamtkunstwerk as yet another
piece of the broader discursive field in which Shaw is situating his heterodox economic theory.
Wagner’s concept thus becomes both a lens through which to view and understand Shaw’s work
and a piece of Shaw’s own attempts to synthesize aspects of traditionally separate discursive
fields.
Before we get to Shaw’s take on Gesamtkunstwerk, however, it is important to define and
unpack the term a bit. In his discussion of the Gesamtkunstwerk in The Cambridge History of
Modernism, Lutz Koepnick defines the term as representing Wagner’s ambition “to join music,
dance, and poetry into compelling spectacles” in an effort “to transform the production and
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consumption of art into a sacred ritual located outside of the routines of modern industrial life.” 67
The purpose of such aesthetic projects, Koepnick writes, was “to contest the perceptual
structures, products, and institutions of modern life.” 68 As the term developed, the specific
combination of media would prove to be less important than this overall aim to interrogate the
conditions of modernity through the act of combination or synthesis of different aesthetic forms.
The result was a range of attempts in different media and aesthetic fields to create works of art
that represented the totality of a society or of human experience, always in relation to the very
present moment. In modernist literature, one thinks of projects like Joyce’s Ulysses, which seeks
to capture the totality of human experience in one day in Dublin. Filtered through the archetypal
forms of The Odyssey and drawing on aspects of deep time and ancient history, Joyce’s novel
nevertheless maintains a hyper-focus on the immediate present as experienced by Bloom,
Stephen, and Molly. Another example is Pound’s project in The Cantos, with its attempt to
compile more and more historical data, “luminous details,” in an effort to capture the totality of
human experience as it bears on the present moment. In the context of Shaw, Back to Methuselah
is perhaps most readily comprehensible as a Gesamtkunstwerk. Shaw’s “metabiological
Pentateuch” is comprised of a series of five interrelated plays, to be performed together, which
engage heavily with Shaw’s evolutionary theory, spanning human history from Adam and Eve to
30,000 years in the future, all while centering on the potentials for human evolution contained
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within the present moment.69 Considered in these terms, it is clear why the concept of
Gesamtkunstwerk is frequently construed as central to modernist aesthetics.
Koepnick makes this claim directly, observing that while Wagner belongs to the
historical moment just before modernism,
nothing could be more erroneous than to relegate the Gesamtkunstwerk to the mere
prehistory of modernism or to see it as a flight from modernism’s acute engagement with
the present, its programmatic awareness of the Now. The dream of the Gesamtkunstwerk
instead figured as a decisive switchboard of various modernist agendas and selfdefinitions. It illuminates how modernism, by negotiating the dialectics of art and
technology, of the aesthetic and the political, of high art and modern mass culture,
aspired to couple artistic experimentation to social reform and to reshape the present in
the name of a different future. To understand the Gesamtkunstwerk in and across time is
to delve deeply into the history and memory of modernism. It helps focalize the
aspirational drive of many different modernist projects, as much as it allows us to map
the deep-seated desire among modernists to explore aesthetic experience as a response to
the problems of industrial modernity.70
What I want to emphasize here is the degree to which the Gesamtkunstwerk insists on the
inextricability of politics and aesthetics. What is more, as Koepnick suggests, it is the “problems
of industrial modernity” that inspires these modernist, aesthetic experiments. The economic note
of this formulation—“industrial”—points to one of the root causes for the flourishing of
Modernist Amateur Economics that I have also discussed in Chapter 1: the increasingly pressing
nature of specifically economic problems in the period (and the failure of orthodox economists to
address those problems). In this context, we can see how the Gesamtkunstwerk offered an
aesthetic model for literary figures interested in integrating economic theorization into their
Modernist Amateur Economic writings.
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The Gesamtkunstwerk also helps explain the frequent link between Modernist Amateur
Economics and anti-democratic politics, which we can see most readily in the terminological
slippage between the most common translation of “gesamt” as “total” and the totalitarian
political movements that swept Europe in the twenties and thirties. The Gesamtkunstwerk’s
association with Wagner, whose antisemitism and German triumphalism has led to frequent
discussions of him as a source of inspiration for the Nazis, has strengthened this connection. As
Koepnick observes, the concept of the synthetic or total artwork found some of its most effective
uses in fascist propaganda, and “no story of the Gesamtkunstwerk…is complete without
discussing how twentieth-century totalitarianism…embraced the full array of modern media to
manipulate minds and engineer politically effective emotions.” 71 In a critical tradition that has
persisted in conceiving of modernist aesthetics as linked to progressive politics, these
connections between modernist Gesamtkunstwerks and totalitarian regimes has led to various
attempts to minimize the importance of the concept to modernism. The two most foundational
treatments of modernism and the Gesamtkunstwerk, Clement Greenberg’s and Theodor
Adorno’s, both argue for this understanding, albeit in nearly opposite directions. For Greenberg,
the term Gesamtkunstwerk should not and indeed cannot be applied to modernism, which is
fundamentally concerned with media specialization—not synthesis. For Adorno, the
Gesamtkunstwerk, as Wagner conceived of it, does not offer a strong enough challenge to
modern industrial capitalism, and attempts to think of modernism in terms of Gesamtkunstwerk
are contributions to the critical and corporate trend of assimilating modernism into “The Culture
Industry.”72
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If we apply some pressure to these arguments, however, it becomes apparent that neither
of these rejections of Gesamtkunstwerk hold much water. Greenberg rejects the term based on an
untenable definition of modernism as interested only in media specialization; Adorno does the
same on the basis of his conception of modernism as in some sense fundamentally anti-capitalist
and indeed Marxist. As Keopnick observes, both Greenberg and Adorno are objecting to
thinking of modernism in relation to Gesamtkunstwerk out of “the rather naïve belief that
modernist aesthetic practice would automatically entail politically progressive stances and could
not associate itself with calamitous movements such as fascism or Stalinism.” In the context of
this chapter on Shaw, who associated himself with both fascism and Stalinism, I would join
Koepnick in stating that we must “abandon the cherished assumption that modernism, by
producing aesthetically innovative and formally reflexive objects, was always already on the side
of progressive politics,” with the result that we will be able to “count late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century experiments with converging different media and cross-wiring separate
channels of sensory perception as modernist, whether we like the political outcome or alliance of
these aesthetic projects or not.”73 Taking this approach allows us as well to see some clear links
between the art of a modernist like Shaw (or, later, Pound) and his political and economic
commitments.
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One implication of Koepnick’s last phrase here—“whether we like the political outcome
or alliance of these aesthetic projects or not”—is that it is important to avoid any definitive claim
about the politics of Gesamtkunstwerk: while Adorno and Greenberg may be wrong that all
modernist works must support progressive politics, it would be equally wrong to say that they all
support totalitarian ones. As I suggested with my reading of Williams in my introduction, letting
go of a conception of modernism or of the Gesamtkunstwerk as having a pre-defined, consistent
politics allows us to pay more attention to the particulars of what’s going on with specific
modernists and specific works. Freeing ourselves from an understanding of Gesamtkunstwerk as
fundamentally political or fundamentally totalitarian allows us to see it as an aesthetic aspiration
or paradigm and to dig into some of the individual strands that necessarily make up these
complex, synthetic works. Given my focus on economic theory here, approaching some of
Shaw’s literary works through the lens of the Gesamtkunstwerk can help us see how those works
embody certain modernist aesthetics and how those ideals, for Shaw, are inextricable from his
Modernist Amateur Economic theorization.
If the keynote of the Gesamtkunstwerk is synthesis, we can see Shaw’s dramatic writings
as synthesizing in a few different ways. The first is in his synthesis of ideas. As I have argued in
this chapter, Shaw’s Modernist Amateur Economic practice centers on his commitment to
contextualizing his economic theories in the larger discursive field of continental philosophy.
The extent to which that contextualization happens within his literary production embodies the
aspirations of the Gesamtkunstwerk. But Shaw’s drama, in unrecognized ways, embodies the
form of the Gesamtkunstwerk as well. While he does not mix poetry, dance, and music, Shaw is
constantly mixing literary genres and registers in his plays. The most famous example is Man
and Superman, in which the third act, “Don Juan in Hell,” breaks entirely from the rest of the
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play to represent a debate between Don Juan and the Devil, after which the play continues as if
uninterrupted in the fourth act. The change in registers and indeed genres is so abrupt that the
play is usually performed without this act. But while the extreme nature of Act III of Man and
Superman causes it to stand out from Shaw’s other works, it is indicative of broader tendencies
in his playwrighting practice. Shaw is known for his impossibly detailed stage directions, which
sometimes take up full pages of the printed text, as well as for his proclivity for writing extended
speeches and philosophical discussions. That said, he is also remembered as a great comedic
dramatist, and some of the comedy of his plays comes from the mixture of comedic elements
with these philosophical discourses. The primary example of this dynamic is Pygmalion, but it is
in many ways central to his dramatic practice. Finally, the science fiction and meta-theatrical
elements of Back to Methuselah offer yet another example of generic and formal variation—and
combination—in Shaw’s works.
Another striking way in which Shaw’s drama works with the concept of synthesis is in
his “discussion plays.” As I have noted, most critics point to this aspect of Shaw’s drama as
showing the influence of Ibsen, and indeed, he follows Ibsen in using his dramatic works to work
through social problems on stage. However, Shaw’s discussion plays represent an innovation on
Ibsen.74 Where Ibsen is frequently most interested in making a particular point with his plays,
Shaw is nearly as interested in presenting multiple sides in any given issue. Shaw makes this
point explicitly in his preface to Plays Pleasant:
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But the obvious conflicts of unmistakeable good with unmistakeable evil can only supply
the crude drama of villain and hero, in which some absolute point of view is taken, and
the dissentients are treated by the dramatist as enemies to be piously glorified or
indignantly vilified. In such cheap wares I do not deal. Even in my unpleasant
propagandist plays I have allowed every person his or her own point of view, and have, I
hope, to the full extent of my understanding of him, been as sympathetic with Sir George
Crofts [an unsavory character in Mrs Warren’s Profession] as with any of the more genial
and popular characters in the present volume. 75
The result of this commitment to presenting his characters not as fully reducible to points of view
but as humans “to the full extent” of Shaw’s “understanding,” is that Shaw’s discussion plays,
even if he thinks of them as “propagandist,” frequently take on a complexity and a depth that go
beyond more straightforwardly socialist plays of his contemporaries, such as Harley GranvilleBarker or John Galsworthy.
Two of the best examples of the dynamic I am describing are Major Barbara (1905) and
Mrs. Warren’s Profession (1893). Brief summaries of these two plays suggest their Fabian roots:
the former involves a critique of the state’s failure to care for the poor, a failure that shifts the
burden onto the evangelical Salvation Army. The latter, Shaw’s most infamous play, is, at its
heart, a critique of the economic conditions that lead to prostitution and, more controversially, an
effort to compare all labor to prostitution. Had these plays been written by Galsworthy, this is all
they would have been. But Shaw was not interested in merely presenting simple socialist morals.
Both Major Barbara and Mrs. Warren’s Profession confound their initial socialist messages by
having their heroines, Barbara and Vivie, come to distinctly un-socialist conclusions. Having
witnessed her previously principled fiancé Adolphus Cusins accept her father’s offer to become
his successor at his munitions factory, Barbara decides to abandon her Salvation Army post and
instead devote her energies to converting her father’s employees to Christianity—revealing that
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her motivations are religious and not socialist. Vivie, meanwhile, rejects her mother’s overtures
of reconciliation and takes an office job in London, effectively refusing the implications of her
mother’s economic analysis. Again and again, Shaw uses his plays not as tools to present bits of
Fabian propaganda, but as forums in which to interrogate those principles.
In the context of my discussion of the Gesamtkunstwerk, we can see this aspect of Shaw’s
discussion plays being mirrored in the form of those plays: Shaw’s attempts to synthesize genres,
registers, and discursive fields are never fully successful. The edges where these different forms
and subjects meet remain rough, visible to the naked eye. Ultimately, Shaw’s plays rarely if ever
come to tidy conclusions, both in their subject-matter and in their formal aspects. Indeed, rather
than representing the triumph of synthetic art, as was Wagner’s dream in The Ring Cycle, Shaw’s
plays showcase the failures of attempts to synthesize away these rough edges. But the point is
not that Shaw fails to meet Wagner’s standards; rather, the key takeaway from Shaw’s dramatic
practice is that through the process of discussion, of debate—between forms, between ideas—the
parameters of those debates get pushed in new directions, forcing us to consider aspects of the
issues on display that we might not have otherwise.
This dynamic illuminates Shaw’s position as Modernist Amateur Economist as well. By
putting his own Fabian socialist economic theories through this process of discussion and debate
in his plays, Shaw is pushing those theories in often unexpected directions. The results were
inevitably un-Fabian, and helped lead him in the direction I have outlined in my discussion of
The Intelligent Woman’s Guide, toward his concept of equality of income. While it is a critical
commonplace that Shaw’s socialism was important to his plays, the reverse has only rarely been
stated. It forms one of the argumentative threads of Charles A. Carpenter’s Bernard Shaw as
Artist-Fabian, as summarized by R.F. Dietrich in his preface: “Shaw’s approach to socialism was
158

like his approach to everything else, that of an artist, first and foremost, and that he was an artist
as a socialist accounts for all the surprising ‘curves’ in the manner in which he presented
socialism.”76 We can see it implicitly, too, in Beatrice Webb’s avowed dislike of Shaw’s plays,
and her preference for Galsworthy.77 Such a preference is fully explicable when we think of
Shaw’s plays as challenging, rather than merely disseminating, Fabian socialist doctrine. Reenvisioning Shaw’s dramatic writing as a space in which he subjected his most firmly held ideals
to scrutiny and debate, rather than as a mouthpiece for Fabian propaganda, helps us see Shaw as
a dynamic figure, and his plays as works of Modernist Amateur Economic theorization.

Shaw’s Plays and Prefaces
I want now to consider a final aspect of Shaw’s writing that will crystalize all of these
points about Shaw, synthetic art, and the Modernist Amateur Economist: the strange, difficult
interaction between the plays themselves and the prefaces that accompany them. 78 Thus far, I
have considered the plays in terms of their form and content, arguing that the failures to achieve
synthesis in these two directions within the plays help us see Shaw as actively working through
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the ideas that he is presenting on the stage. When we encounter these plays in the context of their
prefaces, however, this feeling of partial synthesis and theoretical openness is further
accentuated. Shaw’s prefaces generally come across as didactic; leaning on bits of Fabian dogma
(at least in his Fabian days), Shaw inevitably uses the preface to tell the reader how to read the
play that it introduces. However, in light of the degree of nuance presented in the plays, the
didacticism of the prefaces takes on a new complexity. Moreover, although over the course of
Shaw’s career the messages contained in his prefaces shifted radically—from criticisms of
censorship and professions of Fabian doctrine in the prefaces to Plays Unpleasant and Plays
Pleasant to defenses of totalitarianism in On the Rocks, for instance—this relation between
didacticism in the prefaces and ambiguity in the play stands out as a constant.
Shaw’s explicit attempt at didacticism begins as early as the preface to his first collection
of plays, Plays Unpleasant. Shaw writes:
I must, however, warn my readers that my attacks are directed against themselves, not
against my stage figures. They cannot too thoroughly understand that the guilt of
defective social organization does not lie alone on the people who actually work the
commercial makeshifts which the defects make inevitable, and who often, like Sartorius
and Mrs Warren, display valuable executive capacities and even high moral virtues in
their administration, but with the whole body of citizens whose public opinion, public
action, and public contribution as ratepayers, alone can replace Satorius’s slums with
decent dwellings, Charteris’s intrigues with reasonable marriage contracts, and Mrs
Warren’s profession with honorable industries guarded by a humane industrial code and a
‘moral minimum’ wage.79
This statement is both a reading of the three “plays unpleasant”—Widowers’ Houses, Mrs
Warren’s Profession, and The Philanderer—and a fairly limited summary claim about what
Shaw’s purpose is in writing plays: to expose society itself rather than the individuals who make
it up as the creator of social ills. In other words, it is a moment in which Shaw is theorizing his
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own aesthetic practice. And yet at the same time it is also a gross simplification of Shaw’s
method and of his art. For while Shaw’s early plays certainly do contain an element of the Fabian
principle that the social ills they decry are essentially systemic in nature rather than being caused
by specific individuals, they are certainly not the kind of naturalist constructions the above
paragraph implies they are. Shaw’s characters are always granted a full measure of free will, and
their individual decisions within the systems he also presents form a central part of the social
criticism, not to mention the dramatic interest, of his plays.
Mrs Warren’s Profession helps illustrate the importance of the individual in Shaw’s
drama. The central figure of the play is not the Mrs. Warren of the title, but her daughter, Miss
Vivie Warren, a complex example of the New Woman. In the first act, we learn that Vivie has,
on a bet, attended Girton, one of the women’s colleges associated with Cambridge, taken the
Mathematics Tripos at Cambridge—which Girton students were allowed to do, although they
could not receive a degree—and has beaten the Third Wrangler (which is to say she has done as
well on the exam as the third-highest scorer among the men). Vivie downplays the significance
of this accomplishment, complaining in an early scene that the mathematics Tripos means
“grind, grind, grind for six to eight hours a day at mathematics, and nothing but
mathematics…Outside mathematics, lawn-tennis, eating, sleeping, cycling, and walking, I’m a
more ignorant barbarian than any woman could possibly be who hadn’t gone in for the tripos.” 80
And yet, we quickly find out, Vivie has found that this state of affairs quite suits her and that her
plan is to become a professional accountant. As she tells her mother’s friend Praed: “I like
working and getting paid for it. When I’m tired of working, I like a comfortable chair, a cigar, a
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little whisky, and a novel with a good detective story in it.” 81 Although one of the purposes of
this scene is to set up the play’s undermining of the romantic conception of women as craving
beauty and leisure—as well as the stage convention of the beautiful, frivolous heroine—it also
shows an awareness of the state of the university system in the 1890s and some of the obstacles
that system created for women trying to enter the professions.
Of course, this scene also lays the groundwork for the revelation of what Vivie’s mother
Mrs. Warren’s profession is and for her reasons for taking it up, which in turn sets off a chain of
comparisons, implicit and explicit, between marriage and prostitution, business and prostitution,
and business and marriage. This is more or less where the plot stands at the end of Act Three, at
which point it would be fair to describe the play in the way Shaw does in the preface: as an
attempt “to draw attention to the truth that prostitution is caused, not by female depravity and
male licentiousness, but simply by underpaying, undervaluing, and overworking women so
shamefully that the poorest of them are forced to resort to prostitution to keep body and soul
together,”82 and as a forceful statement that “Society, and not any individual, is the villain of the
piece.”83 But the final act of the play undermines these straightforward readings of both the
play’s theme and its message, leaving the reader without any sense of a neat conclusion.
Indeed, the crux of the play is Vivie’s rejection of her mother in the fourth act. Vivie
rejects her mother for several, somewhat contradictory reasons: she finds her and her friends
unpleasant and tiresome, she doesn’t want to be supported by prostitution, she wants to make her
own way, and she thinks her mother is conventional and wants to be meaningfully
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unconventional herself. Given that the second reason here—an abhorrence of prostitution—
would seem to be the kind of conventional response to prostitution that Shaw is attempting to
undermine in the play, this final point is surprising. And yet Vivie cites it explicitly as her reason
for casting her mother out: “If I had been you, mother, I might have done as you did; but I should
not have lived one life and believed in another. You are a conventional woman at heart. That is
why I am bidding you goodbye now.”84 This phrasing offers a potential solution to the
contradiction between Vivie’s dislike of conventionality and her prudish rejection of prostitution:
it hints that she does not disapprove of the prostitution, but of her mother’s conventional
adoption of the hypocrisy of all businessmen-and-women. But this is an uneasy resolution at
best, given Vivie’s apparent outrage in Act Three when she learns that her mother’s business is
ongoing, as well as her cutting comments in her final conversation with her mother about the
girls her mother employs.
In the end, Vivie’s rejection of her mother, combined with her enthusiastic resumption of
her accounting work, shows that the key question of the play is not, as the preface suggests, why
prostitution exists, but rather something like this: What does it mean to be an independent
woman in a capitalist, patriarchal society? Is there a “good” or “moral” option available? And,
by extension, are there “good” options for anybody, man or woman, in such a society? Vivie
would seem to offer a possible solution: in a world where all money is dirty, it is at least, as
Shaw says of Mrs Warren in the preface, “quite natural and right for [Vivie] to choose what is,
according to her lights, the least immoral alternative” 85—putting her own education (paid for, of
course, by her mother’s business) to use and supporting herself by her own labor. But it is clear
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at the end of the play that this “least immoral alternative” does not necessarily have Shaw’s full
endorsement, and that Vivie’s solution does not necessarily solve the problems of prostitution
and exploitation that he is examining in the play. And it certainly does not leave the reader with a
neat Fabian lesson, about prostitution or anything else. Ultimately, Shaw’s Vivie is a problem
rather than a solution, and Mrs Warren’s Profession is a much more complex work of literature
than the straightforward piece of Fabian literary propaganda Shaw’s preface might suggest it is.
Twelve years later, Shaw’s preface to Major Barbara suggests a strikingly different set of
economic and aesthetic priorities than does the preface to Mrs Warren’s Profession. However, it
is equally didactic and, as in the former case, the play that follows undermines this didacticism in
certain significant ways. The shift in economic theory from 1893 to 1905 illustrates the evolution
of Shaw’s economic thinking during the period, while the continuity of Shaw’s methods of
discussion and partial synthesis helps establish what I am saying about the centrality of those
methods to Shaw’s modernist aesthetics. Moreover, we can see these two aspects as linked: this
representative example supports my claim that Shaw’s commitment to challenging his own ideas
in his plays leads to the further development of those ideas. Ultimately, noting the evolution of
Shaw’s amateur economic theory from Mrs Warren’s Profession to Major Barbara illustrates
how his economic system comes into being directly out of the imaginative process of the
creation of his literary art, establishing him as a Modernist Amateur Economist.
Several major threads of Major Barbara and its preface help us see some of these telling
shifts in Shaw’s art and his economics that occurred between 1893 and 1905. In the preface,
Shaw introduces an early version of his most heterodox economic idea, equality of income, and
directly addresses the importance to his intellectual development of the wider discursive field of
continental philosophy, as I have discussed in this chapter. So, while Shaw is not yet using the
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phrase “equality of income,” he does make the straightforward claim in Major Barbara’s preface
that
The crying need of the nation is not for better morals, cheaper bread, temperance, liberty,
culture, redemption of fallen sisters and erring brothers, nor the grace, love and
fellowship of the Trinity, but simply for enough money. And the evil to be attacked is not
sin, suffering, greed, priest-craft, kingcraft, demagogy, monopoly, ignorance, drink, war,
pestilence, nor any other of the scapegoats which reformers sacrifice, but simply
poverty.86
This formula points toward the solution to which he will soon come—equality of income—and
also provides a surprising, provocative reading of Major Barbara: namely, that there is a great
deal of equivalence between the false “need” of “redemption of fallen sisters and erring brothers”
(Barbara’s crusade) and the false scapegoat of “war” (Andrew Undershaft’s business). This
conflation of daughter and father is strengthened by the imagery of Barbara as Salvation Army
Major and Undershaft the arms dealer symbolically providing the Salvation Army with its
“arms” of bread and butter via his large donation. It is also through this conflation that Shaw
manages to position Undershaft as the “hero of Major Barbara” 87: because Barbara has failed to
perceive the truth about what the poor need—money—and Undershaft has correctly understood
that his business—war—does nothing to undermine the fact that he is helping to lift his
employees out of poverty, Undershaft becomes a sort of avatar of the kind of heterodox common
sense that Shaw so values. And yet Undershaft is also a resolutely un-Fabian figure: while his
factory town has some socialist utopian undertones—not least the joke about the William Morris
Labor Church88—he very clearly represents the capitalist businessman who cares little for
anything that does not help his bottom line.
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Shaw’s second major economic argument in the preface is also distinctly un-Fabian
because it relies heavily on ideas from continental philosophy, including those of Schopenhauer
and especially Nietzsche.89 Shaw begins this argumentative thread by claiming that as a society,
we should not allow people to buy forgiveness for their immoral actions. This is clearly the
major theme of the second act of Major Barbara, in which Shaw juxtaposes Barbara’s principled
refusal of Bill Walker’s attempt to buy forgiveness for a pound with Barbara’s superior’s
acceptance of a thousand-pound donation from Bodger the whisky baron and Undershaft the
arms dealer. While this tableau functions mainly to move the plot forward in the play, Shaw
makes much of it in the preface, arguing that it is only through Barbara’s refusal that Walker has
a chance at redemption. Casting Walker and his situation in biblical terms, Shaw observes that
His [i.e. Walker’s] doom is the doom of Cain, who, failing to find either a savior, a
policeman, or an almoner to help him to pretend that his brother’s blood no longer cried
from the ground, had to live and die a murderer. Cain took care not to commit another
murder, unlike our railway shareholders (I am one) who kill and maim shunters by
hundreds to save the cost of automatic couplings, and make atonement by annual
subscriptions to deserving charities. 90
And yet Barbara loses her chance at saving Walker when the Salvation Army takes a larger
donation from worse offenders, opening Walker’s eyes to their hypocrisy. This moment brings
Shaw’s two economic arguments together, allowing him to present a major catch-22 of the
capitalist system: charities must accept money however they can get it, but accepting donations
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from immoral sources allows those sources to clear their consciences and keep perpetuating the
social ills that those charities must use the money to fight.
And yet, at this moment of dramatic (Fabian) synthesis, the play goes in a direction that
complicates Shaw’s attempt at a didactic message. For while Walker and Bodger fit into the
morality play that Shaw sketches in the preface, Andrew Undershaft does not, for the simple
reason that he does not admit to any guilt about his profession and does not make his donation in
order to find forgiveness. Instead, Undershaft emerges at this point as the embodiment of the
Nietzschean superman, the indomitable personality who will not be cowed by traditional
morality but who will do what is necessary to bend the world to his will. This figure is utterly
foreign to Fabian doctrine, but it also represents a major complication to the economic argument
that Shaw is trying to make in the preface and in most of the play. For what does the concept of
economic morality that Shaw has been developing matter in the face of an Andrew Undershaft
or, as the third act begins to propose, an Adolphus Cusins? There is thus an unresolved tension
here between the intertwined economic arguments Shaw makes in the preface, which are
themselves deviations from Fabian economic theory, and the Nietzschean direction of the play in
the third act.
This moment encapsulates much of what this chapter argues about Shaw as a Modernist
Amateur Economist. Major Barbara, which presents itself as an attempt to work through typical
Fabian themes of poverty, charity, temperance, and opposition to war, refuses to be fit into such
easy categories. Instead, because of Shaw’s insistence on filtering his examination of these issues
through his interests in Nietzsche and Shopenhauer—coupled with his claim in the preface that
he is not interested in those philosophers!—we are left with a work that fails to come to any neat
conclusions whatsoever. What’s more, all of this is taking place against the background of
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Shaw’s pastiche of Wagner’s Siegfried, an unstated influence that nevertheless situates the play
as the linchpin of Shaw’s socialist Gesamtkunstwerk. Given the preface’s invocation of Shaw’s
concept of equality of income, Major Barbara emerges as a clear example of a work of
Modernist Amateur Economics.
Here, as we will see time and again with other modernist amateur economists, literature
provides the imaginative space in which Shaw is able to work out the implications of his new
economic theories. Using literature in this way often has unintended consequences—as we can
see quite clearly here in the tension between what Shaw thinks he is doing in his prefaces and
what he actually does in his plays—as well as adverse outcomes—as we can see in his eventual
embrace of Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler. The point I am making here, though, is that while
Shaw’s non-fiction economic treatises remain important and interesting to the study of his
economic thought, it is this dynamic way in which his literary art gradually becomes integral to
his economic theorization, and vice versa, that truly sets him apart in a different intellectual
category from his contemporaries who were just theorists or just writers. And it is as the
unacknowledged creator of this new intellectual category that Shaw’s legacy can be seen to carry
through the main line of British modernism.

Orage and The New Age
This examination of Shaw illustrates the claim with which I began this chapter: that, far
from demonstrating his extreme divergence from Shaw, A.R. Orage’s critical method of
presentation in arranging each issue of The New Age actually echoes Shaw’s own aesthetic
commitment to presenting debates over ideas in his plays rather than making arguments or
providing dogmatic declarations of Fabian doctrine. In my reading, Orage in The New Age is
taking what he learned from Shaw—and not necessarily from the Fabian Society—and going in
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his own direction, using methods derived from Shaw’s in his plays and prefaces to promote
heterodox economic theory and modernist literary writing in a sort of Gesamtkunstwerk of his
own. Indeed, if the key characteristic of the Modernist Amateur Economist is a commitment to
restoring economic questions to a larger cultural or discursive field, that larger field for Orage is
something like modernist literature itself.
Orage puts forth this view of The New Age explicitly in several places. One, which I have
already quoted, is his declaration that “Every part of THE NEW AGE hangs together…the
literature we despise is associated with the economics we hate as the literature we love is
associated with the form of society we would assist in creating.” 91 Two years later, Orage would
expand on this claim, gently chastising his readers for failing to understand the necessary
interrelation of all parts of the magazine. For Orage, “[t]he neglect to read widely and to think
seriously upon such ‘dull’ subjects as history, foreign affairs, economics, etc. is often claimed as
a proof of aesthetic fastidiousness instead of being accepted as evidence of narrow-mindedness.”
On the other side, “[s]tudents of these ‘dull’ subjects are often as narrowminded as those who
neglect them.” Criticizing both of these frequent readers of The New Age—artists who ignore
economic and political context on the one hand and economists and political enthusiasts who
dislike reading poetry and fiction on the other—Orage declares: “[t]he sooner the whole of THE
NEW AGE is regarded as more important than any of its parts the better.” After all, “[i]f I
[Orage] and others of us, people of letters and the arts, can school ourselves to nod at economics
and politics, the masters of the latter ought not to be too conceited or idle to become in turn
pupils at our school.”92 From these two examples, it is clear that it would be impossible to
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mistake Orage’s purpose in The New Age, a purpose that aligns exactly with that of the figure of
the Modernist Amateur Economist at the center of this dissertation: the insistence that economics
cannot be understood separately from the broader cultural field in which it develops—and vice
versa.93
And yet Orage has received relatively little critical attention, and his writing itself has
been studied even less. While fairly recent work such as Anne Ardis’s contribution to The
Oxford Critical and Cultural History of Modernist Magazines and Robert Scholes’s “General
Introduction to The New Age 1907-1922” in The Modernist Journals Project has provided
detailed overviews of The New Age, scholarship on Orage is sparse.94 Moreover, what scholarly
work exists on Orage is largely concerned with him as a personality, rather than as a modernist
writer. This focus is unsurprising given that the main texts in Orage criticism are universally
some combination of biographical, as in Paul Selver’s memoir Orage and the New Age Circle:
Reminiscences and Reflections (1959) and Philip Mairet’s A.R. Orage: A Memoir (1966), dated,
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as with Wallace Martin’s The New Age Under Orage (1967), or obscure, as with Tom Steele’s
Alfred Orage and the Leeds Arts Club, 1893-1923 (1990).95 Primary texts are also scarce, and
limited on the one hand to a few isolated attempts to collect Orage’s political and economic
essays—Political and Economic Writings (1936), edited by Montgomery Butchart, and Selected
Essays and Critical Writings of A.R. Orage (1935), edited by Herbert Read and Denis Saurat—
and on the other to some of Orage’s theosophical and mystical writings from later in his life,
such as On Love; Freely Adapted from the Tibetan (1932).96 This is a representative rather than
an exhaustive list, but my purpose in producing it is to emphasize a point that Mairet makes in
his memoir, which is that the lack of critical writing on Orage is due in some measure to the fact
that he “wrote no substantial treatise” and instead did most of his “critical work” in “journalistic
causeries.”97 Part of my argument in this section is that these “journalistic causeries” form a
crucial foundation to Orage’s modernism, and we should view The New Age, as a whole, as
Orage’s major work. However, even that point relies more on Orage’s editorial practice than it
does on his actual writing.
Another aspect of the critical erasure of Orage as a writer is the degree to which his
reputation has been tied to the modernist writers he influenced. In Mairet’s phrase, “Orage
worked through many other pens besides his own.”98 Mairet lists Katherine Mansfield, Richard
Aldington, John Middleton Murry, T.E. Hulme, Herbert Read, Edwin Muir, and Ezra Pound as
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significant modernist figures who either got their start in The New Age or were published in it
later in their careers.99 Many of these figures were explicit in crediting Orage for his skill as an
editor. Katherine Mansfield wrote in a letter to Orage: “you taught me to write, you taught me to
think; you showed me what there was to be done and what not to do.” 100 T.S. Eliot, a more
distant acquaintance, nevertheless called Orage “the finest critical intelligence of our day.” 101
And Pound, in a much more begrudging turn of phrase, reflected in his “Obituary: A.R. Orage”
that “our 23 years’ friendship was a friendship of literary differences and never one difference
concealed.”102 Ultimately, Orage’s influence on these better-known modernists can be summed
up in a phrase attributed to him by Hugh Kenner: “I write writers.” 103
But Orage also wrote words, and lots of them: from full-length articles to the “Readers
and Writers” section in The New Age, to the books on mysticism, radio speeches, etc. that
marked his later career. While Orage’s editorial practice and willingness to publish modernist
writers firmly establish him as an important figure for British modernism, it is his writing that
helps us move beyond this conception and to an understanding of Orage as a modernist himself.
Where it is difficult to adjudicate precisely how Orage may have impacted the development of
modernist writers like Katherine Mansfield or Ezra Pound, his own writings provide more
99
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concrete grounds for thinking of him as a Modernist Amateur Economist in his own right, while
also suggesting some elements of his own prose style and philosophical outlook that would
become important to these later modernists. First, I consider the first series of articles that Orage
wrote for The New Age, “Towards Socialism.” This unfinished, ten-part series, written and
published between October and December 1907, helps us position Orage in relation to Shaw and
to the Fabian society, while simultaneously pointing to some of the specific aspects of Orage’s
understanding of socialism that would lead to his departure from his Fabian origins and
forebears. Then, I move to a later series, “Notes on Economic Terms,” to show how Orage’s shift
to Guild Socialism accentuated his amateur economic theorization, bringing his Modernist
Amateur Economic practice to full fruition.

“Towards Socialism”: Orage’s Non-Economic Socialism
Orage begins his series “Towards Socialism” with a Hindu parable. In it, a man who has
summoned a devil goes to a yogi, seeking advice on how to keep the devil occupied so that it
will not turn on him. The yogi gives the man a dog with a curly tail and tells him to set the devil
the task of straightening the tail. The Hindu moral, as Orage relates it, is that “[t]his world, O my
friends, is the dog’s curly tail; and what men call progress is no more than the attempt to
straighten it.”104 But Orage sees a different moral, in the context of contemporary England. For
Orage, the opinion that progress is like an attempt to straighten a curly dog tail is at the heart of
the conservative worldview, whereas socialists reject the simile altogether:
The point is that the philosophic basis of conservatism in every case is the assumption
that the world cannot be changed; an assumption which in actively conservative natures
is transformed into the allied belief that the world and man can only be changed for the
worse. Now Socialists, on the other hand, believe in change, and believe in change for the
better. They deny, in the first place, that the nature of the world is fixed as it is, and, in
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the second place, that the world can ever become worse than it is. The world for the
Socialist is an everlasting becoming, a perpetual process of generation and regeneration, a
continual mounting of life up the ladder of becoming. 105
While Orage, in comparing British conservatives to Hindus, is undoubtedly making a belittling
joke that betrays some of his own cultural biases, his phrasing about “the ladder of becoming,”
not to mention his very familiarity with the parable in the first place, points as well to his
genuine interest in Anglo-American versions of Eastern mysticism. Indeed, these details point
much more to this aspect of Orage’s philosophical and metaphysical outlook than they do to the
alleged subject of the essay, socialism. This opening parable, then, encapsulates the point Mairet
makes in his brief reading of the series, which is that the articles contained here “are frankly
sermons, outlining a religion or philosophy of Socialism.” Containing “clear traces of his debt to
Indian metaphysics,…their effect was to glorify the cause of Socialism one and indivisible,
without raising any of the practical issues which divided the actual movement.” 106 More
philosophical treatise than work of economic theory, “Towards Socialism” would seem to
occupy a fraught position in the context of this chapter and, indeed, this dissertation.
And yet, on careful consideration, Orage’s non-economic socialism, as it emerges in this
series of articles, proves crucial to our understanding of Orage as a Modernist Amateur
Economist. One important point that emerges from Orage’s omission of any discussion of
technical economics here is that from the beginning of his editorship of The New Age, he was
much more invested in the ends promised by Fabian socialism than he was in the means by
which the Fabian Society proposed to achieve those ends. And even then, Orage’s primary end
went beyond the Society’s goals of abolishing poverty. As he writes in the third installment of
“Towards Socialism,” “I confess that if Socialism were no more than the abolition of poverty, if
105
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it did not imply a parallel desire to abolish ignorance, and an underlying purpose in abolishing
both—which purpose alone justifies all the pain likely to be caused by both propagandas—I
should hesitate to call myself a Socialist.”107 The abolition of ignorance, for Orage, was not
merely his desired end: it was the necessary precondition for his real goal, true democracy. In
part nine of the series, subtitled “The Infant, Democracy,” Orage makes this point clear: “The
whole hope of Democracy depends finally on the possibility of a genuinely enlightened public
opinion. If that is impossible, Democracy in the full sense is impossible.” 108 While Orage
concedes that poverty must be abolished if “a genuinely enlightened public opinion” is ever to
emerge, he insists that it is merely “the first of the changes needed,” emphatically not “the most
important” such change.109 Orage’s efforts to establish the abolition of poverty as a necessary
first step, rather than the supreme goal of socialism, point to a clear disjunction, even at this early
moment, between his version of socialism and that of the Fabians. Indeed, Orage’s vision here
turns Fabian doctrine on its head. Where the Fabians sought to educate the public about
socialism, permeating all levels of culture with Fabian ideals, with the goal of relying on a newly
educated public to help abolish poverty, Orage sees these two efforts the other way around.
In the context of this chapter, Orage’s minimization of the question of poverty indicates a
strong disjunction with Shaw as well. As I have established, Shaw’s amateur economic theory
prioritizes equality of income above all other principles, and his identification in the preface to
Major Barbara of the central need of English society as “enough money” and the major “evil” as
“poverty” stands in direct contrast to what Orage is saying here. Orage mentions Shaw directly in
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the third essay in “Towards Socialism,” which is largely concerned with the concept of
solidarity. Lumping Shaw in with Edward Carpenter, Whitman, and Shelley—each of whom
Orage is construing as an “individualist”—Orage asserts that “we may have all the effects of
economic Socialism without being a single sentiment the better off so long as those radical, time
dishonoured, and most damnable beliefs remain that the individual belongs to himself alone, and
that ‘punishment’ is the proper penalty of ‘crime.’”110 Whether this is a fair reading of Shaw’s
philosophy toward individualism and crime and punishment or not, the point here is that Orage is
first construing Shaw as an essentially Nineteenth-Century figure and then that he is accusing
him of being against the vision of socialism that Orage is putting forth in this series. While Orage
is thus primarily engaging with “economic socialism” in this negative way, his references to it
help show that he is interested in distancing himself from Fabian and Shavian economics. Given
that these articles are Orage’s first extended statement of his economic theories in The New Age,
and the increasing identity between Orage and his magazine in the years following this early
series, the gap between “Towards Socialism” and Fabian orthodoxy suggest that the magazine as
a whole is headed in this direction as well.
I have focused mostly thus far on what Orage hasn’t written, on what he has declared his
opposition to. But I want to pick back up on the more positive aspects of “Towards Socialism,”
and especially on Orage’s discussion of the abolition of ignorance. For Orage, the only way to
achieve this goal is through clarity of language. So, in the final installment of the series, Orage
employs the metaphor of “the infant, democracy,” 111 specifically to explain how he would go
about “educating” that infant. Orage writes: “In discussing the education of democracy, then, we
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necessarily have to put away the notion that any one of us or any group of us, however clever or
well-informed, is able to sit apart, like a maiden aunt, and instruct the infant.” This vision of a
top-down effort at “education” holds no water for Orage because “we are part of the infant; our
individual minds are part of the mind of the democracy, which is public opinion.” The
“education of democracy” thus must take place from within: “just as in the individual mind ideas
are effective in proportion as they become clear, so in the mind of democracy ideas become
effective in proportion as they are expressed clearly by one or other individual.” Orage
modulates his metaphor here: moving away from the image of democracy as child and the
enlightened socialist as parent, now democracy is a “mind,” and each individual in it is,
essentially, an idea.
In this conception, the hope of democracy rests on each individual’s capacity “to say
clearly and emphatically what his ideas are, to say them on demand at any moment, and to keep
on saying them until they refuse any longer to be said.” Even “bad” ideas must be articulated
clearly: “The only hope of getting rid of some detestable thought in one’s mind lies in getting it
clear and articulate.” Ultimately, for Orage, “[t]he ‘education’ of public opinion can only
proceed on the assumption that every component individual is not only permitted, but expected
to speak his mind clearly. Only on condition, that is, that the myriad ideas of the public mind are
given free expression can we hope for an intelligent public judgment.” And, finally, Orage ties
clarity of expression to a keen “sense of fact in public life; a sense of fact so acute that writers
and speakers on the one hand and readers and hearers on the other will not hesitate to criticise to
death every evasion or careless expression.”112 Orage’s insistence on the importance of
inculcating a “strong sense of fact” through clarity of expression is thus at the heart of his
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socialist aspirations—as well as to his commitment to presenting opposing arguments, as long as
those arguments are expressed clearly. The yoking together of the ideal of precision in language
and heterodox economics—even if this series of articles is fuzzy on the particulars of the latter—
constitutes an important aspect of Orage’s Modernist Amateur Economics. It is also, as we will
see in the next chapter, an important point of continuity between Orage and Ezra Pound.
In the context of this chapter, though, Orage’s lengthy discussion of the necessity of
precision in language in the final articles in “Towards Socialism” throws the rest of the series
into relief. Reading the earlier articles through this final one, we can see that Orage himself has
been working to develop clear definitions of a range of terms as they are related to socialism.
The series is not fully reducible to this formulation—the first article, for instance, is not
approaching a specific term in this way—but over the course of the ten installments in “Towards
Socialism” Orage gives extensive consideration to terms like “human nature,” 113 “Solidarity,”114
“Trade Unionism, Collectivism, Socialism,”115 “Civilisation,”116 “Liberty,”117 “Sacrifice to
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Society,”118 “Democracy,” and “aristocracy.”119 The simple fact of this kind of hyper-focus on
the meaning of words is significant in itself, but the content of Orage’s definitions help solidify
our understanding of what Orage is doing in this series. For Orage, all of these words are
connected: an educated democracy will lead to socialism, and it is only under socialism that
human nature will reach its full fruition, resulting in universal liberty and the highest form of
civilization. And the key to this entire chain of terms is Orage’s conception of human nature as
“a process of becoming” that relies entirely on his assertion that “man himself is an imaginative
creation, lives in and by and for imagination.” In Orage’s understanding, imaginative, aesthetic
work is inseparable from socialism. In this way, Orage stands as an epitome of a Modernist
Amateur Economist, going beyond the mere claim that economics should not be abstracted from
the larger cultural field to assert that it cannot be so abstracted. At the same time, “Towards
Socialism” emerges as a sort of Modernist Amateur Economic manifesto, an ode to “the divine
faculty of words,”120 a commitment to the idea “that imagination alone creates, imagination
alone is the demiurgos of the universe,”121 and an assertion that “[w]hat Socialists have to
demand is the conditions for the nobler activities of the instincts of man, room and air for their
expansion and blossoming.”122 While Orage is not doing the imaginative work he describes
himself, it is his theorization of the two together here that sets the terms for later works of
Modernist Amateur Economics, both within and beyond the later New Age.
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“Notes on Economic Terms” and Heterodox Economics in The New Age
And yet another major takeaway from reading “Towards Socialism” is that Orage is
already, in 1907, expressing a great deal of discontent with the broader socialist movement. I
have mentioned his direct disagreement with Shaw already, but Orage repeatedly chastises
socialists for falling into the pitfalls of muddled language against which he cautions in his series
of articles. This thread culminates in the final sentences of the series, written in late December
1907 against the backdrop of the first stages of the Chesterbelloc debate. Orage concludes his
series by strongly castigating the current state of socialist thought, writing: “One thing,
unfortunately, is true, that the Socialist movement which began by a campaign of fact, is entering
now on a campaign of criminal reticence, and particularly in regard to our national curse of
indurated morality. If the campaign continues, I can see Socialists as the great anti-Socialists of
the immediate future.” In terms of Orage’s definition of socialism, “the immediate future” was
likely actually the present, and his explicit break with the Fabian society in 1910 was, when it
happened, overdue.
Here my assertion that Orage in his early articles was more interested in the ends—his
vision of socialism—than in the means of socialist change comes fully in view. Since Fabianism
never really aimed at achieving Orage’s ideal socialism, it should be unsurprising that he would
move to an economic theory that did. Guild Socialism promised to be such a system, not least
because of the personal history of its principle theorist, A.J. Penty. Penty was one of the
founders, with Orage and Jackson, of the Fabian Arts Group, which should be seen as a
formative influence on The New Age’s philosophy of integrating socialism and the arts. As
Wallace Martin writes, the main focus of the Fabian Arts Group was “the cultural and
philosophic foundations of Socialism, rather than...the statistical superstructure so important to
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the Fabian Society.”123 Although, as Ian Britain has shown, the Fabian Society was by no means
as hostile to aesthetic concerns as people like Shaw were wont to claim, 124 the Fabian Arts Group
represented the first sustained attempt within the society to relate socialist economics to the
arts.125 It was also the breeding-ground of Guild Socialism, a theory that Penty would expound at
length in The New Age after the magazine’s break with the Fabian society. As I discussed in my
first chapter, Penty’s version of Guild Socialism was conservative and anti-modern, a political
orientation that helps explain his eventual conversion to the Distributism of Chesterton and
Belloc. While Penty’s history with Orage no doubt helps explain how Guild Socialism gained
such a foothold in The New Age, the magazine’s version of the theory drew more from more
progressively oriented writers like S.G. Hobson and G.D.H. Cole. 126
While the shift to Guild Socialism represented a new stage in the life of The New Age,
Orage’s editorial methods—and, indeed, understanding of “Socialism”—remained constant. That
consistency is on full display in “Notes on Economic Terms,” a series of encyclopedia-style
articles that Orage wrote between May 1916 and August 1917, at the height of the magazine’s
support for Guild Socialism. Taking its keynote from Orage’s contention in “Towards
Socialism” that “[it] is not ideas that become, as Coleridge said, bedridden after a brief life, but
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the words which stand for them,” “Notes on Economic Terms” represents an extended attempt to
reanimate economic language, to restore a more vital sense of meaning to words that have
become mere jargon in the hands of the professional economists being produced by the
university system. Rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive account of this series of
articles, which contains twenty-two installments and defines some 115 economic terms, I want to
focus here on how Orage defines his economic theories in relation to economic orthodoxy.
In a move typical of much Modernist Amateur Economic theorization, an explicit antiacademic impulse runs through the series, exemplified in the entry on “Economic Terms” itself,
which should be taken as a sort of mission statement for the series as a whole. There, Orage
defines “Economic Terms” as
Generalised or abstract terms [which] facilitate discussion among persons technically
interested in the theories of economics; but at the risk (or, rather, in the certainty) of
confusing the lay mind. In these notes we are as far as possible re-concretising such terms
and reducing them to their common and real meaning. 127
Besides introducing the anti-academic framing of the series, this passage points to the main point
of interest in “Notes on Economic Terms,” the extent to which the series represents an active
attempt at heterodox economic theorization. While Orage is claiming merely to be clarifying
economic terms for “the lay mind” by “reducing them to their common and real meaning,” it is
immediately apparent that his own claim to understanding that “real” meaning is essentially
rhetorical. It is at least obvious that the definitions that he puts forth throughout the series do not
accord with orthodox theory, as he is claiming here that they do. Rather than showing his readers
what economists really mean by certain words, Orage is actually translating economic terms
from their traditional usage in neoclassical theory into the new vocabulary of Guild Socialism. It
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is this act of creative, critical translation that establishes the series as a work of Modernist
Amateur Economic theory.
Orage’s claim to understanding the “real” meanings of economic terms is only one half of
the critique he is making in this passage, however. He is also explicitly leveling the critique of
mainstream economics that I have claimed as the shared characteristic of Modernist Amateur
Economists: that in the hands of orthodox economists, economic terms have become
“[g]eneralised or abstract.” The result, in Orage’s account, is that mainstream economists have
lost touch with the heart of the subject they are ostensibly studying, thereby allowing themselves
to be reduced to pawns of “commercial men,” corporate or capitalist interests. Orage outlines this
claim in the entry on “Production for Use and for Sale,” which is really an attempt to define
“economics” itself. For Orage, “[t]he reason for the discrepancy between the common and the
economic sense of words lies in the discrepancy between the common and the commercial
meaning of economics itself.” Orage supplies this “common” meaning, as understood by “you
and us”: “Economics is the science of the employment of human abilities in the production of
human utilities, and its object as an applied science is to produce the maximum real utilities with
the expenditure of the minimum of human abilities.”128 Orage’s rhetorical strategy of direct
address aside, his definition of “Economics” requires some unpacking. First, we can see that
Orage regards economics as a science, a view that is perhaps surprising in light of his dislike of
abstraction. However, he quickly clarifies: Economics is “an applied science,” a phrase that
actively works against a conception of science as abstract (and abstracting). The second aspect of
his definition that stands out is its focus on the “human” actors in the economy. Many definitions
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of economics begin with resources: especially in neoclassical economics, the discipline is seen
as the study of the efficient allocation of scarce resources. Even Marshall, who insists that
economics is “a part of the study of man,” foregrounds resources over labor: “Political Economy
or economics…examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely
connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.” 129
Orage’s subtle reorientation throws all of the weight on what he sees as the proper end of
economics: the production of “the maximum real utilities with the expenditure of the minimum
of human abilities.” Orage’s use of “real” here emphasizes that he is interested solely in the
production of human happiness; profits do not enter his equation.
Not so, Orage observes, of “the commercial meaning of economics.” “[I]n the hands of
commercial men,” economics’ “object is to produce the maximum number of marketable utilities
at the minimum cost to the persons who bring them to market. It is, in short, the science of
production for profit, not the science of production for use.” The problem, Orage argues, is that
economists have allowed this “commercial meaning” to replace the “common” or “real”
meaning of economics. Orage stops short of accusing economists for being complicit in this
sleight-of-hand, presenting them as “poor things,” who have been “completely confuse[d]” by
the “double entendre of economics.” In their confusion, orthodox economists “are under the
impression that when they are discussing economics they are discussing production for use; and
all the time they are really discussing marketing and swindling.” In its “commercial meaning,”
economics “is, indeed, a ‘dismal science’; it is the black shadow cast by the real science; and
men who grope about in it without knowing that the real science exists are lost.” 130 Orage is

129
130

Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (1890, 1920; Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1997), 1.
“Notes on Economic Terms,” (August 24, 1916), 398.

184

being charitable to orthodox economists here, but the main takeaway from this passage is that the
neoclassical school has become inseparable from the capitalist system, which is based on the
desire for profits, not the desire for the well-being of humanity. Orage’s definitions here of
“production for use and for sale” and “economics” writ large represents his attempt to decouple
“economics” from “capitalism,” and that effort of course stands at the heart of his developing
theory of guild socialism.
Orage’s direct engagement with economic terms and the language of economics is
significant for several reasons. First, it stands in direct contrast to his practice in “Towards
Socialism.” There, I emphasized that he was most interested in the “ends,” and less so in the
“means”; here, he is clearly interested in both. The Orage of “Notes on Economic Terms” is fully
engaged in the technical side of economics, and the shift from his more general discussion of the
ideal of socialism in the earlier series is clearly due to his belief that Guild Socialism could
provide a real path to that ideal. That said, while I use the word “technical,” it is clear that
Orage’s focus is entirely linguistic, not mathematical. In this sense, “Notes on Economic Terms”
emphasizes the amateur nature of Orage’s intervention: he is bringing his own training and
expertise as a prose stylist and literary editor to bear on a field that does not typically consider
those aspects of its own practice. By challenging the received meanings of the very terms that
make up the discursive field of economics, Orage is in a sense performing a literary analysis of
the field. But, as I have shown, there is a creative as well as a critical element to Orage’s
“Notes.” In putting forth new definitions of economic terms over the course of the series, Orage
subtly shifts the linguistic building-blocks of the field of economics to displace “capitalism”
from the center of economics and to replace it with his understanding of socialism, as he laid it
out in the earlier series “Towards Socialism.” Approaching Orage in this way through the lens of
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the Modernist Amateur Economist helps us see the dual economic imperatives of his literary and
rhetorical project—challenging the received meanings of economic terms and putting forth new,
radical understandings of them—as central to the definition of Modernist Amateur Economic
theory that I am developing in this dissertation.

Conclusion
If Orage’s Modernist Amateur Economic project develops most clearly through his
writings in ‘Towards Socialism” and “Notes on Economic Terms,” I want here to pivot away
from the specifics of those writings and back to a higher-level consideration of The New Age.
For, ultimately, Orage’s importance to Modernist Amateur Economic theorization comes not
from any single thing that he wrote, but from the magazine that he edited. My discussion of the
magazine’s history thus far has largely focused on its origins as a Fabian economic and literary
review. However, its later history, beginning with the shift to Guild Socialism that I have noted
in relation to “Notes on Economic Terms,” proves crucial to the story of modernism and of the
development of Modernist Amateur Economics that this dissertation tells. I have commented
extensively on the magazine’s commitment to publishing literary pieces alongside economic and
political ones. It’s important to observe here, though, that the magazine’s early literary
sensibilities mirrored its Fabian origins. Arnold Bennett, now most famous for being the target of
Woolf’s “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” served as the literary editor in this first phase of The
New Age, and Orage’s shift to Guild Socialism was accompanied by an acrimonious split with
Bennett, who was a loyal Fabian. Bennett’s departure, in turn, opened space for more
experimental writers to be featured in the magazine, leading to the high concentration of
modernist literary work for which The New Age is remembered.
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There is thus a direct connection between The New Age’s turn to increasingly heterodox
economics and its publication of modernist literature. This connection points to another
important outcome of the magazine’s commitment to publishing economics and literature
together: if Orage saw the heterodox theory and the literary experimentation as continuous with
each other, by publishing modernist writers next to Guild Socialist economic theorization, Orage
introduced those writers to those theories. Although none of the modernists were as taken with
Guild Socialism as was Orage, the economic environment in the wake of the First World War
would introduce Orage to a different theory that would be more influential for modernist writers.
Guild Socialism, which had been gathering momentum in the years leading up to the war, was
badly damaged by the war and the peace. 131 In the interim, Orage had moved to the right
politically, and the obviously disastrous Treaty of Versailles pushed him to adopt a new
economic philosophy that had been shaped by observations made during the war, by Major C.H.
Douglas, in his theory of Social Credit. Orage was instrumental in helping Douglas express his
theory in coherent terms,132 and The New Age quickly became the mouthpiece of Social Credit. It
was here that Pound was introduced to Social Credit, an interest that would shape the direction of
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his poetry and his life for the next forty years. 133 And yet while Pound’s interest in Social Credit
is the most important and most obvious way in which The New Age directly sparked an interest
in heterodox economics in a major modernist, the magazine’s commitment to publishing
experimental literature alongside serious discussion of heterodox economics fostered a general
familiarity in certain modernist circles with economics, orthodox and heterodox. 134
This narrative of The New Age’s move away from its Fabian origins may seem to be the
classic one of modernist rupture. And in terms of the magazine’s relationship with Fabian society
writ large, it is that. However, while The New Age may have separated violently from the Fabian
society, it never achieved such a clean break with its original purchaser, George Bernard Shaw.
Although Orage became critical of Shaw as The New Age moved to Guild Socialism and then to
Social Credit, Shaw’s own amateur economic theorization and its integration into his literary
work undeniably provided an early model for Orage that the editor of The New Age would never
fully escape. Orage’s cultivation of The New Age as a space where economic issues could blend
with literary-aesthetic ones marks him as a central and largely unacknowledged figure in cultural
histories of modernist thought, and this insistence on interdisciplinarity comes directly from
Shaw. By forcing his literary contributors to think about economic problems and his economic
contributors to think about literary style, Orage created an entire generation of what I have been
calling Modernist Amateur Economists, transferring Shavian values to them in the process.
Shaw’s sizable influence on this aspect of modernism has gone unnoticed—even by the
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modernist amateur economists themselves—because of its second-hand nature. By focusing, as I
have, on the early days of The New Age, and showing the extensive continuities between Orage’s
editorial practice and amateur economic theorization across the first ten years of his editorship, I
am seeking to restore a sense of the importance of Fabian and Shavian economic theory to this
later popularization of more heterodox theories. And I have shown as well that Orage’s careerlong commitment to juxtaposition, presentation, and synthesis in The New Age draws in
unacknowledged ways from Shaw’s own methods in his plays and prefaces.
As I conclude this consideration of Shaw and Orage, I want to return to my opening
consideration of the terms that make up my title: “modernism,” “socialism,” “Shaw and Orage,”
and “Modernist Amateur Economist.” As I have worked through these terms in this chapter, the
question that has emerged is not whether they are applicable, but why do we not take their
applicability as given? What institutional conventions and received understandings lead us to
question Shaw’s modernism or Orage’s socialism? Ann Ardis points to some possible answers to
these questions in her essay on The New Age in The Oxford Cultural History of Modernist
Magazines. In her epigraphs to this essay, Ardis presents a passage from Wallace Martin’s The
New Age Under Orage in which Martin seeks to position the magazine as at the heart of
modernism: “As an editor, [A.R.] Orage deliberately attempted to make The New Age
a…periodical which would mediate between specialized fields of knowledge and public
understanding, and encourage a vital relationship between literary experimentation and the
literary tradition.”135 Ardis’s second epigraph is a scathing contemporary review of Martin’s
book, anonymously published in the Times Literary Supplement. This lengthy passage mocks
Martin for ascribing such importance to a magazine which, “for all its vigour and occasional
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distinction, seems to have had little impact on the direction of English thought in its time.” 136 In
the body of her essay, Ardis defends Martin and The New Age, writing:
the story Martin tells about the history of literary forms in the twentieth century is the
story of modernism’s rise to cultural prominence and institutionalization as a subject of
academic study. That Martin’s history of The New Age is imbricated with the professional
orthodoxies of English language and literature studies in the 1960s should not be held
against him…Rather, we need to historicize these conventions as we also attempt to
distinguish ‘historical modernism’—the work of the modernist avant-garde, as published
in its original material historical context(s)—from the interpretative and evaluative
paradigms through which the study of early twentieth-century literature and art was
institutionalized in the 1920s, 1930s, and beyond. 137
Ardis’s comments here resonate in multiple directions in the context of this dissertation. First,
she is claiming that we have lost the sense of newness and strangeness that original readers of
modernist and avant-garde literature would have experienced because we (i.e. academics) have
abstracted those writings from their original contexts in the little magazines. Returning to The
New Age, for instance, forces us to consider such familiar modernist texts as Pound’s “Seafarer”
or Mansfield’s first stories in the context of the articles on Guild Socialism that surround them.
Ultimately, Ardis, borrowing a phrase from Suzanne Churchill, calls for modernist
scholars to embrace “the muddle of modernism,” the complexities and contradictions of the body
of literary work that we have come to designate by this term. Put another way, Ardis here
suggests that historicizing modernist studies is a vital part of understanding the actual textual
objects that the field studies. As I argue in my first chapter, we must understand the field of
modernist studies to a significant degree as an intentional, highly-motivated construction that has
more to do with the interests of a few individuals learning how to wield their influence within a
newly-forming institution than with a genuine attempt to study the literature of the period.
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Similarly, Ardis positions Martin, a 1960s scholar, as one of those individuals, and his attempt to
mobilize The New Age as “a comprehensive record of the emergence of modern culture from its
Victorian and Edwardian antecedents” 138 as the same kind of strategic move that I attribute to
Richards and Eliot in my first chapter. As I argued there and as Ardis suggests here, nothing can
be understood about “modernism”—itself a terminological creation of academia in this time
period—at this point without both historicizing the field and returning to some of these original
texts. When we do that, as I have done here with Shaw and Orage, we see how contingent the
boundaries of the field of modernist studies are and how they might look different when we look
at them in light of the figure of the Modernist Amateur Economist.
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Chapter 3: T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and Heterodox Economic Theory
“No individual should get angry if the community refuses to accept his proposals, but it is
intellectual cowardice if one is afraid to formulate one’s own concept of society”
—Ezra Pound, “Gold and Work,” 1944.1
“Politics has become too serious a matter to be left to politicians. We are compelled, to the extent
of our abilities, to be amateur economists, in an age in which politics and economics can no
longer be kept wholly apart. Everything is in question…”
—T.S. Eliot, “A Commentary,” The Monthly Criterion, November 1927.2
“Political Economy boasts itself as a science as Physics is a science; and Physics is too busy with
its own job to stop to repudiate the claims of Economics. And in fact Economics is a science, in
the humane sense; but it will never take its due place until it recognizes the superior “scientific”
authority of Ethics”
—T.S. Eliot, “A Commentary,” The Criterion, January 1931.3
“You can not make good economics out of bad ethics”
—Ezra Pound, “The Individual in his Milieu:
A Study of Relations And Gesell,” The Criterion, 1935.4

Toward the end of February, 1934, Ezra Pound wrote to his friend and mentor A.R.
Orage about his former collaborator and fellow modernist poet T.S. Eliot, whom Orage and
Pound hoped to convert fully to Social Credit. 5 At Pound’s urging, Eliot had met C.H. Douglas,
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the architect of Social Credit, in 1931,6 and had expressed cautious interest in the theory in the
pages of his literary magazine, The Criterion, throughout the twenties and early thirties. As the
thirties wore on, however, Eliot’s social criticism was increasingly less interested in economic
questions in favor of religious ones, a movement that mirrors the shift in subject-matter of his
poetry during the period. When, in early 1934, Eliot published the text of his series of lectures
given at the University of Virginia in 1933, After Strange Gods: A Primer in Modern Heresy,7
Pound and Orage agreed that they needed to take action if they hoped to convince Eliot to
endorse Social Credit. For Pound, After Strange Gods represented the dangerous possibility that
Eliot would be lost to “Chertertism”—a Poundian neologism for G.K. Chesterton’s Distributism.
But for Orage, Eliot’s increasing relevance as a specifically Christian social critic presented an
opportunity: as Roxana Preda records, “Orage remarked that Eliot defended the position of
Roman Catholic economics; he may be able to recruit people who by right should belong to SC
[i.e. Social Credit].”8 Ultimately, Orage, now the editor of the New English Weekly (NEW in
Preda’s abbreviation), wanted Pound to provoke Eliot into the kind of “epochal debate” that he
had orchestrated almost thirty years earlier in The New Age over the Chesterbelloc affair, a
debate that “would put the NEW on the cultural map and force Eliot to declare himself either for
or against SC.”9
In Pound’s letter to Orage, which he sent about two weeks before his negative review of
After Strange Gods, entitled “Mr. Eliot’s Mare’s Nest,” appeared in the New English Weekly, he
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lays out his frustrations with what he views as Eliot’s naïve turn to religion. 10 “Eliot,” he
observes, “dont KNOW a hell of a lot about theology…,” 11 especially, he implies, the theological
basis of traditional Anglo-Catholic opposition to usury, the chief economic evil according to
Social Credit. For Pound and Orage, usury in England finds its clearest representative in the
Bank of England, and in its director, Montagu Norman, whose manipulations of the Gold
Standard and generally deflationary policies during his tenure helped create economic conditions
favorable to high rates of interest that followers of Social Credit found usurious. 12 Indeed, the
question that Orage wants Pound to get Eliot to answer in print is: “Is the bloody Church going
to oppose Norman or is it not?”13 Pound is doubtful that they will be able to get Eliot to answer
“ANY questions even in informal conversation.” 14 After all, Eliot had earned the nickname
“Possum” from Pound for his tendency to play dead and to avoid taking firm positions. Pound’s
doubt that he and Orage could provoke Eliot into taking a clear stance on Social Credit came
from long familiarity.
In this case, however, Pound was wrong that Eliot would most likely ignore his review
altogether. In Preda’s account, “[t]he controversy that O[rage] had in view actually took place,
Pound doing his best.”15 Pound and Eliot exchanged a series of articles of increasing
contentiousness in the New English Weekly between March and June of 1934. At one point,
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Pound wrote that while Eliot “is in fact treating the sickness of the age,” his “diagnosis is wrong.
His remedy is an irrelevance.” Ultimately, for Pound, “Mr. Eliot’s book is pernicious in that it
distracts the reader from a vital problem (economic justice).” 16 And yet Pound was right in
another way: even in printing as provocative a statement as this, Pound and Orage failed to get
Eliot to commit on the question of Social Credit, eventually ending the conversation with an
“outraged” letter to the editor in June 1934, “signed ‘Possum,’ saying he [was] going away for a
fortnight ‘where that old Rabbit can’t reach me with his letters.” 17
Eliot’s tone in this final statement is indicative of the kind of relationship he and Pound
had: as angry as Pound is in his letter to Orage and in his articles in the New English Weekly, and
as frustrating as Eliot’s final evasion must have been, Eliot knew he could defuse the situation by
recurring to the pair’s old nicknames for each other.18 But of course, this incident is mainly
significant in this dissertation not for its implications for Pound and Eliot’s friendship, but for
what it says about the relative positions of the two regarding economics in the mid-thirties.
Indeed, the entire affair shows the extent to which Pound and Eliot were moving in divergent
directions at this moment. Pound is single-mindedly devoted to Social Credit, a devotion that
comes through in his economic and poetic writings of the moment. Eliot, on the other hand, is
intentionally difficult to pin down in terms of the specifics of his economic theory, even if it is
clear that he is interested in heterodox economics like social credit.19 That said, we can see in
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Pound’s frustration with Eliot’s heightened and heightening focus on theological questions at the
expense of economic ones that Eliot was at this time beginning to see the latter as subordinate to
the former, a reprioritization that Pound could never fathom.
Pound and Eliot are not merely diverging here in terms of the specifics of their economic
theories, however. They are also increasingly embodying different versions of the Modernist
Amateur Economist. Both, I argue, are invested in approaching economic questions in light of
larger social and cultural contexts. However, they are going about this process in opposite ways.
Pound, in possession of a theory, quickly became obsessed with showing how Social Credit was
connected to everything and represented to key to solving all economic and cultural problems.
Eliot, on the other hand, is more cautious, more willing to consider a range of possible solutions
to economic problems. Equally as committed as Pound to resisting the discipline’s urge to
abstract economic questions from their social contexts, Eliot nevertheless differed from his
friend in prioritizing those contexts—especially as they related to religious concerns—over any
specific theory. The result is that Eliot’s economic writings take the form of open-ended
ruminations; he rarely takes clear stances on the issues he is discussing, and his purpose in
writing usually seems to be to think about those issues rather than to attempt solutions to them.
Pound, by contrast, is centrally interested in theorizing: his economic thought certainly evolves
over his career, but his individual works of Modernist Amateur Economic theorization are
usually quite explicitly assertions of economic theories rather than efforts to think through
economic questions.
We might think of these differences in focus and method as differences in something
larger, too: a divergence in sensibilities. I emphasize this word here because I have made it
central to my definition of modernism in this dissertation. In suggesting that Pound and Eliot
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were diverging in sensibility in the mid-thirties, I am intentionally suggesting as well that they
were diverging in their respective relationships to what we now call modernist literature. For
Pound, the increasing centrality of his version of Social Credit to all of his intellectual endeavors
coincided with a continuation and a heightening of his modernist formal innovations. We can see
this tendency clearly in his poetic production during this time, which was nearly entirely
concerned with adding to the long poem that occupied him for the last fifty or so years of his life,
The Cantos. In 1934, Pound published the third installment of The Cantos, Eleven New Cantos.
The Cantos had, if not quite from the beginning, at least for most of its composition, been
concerned to one degree or another with expounding Pound’s idiosyncratic version of Social
Credit, and the Eleven New Cantos were no different. Moreover, while Pound never stopped
experimenting formally in The Cantos, they are largely consistent stylistically, featuring a dense
web of allusions; quotations in various languages, including Chinese characters; and abrupt
juxtapositions and leaps from topic to topic.
Eliot, by contrast, was moving away from this kind of modernist formal experimentation
during this time. On the one hand, he was becoming increasingly interested in dramatic writing,
and specifically in verse drama, his most successful experiment with which was Murder in the
Cathedral (1935), a play about the historical murder of Thomas Becket. On the other hand, as
the subject-matter of this play indicates, Eliot’s poetry was also becoming both more religious
and less formally similar to his early modernist verse, epitomized in The Waste Land (1922). So,
in “Ash-Wednesday” (1930), but even more so in the Four Quartets—the first of which, “Burnt
Norton,” was published in 1936—the subject-matter is increasingly religious and the form, while
not regular or “traditional,” exactly, eschews Poundian allusion and juxtaposition in favor of
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continuous, almost prosey verse.20 To put it another way, where the Eliotian “difficulty” of The
Waste Land comes in large part from the density of allusions, quotations in different languages,
and abrupt change of scene, the difficulty of “Burnt Norton” is in unraveling the syntax itself,
and in uncovering Eliot’s philosophical and theological meaning.
Eliot’s trajectory away from his own earlier modernist experimentation has been taken as
typical of what many critics have termed “Late Modernism.” 21 I want to frame my consideration
of Pound, Eliot, and their versions of Modernist Amateur Economics in terms of this subfield
because doing so helps us see the significance of Pound and Eliot’s divergent economic and
aesthetic trajectories for our understanding of the shape of the field of modernism itself. The
term “Late Modernism” was first theorized by Tyrus Miller, in his 1999 book Late Modernism:
Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the World Wars. Published in the year identified by
Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz as the date of “the emergence of the new modernist
studies,”22 Miller’s book self-consciously tries to develop “an alternative depiction of
modernism” by approaching it “from the perspective of its later years.” 23 Miller necessarily
defines “late modernism” in periodizing terms, identifying it as beginning “around 1926” and
stretching to an uncertain endpoint.24 But Miller is much more interested in attempting to define
late modernism in terms of the emergence of a new aesthetic sensibility than he is in assigning a

20

See T.S. Eliot, “Ash-Wednesday,” in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (1930; New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1980), 60-67; and T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets, in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (1936-1942; New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1980), 116-145.
21
Along with the foundational works on Late Modernism that I discuss at length here, much recent critical attention
has been paid to Late Modernism. See, for instance, Thomas Davis, The Extinct Scene: Late Modernism and
Everyday Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); Leo Mellor, Reading the Ruins: Modernism,
Bombsites and British Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Julia Jordan, Late Modernism and
the Avant-Garde British Novel: Oblique Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); and C.D. Blanton, Epic
Negation: The Dialectical Poetics of Late Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
22
Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, “The New Modernist Studies,” PMLA, 123, no. 3 (2008): 737.
23
Tyrus Miller, Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the World Wars (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999), 7.
24
Miller, Late Modernism, 10.

198

range of dates to it. The main thrust of his book involves theorizing late modernism as “a
reaction to a certain type of modernist fiction dominated by an aesthetics of formal mastery,
[which] drew on a marginalized ‘figural’ tendency within modernism as the instrument of its
attack on high modernist fiction.”25 Miller’s major late-modernist figures are, almost universally,
different from his high-modernist ones: Wyndham Lewis, Djuna Barnes, Samuel Beckett, and
Mina Loy.26
Besides identifying this alternative late modernist canon, Miller also makes the claim that
late modernists differed from high modernists by taking “a detour into the political regions that
high modernism had managed to view from the distance of a closed car, as part of a moving
panorama of forms and colors.”27 It is this claim, that late modernism is fundamentally more
political than high modernism, that stands as the primary connection between Miller’s work and
subsequent major monographs on Late Modernism by Jed Esty and Marina Mackay: Esty’s A
Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England (2003) and Mackay’s Modernism
and World War II (2003).28
These latter critics are both primarily interested in theorizing late modernist aesthetics in
terms of specific historical contexts. For Esty, late modernism arises as a response to
decolonization, with its attendant feeling of national contraction, both of which result in a
literary-aesthetic phenomenon which he terms the “anthropological turn.” 29 Late modernists,
Esty argues, began to see the English as a people to be studied, leading to a revival of older
25
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English cultural forms, primarily the pageant play, and a general tendency “to deemphasize the
redemptive agency of art, which, because of its social autonomization, operates unmoored from
any given national sphere, and to promote instead the redemptive agency of culture, which is
restricted by national or ethnolinguistic borders.” 30 Esty is thus echoing Miller here in identifying
late modernism as a reaction against high modernism—which was centrally occupied with “the
redemptive agency of art”—and as demonstrating a greater engagement with current affairs and
politics. However, in an important difference from Miller, Esty’s late-modernist canon is
composed entirely of high modernists: Eliot, Virginia Woolf, E.M. Forster, and John Maynard
Keynes. One reason for this difference is that Miller is writing about anglophone modernism
from the perspective of European modernism as a whole, while Esty is specifically interested in
English modernism—and, indeed, in questions of Englishness itself. But, I would argue, Esty’s
narrower focus here leads to a tighter theorization than Miller achieves of how late modernism
manifested itself in an English context. At the same time, Esty’s choice of archive makes an
implicit argument that late modernism must be approached this way, on a national basis, because
that is how it was experienced in the context of massive changes in Europe in the 30s and 40s.
Where Esty focuses on England’s national crisis in the face of decolonization, Marina
Mackay turns toward the crisis of Europe in the run-up to World War II, while maintaining
Esty’s English perspective. Mackay’s archive is similar to Esty’s, including Woolf and Eliot and
adding Henry Green, Rebecca West, and Evelyn Waugh. For Mackay, the advent of the second
World War provides an explanation for the political turn of late modernism: “the public debate
surrounding [the domestic transformations caused by the war] are crucial because they forced
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modernist writers belatedly to scrutinize their own social and political investments.” 31 Mackay’s
main focus is of course on the war, but her book is also centrally interested in reading late
modernist works and authors in terms of their political interests without reducing those interests
to a single narrative of “the politics of modernism.” Mackay works “to avoid the short cuts
offered by the individual case” by paying attention “both to the amplitude of the period…and to
the meaningful political engagements of individual literary intellectuals.” 32 The benefit of such
an approach, Mackay argues, is that “[t]aking these engagements seriously can certainly tell us
something about these authors’ enduringly important careers, but it can also simultaneously help
to explain how the period was experienced and imaginatively organized and why it continues to
be remembered as it is.”33 Mackay’s comments here can be applied as well to Late Modernist
economic commitments, which have a similar relationship to the impending war—and to the
economic crisis that immediately preceded it, the Great Depression.
Despite their different focuses, these three books allow us to triangulate a critical
consensus on some features of late modernism. First is the conviction that late modernist writers
were more interested in politics and current affairs than were their high modernist predecessors
(even if they were the same people). This conclusion should not be surprising, given the everintensifying sense of crisis hanging over Europe in the run-up to World War II. 34 In economic
terms, as well—glancingly mentioned but not considered centrally in these books—the latemodernist period contained such major economic events as the 1926 general strike, the abolition
of the gold standard in England in 1931, and the Great Depression. Moreover, European political
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events such as the growth of communism in Russia and the rise of Fascism in Italy, Germany,
and Spain were experienced both as political and economic events by modernist writers, many of
whom legitimately considered the merits of the economic systems put in place by these new
political movements. It is thus somewhat self-evident that if modernist writers became more
sensitive to politics in the thirties and forties than they were in the teens and twenties, those
writers by and large became more interested in economics as well. While my discussion of Shaw
and Orage shows that economics was always a central concern for some modernist writers, it
does seem clear that the growing magnitude of the economic crisis facing Britain as the period
wore on led to more widespread engagement with economic theory. Both Pound and Eliot stand
as clear illustrations of this understanding of the field: while both had been introduced to the
ideas of Douglas in the late teens and early twenties, neither took them up fully until the later
twenties and thirties when the increasing pressures of the national and international moment
became overwhelming.
The second major feature of the understanding of Late Modernism that comes out of
reading Esty, Mackay, and Miller together is that it is, to some degree, a reaction against High
Modernism. While Miller’s treatment of younger writers who reacted this way to High
Modernism is interesting, I am more concerned here with tracking this phenomenon among those
writers who were high modernists themselves. Both Mackay and Esty, for instance, read Eliot’s
Four Quartets along the lines I have laid out briefly above, as a reaction to his own high
modernist writing. And Esty reads late work by Keynes and Woolf, the subjects of my next
chapter, in much the same way: in Between the Acts and The General Theory, specifically.
However, there is one High Modernist figure who is conspicuously absent from all three of these
books: Pound. Esty suggests one reason why, lumping Pound in with “avant-gardists (Pound,
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Wyndham Lewis, Mina Loy) [who] gave up on England as a place for radical innovation.” 35
Esty’s implication here is that he leaves Pound out of his account because Pound had left
England and thus wasn’t a factor in the story of national contraction Esty is telling.
Unsurprisingly, given that Esty groups him with two of Miller’s main figures, Pound has more of
a presence in Miller’s book, especially in the chapter on Lewis. But Miller does not treat Pound
in his own right, perhaps arbitrarily, perhaps because Pound does not fit the narrative of Late
Modernism that Miller is telling.
It is for this latter reason that I find it intriguing to think about Pound and Eliot together
in terms of Late Modernism here. For Pound does not fit well into any of these foundational
accounts of Late Modernism. While we can say that he does become more politically and
economically engaged during the period Miller identifies with Late Modernism, the sort of
rejection of high modernism that is so central to these theorizations of Late Modernism never
manifests itself. That said, Pound did understand his Cantos of the thirties and forties as “late” or
even “belated,” but not in such a way as to undermine his involvement with the High Modernist
moment of the earlier 1920s. Instead, especially in The Pisan Cantos, Pound used his poetry to
write an elegy for modernism, as more and more of its central figures died, like Joyce, or moved
in different directions, like Eliot. Importantly, Pound’s elegy for modernism is also an elegy for
his Modernist Amateur Economic theory, now, in Pound’s perception, in danger of being
forgotten forever in light of the failure of Fascist Italy and the death of Mussolini. That Pound’s
version of Social Credit was, in his conception, inextricable from the modernist literature that he
both wrote and helped shepherd into print illustrates the stakes of his Modernist Amateur
Economics, even as it also indicates the depth of his embrace of conspiracy theory. In conceiving
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of Social Credit as the key to all of the social and economic problems in the world, in meeting
resistance to Social Credit with accusing opponents of being bad faith actors and eventually with
an intensely-held antisemitism, and ultimately in flattening his understanding of the world so
that, in his own mind, at least, his economic theorization and his modernist experimentation were
the same, Pound illustrates, to an even greater degree than Shaw, the dangers of allowing
totalizing economic theories to lead to support of Totalitarian regimes.
Where Pound’s single-mindedness led to his enthusiastic contributions to Mussolini’s
Fascist regime and to his treasonous radio broadcasts during World War II, Eliot’s more
measured approach led him in a very different direction. That said, while Eliot certainly never
went as far as Pound in supporting Fascist politics, his differences from Pound can still be
construed as differences in degree rather than in kind. As After Strange Gods indicates, Eliot’s
pursuit of a Christian Society led him to adopt some antisemitic positions of his own, and his
scattered and cautious endorsements of Fascism over Communism may indicate more of a
temperamental difference from Pound than they do a firmly-held moral compunction against
Totalitarianism. Indeed, Eliot’s famous declaration that he was a royalist in politics speaks to his
monarchical—i.e. totalitarian—leanings. 36 Rather than focusing on Eliot’s politics, though, I am
interested here in showing how his conviction that England needed a return to a Christian
Society came out of his engagement with heterodox economics: Social Credit, Distributism,
Fascism, Communism. As we can see in Pound’s concern that Eliot was headed for
“Chertertism,” my reading of Eliot’s Modernist Amateur Economic theorization in the thirties is
that none of these heterodox theories—Chesterton’s included—quite fit the bill for the Christian
36
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Society he wanted to build. Instead, Eliot sought to conceptualize a different form of economics
altogether, one that started from Christian principles, rather than merely supporting them. By
tracing Eliot’s economic thought through his essays in The Criterion, and attending to the way he
works through different heterodox theories in his 1934 pageant play The Rock, I show how he
arrived at his own Modernist Amateur Economic theory, independent of his old friend Pound.
In bringing Pound and Eliot together in the context of their late work, rather than in terms
of the early collaborations in which they are generally discussed together, I am seeking to expand
our understanding of this famous modernist pairing. But I am also interested in what happens to
our conceptions of Late Modernism and the end of modernism in light of Pound and Eliot’s
divergent Modernist Amateur Economic theorization. Late Modernism came into focus as a
subfield within modernist studies as a result of what we might call a “political turn” in the field.
In positioning Pound and Eliot’s economic interests as central to their late aesthetic and critical
work, I am advocating for a further turn in our understanding of Late Modernism: an economic
turn, which recognizes Late Modernist writing as fundamentally informed by Modernist Amateur
Economic theorization in response to the pressing economic issues of the day. Further, in
emphasizing the divergent directions in which Pound and Eliot took their Late Modernist
Amateur Economic theorization, I argue that we must see this kind of heterodox theorization as
just as multi-directional as Late Modernist political commitments. Ultimately, what emerges
from reading Eliot and Pound together is a conception of Late Modernism as inextricably linked
to the political and economic moment in which it developed, with the Modernist Amateur
Economic theories of Pound and Eliot indicating some of the range of broader social and cultural
contexts that fundamentally shaped the final moment of modernist literary experimentation.
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Eliot and Economics
Although the exchange I have quoted between Pound and Orage suggests differently,
T.S. Eliot is not usually seen as centrally or even really peripherally interested in economics,
unlike Shaw, Orage, or Pound. On major reason for the lack of critical attention to Eliot’s
Modernist Amateur Economic theorization is surely that his most read literary and critical works
are not manifestly interested in economic questions. There are brief flashes of such interest, as in
the “Unreal City” passage of The Waste Land. There, Eliot meditates on the striking image of the
work-bound English populace heading to the financial district of London, “To where Saint Mary
Woolnoth kept the hours / With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine.” 37 There is an implicit
disjunction in these lines between the sound of the holy church bells and the workaday capitalist
life they now regulate on Lombard Street, suggesting Eliot’s dissatisfaction with the modern
economic system. That said, these lines also do not indicate any interest on Eliot’s part in the
vast array of alternative economic systems that were being discussed in modernist circles by
1922. Moreover, outside of the context of a project like mine that is focused on Literature and
Economics, these lines would likely not signify as concerned with economics at all. And yet,
1922 also marked a moment in Eliot’s life that would lead to more explicit considerations of
these matters in his literary works: the beginning of his editorship of The Criterion, a journal
which would follow The New Age’s lead in mixing literary content with commentaries on
contemporary politics and economics.
Although Eliot’s interest in economics doesn’t appear fully in his pre-Waste Land
writings, that interest did predate 1922: he famously began working for Lloyds Bank in 1917, a
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job which, as Adam Trexler argues, “enabled Eliot to learn the basic mechanisms banks used to
create credit, control capital and real estate and influence government policy.” 38 His job at
Lloyds was more than just a way to make the rent, too: “Within two years, he was promoted to a
position that involved economic research, exploring how international exchange rates affected
industry.”39 While this work did not establish Eliot as an expert in economics, it did give him a
sort of entrée into the subject: he did some work “on the details of the Versailles Treaty” 40 and
read Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace,41 both of which led to a sense of
disillusionment with establishment economics. It was around this time, too, that Eliot first began
reading C.H. Douglas’s economic works, which inspired his life-long interest in Social Credit.
Although Eliot was thus well-informed about the economic issues of the day, most of his
public pronouncements on them appear slightly later in his career, in editorials in The Criterion.
Following his conversion to Anglicanism in 1927, however, Eliot’s simmering interest in
heterodox economics increasingly came to the fore, first in his writing for The Criterion, but
eventually in his literary production and his longer essays, in relation to his growing belief in the
need for a dramatic reformation of English society. 42 The major expressions of this plan are
1940’s The Idea of a Christian Society and 1949’s Notes Towards the Definition of Culture. And
yet while these two long essays make glancing reference to heterodox economics, that major
influence is largely sublimated in them. The main source of Eliot’s evolving economic interest in
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the 30s remains The Criterion, but it also comes forth dramatically in his pageant play of 1934,
The Rock. Tracing the development of Eliot’s heterodox economics through the later 1920s and
30s in The Criterion and its culmination in The Rock helps restore a picture of Eliot as a key
modernist figure who was more interested in economics than critics have understood him to be.
More than this, though, seeing Eliot’s turn away from the heterodox economic theories that were
available to him and towards a version of Modernist Amateur Economics that sublimated the
economic in favor of the religious and, in his word, ethical questions that he found most pressing
helps us see a different side of the phenomenon I am describing in this dissertation. Eliot pushes
past the other Modernist Amateur Economists I have discussed in insisting not only that
economics not be abstracted from its social and cultural contexts, but that it be subordinated to
what he called in 1931 “the superior ‘scientific’ authority of Ethics.” 43 As Jason Harding and
Ronald Schuchard observe in their introduction to the fourth volume of Eliot’s complete prose,
“Eliot repeatedly argued that economic questions should not be left to the expertise of narrow
specialists but, framed correctly, required an ethical scrutiny of broad and general relevance:
‘We need another Ruskin’ he exclaimed.” 44 When that Ruskin failed to materialize, it seems,
Eliot had to try, at least, to do it himself.45
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Amateur Economics: Gathering the Pieces
Eliot’s extensive writings in The Criterion make it clear that the main influence on his
interest in economics was the chaotic nature of international economics and politics in the 20s
and 30s. If he initially became disillusioned with orthodox economics because of the
mishandling of the Treaty of Versailles, the major national and international events of the
subsequent decades—most notably the Great Depression and the rise of Fascism in Italy and
Communism in Russia—are the driving force behind his continued engagement with alternative
economic theories. As he wrote in “A Commentary” of November 1927: “Politics has become
too serious a matter to be left to politicians. We are compelled, to the extent of our abilities, to be
amateur economists, in an age in which politics and economics can no longer be kept wholly
apart. Everything is in question…”46 This statement is extremely suggestive in the context of this
dissertation, pointing out as it does the increasing inextricability of politics and economics in the
later 1920s and explicitly recommending, as a response, a turn to specifically amateur
economics.47 We can see some of the contours of Eliot’s own brand of economic amateurism
being developed earlier in 1927, in a review essay of five books on heterodox economics,
entitled “Political Theorists.” The books Eliot reviews in this essay span a wide range of
heterodox theories, including G.K. Chesterton’s Outline of Sanity, Hilaire Belloc’s The Servile
State, J.A. Hobson’s The Conditions of Industrial Peace, and Coal: A Challenge to the National
Conscience, written by seven followers of Social Credit in explicit response to the general strike
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of 1926.48 Each of these books, Eliot argues, has been written in response to “the political and
economic anarchy of the present time,” and, taken together, suggest that “salvation is not to be
found by either of two methods with which the nineteenth century consoled itself—either the
Smith-Ricardo method or the Carlyle-Ruskin method. Neither statistics nor revival meetings will
save us…”49
As for what will save us, Eliot begins with Belloc and Chesterton, the famous
conservative social critics who jointly created the heterodox economic system of distributism. 50
Distributism argues that the economic and social ills of modern England can be traced to the
dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII. It is somewhat similar to Guild Socialism in
proposing to repair the wrongs that have occurred since then by reorganizing society into “small
units organized according to natural economic classes and productive functions.” 51 These units
would tend to the needs of their members, and the Catholic church, which would be re-centered
at the heart of English society, would act as a federal government in matters that required any
degree of centralization. While Eliot professes to have “much sympathy with the BellocChesterton gospel of Distributive Property,”52 he is of course suspicious of its Catholic basis,
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arguing that Chesterton and Belloc’s “Romanism of politics and economics…sometimes blinds
them to the realities of Britain and the British Empire.” 53 As we will see, Eliot’s conviction that
it was important to take into account the specificities of place and nation when formulating
economic systems carries through his responses to communism in Russia and Fascism in Italy in
the next few decades and into his own plan for a Christian Society in the forties. But in 1927, he
is content to turn from Belloc and Chesterton to a figure he views as a more serious economist,
J.A. Hobson.
Hobson was the most important heterodox economist of the first part of the twentieth
century. As I have discussed in chapter one, Hobson represents a major school of heterodox
economic thought that was explicitly excluded from the newly-formed academic discipline by
Alfred Marshall. That school of thought, underconsumption, is based on the argument that
recessions occur when there is inadequate purchasing power in the economy, a state of affairs
that usually arises due to involuntary unemployment. Hobson’s theory informed many heterodox
economic theories of the teens, twenties, and thirties and proved to be a key inspiration for
Keynes’s contribution to mainstream economics in 1936 in The General Theory. Eliot thus
knows what he is saying when he comments that “[t]here could be no greater contrast than that
between Mr. Belloc and Mr. J.A. Hobson. Mr. Hobson is a serious economist of the old school,
earnest, heavy-writing, uninspired.”54 Although this seems like a lukewarm list of adjectives,
Eliot clearly admires Hobson’s ability to diagnose the economic problem facing contemporary
society. But while, for Eliot, Hobson’s “great merit lies in his way of putting the problem,” the
solution he offers to that problem is inadequate, “uninspired.” Instead, one gets the feeling from
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reading Hobson that “this problem is so huge that he leaves us almost in a state of despair of
human ability to solve it.”55 Eliot’s terminology is interesting here: in construing Hobson as “a
serious economist,” Eliot is implying that Hobson is a professional. And in calling his attempt at
theorizing a solution “uninspired,” Eliot is implicitly calling for the kind of solution that can only
come from an amateur, outsider position. Even though Hobson is not an orthodox institutional
economist, he still signifies for Eliot as too old-fashioned, too narrow-minded, to meet the
economic challenges on the present moment. Instead, Eliot is looking for a creative, new solution
to what Hobson can ultimately only describe as an intractable problem.
In ending his essay with Coal, an attempt to solve the current labor crisis with Social
Credit theory, Eliot suggests such a possible solution. Claiming that “it is when people reach the
point to which Mr. Hobson brings us, that they produce books like Coal,” Eliot describes the
solution the authors of Coal put forth as proving “the importance of imagination, the value, as
some might say, of illusions” in addressing large-scale economic problems that seem to be
beyond an individual’s ability to solve. It is specifically the imaginative nature of this solution to
Hobson’s “huge” problem that draws Eliot to the amateur economic theorization of the Coal
authors. And yet while Eliot is intrigued with the theory of Social Credit that he finds in Coal,
and especially in the book’s “insistence that economics and politics, in their most exact sense,
deserve the attention of people who believe in the spiritual askesis and the discipline and
development of the soul,”56 he ultimately thinks that the authors do “fail.” The point, though, is
that the Coal authors’ failure is an interesting one, and their book is something “which everyone
ought to read.”57 Ultimately, despite Eliot’s careful dismissal of each of these theories in
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succession, his attention to them here anticipates his career-long fascination with heterodox
economics. Indeed, Eliot would remain fascinated by Social Credit, Distributism, and Hobson as
his economic thought developed over the next twenty years, even if he never came fully to
endorse any one of them as theories. We can therefore see in this essay of 1927 the beginnings of
Eliot’s truly systematic interest in heterodox economic theory.
Eliot continues to refine his understanding of heterodox economics in a pair of articles
from late 1928 and early 1929 on Fascism and Communism. The first of these, “The Literature
of Fascism,” is another review of five books, some arguing for and some against the political and
economic system of Fascism.58 Where “Political Theorists” helps us see the outlines of his
economic concerns, in “The Literature of Fascism” we can see Eliot trying, in the face of
international political turmoil, to pin down what sort of political system could best implement the
economic reforms he desires—even if he remains a bit fuzzy about what, specifically, those
reforms would be. As with the first review, Eliot’s own theorization is at an early stage here, but
we can see him in this review feeling his way toward the political and economic contours of his
Christian Society. I want to point out a few features of this review and of the 1929 follow-up to it
that help frame our understanding of Eliot’s developing Modernist Amateur Economic
theorization and political thought in the thirties.
First is his repeated insistence on his own amateurism. Early in the essay he claims that
he is “interested in political ideas, but not in politics,” 59 and later he refers to himself, tongue
firmly in cheek, as “a political ignoramus.” 60 We have already seen Eliot deploy this insistence
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on amateurism in his comments about needing to be “amateur economists,” and he continues to
thematize amateurism throughout his political and economic writings. 61 That Eliot is selfconsciously identifying himself as an amateur also sets him apart from other Modernist Amateur
Economists like Pound, Orage, or Shaw, who, while they are certainly amateurs, are interested in
making claims to expertise and professionalism. Eliot’s claiming of amateurism goes hand in
hand with the eclecticism with which he approaches economic theory: his willingness to consider
a wide range of economic and political ideas and refusal to wholeheartedly endorse any school of
economic thought should be read as integral to his self-fashioning as an amateur economist. We
can see this attitude on display in these articles about Fascism and its opposite, Communism, as
he politely but firmly raises pointed concerns about the two new political systems but also
questions mainstream critiques of them. Ultimately, Eliot lands on the idea that while “a new
school of political thought is needed,” the answer does not lie in imitating Italy or Russia, for
“sound political thought in one country is not to be built upon political facts in another
country.”62 For Eliot, the question facing England in 1928 is not “democracy is dead; what is to
replace it?” but rather “the frame of democracy has been destroyed: how can we, out of the
materials at hand, build a new structure in which democracy can live?” 63
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Eliot’s review inspired defenses of Communism and Fascism in The Criterion, which in
turn provoked him to publish a response in July of 1929, “Mr. Barnes and Mr. Rowse.” 64 This
essay more explicitly addresses Eliot’s interest in the relation between political form and
economic system than does the previous review, as he asserts that “[i]t seems to me that any
political theory ought to be analysable roughly into three parts: an economic doctrine, a wisdom
(sophia) and an enthusiasm.”65 Eliot is especially adamant about the first of these points, and it
forms the basis of his criticisms of Fascism and of Communism, which he construes in this essay
as fundamentally equivalent, “sterilized,” political ideas, “the natural idea for the thoughtless
person.”66 Eliot’s main critique of Fascism and Communism, then, is his feeling that each is
based on a “muddle of economics and enthusiasm for words.” 67 Eliot is not interested in claiming
strongly “that political thought is impossible to anyone but an economist,” 68 but he does insist
that “one ought to know where things begin and where they end” in terms of economic policy. 69
So, for Eliot, “the really interesting thing about fascism is its syndicalism, its organization of
workers, and its financial policy,” whereas “the interesting point about capitalism is its creation
of economic or financial power, distinct from the political power.” 70 Eliot concludes this essay
by “confess[ing] to a preference for fascism in practice,” even if he views it in a sense as the
lesser of two evils. However, it is clear from his subsequent writings that the dual rise of Fascism
and Communism in the twenties has both helped spark his interest in developing his own
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proposal for political and economic reform and provided a cautionary tale about the dangers of
doing so on the strength of emotional appeals rather than sound economic principles.
And yet Eliot remained dissatisfied with the economic theories available to him in the
thirties, a state of affairs exacerbated by the manifest failure of orthodox economics in the Great
Depression. So, in 1931, Eliot calls for “more and better Economics” that reject the view that
economics is “a pure science unfettered by moral principles.” 71 Moreover, this “better
Economics” needs to be made more comprehensible to the layman. The current state of affairs is
intolerable to Eliot because:
When I read, say, an economic article in The Referee, or any of the numerous productions
of Major Douglas and his disciples, I am confirmed in my suspicion that conventional
economic practice is all wrong, but I can never understand enough to form any opinion as
to whether the particular prescription or nostrum proffered is right. I cannot but believe
that there are a few simple ideas at bottom, upon which I and the rest of the unlearned are
competent to decide according to our several complexions; but I cannot for the life of me
ever get to the bottom.72
To help the lay-person “get to the bottom” of economic problems, Eliot argues, “we need
Economists who will not merely demand of us enough wit to appreciate their own intellectual
brilliance, who will not aim to dazzle us by their technical accomplishments, but who can
descend to show us the relation between the financial cures that they advocate and our simple
human principles and convictions.”73 Eliot cites the inadequacies of his own amateur interest in
economics as an illustration of the degree to which the state of the field is troublesome: even
after having “served my own apprenticeship in the City; endeavoured to master the “classics” of
the subject; [and] hav[ing] written (or compiled) articles on Foreign Exchange which
occasionally met with approval from my superiors” Eliot “was never convinced that the
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authorities upon whom I drew, or the expert public which I addressed, understood the matter any
better than I did myself – which is not at all.”74 These strong expressions of dissatisfaction with
economics as it stands would form the keynote of Eliot’s political and economic statements of
the thirties, and the provocation for his development of his solution to the economic problems of
the day.
That solution, in brief, was pursuing a unification between his interests in economics and
his desire to see English civilization remade through a widespread return to Christianity. So, in
the March 16, 1932 issue of The Listener, Eliot puts forth the relationship between Christianity
and economics as “for our time…the most pressing problem of all” in “an age in which all of
us…are somehow compelled to think about economics.” 75 Later that month, in the same venue,
Eliot would get more specific, arguing that “We have to-day a system, or lack of system, which
Christianity cannot possibly accept. And we need a kind of economics which will ask the
question: Why? What is it good to do? And to answer this question we must find out what is the
meaning of ‘Good’.”76 This effort to integrate Christian ethics and economics, which would
culminate in The Idea of a Christian Society, importantly comes to its first fruition in a literary
work, the pageant play The Rock, written in 1933 and performed in 1934.

The Rock
All of Eliot’s ruminations on economic matters came together in 1933, when he was
asked to write a pageant play in support of “Bishop Winnington-Ingram’s ambitious Forty-Five
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Churches Fund to finance the building of new churches for the burgeoning suburbia of the
Diocese of London in the inter-war years,” 77 an effort made more ambitious still by the historical
circumstance of the Great Depression. 78 The resulting work surveys a range of current economic
theories—relating to Social Credit, Marxism, Fascism, and Capitalism—largely in an effort to
expose their inadequacy in the face of the economic crisis of the 1930s. But The Rock does not
merely survey, as do Eliot’s essays. While Eliot does not ultimately endorse any of these
economic theories, he does paint a picture of an economic theory that, he suggests, would solve
many of the economic and social problems plaguing England in the thirties. Eliot’s positive
suggestions for economic reform is clearly indebted to Distributism, proposing a return to the
church and a prioritization of church-building as a solution to the depression and to a range of
social ills that the play also seeks to diagnose. In this sense, The Rock stands as Eliot’s clearest
example of Modernist Amateur Economic theorization, and a step beyond his engagement with
economic theory in his editorial writings of the late twenties and early thirties.
Much of the didactic message of the play comes through in the chorus, which is the only
part of the play preserved in The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950, an abridgement that
has certainly had an adverse impact on the amount of critical attention The Rock as a whole has
received.79 Eliot’s chorus provides commentary on the ways in which modernity—and especially
the modern economic system—has led the British populace away from the Church, and, through
an almost liturgical use of repetition and refrain, puts forth the economic solution that both Eliot
and the Forty-Five Churches Fund are proposing: “A Church for us all and work for us all and
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God’s world for us all even unto this last.”80 Meanwhile, the main text of the play—i.e. the part
that is not contained in the choruses—serves a different but equally important function: putting
forth and working through the economic alternatives that Eliot seeks to use as foils to this
solution suggested by his chorus. At the same time, the main text of the play lays out a historical
narrative arguing for the centrality of church-building to English history and culture, a typical
trope in English pageant plays which “activates,” in Esty’s phrase, “an amnesiac and socially
cohesive idea of English heritage.”81 The result is a complex, dialectical production that
dramatizes the process through which Eliot has been coming to his economic ideas over the past
decade or so, and lands on an early version of the economic element of the Christian Society that
Eliot would come to theorize in the forties.
The opening series of choruses establishes the two major economic problems that Eliot
sees facing modern British society. First, in a passage that echoes the “Unreal City” passage of
The Waste Land, the chorus takes us on a tour through “London, the timekept City, / Where the
River flows, with foreign flotations.”82 There is a pun here on “flotations,” which is
simultaneously a reference to foreign vessels pursuing commerce in London on the Thames and
a nod to the international nature of the financial system, a cornerstone of which is the “flotation”
of stocks to the public on the stock market. Eliot of course would have known this term from his
time at Lloyds, and the clearly derogatory use of financial jargon in this opening passage reflects
his suspicion of the global financial system and his belief in the necessity of the national
character of economic reform. Meanwhile, the Chorus finds more than stocks in London:
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There I was told: we have too many churches,
And too few chop-houses. There I was told
Let the vicars retire. Men do not need the Church
In the place where they work, but where they spend their Sundays.
In the City, we need no bells:
Let them waken the suburbs.83
This separation of church life and economic life is precisely the feature of modern life that Eliot
most deplores, but when we read this passage in light of the earlier verses from The Waste Land,
we can see that Eliot is painting an even more dire picture in The Rock: where the bells of St.
Mary Woolnoth ironically kept the time of the 9 to 5 workday in the earlier poem, in The Rock
we have a vision of a London that has no auditory reminder of the Church at all.
Things get worse when the chorus travels to the suburbs: “and there I was told: / We toil
for six days, on the seventh we must motor / To Hindhead, or Maidenhead.” At a loss, the chorus
continues to survey the state of England:
In industrial districts, there I was told
Of economic laws.
In the pleasant countryside, there it seemed
That the country now is only fit for picnics.
And the Church does not seem to be wanted
In country or in suburb…84
This is the problem that Eliot uses to frame the rest of the play: the very structure of capitalism,
from the new infrastructural dynamic of city and suburb to the five or six day work week has led
to a near-total neglect of spiritual life in England. And a large part of the justification for this
new social and economic organization is a blind appeal to the authority of “economic laws,”
which, as we can see from his writings in The Criterion, Eliot has viewed with suspicion for
more than a decade.
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As we have seen, one of the main reasons for Eliot’s long-held distrust of mainstream
economics was its failure to account for underconsumption, and thus for unemployment. As I
have mentioned in my survey of the field of economics in Chapter 1, the untenable nature of this
theoretical shortcoming was finally proved to orthodox economists by the Great Depression,
which showed beyond a doubt that the theory that the economy would always come to a point of
equilibrium on its own was critically flawed. In the second part of the initial Chorus of The Rock,
Eliot both acknowledges the demoralizing impact of the Great Depression—demoralizing in part
because of the cultural assumption that the unemployed were unemployed by choice and were
thus lazy—and puts forth a solution: the employment of men on a large scale to build churches.
And so we are introduced to the “voices of the Unemployed,” which lament:
No man has hired us
With pocketed hands
And lowered faces
We stand about in open places
And shiver in unlit rooms
… In this land
There shall be one cigarette to two men,
To two women one half pint of bitter
Ale. In this land
No man has hired us.
Our life is unwelcome, our death
Unmentioned in “The Times”85
Eliot here clearly draws the connection between feelings of worthlessness and unemployment, an
alignment of commercial value and self-worth that he seeks to correct by re-centering the
Church—and work for and on the Church—in English society. Accordingly, he has a “Chant of
Workmen” respond to the Unemployed by putting forth this idea:
If men do not build
How shall they live?
[…]
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Without delay, without haste
We would build the beginning and the end of this street.
We build the meaning:
A Church for all
And a job for each
Each man to his work.86
Here Eliot maintains and even doubles down on the identification of work and meaning, but
posits that the work must be meaningful, and specifically religiously meaningful, for it to rescue
the Unemployed from their despair: “We build the meaning.”
The main narrative of the play is largely an illustration of this concept, as we follow three
workers, Ethelbert, Alfred, and Edwin, as they build a church in the heart of London. While our
trio of workers begins the play thinking of the church as just another job, over the course of the
play, we watch them come to understand that they are doing something more meaningful. 87 They
come to this realization through a dual movement: being shown past acts of difficult churchbuilding and encountering resistance by present-day economic and political ideologies that seek
to denigrate the value of the church they are building. The first of these narrative threads in the
play serves to reinforce the positive message of the chorus by seeking to establish the economic
practice of church-building as a central tradition in English history. At the same time, Eliot
anticipates his Christian Society by including in his series of figures historical acts of churchbuilding outside of England, thereby establishing a Christian lineage for England beyond the
nation itself.88 The three workmen are thus introduced to a series of historical churchbuilders:
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Rahere, known as the founder of the Priory of the Hospital of St. Bartholomew in 1123;
Nehemiah, famous for rebuilding Jerusalem in the 5th century BC; Alfred Blomfield, a 19thcentury Anglican Bishop who led efforts to build “two hundred churches”; 89 and Christopher
Wren, the famous architect and rebuilder of St. Paul’s cathedral in London, along with 51 other
churches that had been destroyed by the fire of London in 1666. There is also a lengthy scene of
the crusades, in a clear attempt to strengthen the image of England as a historically and
fundamentally Christian culture. Hovering over all of these scenes and historical personages we
have the title figure of the play, The Rock, who is clearly meant to signify both Peter and Jesus at
different points in the play. Peter, of course, is explicitly identified in the Bible as “the rock”
upon which the church will be built, and thus stands as the ultimate symbol of the biblical
imperative to build physical buildings in order to spread the Church.
Taken together, these scenes reinforce the play’s straightforward message that, first,
building churches is a central activity of a Christian society and that, second, England has
historically been such a society. The three builders’ encounters with anti-church forces in the
present provide the reciprocal movement of this message, showing that and how modernity has
caused England to forget and forsake its religious roots. The first and richest of these encounters
is with a Marxist “Agitator,” who accosts the workers at the head of “a tattered crowd” and
accuses them of “betrayin’ your class and the workers of the world, by prostitutin’ yourselves by
lendin’ your labour towards buildin’ a church.” 90 Ethelbert, the leader of the three workers,
engages the Agitator on his own terms by drawing explicitly on economic theory. After an aside
to Alfred in which he comments that he “don’t suppose ’e’s even ’eard o’ the principles o’ Credit
their own Christian and tribal identity, as a people still capable of close obedience to God and nature.” Cf. Esty, A
Shrinking Island, 73.
89
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reform [i.e. Social Credit],”91 Ethelbert turns to the Agitator and demands to know his “view o’
Maynard Keynes’s theory o’ money.”92 After a back and forth that illustrates that both the
Agitator and Ethelbert have a rather tenuous grasp on economic matters, Ethelbert lands a
definitive point when he gets the Agitator to admit that he believes that building churches leads
to “money and labour and material bein’ diverted from its rightful purpose o’ providing’ decent
’omes for the workers.”93 Ethelbert pounces: “I knew you ad’ered to some antiquated theory of
money…Deny if you can as there’s enough clay and lime and tools and men to build all the
’ouses that’s needed in this country, and all the churches too? Well, that bein’ the case, I say: to
’ell with money! You can arrange the convenience o’ money so’s to get these things.” 94
Ethelbert’s point here is that the real source of a nation’s prosperity is materials and labor, not
money, which is simply a tool that has been used and misused to create the illusion that it is the
source of value in the economy. This is a classic Social Credit argument, 95 delivered here with
Eliot’s apparent approval as a criticism against the idea that at the present stage of civilization
there is still enough scarcity to justify certain economic shortcomings.
The Agitator has no answer for Ethelbert’s criticism, and Eliot seizes on the opportunity
to level some cartoonish critiques against communism. His Agitator leans exaggeratedly into an
anti-church position, urging the crowd to throw “a brick through one o’ their stained glass
windows what is pure idolatry an’ worshippin’ o’ graven images” (an oddly religious reason for
destroying stained glass) and finally calling for “Sabotagin’!” 96 Besides advocating the physical
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destruction of church property, Eliot’s Agitator, in the figure of whom Eliot is clearly parodying
people who support communism while having only a vague understanding of what it is, says
things like “We’ll all be free and we’ll all think alike, as a free people does; and them that don’t
won’t be allowed to think different.” 97 All in all, the Agitator is not a particularly serious figure
here, but in his exaggerated comments and calls to action we do see the substance of the two
main critiques of communism that Eliot makes in his Criterion articles of the early 1930s: its
reliance on enthusiasm rather than substance and its anti-church position. 98
As the Agitator and his crowd fade into a scene from the “DANISH INVASION”—a
transition and a conflation99—we are given a series of choruses and anti-choruses that expand
this initial critique of communism into a larger survey of other economic and political systems
that oppose the kind of church-centered system that Eliot is developing in the play. As the
Chorus laments the current state of the world, it turns to a succession of these current ideas to see
if any can provide a way out. The first of these comes in the form of a procession of
“REDSHIRTS in military formation.” The Chorus is hopeful, noting that the Redshirts’ “looks
are horrid, but your hearts no doubt are pure / Bring you some succor for our failing strength?” 100
The Redshirts answer in free verse:
Our verse
is free
as the wind on the steppes
as love in the heart of the factory worker
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thousands and thousands of steppes
millions and millions of workers
all working
all loving
in the cities
on the steppes
production has risen by twenty point six per cent
we can laugh at God!101
Although the Chorus is dismayed by this passage—“Alas! There is no help here”—the tone is
much different than in the Agitator scenes. Eliot’s critique of the anti-religious aspect of
Communism is still present, but we can also detect an element of Eliot’s contention that
Communism is a form of economics and of government that is closely tied to Russia itself, and
nontransferable to England. This element of Eliot’s critique of communism comes through in the
repeated reference to Russian “steppes,” as well as Eliot’s arrangement of the verse into a series
of jagged plateaus that mirror this geographical feature. In having his group of Redshirts relate
their economic philosophies to the very specific geographical features of Russia—which,
notably, England does not share—Eliot is emphasizing the foreignness of Communism to
England. It is also significant that Eliot associates Communism with free verse, the quintessential
modernist verse form that he helped to establish as such in his first volume of poems. Without
reading too much into this conflation—which is also simply a punning joke on free verse/free
love—we can see Eliot here actively distancing himself and his proposed economic system from
a modernist form and, by implication, from modernity. 102
Having dismissed the Redshirts, the Chorus perceives a new crowd of people
“approaching from our right”: “BLACKSHIRTS,” also “in military formation.”103 The
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Blackshirts (i.e. the British Fascist Party) speak in rhyming couplets that highlight several of the
elements of Fascism that Eliot found alarming: “
We come as a boon and a blessing to all,
Though we’d rather appear in the Albert Hall.
Our methods are new in this land of the free,
We make the deaf hear and we make the blind see.
We’re law-keeping fellows who make our own laws—
And we welcome SUBSCRIPTIONS IN AID OF THE CAUSE!104
With this passage, Eliot highlights the theatrical—or, indeed music-hall—nature of Fascism, its
authoritarianism, the disingenuousness of its claim to being “law-keeping fellows” and its
essential foreignness in the English context. He proceeds to highlight Fascism’s obsession with
and violent rhetoric toward “anthropoid Jews” and the fact that its religious element, such as it
is, involves having “our own prophets, who’re ready to speak / For a week and a day and a day
and a week.” The Chorus is repulsed by all of these elements of the Blackshirts, commenting that
“[t]here seems no hope from those who march in step, / We have no help from those with new
evangels.”105 As a last resort, the Chorus turns to consider “those who hold the world / …those
who have the glory and the power”: the capitalists.106
At this, a “PLUTOCRAT” appears, along with “other PLUTOCRATS, FLASH LADIES,
GUNMEN and other shady and rapacious individualists getting lower and lower in class.”107
This stage direction indicates immediately where Eliot is going with this figure, and the Plutocrat
does not disappoint. He delivers a speech in which he panders to both the Blackshirts and the
Redshirts, claiming that “[s]ome clergymen are grossly overpaid; / You are extortionate in rents
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and tithes” to the approval of the former and that “[t]he Church is most oppressive to the poor” to
the delight of the latter.108 Ultimately, the Plutocrat offers a compromise solution:
We all, I know, have various interests,
And there’s the Church to be considered too.
So I have had a little image cast,
And I must say, you’ll find it very neat,
Something I’m sure that all of you will like.
It looks like Gold, but its real name is POWER. 109
At this, “FLUNKEYS” enter “bearing the GOLDEN CALF,” which immediately provokes a
struggle between all of the factions present on the stage as they all pursue their real goal: wealth.
Ethelbert sums up the import of this long scene: “O Gawd! O Gawd! Ain’t we got everythink
against us, tryin’ to get this church built! O Lord, help us!” 110 Eliot’s message is clear:
Communism and Fascism are ultimately just new twists on the same old economic system,
Capitalism. And all three of these economic systems are diametrically opposed to the Church and
thus, in his estimation, to England.
In the second act, the three workers prevail in building the church, and aside from the
repeated choral refrains about “A Church for us all and work for us all,” the second act contains
no more references to the economic turmoil that the first act explores so thoroughly. But this
apparent shift in focus is due, I argue, to the fact that the second half of the play represents
Eliot’s own economic theory. For Eliot, England’s way out of the economic problems of the
present is not to emulate new, foreign economic systems or to insist upon the viability of the
current system that is clearly failing the majority of the population. Rather, it is to set these
things aside and focus on re-centering and literally rebuilding the church in a system akin to but
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not fully congruent with Distributism. For Eliot’s deployment of Ethelbert as the voice of Social
Credit, comic as it is at times, clearly contains a grain of seriousness. In arriving at this early
expression of Eliot’s Social-Credit-Inflected Distributism, The Rock stands as an important
moment of synthesis of Eliot’s late-20s and early-30s economic and political thought. Moreover,
The Rock helps establish the specifically economic contours of that thought in a way that his
later, more systematic plan in The Idea of a Christian Society largely hides.

After The Rock: Eliot’s Christian Society
In retrospect, The Rock stands as an inflection point in Eliot’s career as a Modernist
Amateur Economist. Whereas the years leading up to the play’s publication were marked by
increasingly involved attempts at economic theorization and speculation, the years following
1933 saw Eliot starting to prioritize questions of ethics, morals, and culture above economics.
This is not to say that Eliot turned away from economics entirely in the later thirties and forties:
he remained intensely convinced that the modern economic order was at fault for many of
society’s ills and highly motivated to show that neither of the major economic alternatives of the
day, Fascism and Communism, were adequate substitutes for the current system. Moreover, he
continued to be intrigued by the possibilities of Social Credit, even if he never became the kind
of rabid supporter of the cause that Pound did. Eliot sums up this series of positions later in 1934,
in a letter to the editor of the paper Social Credit:
Sir, – Economics is a subject I have never been able to understand, but I suspect that one
reason why I cannot understand it is that orthodox economics rests upon moral
assumptions which I could not possibly accept, if they were laid bare. The moral
foundations of Communism and Fascism seem to me equally unacceptable, and their
economic and monetary theories, if any, do not seem to me to differ very interestingly
from the old theories. Furthermore, while I do not pretend that I understand Major
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Douglas’s theory yet, I cannot see that his opponents are in a strong position, so long as
they continue to support a system which simply does not work. 111
As the international situation continued to degrade over the course of the later thirties, Eliot
would repeatedly return to the first part of this message: that while the current state of affairs was
unacceptable, Communism and Fascism were not the answer. And in trying to formulate what
that answer was, Eliot pivoted away from considering preexisting economic theories and toward
solving what he saw as the more pressing problem: the lack of cultural coherence in England and
in Europe at large.
In the second half of the thirties, then, Eliot developed a refrain, summarized by his
comments in his article “Last Words” in the final issue of the Criterion in 1939: “[f]or myself, a
right political philosophy came more and more to imply a right theology – and right economics
to depend upon right ethics.”112 These shifts from politics to theology and from economics to
ethics resulted in Eliot’s two major essays of the forties: The Idea of a Christian Society (1940)
and Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (1949).113 As he wrote in the former of these essays,
“I am here concerned only secondarily with the changes in economic organization, and only
secondarily with the life of the devout Christian: my primary interest is a change in our social
attitude, such a change only as could bring about anything worthy to be called a Christian
Society.”114 Although Eliot clearly came to see economics as a second-order concern in the later
thirties and forties, my claim here is that his theorization of the Christian Society only came
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about at all because of his early and enduring interest in economic questions. While Eliot’s
essays and articles provide clear indications of the depth of his interest in these questions, his
Modernist Amateur Economic theorization importantly only comes into being when he applies
his literary sensibilities to those questions in The Rock. In using his literary writing as a testingground for his long-gestating economic theory, and in eventually producing a theory that insists
on subordinating economics to broader social and cultural contexts, contexts that, in Eliot’s
estimation, are more important than economics itself, Eliot both picks up on the methods of the
Modernist Amateur Economic theorization that Shaw, Orage, and Pound had already begun to
produce and pushes that kind of intellectual and creative project in a direction that is resolutely
his own.

Pound and Fascism
In his divergence from Pound, Eliot also adds to the very large number of Pound’s friends
and acquaintances who ultimately did not become converts to Social Credit. And where Eliot’s
interest in economic questions gradually became subordinate to his other social and religious
concerns, Social Credit economics came increasingly to signify for Pound as the key to
understanding the world. In terms of critical reception, too, while Eliot’s interest in economic
theory has been lost in critical accounts of his late career, Pound’s all-consuming obsession with
economics is well-known. The details of Pound’s theoretical interests have been welldocumented, famously in Hugh Kenner’s The Pound Era and in more critical detail in
monographs by Leon Surette, Tim Redman, Peter Nicholls, and others. 115 Despite this critical
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attention paid to Pound’s economics, Pound’s general placement in the modernist canon seems to
focus more on his early works—and especially his involvement with Imagism—and his
influence on T.S. Eliot rather than on his later works. It is clear why: his economic interests and
later poetry both actively led him to support Mussolini and reflect the depth of the pro-Fascist
and antisemitic positions that he came to hold in the thirties and beyond.
Pound’s support of Mussolini makes him a difficult figure to discuss, and I want to pause
to acknowledge that difficulty here. In my introduction to this chapter, I claim that Pound’s
difference from Eliot is one of degree rather than kind. Both endorsed or even originated various
versions of antisemitism and white supremacy, and both became fascinated by Fascism in
various ways. That said, the difference in degree between Pound and Eliot is great. Where we
find in Eliot a series of unsavory comments in support of totalitarianism or against allowing “any
large number of free-thinking Jews” into his Christian Society, 116 Pound went much further. The
epitome of his antisemitism and his support for Fascism is undoubtedly his radio broadcasts on
behalf of Mussolini’s government, which were produced for an American audience and
broadcast into the United States throughout the early part of the war. 117 These radio broadcasts,
as well as the virulently antisemitic letters and essays that Pound wrote while he was producing
them, have raised critical questions about whether Pound should be studied at all. As Benjamin
Friedlander notes in his overview of the broadcasts, “the surviving scripts and recordings…have
an aberrational status among Pound scholars, who for many decades received them with
embarrassment and apologetics, segregating them from Pound’s other prose and from his
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poetry.”118 “There are good reasons for that marginality,” Friedlander concedes, but more to the
point is the uncomfortable feeling that if we look squarely at Pound’s broadcasts, we might find
that they show us that we should not talk about Pound at all, except as a cautionary tale.
The problem deepens when we consider Pound as a Modernist Amateur Economist
whose economic and literary writings increasingly came to be mutually informative and even
mutually constitutive. More than this, in my reading, Pound’s later critical and poetic writings
are not separable from his earlier work: the later, more economically-focused writings are
substantially linked in various aesthetic and philosophical ways to Pound’s earlier, less political
literary and critical production.119 Tim Redman, in Ezra Pound and Italian Fascism, writes
powerfully about the moral problem posed by precisely this inextricability of Pound’s fascism
and his aesthetics, and gives a helpful survey of critical attempts to gloss over this inextricability.
Translating Pound’s status as a Fascist poet into a logical syllogism, Redman writes:
Take as the major premise of poetic faith that the Poet as Genius offers guidance to the
tribe. Add to that the minor premise that the Poet Pound embraced fascism, and the
conclusion that we should also embrace fascism seems to follow. Since few can accept
such a conclusion, critical contortions ensue, all focused on the second term of the
syllogism: Pound was not really a poet; Pound was not really a fascist; Pound was a
fascist, but his poetry is not fascistic; the good, essential Pound was not a fascist, but the
evil, insane Pound was; Pound’s fascism was not really fascism. 120
The result of these “critical contortions,” Redman argues, is that “[s]ince the time of the
Bollingen controversy, Pound scholarship has engaged in an aestheticization of fascism,” in a
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way that directly mirrors “Walter Benjamin’s influential and illuminating dictum” that
“Fascism…is the aestheticization of politics.”121 Redman’s book represents an attempt to strip
away this critical baggage and to confront what Pound’s support of Fascism means for our
understanding of not only his poetry, but of poetry in general. 122 While Redman’s conclusion,
which is that Pound’s fascism is the direct cause of “the loss of poetic authority” writ large, 123 is
too broad for me to agree with wholeheartedly, his argument that there is nothing to be gained
from skirting the political and economic content of Pound’s writing does ring true.
Redman’s position leads me to a larger point in my approach to reading Pound, namely,
that I do not hold that reading and engaging extensively with a literary figure is equivalent to
endorsing everything that figure says or every position that figure holds. If this were my criteria,
I would have found it very difficult to write about modernism and economics at all, given the bad
politics of Shaw, Orage, Eliot, and Pound. My purpose in this dissertation is not to valorize or
recommend the specific economic theories these writers put forth in their Modernist Amateur
Economic writings. Indeed, most of these theories are not merely impractical, they are often
deeply problematic as well. In writing about Pound, I am not claiming that Social Credit would
have worked or that it excuses his fascism. That said, I am seeking in this dissertation to
represent each figure I am discussing on his or her own terms. The only way to draw conclusions
about any given writer’s economic theorization is to be clear about what that theorization looked
like. Accordingly, in what follows, I aim to lay out the specifics of Pound’s economic theories,
with the goal of outlining how those theories developed in and through his literary writings. As I
do so, I want to emphasize now that the “connections” to which I will point between various
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economic problems, fascist politics, and global Jewish conspiracies are connections in Pound’s
conspiracy theory-ridden mind alone. Even as this process will require me to engage with some
of Pound’s explicitly fascist works—including The Pisan Cantos—it also gives us substantial
insights into Pound as the quintessential Modernist Amateur Economist.

Pound and Economics
Tracing the evolution of Pound’s interest in economics is critical to understanding what
he is doing in his poetic and economic writings of the mid-thirties and beyond. 124 Although I
have been identifying Pound’s economics throughout this chapter so far as congruent with Social
Credit, one reason that Pound emerges as a Modernist Amateur Economist is the sheer range of
economic ideas and theories that he discovered and sought to synthesize over the course of the
twenties and thirties. If that theorization began with Douglas, it quickly grew to include other
heterodox ideas like Silvio Gesell’s concept of stamp scrip and Fascist notions of political and
economic organization. As we shall see, Pound’s effort to bring these and other heterodox ideas
together frequently alienated adherents of the various theories he sought to combine, a
phenomenon that only deepened Pound’s convictions that he alone understood the current
international economic situation and that he was being silenced.
Before he reached this point, however, Pound had a more casual relationship to heterodox
economic theory. Pound was first introduced to such theories through Orage, as he was a
frequent contributor to The New Age from 1911 onwards, usually writing articles on various
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literary figures and related topics. While his affiliation with The New Age and friendship with
Orage therefore introduced him to Guild Socialism, Pound did not find this theory compelling,
and did not become interested in the economic side of the magazine until Orage’s post-war shift
from Guild Socialism to Social Credit. Looking back on this moment from the perspective of
Orage’s recent passing, Pound wrote in his obituary for his friend:
The actual battle with ignorance, in the acute phase wherein I shared, began with
Douglas’s arrival in Cursitor Street. The earlier Guild Socialism, and all other political or
social theory had lain outside my view. (This statement is neither boast nor apology.) I
take it I was present at some of the earliest talks between the two leaders. At any rate my
economic study dates from their union, and their fight for its place in public
knowledge.125
While Pound dates the beginning of his interest in economics from this moment, in reality he
was not immediately convinced by Douglas’s argument either. However, he was immediately
attracted to the idea implicit in Douglas’s theory that value came from the cultural capital of the
society, an idea that thus included the arts in a way that orthodox economics did not.
Nevertheless, even this insight did not lead Pound to take up Social Credit or heterodox
economics fully. There are moments, such as the appearance of “the beast with a hundred legs,
USURA,” Canto 15, that reflect a heightened awareness of economic issues as filtered through
Douglas’s analysis.126 However, it is clear that as Pound worked on A Draft of XXX Cantos over
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Cf. Ezra Pound, “Obituary: A.R. Orage,” in Selected Prose: 1909-1965, ed. William Cookson (1934; New York:
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Cf. Ezra Pound, “Canto XV,” in The Cantos of Ezra Pound (1925; New York: New Directions, 1996), 64, line
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far from his mind.
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the course of the twenties, his interest in Douglas’s ideas faded into the background, to return in
force in the early 1930s in response to the Great Depression.
The intervening years had allowed Douglas to refine his ideas, and Pound to get a better
handle on them. Douglas’s concept of Social Credit came from an observation he had made
while working in an airplane factory during the First World War. From his supervisory role,
Douglas realized that the total wages paid to the aggregate of all workers employed making
airplanes were always less than the cost of the airplane itself. Applied to the economy as a
whole, this state of affairs meant that there was a chronic shortage of purchasing power available
to buy the goods being made by all factories. 127 For Douglas, there were clearly only two
solutions to this problem under the current economic system: goods must be sold to foreign
markets, or they must be destroyed. And both of these solutions pointed, naturally, to the conflict
in which Europe was currently engaged: World War I. In other words, Douglas claimed, the
present economic system was actively engaged in pushing the European nations into war with
each other.128
Alongside this core insight, Douglas leveled a heavy critique at the methods used to
bridge the gap between the too-small supply of purchasing power and the too-large cost of
products being made in factories. As Douglas was developing his theory, England was still on
the gold standard, which meant that government-issued currency had to be backed by a specific
amount of metal that the government had in its possession. This system meant that if the
government printed extra currency to finance something like a war, an increased number of bank
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It is in this sense that Social Credit is an underconsumptionist theory, even if Douglas was so untrained in
economics that he may not have recognized that term.
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Cf. Preda, “Introduction,” 6-7, for a full explanation of this central element of Social Credit, which Douglas
called the A+B theorem.
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notes would be representing the same amount of gold, leading inevitably to inflation. The
government solved this problem by relegating it to the private sector, specifically to banks.
Banks could essentially increase the money supply by issuing credit in the form of loans,
allowing private individuals and the government to buy things that they couldn’t afford without
issuing more currency. Of course, the banks charged interest on these loans, which led to large
profits for, essentially, creating imaginary money out of nothing. For Douglas, this system was
intolerable, as it incentivized the banks to promote wars, knowing that such wars would result in
the government needing to take out more loans, thereby increasing the wealth of the bank.
The heart of Douglas’s Social Credit theory was a direct response to this problem. For
Douglas, the source of value in a given nation was the natural wealth of the nation, combined
with the industry (labor) of the nation. The profits of this combination of natural resources and
industry belonged to the stakeholders in the nation, the citizenry. In Douglas’s system, the state
would receive the difference between the revenue generated by the industry of the nation and the
wages paid to the workers. Then, it would be up to the state to issue credit based on this national
wealth. Part of this national wealth would be distributed as a national dividend, whereby each
citizen would receive a certain amount of money each month. The rest would be put to use in the
public interest—building infrastructure, etc. Moreover, the state would develop a “Just Price” for
goods, a measure which would help prevent price-gouging and ensure that the citizenry could
afford enough goods to have a reasonably high standard of living.
There were some obvious problems with Douglas’s theory from the very beginning. For
instance, one common critique was that such a system would require a massive—and
incorruptible—bureaucracy, as well as increased centralization. Douglas refused to recognize
this feature of his theory, claiming instead that Social Credit would lead to more independence
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and less reliance on a central government. Indeed, Douglas remained vague on a number of
practical questions. For example, it was unclear how the government would determine the “Just
Price.” It was also unclear how a Social Credit system would interact with the increasingly
global economy, as the focus on “natural wealth” and national dividends seemed distinctly
national and isolationist in conception. Douglas’s failure to provide satisfactory answers to these
questions about the practical application of his theory led established economists to dismiss him
as an amateur and a charlatan—as Keynes does in The General Theory. However, these
problems did not deter a large range of intellectuals from taking his ideas, at least in general
terms, quite seriously.129
For while Douglas’s plan had obvious and unanswerable problems, it was based on a
correct observation: there was inadequate purchasing power in the post-World War I economy.
This principle became acutely relevant during the Great Depression, as it became quite obvious
that something had gone fundamentally wrong with the economy that orthodox economics was
unable to explain.130 The Depression brought economics back to the center of Pound’s interest,
and Douglas’s solution had become more attractive in the intervening years. Then, in short order,
two other major events occurred that largely established the content of Pound’s economic
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Cf. Surette’s chapter “Banking in Social Credit in Surette, Pound in Purgatory, 13-46, for a concise summary of
Douglas’s theories, and emphasis on their flaws.
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As Surette writes about Pound’s endorsement of Social Credit: “It cannot be said that Pound’s grasp of economic
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theorization for the rest of his life. First, he met with Mussolini in January of 1933. Although he
had obtained the meeting by sending Mussolini a copy of A Draft of XXX Cantos, Pound’s main
purpose in the meeting was to try to convince Mussolini to implement a Social Credit system in
Fascist Italy.131 Fascism’s concept of the “corporate state,” however wishy-washy in practice,
suggested to Pound the perfect political configuration needed to meet the bureaucratic needs of
Social Credit. Mussolini did not respond particularly warmly to Pound’s overtures but
complimented his poetry and appeared to be interested enough in Social Credit that Pound was
convinced that he would eventually try it out in Italy. 132
The second event is known as the Wörgl Experiment, which occurred in Wörgl, Austria
for just over a year in 1932 and 1933. The Experiment was a test of one of the theories of Silvio
Gesell, a German heterodox economist who was also interested in the problem of
underconsumption. Gesell’s experiment was to introduce a new kind of currency, stamp scrip, to
which the bearer was required to affix a stamp every month costing 1/100 th of its face-value. By
this method, the currency would slowly diminish in value, which would discourage saving and
encourage people to spend it more rapidly. The diminishing value of the money would help
guard against inflation, allowing the government to issue more currency when it was needed in
the knowledge that older currency would fade out of existence in a fixed amount of time. The
result in Wörgl was complete success: at the height of the depression Wörgl’s economy boomed
and several public projects were completed, all on the strength of the fact that people were being
encouraged to spend their money as fast as they could. Pound saw this system as the answer to
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Social Credit’s inflation problem: with stamp scrip, the government could issue currency to pay
the national dividend without having to worry about inflation and without having to increase the
size of the bureaucracy to deal with controlling inflation or deflation.
Over the rest of the 1930s, Pound tried to bring the Douglasites, Fascists, and Gesellites
together, but was unable to do so. Douglas abhorred the militarism of the Fascists and saw
Gesell’s stamp scrip as a tax on money, which he opposed on the grounds that such a tax would
fall disproportionately on the poor, the social class he was most focused on helping with his
economic system. The Gesellites, in turn, were uninterested in Social Credit, largely because of
the questions of implementation that Douglas was unable to answer. And the Fascists, as it
turned out, were less interested in questions of social and economic justice than Pound believed
them to be and were instead more interested in power and the pursuit of more power.
Nevertheless, Pound remained committed to bringing these three factions together and to
expounding his idiosyncratic economic theory in any venue that would print him. 133

Pound’s Modernist Amateur Economic Theorization and the ABC of
Economics
Turning from the broad outlines of Pound’s theory to his writings themselves, it becomes
immediately obvious that his economic essays are very far away from the kind of measured,
well-informed economic writing that one finds in, say Keynes, or even in well-established
heterodox economists like Hobson, Douglas, or Orage. 134 The piece Pound wrote immediately
after his meeting with Mussolini, the ABC of Economics (1933),135 sets the tone for all of the
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Indeed, I feel compelled to observe that the closest contemporary analogue for Pound’s economic essays—not to
mention his letters on the subject—is Donald Trump’s tweets.
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As I remarked in Chapter 1, Pound followed the ABC of Economics with the ABC of Reading in 1934. Both of
these books were intended as textbooks, the one to provide students with a sound understanding of basic economic
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economic writings that follow and suggests that from the very beginning Pound is blurring the
lines between his economic and poetic writing. Pound opens his ABC of Economics by declaring:
“I shall have no peace until I get the subject off my chest, and there is no other way of protecting
myself against charges of unsystematized, uncorrelated thought, dilettantism, idle eclecticism,
etc., than to write a brief formal treatise.” 136 What follows is utterly unsystematized,
uncorrelated, eclectic, and amateurish. There are also several major elements of Pound’s writing
in The ABC of Economics that demand comparisons to his ongoing work on The Cantos, a
stylistic similarity that illustrates Pound’s growing tendency to blend poetic and economic modes
in his writing. First is his “treatise’s” reliance on the “luminous detail,” a concept that Pound hit
upon as early as 1911 in his series of essays “I Gather the Limbs of Osiris” in The New Age:
“The artist seeks out the luminous detail and presents it. He does not comment.” 137 The luminous
detail has been taken as a central concept in the development of imagism, 138 but as Pound moved

principles and the other to direct students to all of the sources of poetry in European history that introduced a new
element in poetry. This pairing, explicitly emphasized by Pound in his pairing of the titles, emphasizes as well the
degree to which Pound fancied himself after 1933 an expert in both fields. Cf. Ezra Pound, ABC of Economics
(1933; Tunbridge Wells, UK: The Pound Press, 1953) and Ezra Pound, ABC of Reading (1934; New York: New
Directions, 2010).
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Pound, ABC of Economics, 13. In seeking to fend off charges of “dilettantism,” it should be noted, Pound is
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Ezra Pound, “I Gather the Limbs of Osiris,” in Selected Prose: 1909-1965, ed. William Cookson (1911-1912;
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what my late pastors and masters would term, in classic sweetness, my ‘unmitigated gall’, and by virtue of it venture
to speak of a ‘New Method in Scholarship’, I do not imagine that I am speaking of a method by me discovered. I
mean, merely, a method not of common practice, a method not yet clearly or consciously formulated, a method
which has been intermittently used by all good scholars since the beginning of scholarship, the method of Luminous
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the Limbs of Osiris,” 21.
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Cf., for just one example, Massimo Bacigalupo’s description of the method of Imagism in his essay “Pound as
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field (or complex) of knowledge.” Cf. Massimo Bacigalupo, “Pound as Critic” in The Cambridge Companion to
Ezra Pound, ed. Ira B. Nadel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 193-194.
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away from Imagism in the later teens and twenties, he did not discard the concept of the
luminous detail. Indeed, The Cantos can and should be taken as a large-scale attempt to enact the
“method” of the luminous detail: presenting a series of historical moments and allowing the
reader to draw his or her own conclusions from them.
The luminous detail also fits well with another of Pound’s well-known theorizations of
his own poetic method, the “ideogrammatic method” that he describes in the ABC of Reading.
And, like the luminous detail, Pound seeks to apply the ideogrammatic method to his economic
writings as well as to his poetry. Pound’s ideogrammatic method is based on his incorrect
intuition that the Chinese ideogram is “the picture of a thing; of a thing in a given position or
relation, or of a combination of things. It means the thing or the action or situation, or quality
germane to the several things that it pictures.” 139 From this starting point, Pound theorized that
the Chinese written character represented a form of language in which even abstract concepts
were literally tied to concrete referents. Employing a metaphor of a good cheque, Pound explains
the ultimate value of the kind of concrete thinking that the Chinese ideogram makes not just
possible, but necessary: “Your cheque, if good, means ultimately delivery of something you
want. An abstract or general statement is GOOD if it be ultimately found to correspond with the
facts…A general statement is valuable only in REFERENCE to the known objects or facts.” 140
To apply this concept to The Cantos, it is clear that Pound’s method in that poem is to assemble
luminous details—concrete moments in and facts about history—and display them next to each
other in an effort to convey something abstract: the totality of history, for instance, or, as The
Cantos develop over the course of the thirties and forties, economic conspiracy. In his

139
140

Pound, ABC of Reading, 21.
Pound, ABC of Reading, 25-26.

243

excoriation of abstraction, especially in matters of economics, Pound is synthesizing the central
insight of Modernist Amateur Economics, that economic questions cannot be abstracted from
their social contexts, with his conception of his own aesthetic practice.
In the context of Pound’s concepts of the luminous detail and the ideogrammatic method,
the ABC of Economics becomes legible as Pound’s extended attempt to apply these aesthetic
theories to his Modernist Amateur Economic theorization. The book is peppered with “luminous
details,” many of which eventually find their way into The Cantos. For instance, in the span of
two pages we have Arthur Griffith’s comment that you “[c]an’t move ’em with a cold thing like
economics,” which had already appeared in Canto 19 and would again in Canto 128, Marx’s
intuition that “Goods in the window are worth more than the goods in the basement,” and
Pound’s own anecdote about his grandfather’s fundamentally artistic motives for building
railroads.141 As Pound explains: “Very well, I am not proceeding according to Aristotelian logic
but according to the ideogramic method of first heaping together the necessary components of
thought.”142 Pound employs this method in various degrees of concentration and intensity in the
ABC of Economics, perhaps most clearly in his dizzying series of statements intended to
demonstrate the sheer variety of historical monetary systems: “Nile tolls are at the beginning of
history. Kublai understood paper currency. The Mantuans in the quattrocento considered a cloth
pool on the lines of the Hoover government’s buying of wheat. There is probably no inventable
scheme or measure that can’t be upholstered with historic background.” 143 Pound’s intention
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here is to suggest that the monetary system of the present is not necessarily the only or best
possible system: others have preceded it and can be tried again. But, in following the
ideogrammatic method, Pound does not make this point explicity: he merely gathers these details
together in order to suggest this conclusion.
This method of conveying economic principles through the ideogrammatic method
mirrors the section of The Cantos that Pound was writing at the same time as the ABC of
Economics, Eleven New Cantos (1934). Although this method is apparent in the earlier Cantos—
the seemingly inconsequential details in The Malatesta Cantos, for instance—Pound starts
pursuing it more aggressively in Eleven New Cantos, which is largely made up of Cantos
composed mostly of excerpts from letters by Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, John Quincey
Adams, Martin Van Buren, and Andrew Jackson, tenuously cast into verse, and ends with
encomiums on Mussolini. Both the prosiness of this section of The Cantos and the shared pool of
references between it and Pound’s contemporaneous prose writings encourages us to read them
together, as part of the same project. Doing so allows us to see Pound’s poetic and prose writings
as mutually enforcing sites of development for his Modernist Amateur Economic theories,
similar to those I have located in Shaw’s prefaces and plays and Eliot’s The Rock.
Canto 32 provides an indicative example of what I mean. The Canto is mainly composed
of a series of excerpts from letters and diary entries by John Adams, discussing such matters as
the extent of French involvement in the American Revolution, the injustice of the treatment of
the Creek and Cherokee in the American South after the war, and the conduct of Chief Justice
John Marshall of the Supreme Court, whose practice of drawing on cases unrelated to the one at
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hand in order to establish legal precedents Adams disliked. 144 Taken together, the Canto seems to
be a meditation on the status of the young United States after the revolution, its debts to old
European powers like pre-revolutionary France (in light of the French Revolution and the rise of
Napoleon), and the bearing that these factors in the nation’s history has on the present treatment
of American Indians. However, as in the passage on monetary systems in The ABC of
Economics, these connections are not made explicitly: the reader is left to draw his or her own
conclusions.
Intriguingly, though, Pound does nudge the reader toward this conclusion by changing
the register in which he writes certain parts of the poem. While most of the poem focuses on
quotidian elements of Adams’s communications, including, for instance, a semi-serious request
that his correspondent bring him a few sheep-dogs from Russia, 145 it occasionally shifts into a
more lyric register. Most notably, the poem concludes with an approximation of a haiku:
a guise de leon
The cannibals of Europe are eating one another again
quando si posa.146
The split Italian quotation from the Purgatorio refers to Sordello, “guard of vale of princes,”
describing Sordello as being “like a lion when he poses.” 147 Sandwiched between Dante’s lines is
a rich poetic line that Pound has taken straight from Adams. This configuration of lines is
suggestive on its own, but also throws the entire preceding Canto into relief, giving significance
to what we now see as a critical mass of comparisons between humans and animals, and more
especially of the instability of the line between humans and animals. In these final lines, Pound
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troubles the time-honored European distinction between themselves as the “civilized” and
cannibals as “savages.” The other topics in the Canto—American treatment of American Indians
during the Trail of Tears, the state of Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, and the decrepitude of
the increasingly in-bred European aristocracy—come into focus in an instant because of this shift
into a lyric register, and the reasons for Pound’s deployment of these “luminous details”
suddenly become less opaque. And yet, Pound leaves it to the reader to re-read the poem and
make sense of these connections: the lyric ending suggests an interpretation but does not insist
upon it.
Pound uses shifts in register in the ABC of Economics in a similar way, even as the prose
bits of his economic tract are more straightforward than those in Canto XXXII. For instance, in
the midst of a discussion of banks, cheques, and credit, Pound opines:
Yes, yes, I have a cheque book, but if I get fanciful the bank doesn’t pay for my
cheque.
But there be some, alas my brother there be some who can write cheques for great
figures and for mysterious reasons Who, my brother, controlleth the bank?
In one country the east wind, and in another country the west wind. 148
The change in register is arresting here. As this question— “Who…controlleth the bank?”—
would come to form the core of Pound’s economic conspiracy theories in the later thirties and
forties, it is unsurprising the see Pound heighten the emotional tenor of his book here. What is
more strange is the experience of encountering such language in an economic tract at all. While
on one level we expect this sort of thing in any piece by Pound, it is worth considering the
rhetorical impact of poetic language appearing in an economic tract. That is, rather than
dismissing Pound’s poetic language as an inevitable feature of his prose style, we can and should
consider its inclusion as central to Pound’s attempt to remake the genre of the economic tract by
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moving it away from the kind of technical language that he excoriates here and elsewhere and
toward something more comprehensible, actionable, and ultimately human. 149
In the end, it is this feature of Pound’s economic writing that holds the most significance
to my argument in this dissertation. If first Shaw and then Eliot (and, to a lesser degree, Orage)
held this kind of re-centering of the human and the common sense at the expense of the abstract
and the technical as major goals of their Modernist Amateur Economic theorization, it is Pound
who most fully integrates that ethical goal with stylistic innovation. Given his eventual support
of some of the worst regimes the world has ever seen, it seems odd to think of Pound in these
terms—as fundamentally driven into economic theorization by ethical concerns. But, after all,
“ethics” do not necessarily imply “good politics”; ethics is merely the study of morality, and
plenty of bad things have been done in the name of morality. In the final analysis, Pound’s
economics are clearly based in an ethics, even if his ethical reasons for supporting Mussolini
were foolish, not merely in hindsight, but at the moment in which he developed them. 150 As the
decade of the thirties wore on, however, Pound’s ethical claims became increasingly tenuous,
even as his economic theorization and literary production became increasingly intertwined.

Economic Elegy: Pound’s Later Economic Writings
As the political situation devolved in Europe over the course of the thirties, Pound’s
economic and poetic writings continued to develop along the trajectory established in the ABC of
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Economics and the Eleven New Cantos. Pound’s economic writings become more epigrammatic,
with increased repetition and more moments of heightened emotional register. At the same time,
the Cantos written in this period become more invested in Chinese ideograms and the history of
international banking practices. But the war was not the only source of concern for Pound:
following Keynes’s publication of The General Theory in 1936, much of the Social Credit
movement had lost steam. Keynes’s macroeconomic theory addressed the central cause of the
problem that Social Credit sought to target with its policies: underconsumption and
unemployment. While many acolytes of Social Credit accepted the Keynesian solution and
backed off their militant support of Douglas’s theories, Pound refused to concede that Keynes
was anything other than a representative of a corrupt, university-based orthodoxy. 151 And yet, by
the beginning of the forties, it was clear that Keynes’s theories were having an effect on the
discipline that Pound’s Social Credit writings could not hope to oppose. Pound’s economic
writings in the early forties became increasingly defensive in response to his unacknowledged
recognition that his theories were unlikely ever to gain the kind of traction they needed to make a
significant impact on the world.
Pound’s sense that his opportunity to make a real-world impact with his economic
theories was slipping away led to a change in tone in his poetic and economic writings.
Especially after Mussolini was removed as Prime Minister in 1943, Pound began conceiving of
his writings as preservational and indeed elegiac: mourning an economic utopia that he had not
been able to bring about. In Pound’s perception, the closing—and perhaps already closed—
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window of opportunity for his economic theories coincided as well with the end of the moment
of literary modernism. In typical Poundian fashion, Pound saw these two phenomena not only as
linked, but also as under attack by the same enemies: the sinister international conspiracy of
(Jewish) financiers that he termed the “usurocracy.” In the face of this opposition that Pound was
increasingly recognizing as insurmountable, Pound’s late economic writings represent, on the
one hand, a last-ditch attempt to gather together all of the “luminous details” that make up his
economic theory to convince posterity, at least, that he was right. And on the other hand, the late
economic essays show us a Pound who is despairing over the failure of his economic dreams.
The tension between defiance—of his enemies and of his circumstances—and despair drives
Pound’s late economic writings, preparing the way for his poetic treatment of these same
concerns in The Pisan Cantos.152
In the years between his first meeting with Mussolini and the middle of the war, Pound
continued to add more theoretical concepts and luminous details to his economic theorization.
His economic writings during this period are specific and generally limited in scope to whichever
new concept he was adding to his theoretical toolkit. So, in “The Individual in his Milieu: A
Study of Relations And Gesell” (1935), Pound writes enthusiastically for the first time about
Gesell’s experiment with stamp scrip. Then, in “For a New Paideuma” (1938), 153 Pound
introduces the concept of the “Paideuma”— “the active element in the era, the complex of ideas
which is in a given time general, reaching into the next epoch, but conditioning actively all the
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thought and action of its own time”—into his economic writings. Other writings, such as “What
is Money For” (1939), are focused narrowly on pushing a certain aspect of his theory—in this
case, the idea that ignorance about what money is, and especially the misconception that money
itself is wealth rather than a medium of exchange, allows those in the know (i.e. the usurers) to
exploit the general populace.154 In the context of this movement toward short, specific economic
writings, Pound’s two longer economic essays of the 1940s, “A Visiting Card” (1942) and “Gold
and Work” (1944), stand out for their range of reference as well as their respective attempts to
link Pound’s economic theories to all of his other interests, aesthetic, political, and
philosophical.155
Originally published in Italian in 1942, “A Visiting Card” is worth pausing over for
reasons of content and style. Stylistically, the essay represents the culmination of the movement
in Pound’s economic writings toward epigrammatic statements. So, Pound writes: “The
difference between money and credit is one of time. Credit is the future tense of money”; 156
“News is what one hasn’t heard”;157 “Without understanding economics one cannot understand
history”;158 and “Monetary theory is worthy of study because it leads us to the contemplation of
justice.”159 These epigrammatic phrases sit alongside concise examples of economic phenomena,
most notably “the foundation of the Sienese bank, the Monte dei Paschi” 160 and the fact that
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“[t]he fleet that was victorious at Salamis was built with money advanced to the shipbuilders by
the State of Athens,” proving that “[t]he state can lend.” 161 Pound ties these historical details and
his summary statements first to his concept of the luminous detail—“In our intellectual life—or
‘struggle’, if you prefer it—we need facts that illuminate like a flash of lightning, and authors
who set their subjects in a steady light.” 162—and then to his ideogrammatic method:
But if I have made any contribution to criticism I have done so by introducing the
ideogrammatic system. True criticism will insist on the accumulation of these concrete
examples, these facts, possibly small, but gristly and resilient, that can’t be squashed, that
insist on being taken into consideration, before the critic can claim to hold any opinion
whatsoever.163
The result is an essay that stands as a concise summary of the totality of Pound’s economic and
aesthetic thought, thoughtfully assembled and filled with implications.
For while the emphasis does consistently fall here on economic questions, Pound’s essay
also attempts to synthesize nearly all of his economic, philosophical, and aesthetic concerns,
including recapitulations of his early aesthetic theories and extended discussions of Confucius,
always geared toward connecting them to his economic concerns. So, for instance, he returns to
the concepts of melopoeia, phanopoeia, and logopoeia in an effort to connect his literary past—
“the poetical reform between 1910 and 1920”—which resulted in “the scrutiny of the word, the
cleaning-up of syntax” to the kind of linguistic approach he takes to economics in his insistence
on understanding such key terms as money, credit, and usury. 164 Indeed, one of the main abstract
concepts Pound is trying to convey through his ideogrammatic method in “A Visiting Card” is
that having a more concrete understanding of language is integral to achieving a just system of
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government and economics. His discussion of Confucius emphasizes this point. Upon being
asked what his first act would be if he were appointed head of the government, Pound’s
Confucius states: “To call people and things by their true and proper names.” This approach to
government is so crucial because “If the terminology be not exact, if it fit not the thing, the
governmental instructions will not be explicit; if the instructions aren’t clear and the names don’t
fit, you can not conduct business properly.” 165 Pound’s relentless program of connecting
concreteness and specificity in language to good government and good economics contains
within it its opposite: that looseness in language, or indeed in any of the arts, corresponds
directly to unjust economic practices, namely usury: “To repeat: an expert, looking at a painting
(by Memmi, Goya, or any other), should be able to determine the degree of the tolerance of
usury in the society in which it was painted.”166 This principle, long in development, stands at
the center of Pound’s worldview by 1942, and helps us see the degree to which the arts and
economics are inextricably linked for him. 167
Moments of synthesis like this one, as well as the sheer range of Pound’s interests
contained in this essay, suggest an urgency that is absent from some of his earlier economic
writings, an urgency which is reflected by the essay’s title. A visiting card was a card much like
a business card that people would leave with their hosts after making social calls, a practice that
arose in the nineteenth century. Visiting cards are mainly concerned with representing the social
status and contact information of their owners, but also represent a unique temporal orientation: a
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visiting card represents a visit that has already been paid, by a person who is no longer there. 168
For Pound, who had been living in Italy since 1925, this choice of title for his essay is striking: it
implies that his stay in Italy is just a visit, one he foresees may be over soon. Moreover, it
emphasizes his status as a visitor, a stance which he takes up in the essay itself, which is in part
construed as the observations of a foreign visitor on the progress of the Italian Fascist state.
Pound’s intentionally puzzling temporal framing of the essay contributes to the feeling one gets
while reading it that Pound is mourning the end of his “visit” before it is properly over,
positioning him as someone who has seen the writing on the wall even as he continues to write in
defiance of it.
This tension comes through even more intensely in “Gold and Work,” also written in
Italian and published the year following Mussolini’s removal as Prime Minister. The essay
begins with a concise Poundian Utopia, modeled less on Thomas Moore’s original than on
William Morris’s News from Nowhere. Morris’s influence comes through in Pound’s framing—
he falls asleep, finds himself in Utopia, and then returns to the present by falling asleep again—
and in his emphasis on agriculture: “They attach the importance to skill in agricultural tasks that
I attached in my youth to skill at tennis or football.”169 Most of the specifics of Pound’s Utopia,
however, come not from Morris but from his own Modernist Amateur Economic theories: the
“Republic of Utopia,” has a stamp scrip system, puts nearly all of its educational emphasis on
“defining their economic terms, with the result that various iniquities of the stock market and
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financial world have entirely disappeared from their country, for no one allows himself to be
fooled any longer,”170 and has adopted Pound’s proposal that “[e]very bookseller [be] obliged to
stock the best books; some of outstanding merit must be displayed in his window for a certain
number of months each year.”171 And yet, in the Utopian tradition, Pound takes care to
emphasize the apparently unbridgeable gap between the Utopia he has imagined and the present
situation in Europe. His Utopia lies “eighty years east of Fara Sabina,” and as he prepares to go
to sleep and return to the present, he finds himself “pondering over the astonishing effects of
these reforms, apparently so trifling, and marveling at the great distance separating the twentiethcentury world from the world of contentment.” 172 Pound’s Utopia thus simultaneously puts forth
a Morris-style vision of an ideal future and undercuts that vision by emphasizing its
unattainability.
The essay that follows this introductory narrative is strikingly different from “A Visiting
Card,” exchanging the former’s ideogrammic method for Pound’s most focused attempt to
outline his conspiracy theory of the “usurocracy.” Rather than casting a wide net among his
intellectual interests, Pound in “Gold and Work” gathers a few luminous details, here thoroughly
explained, and works them through repetition like poetic motifs to make his economic points.
This repetition also emphasizes (for modern readers) Pound’s growing paranoia as well: Pound is
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giving himself entirely over to his conspiracy theory here, striving over and over to prove the
existence of the international conspiracy of usurers and their tactics of manipulating currency
and keeping the public ignorant about their machinations and the true nature of money. The
reason for this increasing methodological and stylistic paranoia comes through only implicitly
but is clearly the series of events that led to Mussolini’s removal as Prime Minister in 1943. This
event, as well as Mussolini’s subsequent rescue by Nazi forces and establishment as the head of
the puppet Salò Republic in Northern Italy late in 1943, had an enormous impact on Pound,
which is reflected in several ways in “Gold and Work.”
Pound’s primary reaction is to accuse Italian institutions and its populace of having been
deceived about the true causes of the war and thereby of having made Mussolini into a
scapegoat. After claiming that the “Rome-Berlin axis” has been the only real attempt to take
“serious measures against the usurocracy” since Lincoln’s assassination, Pound berates “the
great Italian publishing houses, more or less open accomplices of the perfidious Italian press” for
failing to publish “the works of Brooks Adams and Arthur Kitson in which these facts are
given.”173 The point, in Pound’s twisted perception, is that
This war was no whim of Mussolini’s, nor of Hitler’s. This war is a chapter in the long
and bloody tragedy which began with the foundation of the Bank of England in far-away
1694, with the openly declared intention of Paterson’s now famous prospectus, which
contains the words already quoted: ‘the bank hath benefit of the interest on all moneys
which it creates out of nothing.’174
This is the second time in the essay that Pound has quoted this “prospectus,” which is one of his
favorite pieces of evidence for the existence of the usurocracy.
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Paterson’s description of the Bank of England is one of several “luminous details” that
Pound repeats in his essay. He quotes the “Hazard Circular of the year 1862” twice in full in an
effort to show that the usurocracy engages in overt currency manipulation to extract greater
profits out of their loans.175 He repeatedly claims that “Usurocracy makes wars in succession. It
makes them according to a pre-established plan for the purpose of creating debts.” 176 And he
continuously returns to the idea that the average person does not understand money, giving us
bits of his explanation of what money is, illustrated with luminous details, losing the thread, and
then taking it up again. The result of this extreme repetition is twofold: it emphasizes the three or
so points Pound is making here: the usurocracy exists, it is responsible both for endless wars and
the instability of currency, and it has actively conspired to suppress a general understanding of
what money is—all evils that Pound’s utopia is designed to combat—and it also gives us the
impression of a writer, Pound, who is circling the wagons. With the fall and uneasy reinstatement
of the political figure on whom Pound has unwisely pinned his economic ambitions, Pound’s
method of argument in “Gold and Work” comes across as the work of an increasingly desperate
man.
This thread of the essay, introduced as I have shown in the pessimistic notes of the utopia
which begins it, comes to the fore in its conclusion, in which Pound attempts to justify his
economic theories which he now clearly fears will never come to fruition. Pound writes:
There can be no military valour in a climate of intellectual cowardice.
No individual should get angry if the community refuses to accept his proposals, but it is
intellectual cowardice if one is afraid to formulate one’s own concept of society. This is
all the more so at a time full of possibilities, at a time when the formulation of a new
system of government is announced. Everyone who has some competence as an historian,
175
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and is in possession of certain historical facts, should formulate his concepts in relation to
that part of the social organism in which his studies have given him authority to act as a
judge.177
Pound is defiant here, arguing that the vehemence with which he has put forth his vision of a
better world is not only justifiable, but in fact the only justifiable response to “a time full of
possibilities.”178 At the same time, though, Pound is implicitly recognizing that “the community
[has] refuse[d] to accept his proposals.” His final declaration of defiance is thus also a deeply
bitter admission that his utopia has already been foreclosed; it is, in that sense, the extension of
his feeling of belatedness in “A Visiting Card” and the beginning of his turn to elegy in his
poetry. And indeed, as the war progressed toward its end, and after Mussolini’s execution in
1944, Pound’s perception in “Gold and Work” that not only his economic theories, but also this
“time full of possibilities,” were likely gone forever would find their elegiac expression in The
Pisan Cantos.

A Poem Containing Economics: The Pisan Cantos
If “A Visiting Card” and “Gold and Work” express Pound’s fears for the future, The
Pisan Cantos stand as the work of a poet who has seen them all confirmed. 179 From his position
in the prison-camp in Pisa, Pound in The Pisan Cantos channels the mixture of defiance and
despair that characterizes his late essays into what he fears may be his last piece of writing. Out
of the tension between these two opposing emotional registers, The Pisan Cantos emerges as an
elegy both for the economic system that Pound now understands will never come into being and
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for modernism itself. Pound’s intertwining of these two central aspects of his life and work
comes from the most straightforward of places: fear for his personal safety at the hands of the
Allied forces, which he views as avatars of “the usurocracy.” Trapped “in the usurers hell-adice,”180 Pound figures himself as Odysseus, the epic hero as representative of his age but also,
in Hugh Kenner’s phrase, “one vulnerable mind getting down with a lifetime’s craft the feel of it
all, a bullet perhaps in waiting, or a noose.” 181 In this sense, Canto 74, the first of the sequence,
functions as a recapitulation of Canto 1’s descent into Hell, narratively preparing for the rest of
The Pisan Cantos to function as a record of Pound’s journey back to the surface.
In my reading, The Pisan Cantos is centrally marked by a tension between defiance and
despair, and I want here to devote some space to examining how Pound carries each of these
themes and attitudes through the sequence.182 While the very first note of the sequence is clearly
one of despair—“The enormous tragedy of the dream in the peasant’s bent / shoulders”—it
seems clear that, in the first half of The Pisan Cantos, at least, the dominant note is of
defiance.183 Pound’s defiance stretches in several directions. First, he refuses to concede that the
utopia he sketched out in “Gold and Work” has been rendered unattainable by the events of the
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war. Second, he stridently maintains that his activities during the war were justified. And finally,
he claims, both directly and through the process of writing The Pisan Cantos itself, that the
group of modernist writers he has been so centrally involved with for so long have not lost their
relevance, and that their aesthetic experiments and values remain vital even if many of them are
dead and gone. Taken together, these threads of the poem form a major positive trajectory,
positioning Pound as a martyr who refuses to be silenced even if his enemies succeed in killing
his physical body.
Pound’s defense of his utopia—which, as we have seen in “Gold and Work,” consists of
a society that runs according to Pound’s idiosyncratic combination of Gesellite and Social Credit
economic theories—begins early in Canto 74 and stretches deep into The Pisan Cantos. First, in
a line added well after the completion of the poem, 184 Pound writes: “To build the city of Dioce
whose terraces are the colour of stars.” 185 Pound has referred to this city, Ecbatana, before, in
Cantos 4 and 5.186 The city, built by “Deioces, the first great ruler of the Medes,” 187 stands in
these early Cantos as a symbol of human ingenuity, with the emphasis on its “plotted streets,”
and “gilded tower.”188 Now, however, Ecbatana has returned as a stand-in for Pound’s Social
Credit utopia, with the emphasis on its builder, Dioce, here tacitly rhyming with Pound’s favorite
nickname for Mussolini, “il Duce.” Although this first reference to Ecbatana is paired with an
account of Mussolini’s death, Pound’s next reference to it indicates that his vision of the ideal
city has survived the death of Mussolini. Later in Canto 74, Pound boldly states that
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I surrender neither the empire nor the temples
plural
nor the constitution nor yet the city of Dioce
each one in his god’s name.189
While there is a concession here in the phrase “nor yet” that Pound’s utopian vision has been
dealt a major, perhaps fatal blow, the dominant tone here is one of defiance and hope in the face
of adversity.
This hopeful tone is carried through a parallel set of references to the mythical African
city of Wagadu, which Sieburth tells us Pound knew through Leo Frobenius. The story of
Wagadu is one of destruction and renewal: the city has been built and destroyed four times, by
“vanity, falsehood, greed, and dissension.” 190 “Should Wagadu ever be found for the fifth time,”
writes Frobenius, “then she will live so forcefully that vanity, falsehood, greed and dissension
will never be able to harm her.”191 The appeal to Pound is obvious, as these are four of the social
ills he associates most trenchantly with the usurocracy. It helps that the legend of Wagadu
contains the refrain “Hoo Fasa,” which Pound rhymes with Fascia in the same, implicit way he
rhymes Dioce with Duce. Pound solidifies the comparison between the two cities by writing of
Wagadu’s “terrace the colour of stars,” 192 a direct echo of his description of Ecbatana. Pound’s
invocation of Wagadu is coupled with an explicit moment of the kind of internalization that I am
arguing marks the poem’s most characteristic movement: Pound’s Wagadu is, in this first
instance, “now in the mind indestructible,” 193 a refrain that recurs with a difference in Canto 77,
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in which Wagadu is figured “now in the heart indestructible.” 194 Pound’s conception of Wagadu
may be firmly planted in his heart and mind, but the existential threat he is facing is threatening
his economic and political utopia as well because of its location within Pound’s mortal body. 195
Accordingly, a large part of Pound’s energy in The Pisan Cantos is dedicated to
defending his economic theories and his support of Mussolini against the usurocracy, whose
sinister machinations he also works to expose. In many ways, this major theme of the poem is a
recapitulation of the content of his economic essays of the previous ten years. However, the
stakes are higher here for Pound, now that he finds himself in physical danger, writing what he
fears may be his last statement of his economic theories. As a result, Pound’s defense of those
economic theories in The Pisan Cantos takes on a more personal note than the same defenses do
in his essays. While Pound’s mustering of luminous details that he believes will prove the
conspiracy against him is more opaque in The Pisan Cantos than they are in his essays, the
personal dynamic and poetic form add an emotional depth to Poundian economics that his purely
economic writings are largely unable to attain. The extent of Pound’s treatment of his Modernist
Amateur Economic theories in The Pisan Cantos surpasses all of the other examples I have
examined thus far in this dissertation, and the sequence stands as a culmination not only of
Pound’s Modernist Amateur Economic writing, but of Modernist Amateur Economics more
generally. That this “culmination” occurs in an openly Fascist work should emphasize the point I
have been making throughout this dissertation: Modernist Amateur Economic writing was
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certainly not always in the service of economic or political programs that we would think of as
“good.” Indeed, the opposite is as often true as not.
How does Pound’s Modernist Amateur Theorization come together in The Pisan Cantos?
In much the same way as his essays: bits of Pound’s economic theories permeate the sequence as
luminous details. At times these details seem to appear merely as the product of free-association,
as in the moment in which his account of the kindness of a GI named Edwards, who violated
regulations to build Pound a writing table, turns into a rant against usury. And yet even this
moment stands as a sort of microcosm of the larger defense that Pound is mounting in The Pisan
Cantos:
and yet petty larceny
in a regime based on grand larceny
might rank as conformity nient’ altro
with justice shall be redeemed.196
Like Edwards, Pound implies, Pound’s actions, mistakes and all, are justified because of the
greater evil, usury, that he sought to combat. Pound works throughout the poem to associate
himself with historical and mythic figures either persecuted or ignored because of their
heterodox opinions: Erigena Scotus, 197 Basil Bunting,198 Wanjina,199 “Les Albigeois,”200
Odysseus, and Cassandra.201 This rhetorical move fuels the adamance with which Pound puts
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forth fragments of his economic theory as proof both that he has been fighting alone against a
vast, powerful conspiracy and that he is in the right.
This dynamic comes through clearly in a moment occurring midway through Canto 74, as
Pound meditates on his situation in the Pisan prison camp. In this passage, Pound casts himself
as Odysseus, trapped by the usurocracy in a modern-day version of Circe’s island:
ac ego in harum
so lay men in Circe’s swine-sty;
ivi in harum ego ac vidi cadaveres animae202
In Sieburth’s translation, the first and last lines of this quotation read: “I too in the pigsty” and “I
went into the pigsty and saw corpses of souls.” 203 The “corpses of souls” soon prove to be odd
transmigrations of deceased US presidents, contained within or at least called to mind by the
actual names of Pound’s co-prisoners:
and all the presidents
Washington Adams Monroe Polk Tyler
plus Carrol (of Carrolton) Crawford
robbing the public for private individual’s gain ΘΕΛΓΕΙΝ
every bank of discount is downright iniquity
robbing the public for private individual’s gain.204
Pound uses the Greek word ΘΕΛΓΕΙΝ (“to enchant, bewitch, cheat”) 205 to draw a parallel
between banks of discount and Circe, to whom he returns in the next line: “nec benecomata
Kirkê, Mah! κακά φάργακ έδωεν,”206—“nor fair-tressed Circe, Well! She had given them evil
drugs.”207 This is a complex passage, not least because of Pound’s characteristic mixture of
languages. In light of Sieburth’s explanatory notes and translations, however, we can see that
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Pound is figuring the DTC prison camp as a microcosm of contemporary American society: the
spirits of the founding fathers have been beguiled by the sinister forces of usury, which have
caused them to lead diminished lives in the “swine-sty” of the usurers’ world. Even Adams,
represented here in his line “every bank of discount is downright iniquity / robbing the public for
private individual’s gain” has been reduced to a mute, unread “pig” by the machinations of the
usurocracy. And Pound finds himself trapped among these “corpses of souls,” unable to break
free or make himself heard.
Despite this bleak portrait of his predicament and of the state of the world, Pound’s
deployment of the Odysseus myth here does suggests that he sees potential for a better future. In
a literal sense, the Circe episode of The Odyssey is not the end of Odysseus’s story. As we know
well, he does make it home to his Penelope, restoring order and honor to Ithaca. That Pound
figures himself as Odysseus implies that he is holding onto the possibility of a similar
homecoming. Pound’s choice of the Circe episode is also crucial to the narrative shape and
symbolic economy of The Pisan Cantos. Readers of The Cantos will recall that Canto 1 begins
the poem with an extended Poundian translation of the descent into hell scene from The Odyssey,
which directly succeeds the Circe episode. Pound here is thus setting up the rest of The Pisan
Cantos as a re-writing of the descent into hell while also implying that the new political
conditions he is facing have forced him to start his great project over again. Pound’s use of the
Latin translation of The Odyssey here strengthens this connection with Canto 1, which is an
English translation of Andreas Divus’s 1538 Latin translation of The Odyssey.208 And of course
the reason that Pound feels he must begin again is contained within his presentation of the Circe
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scene here: the usurocracy’s economic machinations, and the “sorcery” they use to conceal them
from the general public.
With this framing in mind, Pound proceeds to muster an array of luminous details to
prove that he is being persecuted. To a large extent, these details are the same ones he has been
repeating in his economic essays of the late thirties and forties: Paterson’s “prospectus”
regarding the Bank of England, the currency manipulation created by Churchill’s return to the
gold standard in 1925, and, most significantly, the Athenian government’s funding of the fleet
built for the battle of Salamis, which proved that the state could lend money. In each instance,
Pound’s deployment of these luminous details serves as a defense against the usurocracy, aimed
either at exposing their machinations to the world or proving that they are fulfilling a nonessential part of the economic system, even as they claim the opposite.
A close look at a representative passage from Canto 74, in which Pound references all
three of these luminous details, will help illustrate Pound’s strategic use of his economics in The
Pisan Cantos. This passage stands as the poem’s most sustained engagement with economics
and, not coincidentally, contains some of its most virulently antisemitic moments. It begins with
Pound explicitly identifying the usurocracy as a distinctly Jewish conspiracy, ventriloquizing
Jewish financiers to cast them as villains bent on destroying all non-Jews:
the yidd is a stimulant, and the goyim are cattle
in gt/ proportion and go to saleable slaughter
with the maximum of docility.209
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The methods the Jewish usurocracy employ to achieve this state of affairs, Pound claims, can be
illustrated by two of his favorite luminous details, and his defense against them can be summed
up by a third:
and the two largest rackets are the alternation
of the value of money
(of the unit of money METATHEMENON TE TON
KRUMENON
and usury @ 60 or lending
that which is made out of nothing
and the state can lend money
as was done
by Athens for the building of the Salamis fleet
and if the packet gets lost in transit
ask Churchill’s backers
where it has got to
the state need not borrow. 210
Here the example of Salamis is called up to combat two of Pound’s favorite bugbears, the bank
of England, invoked here through the phrase “lending / that which is made out of nothing,” and
Churchill’s manipulation of currency. Paterson’s “now famous prospectus” 211 and Churchill’s
“alternation” are met here by the emphatic statement that “the state can lend money,” with the
italicized “can” showing both Pound’s certainty and his frustration that this fact has not been
properly recognized.
Pound quickly follows this excoriation of usury and the bank of England with one of two
discussions in The Pisan Cantos of Wörgl and stamp scrip, the success of which “terrified” “all
the slobs in Europe.”212 The suppression of stamp scrip, the persistence of the system
inaugurated by the Bank of England, and Russia’s failure to institute Pound’s concept of money
as a certificate of work done213 stands as proof for Pound that the suppression of economic
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experimentation is worldwide, and must be the result of a conspiracy of usurers. All of this,
Pound claims, “leads to the death-cells,”214 the cages in which Pound was imprisoned in Pisa, “in
the usurers’ hell-a-dice.”215 Pound’s ironic inversion here of “paradise” to describe the world
under “usurocracy” implies that it is only by directly reversing everything about the world’s
economic system that paradise (the city of Dioce) can be achieved.
Having arrived in the hell prepared for him by his economic enemies, Pound spends the
bulk of The Pisan Cantos musing about the past and thinking about the shades he encounters
there in his memory. These shades and ghosts include random acquaintances, favorite restaurants
and museums, and, most significantly, an impressively large roster of Pound’s fellow modernists,
most of whom are now dead. Pound’s first extended list of his literary compatriots sets the tone
for the rest of the poem, while also establishing the contours of what Pound understands as his
modernist set:
Lordly men are to earth o’ergiven
these the companions:
Fordie that wrote of giants
and William who dreamed of nobility
and Jim the comedian singing”
“Blarrney castle me darlin’
you’re nothing now but a StOWne”
and Plarr talking of mathematics
or Jepson lover of jade
Maurie who wrote historical novels
and Newbolt who looked twice bathed
are to the earth o’ergiven.216
The first line of this passage comes from Pound’s translation of The Seafarer, one of his early
successes that helped launch his poetic career. The content of the line, repeated in the final line,
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emphasizes that each of the figures Pound proceeds to mention—Ford Maddox Ford, W.B.
Yeats, James Joyce, Victor Plarr, Edgar Jepson, Maurice Hewlett, and Sir Henry Newbolt—are
dead and buried. Again and again in the Cantos that follow, Pound dwells upon deceased literary
“companions” of years past: Aubrey Beardsley, whose line “Beauty is difficult” echoes from
Canto 74 to Canto 80,217 T.E. Lawrence,218 Gaudier-Brzeska, Allen Upward, Amy Lowell, 219
Orage, René Crevel—“too quickly taken” 220—and Wilfred Scawen Blunt.221
Most of these figures are only allotted a line or two, but Pound spends substantial space
on Yeats and Joyce, and also includes an account of his first meeting with Wyndham Lewis, 222
who, with Eliot, 223 is one of the few living literary figures Pound mentions in The Pisan Cantos.
It is clear that Pound is trying in The Pisan Cantos to memorialize a literary moment, represented
by these “men of 1914,” a project confirmed by a moment in Canto 78. Pound, thinking about
the World Peace Assembly in San Francisco and, painfully aware that the delegates there were
not talking about Social Credit or stamp scrip, casts himself as a modern-day Cassandra, always
speaking the truth, never heard:
Cassandra, your eyes are like tigers,
with no word written in them
217

Cf. Pound, “Canto LXXIV,” 22, 666 and Ezra Pound, “Canto LXXX,” in The Pisan Cantos, ed. Richard Sieburth
(1948; New York: New Directions, 2003), 89, lines 611-617: “La beauté, ‘Beauty is difficult, Yeats’ said Aubrey
Beardsley / when Yeats asked why he drew horrors / or at least not Burne-Jones / and Beardsley knew he was dying
and had to make his hit quickly / hence no more B-J in his product. / So very difficult, Yeats, beauty so difficult”
218
Pound, “Canto LXXIV,” 22, 669-684.
219
Pound, “Canto LXXVII,” 47, lines 149-151. Pound’s longtime nemesis Amy Lowell, of course, functions more
as an object of ridicule than as a “companion.”
220
Pound, “Canto LXXX,” 88, line 592.
221
Ezra Pound, “Canto LXXXI,” in The Pisan Cantos, ed. Richard Sieburth (1948; New York: New Directions,
2003), 100, line 169.
222
Pound, “Canto LXXX,” 84, 467ff. Pound’s memory of meeting Lewis kicks off a long passage of memories
about his time in England in the years before the first World War.
223
Pound references Eliot’s “The Hollow Men” directly (“yet say this to the Possum: a bang, not a whimper, / with a
bang not with a whimper”), includes him in a very small roster of people “who did anything of interest” in recent
years—along with Hitler, Mussolini, and Jean Cocteau, and recounts an anecdote about Eliot’s observation about
dance customs in the Canary Islands. Cf. Pound, “Canto LXXIV,” 3, lines 9-10; Pound, “Canto LXXIV,” 14, lines
382-388; and Pound, “Canto LXXXI,” 96, lines 42-46.

269

You also I have carried to nowhere
to an ill house and there is
no end to the journey.224
As he muses on the failure of his economic theory and of the Italian Fascist state, Pound, echoing
his earlier defiant declaration of the immortality of “the city of Dioce,” asserts that even if they
are dead, the “men of 1914” will continue to survive through their literary productions:
Gaudier’s word not blacked out
nor old Hulme’s, nor Wyndham’s,
Mana aboda.225
The final line here comes from a poem by Hulme, but its meaning, “my home,” implies that
Pound is at home in this literary context. This moment, while brief, is significant here because it
is clearly reflexive: Pound, fearing his own imminent demise, places himself and his poem under
progress in the context of the other modernists and asserts that his works will remain even when
he is gone. Given the economic content of those works, and especially of The Pisan Cantos, this
moment works in concert with Pound’s defiant claims about the city of Dioce, “now in the mind
indestructible.” Contained as his economic aspirations are within the immortal form of poetry,
even his death will not signal the end of the dream. If the characteristic intervention of the
Modernist Amateur Economist is to insist on the interrelation between economics and its cultural
contexts, Pound’s dual focus on modernism and his version of heterodox economics constitutes
his version of this argument. By synthesizing his economic theories with these references to his
former compatriots in modernist literary experimentation within a literary work that showcases
that experimentation, Pound implicitly presents his late modernist poetic sequence as proof that
his modernism and his economics cannot be separated from each other.
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It is as a culmination of this attempt at synthesis that I read the famous second half of
Canto 81. Critics generally agree that Canto 81 stands out from the rest of the sequence because
of its shift into a more lyric register, punctuated by the repeated phrase “what thou lovest
well.”226 Less agreed upon, however, is the referent of this phrase, as well as its significance for
the question of whether Pound is recanting or reaffirming his Fascit allegiances here. 227 In my
reading, what Pound “lov’st well” is “the palpable / Elysium, though it were in the halls of
hell”—yet another form of the City of Dioce. 228 His exhortations to “Pull down thy vanity” 229 are
thus outwardly directed at those who have refused to consider that they may be wrong and that
Pound may be right about the widespread social justice that would be wrought by his economic
theories, a reading supported by Pound’s assertion in the final stanza: “But to have done instead
of not doing / this is not vanity.”230 Echoing his claim in “Gold and Work that “[n]o individual
should get angry if the community refuses to accept his proposals, but it is intellectual cowardice
if one is afraid to formulate one’s own concept of society,” 231 Pound here is justifying his
support of Mussolini and his heterodox economic theories. The rest of the final stanza connects
his economic and political self-justification to his modernist milieu:
To have, with decency, knocked
That a Blunt should open
To have gathered from the air a live tradition
or from a fine old eye the unconquered flame
This is not vanity.
Here error is all in the not done,
226
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all in the diffidence that faltered… 232
The reference to Blunt, himself a poet imprisoned for his strenuous critiques of British
imperialism, and more specifically to Pound’s visit (along with six other poets, including Yeats)
to Blunt to present him with a statue by Gaudier-Breszka, links literary modernism to a tradition
of political critique in which Pound is situating himself in The Pisan Cantos as a whole.
Read alongside his assertion that Hulme and Gaudier-Breszka live on through their
poetry, Pound’s lyrical defense of his own poetic and economic career in Canto 81 is a moment
of clarity and of defiance, something akin to a classic moment of modernist epiphany. And yet, it
seems, as the sequence continues, Pound achieves a degree of clarity in a different direction too,
in his growing sense of anxiety, fear, and finally resignation at the ever-growing likelihood that
Pound’s poem, and thus his economic theory, is simply going to be ignored. This
counternarrative has been present throughout the poem, especially in Pound’s self-figuration as
Cassandra. But it comes to the fore in the changes Pound made to The Pisan Cantos in
November of 1945 following the news that several of his fascist friends had been executed.
Besides “explicitly transforming the entire sequence into a requiem for Italian Fascism,” 233 these
changes, most notably the addition of Canto 84 and of the first eleven lines of Canto 74, heighten
the intensity of Pound’s pessimistic movement within The Pisan Cantos, giving it pride of place
in the sequence’s beginning and conclusion.
A collection of details from across the sequence will help illustrate the depth of Pound’s
ultimate despair in The Pisan Cantos. Pound’s despair creeps into each of the three areas I have
discussed above: the city of Dioce, the immortality of modernism, and the fight against the
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usurocracy. For the reverse side of Pound’s triumphant presentation of the city of Dioce is that
the leader with whom he is associating it, “il Duce,” is dead. While Pound puts on a brave face
about the implications of Mussolini’s death for his imagined Fascist utopia, he can’t help but
concede that the city “in the mind indestructible” has been dealt a major blow. In Canto 78,
discussing Gesell’s theory of stamp scrip, Pound writes:
à la Wörgl. Sd/ one wd/ have to think about that
but was hang’d dead by the heels before his thought in proposito
came into action efficiently234
This explicit juxtaposition between Pound’s hope that Mussolini would implement Gesellite
stamp scrip and the reality of the situation throws the emphasis on Pound’s disappointment and
implies that Pound is coming to realize that he may have missed his chance. The opening and
closing lines of the poem similarly emphasize the major blow that has been dealt to Pound’s
economic hopes by not just Mussolini’s death, but the deaths of other Fascists and, Pound can
only assume, his own imminent demise. The opening lines of Canto 74 explicitly discuss
Mussolini’s death—“Thus Ben and la Clara a Milano / by the heels at Milano”235—and the
closing lines of the sequence foreshadow Pound’s own death, and his acceptance of its
inevitability: “If the hoar frost grip they tent / Thou wilt give thanks when night is spent.” 236
Pound’s despair over the potential obsolescence of the literary movement of which he is
such a major part goes hand-in-hand with his distress over the death of Mussolini and his own
uncertain future. In Canto 76, amidst one of his attempts to catalogue the artists whom he knew
in his youth, Pound writes:
and who’s dead, and who isn’t
234
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and will the world ever take up its course again?
very confidentially I ask you: Will it?237
After listing several dead artists and mourning the loss of the priceless works of art destroyed
during the war, as well as recounting at length his first meeting with Joyce, Pound meditates on
his own position relative to these people and works that are now gone: “[a]s a lone ant from a
broken ant-hill / from the wreckage of Europe, ego scriptor.” 238 Not for the first time in the
sequence, Pound adapts Baudelaire to describe his state of mind: “le paradis n’est pas artificial,”
he writes, “l’enfer non plus.”239 While Pound may cling to the idea that his dead modernist
compatriots live on in their writings, this bleak depiction of himself as the last surviving member
of an intellectual community, writing from inside a very real hell, undermines Pound’s posture of
defiance that I have traced above.
But this point comes through most clearly in Pound’s increasing conviction that his
works—literary and economic—are never going to be read by the people who, in his eyes, most
need to read them. A series of details spread throughout the Cantos—references to poets and
heretics suppressed by the powers that be, comparisons between himself and Cassandra, Arthur
Griffith’s claim that you “Cant move ’em with / a cold thing like economics,” 240 a phrase that
casts doubt on Pound’s entire enterprise in The Cantos—culminate in Canto 84 in a comparison
between Pound and John Adams, whose excoriation of “banks of discount” has provided a
steady refrain throughout The Pisan Cantos. In Canto 84, Pound ruefully admits “We will be
about as popular as Mr John Adams / and less widely perused” 241 before declaring “John Adams,
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the Brothers Adam / there is our norm of spirit.” 242 The Canto—and the sequence as a whole—
then ends with a sober evaluation of the future direction of international politics: “and that
Vandenberg has read Stalin, or Stalin, John Adams / is, at the mildest, unproven.” 243
“Vandenberg” here is Arthur Henrick Vandenberg, whom Sieburth identifies as “U.S. delegate to
the United Nations conference in San Francisco.” 244 The implication, then, is that the
representatives of the two new global superpowers, the US and the USSR, not only have no
common ground—viz Vandenberg’s ignorance of Stalin’s ideas—but also have no understanding
of how international collaboration could actually improve the economic conditions of their
individual countries because of their shared ignorance of Adams. Moreover, the implication here,
that the US and the USSR could change the world for the better if everybody just read the right
(Poundian) economic theory, is emblematic of Pound’s view of what it would––or, at least,
should––take for economic reform to be initiated. This final comment, then, is a statement of
crushing personal defeat, as it contains simultaneously the affirmation of the idea that Pound
knows how to fix the economic problems of the world and the concession that no one important
enough to do anything about it is willing to listen to him.
The tension between this narrative of despair and Pound’s poem-long attitude of defiance
is the most compelling feature of The Pisan Cantos. But, as I have observed already, Pound’s
despair does not redeem the piece politically: Pound’s sense that his economic and aesthetic
values are becoming irrelevant does not amount to a retraction of them. In the final analysis, The
Pisan Cantos stands as a last-ditch attempt to respond to Arthur Griffith’s claim that you “Cant
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move ’em with / a cold thing like economics,” 245 and simultaneously as the most significant
effort in the modernist canon to make poetry out of heterodox economic theory. However,
reading the sequence in the context of my larger discussion of Modernist Amateur Economics in
this dissertation helps us see it in a different light as well. When we see The Pisan Cantos as a
culmination not merely of Pound’s poetic career but of a certain strand of Modernist Amateur
Economics, the sequence appears much less as a final expression of Pound’s intensely
idiosyncratic interest in economics and instead as an extended engagement with a topic central to
modernist literary production. Putting the sequence and its author in this larger context lets us see
Pound’s economics and his Fascism as more in line with the rest of British modernism than we
have perhaps wanted to admit.
Certainly, pairing Pound with Eliot leads us to this conclusion, as Eliot’s interests in
Social Credit and other heterodox theories and brief flirtations with Fascism gain significance
from Pound’s more thoroughgoing endorsements—and vice versa. But to return to the critical
subfield of Late Modernism with which I framed this chapter, reading Pound and The Pisan
Cantos next to Eliot complicates our understanding of Late Modernism as well. For in tying his
Modernist Amateur Economic theories together with his memories of his literary compatriots in
a work that is formally continuous with his own High Modernist poetry, Pound in The Pisan
Cantos is seeking to extend, rather than repudiate or transcend, that moment. However, the
sequence develops its own sense of “lateness,” in the feeling of belatedness that runs throughout
and in its elegiac treatment of these themes. While the general feeling of elegy is likely
perceptible to any reader of The Pisan Cantos, it is my contention that we can only understand
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the specifics—and thus the pro-Fascist import—of the sequence if we come to it with a good
understanding of Pound’s Modernist Amateur Economic theories, and that that understanding
only hold these implications for Late Modernism when we understand Pound’s economics in
light of the larger context of Modernist Amateur Economics that I am developing in this
dissertation.

Conclusion
Pound’s fears about the likely course of the post-war economy would come to nearly
immediate fruition in a way that his anxieties about his personal safety would not. In economics,
the phenomenon known now as the Neoclassical Synthesis, a theoretical integration of
neoclassical economics and Keynesian macroeconomics, occurred in 1948 with the publication
of Paul Samuelson’s Economics. Shortly thereafter, the first credit card was invented in 1952, an
innovation that launched an economy based on credit to such a large degree that Pound’s
advocacy of stamp scrip looked hopelessly outdated. These developments alone add significantly
to our sense of the belatedness of The Pisan Cantos, shaping the sequence as a last, doomed
attempt to seize the moment of possibility for innovation in economics afforded by the
inadequacy of the institutional response to issues like the Great Depression in the first half of the
twentieth century.
Of course, The Pisan Cantos are much more frequently cited for their reception than they
are for their content. And it is here that Eliot makes his reappearance. Eliot’s major role in
awarding the first Bollingen Prize to The Pisan Cantos in 1949 speaks volumes about the relative
statuses of the two poets in the years immediately following the war. Eliot, who had received the
Nobel Prize in literature in 1948, was for the last two decades of his life the epitome of the living
literary legend. Although he had turned his literary energies away from poetry and toward drama
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and prose, the degree to which Eliot stood as an established literary giant in the forties, fifties,
and sixties cannot be overstated. As I discuss in Chapter One of this dissertation, this state of
affairs had to a great degree been prepared by Eliot’s own efforts: the centrality of modernism to
the still-developing English department was both partially a result of Eliot’s early literary
criticism and the main reason for his high status in the post-war years.
The same cannot be said of Pound: while Eliot became the definition of the literary
institution, Pound was literally institutionalized. And while the Bollingen committee’s defense of
The Pisan Cantos, which is remembered as a sort of manifesto for the New Criticism, actively
worked to bring the poem into the center of the modernist literary canon, Pound remained largely
on the outside looking in. Not coincidentally, Pound continued to write sections of The Cantos,
staying true to his modernist stylistic experiments, even as postmodernism began to dominate the
high literary scene. Eliot, conversely, had given up both his fascination with modernist
economics and his interest in modernist aesthetics, content to participate in the domestication and
standardization of both fields in the post-war period. In the end, the forces of institutionalization
and professionalization that Eliot came to represent won out, closing down the window of
possibility in economics and literary experimentation afforded by the institutional uncertainty of
the first half of the twentieth century.
Indeed, we can learn a lot about the mid-century institutionalization of modernism by
looking at the contrasting statuses of Pound and Eliot in the 1950s and beyond. For despite our
current understanding of Late Modernism as more political than the High Modernism that
preceded it, it remains true, as I discussed in my introduction, that for many years literary critics
viewed modernism as either fundamentally apolitical or latently progressive. In light of the
obvious right-wing politics of both Eliot and Pound that I have considered in this chapter, this
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reading of “the politics of modernism” seems untenable, and even unbelievable. Mackay offers
an intriguing reason for this dislocation, arguing that Late Modernism began to emerge at the
same time as or, in some cases, after modernism was being institutionalized. In Mackay’s
reading, the temporal nearness of the increased political engagement of Late Modernism to
modernism’s institutionalization became central to that institutionalization’s neglect of politics.
Citing John Lehmann’s ability to identify a modernist canon in 1940 as evidence of
“modernism’s precipitate institutionalisation.” 246 Mackay’s reading of late modernism and World
War II is throughout informed by a sense of “the dislocation of modernism in the process of its
mid-century institutionalization.” In Mackay’s reading, the immediacy with which modernism
was institutionalized led to an artificial imposition of uniformity, “subsuming local differences
and preoccupations into a general category of western literary modernism.” 247 Ultimately, for
Mackay, the political investments of late modernism were omitted from the critical account of
modernism for so long precisely because of the lateness—and even belatedness—of the shift.
She writes: “Late modernism puts to new political uses the imaginative structures of modernist
writing—but it was too late to count. Modernism by then had ossified into a self-contained
literary period and into an aesthetic achievement that could only be construed as political in the
most problematic, even embarrassing, of ways.” 248 Mackay’s argument here, and especially her
final comment, ring true in the context of this chapter: while Pound and Eliot both had
problematic views, it seems clear from the divergence of their post-war reputations that Pound’s
politics were so problematic, so embarrassing, that his centrality to modernism needed to be
disavowed.
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That said, another thing that emerges from Mackay’s argument here is that even as she is
criticizing mid-century academics for flattening modernism into a monolithic aesthetic and
political entity, she uses the term “Late modernism” in a similar way in her claim that “Late
modernism puts to new political uses the imaginative structures of modernist writing.” In
bringing Eliot and Pound together in the paired contexts of Late Modernism and (Late)
Modernist Amateur Economic theorization, I have sought to show how even if Late Modernism
is marked by increased engagements with public affairs—from economics to politics and back
again—the economic and political interests of Late Modernist figures were not monolithic, and
also were often not pleasant. One of my contentions in this chapter and in this dissertation more
generally is that there is nothing to be gained by minimizing or ignoring the problematic
elements of the Modernist Amateur Economists that I am surveying. In a current moment
similarly filled with problematic and embarrassing politics, there is much to learn from Pound
and Eliot’s right-wing Modernist Amateur Economic theorization, as well as its mid-century
assimilation into the modernist canon.
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Chapter 4: Woolf and Keynes: Unemployment, Feminism,
Modernism
“The composition of this book has been for the author a long struggle of escape, and so must the
reading of it be for most readers if the author’s assault upon them is to be successful,—a struggle
of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression. The ideas which are here expressed so
laboriously are extremely simple and should be obvious. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas,
but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been,
into every corner of our minds”
—Keynes, The General Theory1
“‘Take this guinea and with it burn the college to the ground. Set fire to the old hypocrisies. Let
the light of the burning building scare the nightingales and incarnadine the willows. And let the
daughters of educated men dance round the fire and heap armful upon armful of dead leaves
upon the flames, and let their mothers lean from the upper windows and cry ‘Let it blaze! Let it
blaze! For we have done with this ‘education’!’”
—Woolf, Three Guineas2
“The news of my legacy reached me one night about the same time that the act was passed that
gave votes to women…Of the two—the vote and the money—the money, I own, seemed
infinitely the more important.”
—Woolf, A Room of One’s Own3
In 1934, taking a break from her struggles with The Pargiters, the failed novel project
that would eventually become The Years and Three Guineas, Virginia Woolf wrote an account in
her diary of a typical Bloomsbury Thursday evening. John Maynard Keynes and T.S. Eliot had
come around, and were discussing After Strange Gods, Eliot’s infamously anti-Semitic tract on
the dangers of building a culturally diverse society.4 This discussion was interrupted when Julian
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John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936; New York: Harcourt,
1964), viii.
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Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas, in A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas, ed. Morag Shiach (1938; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 202-203.
3
Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, in A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas, ed. Morag Shiach (1938;
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48.
4
In Woolf’s account Keynes, to his discredit, said of the book: “You have brought up again one of the primal
questions, & nobody has even tried to consider it.” Woolf records Eliot’s answer with one of her characteristically
nasty turns of phrase: “No, said Tom, much like a great toad with jeweled eyes.” Cf. Virginia Woolf, diary entry,
April 19, 1934, in The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Volume Four: 1931-1935, ed. Anne Olivier Bell and Andrew
McNeillie (San Diego: Harvest, 1982), 208.

Bell arrived, after which the conversation turned to “[t]he economic question: the religion of
Communism.” Woolf writes, in what is clearly Keynes’s phrasing: “This the worst of all &
founded on a silly mistake of old Mr Ricardo’s which M. [i.e. Maynard, as Keynes’s friends
called him] given time will put right. And then there will be no more economic stress, & then—?
How will you live Julian, you who have no moral strictness?” Having, apparently, talked Julian
down—and weathered an awkward appearance by Elizabeth Bowen 5—Keynes and Eliot
discussed the Bank of England, C.H. Douglas, and Social Credit:
M. talked about Montagu Norman the Governor of the B. of E. an elf; an artist, sitting
with his cloak round him hunched up, saying ‘I cant remember—’thus evading all
questions, & triumphing—going away disguised—going mad. Also about Douglas, the
credit man, being interviewed, & whenever they came to par. 7 saying ‘To explain this I
must go back to the beginning’.6
Woolf’s account of this evening isn’t remarkable, exactly, but that is part of my point in
including it here: it is in anecdotes like this that we can see the way that the intellectual ferment
of the Bloomsbury group worked. Where else could we find one of the preeminent modernist
poets and the most important economist of his generation talking shop, while a great modernist
novelist and essayist observed from her seat by the fire?
Thus far in this dissertation, I have considered a range of what we might call
“ecosystems” of British modernism: the modernizing university in Chapter 1, the Fabian society
and its disgruntled progeny in Chapter 2, and the relationship between Pound and Eliot in
Chapter 3. The sheer variety of these “ecosystems” helps explain why British modernism is so
diverse in terms of its commitments, philosophy, and manifestations—and why attempts to
produce a unified conception of modernism must inevitably emphasize variousness and

5
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“Eth Bowen ran in, rayed like a zebra, silent & stuttering. Is 34.” Cf. Woolf, diary entry, April 19, 1934, 208.
Ibid.
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diffuseness over coherence. Within that diffuseness, however, the Bloomsbury Group has
consistently emerged in critical accounts of English modernism as the key site of modernist
aesthetic and intellectual exchange, not least because it is the “ecosystem” that most explicitly
thought of itself as such. Although I want to preserve the sense of variety that is central to my
understanding of modernism, it is also interesting to think of the Bloomsbury Group as a
conceptual and physical site that serves as a sort of gathering place for many of the theories and
figures I have discussed thus far. Born out of the Cambridge Apostles, the Group claimed
Keynes as a member and Eliot as a peripheral figure, ensuring that concerns about the
professionalization of literature and of economics were frequent topics of discussion. The
involvement of various members with the Labour Party and the Fabian society—including
personal relationships between Keynes and the Webbs7 and the Woolfs and the Shaws8—reflect
the Group’s interest in the kinds of social justice causes that the Fabian Society espoused. And,
as Woolf’s account records, Eliot’s friendships with the Woolfs and others led to general
awareness of Social Credit and the related heterodox theories so important to Pound (even if
Pound himself wouldn’t have been caught dead in Bloomsbury). Although Bloomsbury does not
offer a sort of magic pill to understanding all of British modernism or even all of the conjunction
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Cf. The letter Woolf wrote to Margaret Llewelyn Davies on September 2, 1926, where she refers to Keynes as
being “completely under the sway of the Webbs.” See Virginia Woolf, letter to Margaret Llewelyn Davies,
September 2, 1926, in A Change of Perspective: The Letters of Virginia Woolf, Volume 3: 1923-1928, ed. Nigel
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8
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Virginia Woolf, diary entry, December 28, 1929, in The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Volume Three: 1925-1930, ed.
Anne Olivier Bell and Andrew McNeillie (San Diego: Harvest, 1980), 276-277. As I noted in Chapter 2, Woolf
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Samuel Butler, in The Way of All Flesh in particular; the plays of Bernard Shaw continue to record it.” See Virginia
Woolf, “Character in Fiction,” in The Writer’s Reader: Vocation, Preparation, Creation, ed. Robert Cohen and Jay
Parini (1924; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 268.
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of British modernism and economics, it represents a compelling site to think through those major
themes of my dissertation.
Although I want to keep my reservations about viewing Bloomsbury as the key locus of
British modernism, then, Bloomsbury has emerged in critical accounts in this way because of its
interdisciplinarity. The writings and artistic productions of its various members would seem to
provide a perfect grounds for making claims about an interdisciplinary modernism, a shared
modernist philosophy, worldview, or sensibility that we can see, through Bloomsbury, run
through the arenas of visual art, political theory, philosophy, biography, psychoanalysis,
literature, and economics. Within this huge body of critical material, there is a smaller subset that
focuses on the ways in which the Bloomsbury Group as a whole interacted with the market.
Given Keynes’s stature in the field of economics, he is naturally at the center of any answer to
this question. More surprising is the degree to which Woolf has emerged as a sort of
counterpoint to or at least interlocutor with Keynes. A short survey of some of this writing will
give a representative sample of the many theoretical frameworks and critical concepts that have
been brought to bear on this question: how did Bloomsbury see itself in terms of the economy
and how did it influence that economy?
Kathryn Simpson provides a useful starting-point in her consideration of Bloomsbury in
terms of what she, borrowing a concept from theorist Lewis Hyde, calls the “gift-sphere.” 9 For
Simpson, the Bloomsbury Group conceived of itself as operating within a “‘double economy,’”
which “facilitates ‘the conversion of market wealth to gift wealth’, so that money earned can
then support the real work of artistic creativity. This means of conceptualizing the artist’s
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284

engagement with the monetary economy so as to ‘make some peace with the market’ effectively
describes what might be called Bloomsbury gift-spheres, particularly the Omega Workshops and
the Hogarth Press.”10 This concept of working within the economy but not capitulating to it is
central to Woolf’s conclusions in Three Guineas, and provides a useful way of thinking about the
two major engagements with the market that Simpson cites here, the Omega Workshops and the
Hogarth Press.11 Ultimately, Simpson argues, these economic endeavors should be understood as
representative of the Bloomsbury Group’s attempts to situate itself within the market but also of
its members’ shared commitment to rejecting the corrupting influences of the capitalist system.
Importantly, much of Simpson’s essay depends on an implicit claim that all of
Bloomsbury thought about economics along the lines set forth by Roger Fry in “his radical
theories of art’s relation to the market” expressed “in a number of essays,” which Simpson
distills into “the idea of a safe space for artistic experimentation and creativity as ‘havens’, as
‘interstice[s]’, and as an ‘enclave.’” 12 Economic historian Craufurd D. Goodwin also emphasizes
the importance of Fry in his own discussion of how we might read the disparate parts of
Bloomsbury together. Focusing on his title characters, “Maynard and Virginia,” Goodwin asks:
So if Maynard found little of interest in what Virginia considered to be her most original
economic ideas contained in A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas, and if Virginia
10

Simpson, “Woolf’s Bloomsbury,” 171.
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expressed doubts about Maynard’s plea for government attention to aggregate demand,
what could they have had in common in economic discussion? The answer may lie in a
body of doctrine that the modern economist might not consider “economic,” but the
Bloomsburys definitely did. One of the unifying elements in Bloomsbury thought was a
social philosophy developed mainly by Roger Fry with inputs from G. E. Moore,
propagated especially by Clive Bell, and explored by all the others in various ways. 13
The “body of doctrine” Goodwin goes on to discuss boils down to a distinction between the “real
life” and the “imaginative life,” a distinction that can legitimately be traced through many works
by Bloomsberries.14 Goodwin’s emphasis here, though, on this idea as a “unifying element,”
“explored by all the [Bloomsberries] in various ways” hews to the overarching concept of the
Bloomsbury Group as a coherent, unified modernist collective that Simpson also endorses.
Both of these accounts focus on philosophical and conceptual underpinnings that help
inform how the Bloomsbury Group approached basically all social issues, but especially
questions of economics. As Goodwin argues, the element of Woolf’s writing that proved most
influential to Keynes was precisely her consideration in her fiction of this distinction between
“the real life” and “the imaginative life”:
The distinctive contribution Virginia made to Maynard’s musing on this subject was to
reflect in her writings, sometimes obliquely, on several things: first, what the imaginative
life looked like. Would you recognize it when you saw it? Second, what conditions would
have to be met and devices employed to promote the imaginative life in a civilization?
Third, what were the most serious obstacles likely to be faced in achieving this objective?
And finally, what policies should be in place to meet the goal? 15
A literary critic would likely object to this reduction of Woolf’s fictional output to attempts to
answer a set of philosophical and ethical questions. Goodwin’s argument here, though, is that it

13

Crauford D. Goodwin, “Maynard and Virginia: A Personal and Professional Friendship,” History of Political
Economy 39 (2007): 279-280.
14
See Goodwin, “Maynard and Virginia,” 280-290, for his discussion of this concept. A familiar illustration of it in
fiction can be found in E.M. Forster’s Howards End (1910), in which the privations of the “real life” explicitly keep
Leonard Bast from achieving the rewards of the “imaginative life.” I discuss Forster’s novel at length in my
conclusion below. Cf. E. M. Forster, Howards End (1910; New York: Norton, 1998).
15
Goodwin, “Maynard and Virginia,” 280.

286

is in addressing these kinds of questions which “the modern economist might not consider
“economic,” but the Bloomsburys definitely did” 16 that we can see Woolf as informing Keynes’s
own economic theorization. For Goodwin, then, as for Simpson, the everyday practices—and
writings—of the members of the Bloomsbury Group were always concerned with understanding
their relationship to the economy and attempting to shape that economy for their own artistic and
social ends. And it is Woolf, particularly, who provides the most coherent and expansive body of
work contributing to that understanding, shaping even Keynes’s conception of how the economy
worked.
Jennifer Wicke, in one of the best-known essays on the subject, takes this conclusion
even further, down to the level of the sentence. For Wicke, the interaction between Woolf and
Keynes helps us see “how modernism altered our ideas of “markets” and the practices of
marketing.”17 More than that, Wicke argues,
modernism contributed profoundly to a sea-change in market consciousness, a
consciousness we all tend to share, with sharp disputes about what implications should
flow from that shared consciousness. This means that modernism (writ large) is neither
separate from market consciousness, nor just a johnny-come-lately in putting to use
market procedures to advance aesthetic goals. The connection is much more intense,
more salient, more peculiar, if I am to be believed; aspects of modernist practice made
possible the transformations in the understanding of that secret sharer, “the market,” and
as a result changed the nature of modern markets for once and all. 18
In support of this enormous claim, Wicke turns to Keynes and Woolf to try to show that the two
Bloomsberries are thinking about consciousness and the market in precisely the same way
because the two, in modernity, have become mutually imbricated and, indeed, functionally
identical to each other. Ultimately, Wicke claims,
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The argument is that “the market” is at least as much an aesthetic phenomenon as it is
anything else, and that neither art nor economics can be separated out of it or given an
artificial primacy as instigator or reflector…I would say that Woolf and Keynes are doing
the same thing, i.e. giving representation to the everyday of the market in the genres and
institutional formats appropriate to their quite different formations as literary writer and
theoretical economist.19
Moreover, for Wicke, it is Bloomsbury’s position within the market, as “a coterie of
consumption,” that enables this reading of Woolf and Keynes, a reading that she pursues in a
consideration of Mrs Dalloway. In this way, Wicke links up with Simpson and Goodwin in
conceiving of Bloomsbury as always pressingly concerned with understanding its own place in
the market, but she also takes it further, arguing (in opposition, I think, to Simpson at least) that
Bloomsbury is actually the key factor in understanding the development of the modern economy
in the early 20th century. That is, rather than seeing Bloomsbury as participating in the market
but remaining detached from it (and uncorrupted by it), Wicke argues powerfully against
indulging “the temptation to see art and ‘the market’ on two utterly divergent paths, or on paths
that can only intersect with muddy, or smutty, results for both sides.” Indeed, for Wicke, “Within
this modernist moment, art remade the market, and the market made modernism.” 20 In this way,
we can see Wicke’s argument as echoing earlier, Marxist understandings of modernism as fully
complicit with the development of capitalism (such as Adorno’s), and anticipating John Xiros
Cooper’s argument in Modernism and the Culture of Market Society that “posits modernism as
the culture peculiar to market society,” not merely coopted by capitalism, but in fact constitutive
of it.21 Such a view is in line with the institutionalizing “face of modernism” that I have
discussed in my introduction and first chapter, and which I associate with Keynes here.
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Despite Wicke’s complication of the understanding put forth by Goodwin and Simpson,
all three critics I examine here premise their arguments on a concept of a shared worldview
within the Bloomsbury Group—a perspective that certainly represents a critical consensus.
Victoria Rosner, in her introduction to the Cambridge Companion to the Bloomsbury Group (a
volume designed to reflect and solidify just such a critical consensus), provides a formulation of
a common understanding of the Group, noting that “[w]hile there is no unified Bloomsbury
philosophy, the group was bound together both by lifelong ties of affection and by shared ideas
about aesthetics, philosophy, and psychology.” 22 There is ample evidence for this reading of the
Bloomsbury Group, and my purpose here is not wholly to argue otherwise. However, I do want
to suggest here that the story is more complicated than that of a group of friends who shared a
worldview. Moreover, it seems to me that an underexamined element of this kind of
understanding of Bloomsbury is the very interdisciplinary nature of the Group that has
contributed so directly to its fame. Due in part to the way the modern university is structured,
any broad consideration of the Bloomsbury Group involves an array of oversimplifications of
those disciplines that are not the writer’s. 23 So, in accounts by economic historians of Virginia
Woolf, for instance, we find a brand of “literary criticism” that tends to focus on reading her
early work as if it is non-fiction social commentary. 24 On the other hand, literary critics are eager

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), especially their chapter “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass
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to exaggerate the degree to which Keynes’s modernism pervades his economic theories, leading
to statements like “Keynes…shifted away from the rational actor hypothesis in economics—a
decision attributable to his exposure to the literature of psychology through James Strachey’s
translations of Freud, published by Virginia and Leonard Woolf’s Hogarth Press,” 25 or “I would
say that Woolf [in her experiments with representing consciousness in fiction] and Keynes [in
describing the market] are doing the same thing.”26
I am not saying that these economic historians and literary critics are wrong, exactly. It
does matter that Woolf includes debates about the nature of property and poverty in The Voyage
Out, and we can make something of her reference to Henry George’s Progress and Poverty.
Keynes’s application of modernist understandings of irrationality in human behavior are crucial
to understanding his late work as modernist. And, most importantly for this dissertation, by
paying attention in some depth to some of the major works of both Keynes and Woolf, we can
discern, if not a shared worldview, at least a coherent conversation. The issue is the impulse to
summary, on both sides. Can we attribute Keynes’s reconceptualization of economic actors to
the currency of Freud’s theories in the Bloomsbury Group? 27 On what grounds can we say that

superficial description of Woolf’s writing as “stream of consciousness.” See Matthias Klaes, “Keynes Between
Modernism and Post-Modernism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Keynes, ed. Roger Backhouse and Bradley W.
Bateman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 264-266; 265.
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became a member of the Macmillan Committee in 1930, his commitment to a mechanistic model of the business
cycle (driven by changes in the interest rate) was so strong that he engaged his fellow Cambridge economist A. C.
Pigou in an acerbic exchange before the Committee, and tried to force him to admit that uncertainty and
expectations were no part of a proper understanding of the current environment… Keynes held on to his mechanistic
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Keynes and Woolf’s experiments with describing the market, on the one hand, and
consciousness, on the other, can and should be boiled down to a shared perception that the
market, at a fundamental level, is constituted of consciousnesses and has become, in the
twentieth century, constitutive itself of those consciousnesses? 28 To what extent is it fair to argue
that Woolf is, in a meaningful way, an economic thinker? What is missing in these accounts, I
argue, is, first, a more careful consideration of the primary materials and, second, the broader
context that I have developed in this dissertation of Modernist Amateur Economics.
In this chapter, then, I focus on two pairings of texts by Keynes and Woolf: Keynes’s
1926 pamphlet The End of Laissez-Faire alongside Woolf’s essay A Room of One’s Own (1929),
and Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) with Woolf’s
Three Guineas (1938). What emerges from considering these pairs of texts in relation to each
other (both within and across these pairings) is a picture of an intellectual debate based in
divergent understandings both of economics and the British social order more generally. If, as
critics are so hasty to claim, Woolf and Keynes spring from the same intellectual ecosystem, one
of the points of interest here is the radically different directions in which they take that
intellectual starting-point.
Reading Woolf and Keynes together holds great implications for our understanding of the
figure of the Modernist Amateur Economist as well. As I will argue here, through his
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interactions with his Bloomsbury social circle, Keynes brought many insights of Modernist
Amateur Economic theorization to bear on his academic work. Specifically, his later work is
premised to a large degree on the idea that economic problems can only be understood in relation
to other, broader discursive fields, including human psychology, art and literature, etc.—the
principle areas of interest of other figures in the Bloomsbury Group. Given the extent to which
Keynes’s theories transformed neoclassical economics, we can see that the field was reenergized in part by the Modernist Amateur Economic insights that Keynes incorporated into his
own economic work.
However, Keynes’s intervention is so important and became so impactful because he
adopted this outsider position from within. That is, while Keynes drew heavy inspiration from
heterodox sources and put forth a hefty challenge to the neoclassical theory, he worked hard to
position himself rhetorically so that it remained clear that he was writing as a professional
economist. Accordingly, Keynes achieved not a radical break from economic orthodoxy, nor a
wholescale reconceptualization of the field, but a modification of the neoclassical theory, and a
synthesis of his theories and the old ones. Keynes was therefore able to have it both ways:
drawing on heterodox ideas to put forth a new orthodoxy, which in turn embodied his modernist
reconceptualization of the field, Keynes exemplified the institutionalizing “face of modernism.”
Keynes’s strategic deployment of heterodox economics and of the central insights of
Modernist Amateur Economics come into focus by reading them alongside Woolf. Woolf
exemplifies the other “face of modernism,” with its focus on experimentation and abiding
distrust of institutions and bodies of received knowledge. As an exemplar of a writer and
economic thinker who was fully committed to the kind of Modernist Amateur Economic
theorization that Keynes merely adopted in his late work, Woolf helps us measure the distance
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between the tactical use of such a subject-position and a real commitment to it. In critiquing
institutionalized, orthodox economics—including, pointedly, Keynes—for ignoring women in its
allegedly scientific analysis, Woolf emerges as the radical counterpoint to Keynes’s more
measured calls for economic reform. Reading Keynes in light of Modernist Amateur Economics,
and especially with the central contention that economic issues should not be abstracted from the
cultural and social contexts in which they develop, sheds new light on his place in considerations
of modernism. At the same time, Woolf’s critique, that Keynes ultimately failed to go far enough
in this direction, stands as well as a final expression of the Modernist Amateur Economic critique
of neoclassical theory, a criticism that has still gone unanswered today.

Keynes and Woolf in the 20s: The End of Laissez-Faire and A Room of One’s
Own
Although I am thus focusing in part on the limited nature of Keynes’s critique of the
neoclassical theory here, I do not want to lose sight of the fact that that critique was extensive.
Indeed, it would be fair to say that Keynes’s quarrel with the neoclassical theory went precisely
as far as it possibly could have without precipitating a complete break—an event that could have
resulted in Keynes being labeled a crank and cast aside, like Hobson before him. I argue as much
in my first chapter, where I outlined the ways in which Keynes, through his collection Essays in
Biography, sought to shape a narrative of the history of economics in such a way as to
accommodate his forthcoming theoretical innovations. There, in his essay on Marshall, Keynes
began to criticize the concept of laissez-faire, stating that while
Marshall’s proof that laissez-faire breaks down in certain conditions theoretically, and
not merely practically, regarded as a principle of maximum social advantage, was of
great philosophical importance,…Marshall does not carry this particular argument very
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far, and the further exploration of that field has been left to Marshall’s favorite pupil and
successor, Professor Pigou.29
Pigou aside, it is clear, as I argued there, that Keynes is also paving the way for his own critique
of laissez-faire. While Keynes was unable to offer a solution to the gap in economic theory
caused by the destruction of laissez-faire until 1936 in the General Theory, his 1926 pamphlet
The End of Laissez-Faire sets out in clear terms precisely why Keynes believed the concept
needed to be dispensed with. This provocatively titled, didactic essay, published by the Hogarth
Press, marks an important moment in the understanding of economics within the Bloomsbury
milieu and sets the stage, I am arguing, not only for Keynes’s major contributions to economics
in the 30s, but also for the way in which Virginia Woolf takes up and fashions a new, feminist
economic theory in A Room of One’s Own.
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, Keynes in The End of Laissez-Faire echoes Shaw’s
Fabian essay “Economic” in approaching his topic by way of a brief precis of late-eighteenth to
mid-nineteenth century intellectual history. 30 Explaining that the concept of laissez-faire
emerged from a confluence of “the philosophical doctrine that Government has no right to
interfere, and the divine miracle that it has no need to interfere,” combined with “a scientific
proof that its interference is inexpedient,” Keynes paints a picture of a pre-Darwinian world in
which “[t]he political philosopher could retire in favour of the business man—for the latter could
attain the philosopher’s summum bonum by just pursuing his own private profit.” 31 Keynes, like
Shaw, then notes that while Darwin’s revelations about the origins of species would seem to
have interrupted at least one important pillar of this three-part support for laissez-faire—the

29

John Maynard Keynes, Essays in Biography (1933. Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2012), 225-227.
I say “surprisingly,” but, as I have already mentioned, Keynes was friendly with both the Shaws and the Webbs.
31
John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire (London: The Hogarth Press, 1926), 10-11.
30

294

“divine miracle”—the supporters of the principle were instead able to enlist Darwin in their
philosophical defense of the free economy:
But at this point the new ideas bolstered up the old. The Economists were teaching that
wealth, commerce, and machinery were the children of free competition—that free
competition built London. But the Darwinians could go one better than that—free
competition had built Man…The principle of the Survival of the Fittest could be regarded
as a vast generalization of the Ricardian economics. Socialistic interferences became, in
the light of this grander synthesis, not merely inexpedient, but impious… 32
Where Shaw pinpointed this moment in intellectual history in an effort to undermine the
credibility of orthodox economists and put forth his version of Fabian economic theory, Keynes
goes in a different, and indeed opposite, direction. Having laid out the theoretical basis that “The
Economists” lent to laissez-faire, Keynes changes course:
This is what the economists are supposed to have said. No such doctrine is really to be
found in the writings of the greatest authorities. It is what the popularizers and vulgarisers
said. It is what the Utilitarians, who admitted Hume’s egoism and Bentham’s
egalitarianism at the same time, were driven to believe in, if they were to effect a
synthesis. The language of the economists lent itself to the laissez-faire interpretation.
But the popularity of the doctrine must be laid at the door of the political philosophers of
the day, whom it happened to suit, rather than of the political economists. 33
Keynes goes on to provide examples of orthodox opposition to the concept of laissez-faire,
firmly positioning himself as a supporter of orthodox, neoclassical economics. By strenuously
arguing against both laissez-faire and the idea that laissez-faire has been central to economics,
Keynes is able to have it both ways here, as he does throughout his career as an economist. By
walking this line, Keynes is working to establish himself as a reformer from within the
discipline, rather than a heterodox figure outside of it.
This point becomes even clearer in the closing stage of Keynes’s argument. Claiming that
the identity of laissez-faire with Capitalism that has developed in the popular conception of
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economics has led to “[c]onfusion of thought and feeling” and a concomitant “confusion of
speech,” Keynes boldly states: “[n]evertheless a time may be coming when we shall get clearer
than at present as to when we are talking about Capitalism as an efficient or inefficient
technique, and when we are talking about it as desirable or objectionable in itself.” 34 It is clear
that Keynes envisions himself as playing a role in this “coming time,” an impression he confirms
in his final pronouncements on Capitalism here. “For my part,” Keynes writes,
I think that Capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for
attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in
many ways extremely objectionable. Our problem is to work out a social organization
which shall be as efficient as possible without offending our notions of a satisfactory way
of life.35
The solution to this problem will come, crucially, not from “political agitation” or even from
“premature experiments” that involve a sharp break with neoclassical economic orthodoxy, but
rather, simply, “from thought... We need a new set of convictions which spring naturally from a
candid examination of our own inner feelings in relation to the outside facts.” 36 This move:
beginning with an apparently radical notion—the End of the cornerstone of orthodox
economics!—and ending on a softer, Whiggish conclusion that assumes that rationality will
prevail at the end of the day, is a hallmark of Keynes’s economic thought in the period before
The General Theory.37
And yet, I argue, this movement from radical starting-point to meliorist conclusion is
more complex than it would appear. In invoking the revolutionary, Keynes is working to prepare
the discipline to accept theories that are, in fact, quite radical. By tactically pulling back from
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making any radical conclusions here, Keynes implies that the theoretical works that he will write
in the late twenties and early thirties will be perfectly in line with the values that British society
already holds, a “new set of convictions” that nevertheless stop far short of “offending our
notions of a satisfactory way of life.” In this way, Keynes is able both to call for the end of
laissez-faire economics and to preserve his position as a respectable economist. In both its
rhetorical strategy and in the specifics of its argument, The End of Laissez-Faire provided Woolf
with a usable model for her own economic arguments, first in A Room of One’s Own and in
Three Guineas. However, neither of these works are derivative of Keynes’s pamphlet; indeed,
they both seek to push Keynes’s theories much further than he took them himself. Nevertheless,
Keynes’s careful self-positioning is key, I claim, to understanding how Woolf is appropriating
but also critiquing her friend’s economic argumentation in her major prose works.
While most critical accounts of Woolf’s relationship with Keynes focus on the positive
aspects of that relationship, and especially on how each may have influenced the others’
thought,38 a perusal of Woolf’s diaries and letters reveal that she felt more than a little
ambivalence about Keynes. And, moreover, that ambivalence often came from what Woolf
perceived as a gendered discrepancy in the way Woolf and Keynes were perceived by both the
public and the rest of the Bloomsbury group. It is clear that Woolf was, early in their
acquaintance, jealous of Keynes’s reputation as a brilliant person. In her first mention of him in
her Diary, in 1915, Woolf says of Keynes: “He is like quicksilver on a sloping board—a little
inhuman, but very kindly, as inhuman people are.” 39 Later, in 1920, she records “a vivid sight
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[she has of] Maynard by lamplight,” where he appeared to her “like a gorged seal, double chin,
ledge of red lip, little eyes, sensual, brutal, unimaginative: one of those visions that come from a
chance attitude, lost so soon as he turned his head.” Reflecting, she writes: “I suppose though it
illustrates something I feel about him. Then he’s read neither of my books—.” 40 This dual sense
that Maynard is a bit less impressive than he is generally considered and that he does not give her
her due as a genius in her own right pervades Woolf’s private writings. From his backhanded
compliment in 1921 that “The best thing you ever did…was your Memoir on George. You
should pretend to write about real people & make it all up.”—a comment that Woolf did not take
well: “—I was dashed of course. (& oh dear what nonsense—for if George is my climax I’m a
mere scribbler)”41—to his assertion that Three Guineas is “a silly argument and not very well
written,”42 Keynes consistently refused, or at the very least failed, to give Woolf credit for her
literary accomplishments.43
For her part, Woolf is consistent in giving Keynes the highest place as an economist.
Maynard is “our greatest living economist,” 44 the “process of mind” displayed in A Tract on
Monetary Reform (1923) is “as far ahead of me as Shakespeare’s,” 45 and his “gigantic boast” that
in The General Theory “he has revolutionized economics,” is, in Woolf’s opinion, “true I
40
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daresay.”46 And yet, if we approach Woolf’s first great prose work that deals centrally with
economics, A Room of One’s Own, through the lens of her fraught relationship with Keynes, it
becomes clear that she has perceived a major gap in his thinking: he does not deal with the dead
weight loss to the economy caused by the systemic exclusion of women from the workforce. 47 It
is this simple perception, perhaps more sociological in nature than economic, that Woolf uses to
motivate the trenchant critique of orthodox economics that appears in A Room of One’s Own.
And yet it is precisely this type of critique—bringing non-economic, humanistic fields of
knowledge and experience to bear on economic questions—that I have been marking as the
signature characteristic of the Modernist Amateur Economist. While Woolf does not claim A
Room of One’s Own as an economic tract in the way that Shaw, Pound, or Orage claimed their
respective writings, the ultimate message of Woolf’s essay—“that it is necessary to have five
hundred a year and a room with a lock on the door if you are to write fiction or poetry” 48—is
economic in nature, as, as we shall see, is the central argument and much of the imagery
employed in the piece. Moreover, as I have already suggested above, that Woolf uses Keynes’s
critique of laissez-faire as her point of departure for her feminist economic argument in A Room
of One’s Own positions her essay as an integral piece in understanding the debate in which they
were implicitly engaged.
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Woolf’s focus on economics is most clear in the first chapter of A Room of One’s Own,
where she meditates on the economic disenfranchisement that has been perpetrated against
women over the course of English history. As she speaks to an audience of Girton students,
Woolf imagines herself on the campus of Cambridge (famously turned into “Oxbridge”). This
dynamic between the audience—women attending the “separate but equal” women’s college—
and the setting of Woolf’s story—the venerable institution that still refuses her audience to take a
degree even if they pass the examinations—is of course instrumental to the critique she is
leveling in this first section and in the essay broadly. But it is also fair to read her narrative of
exclusion—especially the jarring moment when she is turned away from the library by a zealous
beadle, losing her precious train of thought—back into her experience as a female member of the
Bloomsbury Group. Her resentments against Keynes, after all, are somewhat generalized in her
Diary against all of the former Cambridge Apostles in her social circle. 49
This act of rhetorical self-positioning is more important in the context of this dissertation
because of the work it does to dramatize one of Woolf’s most central arguments, both here and in
Three Guineas, which is that women have been systematically excluded from the economy
specifically by being denied education. It is telling, too, that the University that Woolf most
associates with the discipline of economics, Cambridge, is the same institution that is keeping
her out of the library because she is a woman. Even as the discipline is solidifying in the ways I
have discussed in chapter one, Woolf in A Room of One’s Own is interested in exposing both
how that discipline has neglected to include women in its theoretical scope and as fellow-
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members in the profession. In a very fundamental way, then, Woolf’s concerns about women’s
exclusion from educational institutions includes and mirrors a claim that they have been
excluded from both the economy and economics—and her essay is, among other things, an
attempt to theorize a remedy to that exclusion.
That work begins in the first chapter as Woolf lays out the specifically economic
foundation of “Oxbridge,” as it has evolved over the course of economic history. Woolf muses
that “[a]n unending stream of gold and silver…must have flowed into this court perpetually to
keep the stones coming and the masons working,” first coming, in the feudal economic system—
which Woolf calls “the age of faith”—“from the coffers of kings and queens and great nobles”
and then, after the industrial revolution—in “the age of reason”—“from the chests of merchants
and manufacturers, from the purses of men who had made, say, a fortune from industry, and
returned, in their wills, a bounteous share of it to endow more chairs.” 50 The result, Woolf
observes, is that “the foundation of gold and silver seemed deep enough; the pavement laid
solidly over the wild grasses.”51 If Woolf is reflecting here on a different kind of economic
history than is Keynes, it is nevertheless the case that she is pointing out a major deficiency of
the intellectual history he outlines. Where Keynes is concerned with the abstract—how the
concept of laissez-faire came to ascendency within the discipline of economics—Woolf turns her
attention to the material ways in which the economy based on that intellectual foundation has
consistently prioritized men over women.

50

Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, 11-12.
Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, 12. Woolf’s language here is surely one of the details that provokes Gualtieri’s
insightful comment that money is “enveloped in…misty fictions [in] A Room of One’s Own, where it somehow
seem[s] to generate itself spontaneously, by parthenogenesis.” See Gualtieri, “Woolf, Economics, and Class
Politics,” 188.
51

301

For this “foundation of gold and silver” stands in stark contrast to the humble beginnings
of Woolf’s fictional Women’s College Fernham, which, we later discover, has been founded,
after great effort, on a small collection of “thirty thousand pounds.” 52 Woolf’s narrator reacts to
this information with mock “scorn at the reprehensible poverty of our sex,” asking “What had
our mothers been doing then that they had no wealth to leave us?”53 The answer, it appears, is
that they have been oppressed by the legal and cultural apparatus of the patriarchy: “it is equally
useless to ask what might have happened if Mrs. Seton and her mother and her mother before her
had amassed great wealth and laid it under the foundations of college and library, because, in the
first place, to earn money was impossible for them, and in the second, had it been possible, the
law denied them the right to possess what money they earned.” 54 As Woolf’s narrator returns to
her room, she begins to meditate on the way in which this legal restriction has created a profound
inequality between the sexes: “I pondered why it was that Mrs. Seton had no money to leave us;
and what effect poverty has on the mind; and what effect wealth has on the mind…and I thought
of the organ booming in the chapel and of the shut doors of the library; and I thought how
unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how it is perhaps worse to be locked in.” 55 Woolf
here implies that for women to attain clarity and originality of thought, they must first be given
financial stability. Only then can the process of opening those doors—a process that will be to
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the benefit of those on the inside as well as those shut out—begin. Two burning questions
remain: how can that goal be achieved? And what happens to the prevailing economic order if
and when it is?
It is here that Woolf’s familiarity with and critique of Keynes comes to the fore. For
Woolf in A Room of One’s Own is taking the strong position that the worldview perpetuated by
the Cambridge crowd, exemplified by Keynes and the other former Apostles in the Bloomsbury
Group, is fatally flawed because it fails to take as foundational the patriarchal basis of twentiethcentury British society. How can an economic theory possibly have explanatory power if it
ignores half of the available workforce, 56 as well as the deadweight loss to society of the
exclusion thereof? Woolf is not using these terms, but her example of Shakespeare’s sister is one
of the most compelling examples of “deadweight loss” in existence: the culture of the world has
been robbed of a second Shakespeare because of discrimination against women. Woolf is writing
from an amateur position, feeling her way into this economic critique, not because of any
expertise in economics, but because of a long-gestating feeling that there is something
fundamentally missing from an economic system that excludes women. 57 But the economic tools
and concepts she does manipulate here originate in her exposure to Keynes via the Bloomsbury
milieu to which they both belonged. In this sense, A Room of One’s Own stands as a
characteristic example of Modernist Amateur Economic theorization, in its commitment to
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recontextualizing economic concepts and theories within larger cultural and social phenomena—
the patriarchy, in this case—out of which they have all too often been abstracted.
Woolf’s argument is most closely tied to economics and to Keynes in the concluding
moment of the first chapter of her essay. As Woolf’s narrator concludes her musings and turns
into her hotel, she comments that “[o]ne seemed alone with an inscrutable society…Even the
door of the hotel sprang open at the touch of an invisible hand—not a boots was sitting up to
light me to bed, it was so late.”58 “An invisible hand” is not merely a nice turn of phrase; it is,
indisputably, the most famous phrase in the history of English economics, appearing in Adam
Smith’s explanation of what we now know as the concept of laissez-faire capitalism in The
Wealth of Nations.59 In the context of this chapter, the phrase also stands out because of the
central position it occupies in Keynes’s subtle negotiation of his subject-position in The End of
Laissez-Faire. There, Keynes places the phrase “invisible hand” at the center of his attempt to
claim that laissez-faire has never been central to economics. He writes:
The phrase laissez-faire is not to be found in the works of Adam Smith, of Ricardo, or of
Malthus...Adam Smith, of course, was a Free Trader and an opponent of many
eighteenth-century restrictions on trade. But his attitude towards the Navigation Acts and
the Usury laws shows that he was not dogmatic. Even his famous passage about “the
invisible hand” reflects the philosophy we associate with Paley rather than the economic
dogma of laissez-faire. As Sidgwick and Cliff Leslie have pointed out, Adam Smith’s
advocacy of the “obvious and simple system of natural liberty” is derived from his
theistic and optimistic view of the order of the world, as set forth in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments, rather than from any proposition of Political Economy proper. 60
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As I have already argued, Keynes’s attempt in this pamphlet to excise laissez-faire from the
history of economics is tactical rather than genuine, reflecting a desire to establish his
forthcoming economic innovations as fully continuous with neoclassical economics. The same
thing is happening here with this attempt to decouple “invisible hand” from laissez-faire. Perhaps
even more telling, though, is Keynes’s rather stilted argument here that Smith’s contributions to
philosophy are separable from his economics. This attempt to isolate one element of Smith’s
thought—“Political Economy proper”—from his “theistic and optimistic view of the order of the
world” opens Keynes up to the charge that Woolf is implicitly leveling at him—and at
neoclassical economics more broadly—in A Room of One’s Own: that economists like Keynes
consistently fail to consider the principals of economics in relation to the social context in which
they have arisen. For Woolf, the major omission from neoclassical economics is an account of
the economic disenfranchisement of women, but this moment in Keynes’s pamphlet points to the
larger tendency in neoclassical economics to abstract the field from social realities. By seizing on
the phrase “invisible hand,” Woolf is cutting to the heart of what she sees as Keynes’s major
failing, his complicity in this aspect of the discipline, itself the chief target of all of the Modernist
Amateur Economic theorization I have discussed in this dissertation.
With this context in mind, I return now to Woolf’s essay to lay out some ways of reading
her use of the phrase “invisible hand.” In one reading, then, the “invisible hand” that opens the
door for Woolf’s narrator might be taken as doing the same for women more generally,
providing opportunities for employment and economic empowerment that could result in the
elimination of economic inequality across genders. Taken in the context of the rest of the
chapter’s emphasis on the persistence of inequalities based on long histories of explicit
disenfranchisement, we can read this concluding image of the invisible hand at last opening
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doors for women as an implication that if this original inequality could be remedied, the invisible
hand could be effective. In this reading, Woolf’s critique of neoclassical economics is similar to
Keynes’s: by correcting a theoretical shortcoming—the systemic exclusion of women from the
economy—neoclassical theory can be taken as offering an accurate depiction of the economy. In
turn, Woolf’s critique of Keynes would inhere entirely in his exclusion of women from his
analysis, with the implication that widening his theory to include women would solve the
economic problems she discusses in her essay.
But Woolf’s passage here also makes a more radical reading available. 61 For Woolf’s
encounter with the invisible hand is framed by imagery of isolation: “not a boots was sitting to
light me up to bed” as “one seemed alone with an inscrutable society. All human beings were
laid asleep—prone, horizontal, dumb.”62 The concept of the invisible hand relies upon a model
of society in which human interconnection is so fundamental that the self-interested action of one
economic actor will result in the economic uplift of the whole society. In this light, Woolf’s
pairing of the image of the invisible hand with the vision of being “alone with an inscrutable
society” casts some doubt on her faith in the former concept. And indeed, her thesis in A Room of
One’s Own is just as much that women have been and still are being kept out of the educational
system and thus the economy as it is that efforts like the foundation of Girton are the necessary
steps toward correcting that injustice. In this reading, Woolf, positioned as an outsider—a
subject-position to which she would famously return in Three Guineas—can only see the
“invisible hand” that opens the door to the women’s college as a mockery of the hand that might
provide her equal standing within society.
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And indeed, we shall see in my discussion below of Three Guineas that this first reading holds implications about
participating in the capitalist system that Woolf wanted to reject.
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In the context of the rest of the essay, it seems that while this latter meaning is invoked,
the former is closer to Woolf’s central argument. Starting from Woolf’s overall claim that a
woman must have “five hundred a year and a room of her own” 63 in order to write fiction—
which has been traditionally taken as shorthand for all manner of intellectual and professional
pursuits—suggests that what is needed to achieve intellectual and cultural equality is an
economic adjustment, not a revolution. Indeed, Woolf sees this adjustment—whether it occurs
through an inheritance, as in her case, or by “[e]arn[ing] five hundred a year by [one’s] wits” 64—
as the starting point in a long-term process that will result in equality in the future. Woolf makes
this meliorist argument clear in the final paragraph of the essay, as she returns to her example of
Shakespeare’s sister, her fictional stand-in for all women silenced by gender-based economic
inequality:
For my belief is that if we live another century or so—I am talking of the common life
which is the real life and not of the little separate lives which we live as individuals—and
have five hundred a year each of us and rooms of our own; if we have the habit of
freedom and the courage to write exactly what we think; if we escape a little from the
common sitting-room and see human beings not always in their relation to each other but
in relation to reality; and the sky, too, and the trees or whatever it may be in themselves;
if we look past Milton’s bogey, for no human being should shut out the view; if we face
the fact, for it is a fact, that there is no arm to cling to, but that we go alone and that our
relation is to the world of reality and not only to the world of men and women, then the
opportunity will come and the dead poet who was Shakespeare’s sister will put on the
body which she has so often laid down.65
The timeframe of a “century” here echoes Woolf’s earlier remarks about the fictional Mary
Carmichael, in which she argues that while her first novel shows promise, we should “[g]ive her
another hundred years…give her a room of her own and five hundred a year, let her speak her
mind and leave out half that she now puts in, and she will write a better book one of these
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64

307

days.”66 With statements like these, the argumentative thrust of the essay largely rests on
conventional concepts of “progress,” paired with a distinctly Whiggish interpretation of
history.67
Although Woolf’s essay ultimately lands on this melioristic note, the point of interest
here is not necessarily the content of her economic theorization, but the way she is able to
introduce a revolutionary edge to that theorization by using literary techniques. As I noted above,
Keynes anticipates Woolf in invoking radical language only to soften it in his conclusions.
However, Woolf’s manipulation of tone is, as we might expect, more sophisticated than Keynes,
and her radical invocations heartfelt where they are tactical in her friend’s pamphlet. The first
chapter of A Room of One’s Own is a tightly-constructed example of what I mean. The chapter is
a self-contained narrative of a (fictional) day, not unlike some of Woolf’s famous literary works
such as Mrs Dalloway. Within the space of that narrative, Woolf works a system of symbols and
allusions, ending on the image of the invisible hand, which only lands in the way I have
discussed because of the cumulative impact of the narrative laid out in the rest of the chapter.
The lack of “a boots” in the last line, for instance, rhymes with the over-protective Beadle that
keeps Woolf’s narrator out of the library, bringing home her message that Fernham students are
at a major disadvantage compared to their Oxbridge peers. Rather than simply asserting the
gender disparities that she decries, Woolf uses literary techniques to bring her points home. In
this way, too, Woolf’s essay recalls Shaw’s essay “Economic,” which relies on literary and
rhetorical techniques rather than mathematics and theory to make economic points.
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Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, 123.
See Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (1931; London: G. Bell, 1950).
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But Woolf’s essay is clearly much more literary than Shaw’s: where Shaw employs
classic rhetorical moves like appeals to emotion and straw man argumentation, Woolf again and
again uses narrative techniques to make her points. A Room of One’s Own is filled with invented
characters—Shakespeare’s sister, Chloe and Olivia, Mary Carmichael, and the narrator of
chapter one—and Woolf builds sympathy for the points she is making by tying them to these
characters, the collective Mrs. Browns of the essay. Moreover, much of the radical content of A
Room of One’s Own comes through almost solely via Woolf’s subtle manipulation of tone.
Throughout the essay, Woolf affects a sort of wide-eyed persona that constantly gives way to
bitter, sarcastic moments. In chapter one, for instance, Woolf’s narrator feigns outrage at the fact
that women in the past have apparently neglected to fund the women’s college, wondering:
“What had our mothers been doing that they had no wealth to leave us? Powdering their
noses?,”68 a rhetorical outburst that gives way to a reasoned explication of why women had been
unable to participate in the economy when colleges were being built. Later, in the concluding
passages that most clearly point to her melioristic message, Woolf inserts a strain of bitterness
that serves to undermine that message. In the concluding passage above, we can perceive a
sarcastic edge to phrases like “give her another hundred years,” “she will write a better book one
of these days,” “Shakespeare’s sister will put on the body which she has so often laid down.”69
The impact of Woolf’s tone here is that one comes away from this concluding paragraph not
reassured, but angry; not sanguine or complacent, but keenly aware of the magnitude of the
injustices Woolf is examining in her essay.
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Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, 26.
Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, 149, emphases mine.
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The unsettling nature of Woolf’s conclusion helps point to some clear divergences
between her argument in A Room of One’s Own and Keynes’s in The End of Laissez-Faire.
Neither Keynes nor Woolf give us specific solutions to the economic problems they raise in their
essays. That said, Keynes is promising a future solution. He has outlined a problem—laissezfaire economics are inadequate to understanding the economy—and he will be giving us a
solution after some “thought.” And he is at great pains to show that the problem he has identified
is very limited in scope: it is a specific concept that is faulty; replacing it with a better concept
can and will fix the theory of which it currently forms a flawed center. While Woolf is also
outlining a problem with neoclassical economics, it is a much more fundamental one. As her
concluding appeals to duration imply—especially in combination with her bitter tone—Woolf
doesn’t think there’s an easy solution to the exclusion of women from the economy. To find that
solution, Woolf implies, we need to reconceive the grounds of economic thought itself. We need
to move away from a view of economics as operating in a problem/solution paradigm and view it
instead as a discursive field, fully imbricated in other, larger discursive fields. What’s at stake in
Woolf’s revision of Keynes in A Room of One’s Own is not just a shift in the methods of
economics—a move away from models based on laissez-faire, for instance—but in the breadth
of the subject-matter that we should consider economic and that we should consider in thinking
about economic problems.

Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
I am here making broad, rather bold conclusions about Woolf’s critique of Keynes in A
Room of One’s Own. But those conclusions are supported by the directions that Keynes and
Woolf took in their respective sequels to their earlier essays, Keynes’s The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) and Woolf’s Three Guineas (1938). For The General
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Theory is nothing if not the long-promised solution to the problems with laissez-faire,
neoclassical economics that Keynes identified in The End of Laissez-Faire and Essays in
Biography. Accordingly, The General Theory is Keynes’s major work, the impact of which on
the field of economics cannot be overstated. Written in the midst of the Great Depression and in
the context of the rise of global Fascism, The General Theory resulted in a reconceptualization of
economics, as well as the field’s bifurcation into Microeconomics—the study of the economic
decisions of the individual firm—and Macroeconomics—the study of the economic decisions of
the nation (or, in some cases, of multi-national groups like the European Union).
Put briefly, Keynes’s argument in The General Theory is that “the postulates of the
classical theory are applicable to a special case only and not to the general case.” 70 Specifically,
the special case outlined by the classical theory is the case at which there is full employment (or,
more specifically still, the case in which the interest rate is such that full employment can be
achieved). Under the classical theory, the interest rate would always automatically reach the
point that would guarantee full employment, thereby rendering involuntary unemployment
impossible.71 In the context of the Great Depression most pressingly, but more generally as a
result of the series of major economic recessions and depressions that plagued the later
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was becoming increasingly difficult for economists to
argue that the large number of unemployed people had either chosen to be unemployed or simply
did not exist. Keynes’s intervention, put most simply, was to argue that the economy does not
automatically adjust to an interest rate that will ensure full employment. Rather, it is the
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Keynes, The General Theory, 3. He adds: “Moreover, the characteristics of the special case assumed by the
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teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience.”
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government’s role to set the rate at the appropriate level. This apparently small adjustment to the
neoclassical theory has reverberated throughout the rest of the 20 th century and beyond, into the
post-2008 recession years of the present century. 72
What, then, can such a canonical work of economic theory have to do with Modernist
Amateur Economics? It obviously fits with “economics,” and Keynes is a figure centrally
associated with the most famous modernist milieu. But Keynes’s relationship to modernism is far
from settled in critical accounts, as I have shown throughout my engagements with him in this
dissertation. And while it is one thing to talk about Keynes’s Essays in Biography in terms of
conceptions of amateurism, surely The General Theory cannot be seen in that way. Nevertheless,
in what follows, I want to approach The General Theory through the lens afforded by each word
in my tri-partite term Modernist Amateur Economics. The result of doing so, I show, is that
Keynes comes more sharply into focus in the way I have described him in the introduction to this
chapter: as a figure who is tactically using the insights and, more important, subject-position of
the Modernist Amateur Economist from within economic orthodoxy itself, as a tool for reforming
that orthodoxy. Ultimately, my reading of The General Theory is that while Keynes goes some
of the way toward re-envisioning economics as always already part of larger cultural and social
discursive fields, his goal, as well as the outcome of his intervention, is to create a new version
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of neoclassical economics that includes his macroeconomic theorization, leaving the core of the
orthodoxy unchallenged and unchanged.

“Modernist”
To begin, then, with the first term: I argue that we can discern a modernist impulse in The
General Theory in four distinct directions.73 First is the way that Keynes positions himself and
his theory in relation to the field of economics as it stands in the mid-1930s, which he calls the
classical theory.74 This major strain of the book forms a repeated refrain in Keynes’s argument,
reflected in my epigraph to this chapter:
The composition of this book has been for the author a long struggle of escape, and so
must the reading of it be for most readers if the author’s assault upon them is to be
successful,—a struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression. The
ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are extremely simple and should be
obvious. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones,
which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our
minds.75
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This is also a good moment to reference my discussion in my introduction of the different ways that “modernism”
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It would be difficult to produce a more cogent example of a modernist’s understanding of what
we now call modernism’s relationship to the past. Here as elsewhere, the strength of Keynes’s
writing comes through repetition: the “struggle of escape” dramatized on the page through the
repetition of the phrase, as well as the inclusion of “escaping” in the final sentence, buried in a
halting, harrowing series of commas.76 And yet the word that stands out most clearly here is
undoubtedly “assault”: The General Theory is not merely an escape; in it Keynes means to do
real violence to the reader’s “habitual modes of thought and expression.”
Perhaps the strongest expression of Keynes’s language of rupture comes in his
comparison between Economics and Mathematics:
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world who,
discovering that in experience straight lines apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the
lines for not keeping straight—as the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which
are occurring. Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of
parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required to-day
in economics. We need to throw over the second postulate of the classical doctrine and to
work out the behavior of a system in which involuntary unemployment in the strict sense
is possible.77
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Keynes’s serio-comic image of geometers rebuking lines, combined with his repeated assertion
of the need to “throw over” aspects of “the classical doctrine,” establishes that he is thinking of
this work as incendiary, as a major instigation to other economists to rethink the very
fundamentals of their field.
These two extended examples are not cherry-picked: they are just two of the repeated,
often acerbic, assaults on the classical theory specifically and the Victorian and Edwardian eras
more generally. This general tone of the book establishes a second, if related, grounds for
describing it as a modernist text: a phenomenon we might describe as a literary turn. I have
discussed Keynes’s literary style in my reading of Essays in Biography, where I compared
Keynes’s bitter use of irony to fellow Bloomsberry Lytton Strachey’s. Keynes’s manipulation of
tone is one thing in Essays in Biography, marked by its title as a literary work. But it is more
remarkable, surprising, and experimental to find similar moments in a work purporting to be hard
theory. And indeed, irony and sarcasm consistently appear alongside mathematical formulas and
rigorous economic argumentation in The General Theory as part of Keynes’s argumentative
toolkit, a mixture of registers that compels the reader to pay attention to the book as a text—a
clear departure from contemporaneous works of economic theory.
This aspect of Keynes’s book comes through most clearly in one of the most celebrated
moments in the text. In it, Keynes excoriates contemporary politicians and economists who,
unable to see beyond the limitations imposed by the gold standard, 78 advocate for “wholly
‘wasteful’ forms of loan expenditure rather than for partly wasteful forms.”79 What follows is a
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tongue in cheek (although angry) illustration of the ways in which “the education of our
statesmen on the principles of the classical economics stands in the way of anything better” than
such useless, wasteful activities as “pyramid-building, earthquakes, even wars.” 80 Keynes’s point
is summed up in the next paragraph:
If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in
disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it
to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again (the
right to do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing
territory), there need be no more unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions,
the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a
good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses
and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the
above would be better than nothing. 81
Keynes’s “proposal” here is a rhetorical flourish, a reductio ad absurdum. But it contains within
it a characteristic modernist bitterness about the narrowness of vision of the generation that is in
power.
Keynes’s phrase “it would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like” both
functions as his actual policy proposal—which would be taken up in the US in various ways in
the New Deal—and sets the characteristic rhythm and tone of the section. Over the next few
pages, Keynes mentions gold-mining—“the only pretext for digging holes in the ground which
has recommended itself to bankers as sound finance”—and wars—“the only form of large-scale
loan expenditure which statesmen have thought justifiable”—as examples of government
interventions that have had the effect of stimulating the economy, “failing something better.” 82
He continues sarcastically to examine the benefits of wars and mining, assuming that “we are

the ground known as gold-mining, which not only adds nothing whatever to the real wealth of the world but
involves the disutility of labor, is the most acceptable of all solutions.”
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precluded from increasing employment by means which at the same time increase our stock of
useful wealth.” He even ironically concedes that gold mining might be a more effective stimulus
than house-building, as “the value of a house depends on its utility, [and] every house which is
built serves to diminish the prospective rents obtainable from different house-building” whereas
“the fruits of gold-mining do not suffer from this disadvantage.” 83 After all, gold does not have
utility!
All of this sarcasm and irony reaches a crescendo in the final paragraph of the chapter, in
which Keynes declares: “Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubtless owed to this its
fabled wealth, in that it possessed two activities, namely, pyramid-building as well as the search
for the precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not serve the needs of man by being
consumed, did not stale with abundance.” “Doubly fortunate,” “doubtless,” the italicized “two,”
the final emphasis on the fact that these activities do not “serve the needs of man”: Keynes
makes his point through a careful choice of words and the strategic use of stylistic flourishes. 84
Pivoting to the current moment, Keynes concludes:
Thus we are so sensible, have schooled ourselves to so close a semblance of prudent
financiers, taking careful thought before we add to the “financial” burdens of posterity by
building them houses to live in, that we have no such easy escape from the sufferings of
unemployment.85
Again, the obviously jarring contrast between the discourse of “‘financial’ burdens” and the
“sufferings of unemployment”—the former a mock-quotation of the statesmen and economists
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Keynes is taking to task and the latter a statement of reality as he sees it—constitutes, in
Keynes’s own words, an “assault” on the reader, designed to provoke them to “escape from
habitual modes of thought and expression.”86 The polite rage that Keynes channels here is
present throughout The General Theory, and this is just the most striking moment at which it
comes uncomfortably close to the surface. The result in this passage is a tone that combines
anger, bitterness, and ridicule of the generation that has fallen headlong into this blind trust in the
truisms of the classical theory, rivaling anything Strachey wrote in Eminent Victorians.87 It is this
bitterness, conveyed through a carefully controlled tone, that forms the clearest grounds for
describing Keynes’s writing itself as modernist in any meaningful way. 88
But in the context of this dissertation, the two most strikingly modernist qualities of
Keynes’s project in The General Theory are intimately related. First is his increased
willingness—in a departure from much of his earlier work—to bring non-economic fields of
knowledge to bear on his economic subject. Second, and relatedly, is the extent to which his
thought is inspired by the heterodox economists we have encountered thus far in this dissertation
and, crucially, his willingness to credit and discuss their ideas and contributions. While these
facets of The General Theory are, I argue, crucial to our understanding of it as a modernist text,
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they are also the keys to understanding in what sense Keynes can and should be described as an
“amateur” here. The way in which these two terms become interrelated emphasizes the important
point that even as I separate the three signifiers that make up “Modernist Amateur Economist”
here, the three words are in fact mutually constitutive and, ultimately inseparable: the modernist
impulses of the various figures inspires their amateur interest in economics, which is in turn
shaped by the modernist sensibility with which it is approached. Keeping this in mind, I will turn
to a consideration of how we might read Keynes, apparently the consummate professional
economist, as also an amateur.

“Amateur”
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, one of the hallmarks of the economic
amateurism of the other figures I have examined is their tendency to bring non-economic fields
to bear on economic questions. Shaw’s interest in continental philosophy and Darwin, Pound’s
insistence on mixing his aesthetic principals and understanding of literary history with
economics, and Eliot’s aspirations for a Christian society are examples of this strain that has run
throughout this study. Keynes was similarly interested in a range of fields in his literary career
and personal life: for instance, the Essays on Biography that I discussed in Chapter One evince
interests in biography and history, while his support of the ballet went far beyond the fact that he
was married to a former ballerina. Meanwhile, his editorship of The Nation, and his employment
of Leonard Woolf as the fiction editor thereof, demonstrates his centrality to the humanistic
endeavors of the Bloomsbury Group as well. In The General Theory, interestingly, Keynes
departs from the conventions of economic writing to bring other fields of knowledge to bear on
the economic questions he is discussing. Despite his status as a professional economist, I argue
that this tendency points to a self-conscious embrace of anti-professionalism, or amateurism, a
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move that Keynes felt was necessary given the theoretical dead-end at which professional
economics had arrived.89
One of the most striking of these moments is Keynes’s recourse to growing psychological
understandings of human behavior. Although he doesn’t mention Freud by name, Keynes’s
discussion of “Long-Term Expectation” is clearly informed by aspects of Freud’s thought. 90 In
this chapter, Keynes chides economists for failing to take into account the “instability
[introduced into economic models] due to the characteristic of human nature that a large
proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a
mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic.” 91 Besides standing in
contrast to the tendency of economists to assume away behavioral irregularities, this emphasis on
the fact that humans are perhaps not fully rational all the time clearly draws from Freud, who had
been published in English by the Hogarth Press and whose theories were well-known within the
Bloomsbury Group (and indeed everywhere by 1936). Keynes makes this connection even
clearer in the concluding paragraph of the section:
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We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves of irrational
psychology. On the contrary, the state of long-term expectation is often steady, and, even
when it is not, the other factors exert their compensating effects. We are merely
reminding ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or
political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis
for making such calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity which
makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives as best
we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on whim or
sentiment or chance.92
This is a stark departure from understandings of human beings as rational actors, with the
emphasis falling instead on our tendency to “[fall] back for our motive on whim or sentiment or
chance.” And this different understanding of human motivation is not a trivial component of
Keynes’s theory. Indeed, his explanation of the effect of changes in the interest rate is central to
his theory that it is the interest rate that drives investment, thereby determining the rate of
unemployment as well. And his conclusions on that topic are based on this understanding of
humans as not-quite-rational actors. 93
Keynes’s recourse to psychoanalysis here is part as well of a larger strain in his book: the
insistence on empirics and the excoriation of excessive abstraction. This thread, we will recall, is
key to his arguments about Ricardo and Malthus in Essays in Biography, but it reaches its full
fruition here. Keynes announces this focus of his book immediately, in his explanation of its title.
Arguing that the classical theory is applicable only to a special case (and that he is outlining a
general one), Keynes writes: “[m]oreover, the characteristics of the special case assumed by the
classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with
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the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of
experience.”94 This is the first of many such statements in The General Theory, and the way in
which Keynes positions “experience” as opposed to “the classical theory” emphasizes that to
restore the former to the latter is, essentially, a move that must come from outside of classical
economics: an intervention by an amateur.
Keynes affirms this conclusion later in the opening section, where he links Malthus and
empirics to “the underworlds of Karl Marx, Silvio Gesell or Major Douglas.” 95 As he writes
much later of Douglas specifically, “[t]he strength of Major Douglas’s advocacy has, of course,
largely depended on orthodoxy having no valid reply to much of his destructive criticism.” 96 It is
clearly Keynes’s aim in The General Theory to provide that “valid reply.” And yet, to do so,
Keynes must enter the economic “underworlds” of which he speaks. Tellingly, Keynes saves his
extended engagement with the heterodox theories that preceded him for the end of his book,
ensuring that his own contribution appears to be independent of them. But it quickly becomes
clear that the heterodox theories that Keynes discusses in this chapter, entitled “Notes on
Mercantilism, the Usury Laws, Stamped Money and Theories of Under-consumption,” 97 are in
fact both fundamental to his theory and in a large measure the direct inspiration for it.
This is perhaps most true of Mercantilism, which Keynes endeavors to rehabilitate here.
Mercantilism, the economic system (and theory) that preceded capitalism, was largely based on
the premise that in order to ensure the economic success of the nation, a favorable balance of
trade must be achieved and maintained. In practical terms, this economic worldview led to
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protectionist policy measures such as tariffs. Of course, it was also premised upon and fueled
extreme nationalism, leading to rampant colonialism (to secure national claims to resources) and
constant wars. The turn away from mercantilism was accomplished largely by the acceptance of
the classical theory of economics, especially the principle of laissez-faire applied on a national
scale. If government intervention actually slows economic growth, the argument went, then the
solution must be to cease regulating all parts of the economy, including foreign trade. David
Ricardo’s concept of comparative advantage—the idea that even a nation that was better at
producing all goods than another could still achieve a profit by trading with that nation—
solidified the economic truism that protectionism was a recipe only for national economic
failure.98
It would be hard to overstate the radical—and unprofessional—nature of Keynes’s move
to reposition Mercantilism near the center of his economic theory. The entire edifice of the
classical theory is built in one way or another on a rejection of what came before: the
Mercantilist system. Keynes acknowledges this fact in this chapter in what I read as an embrace
of a certain amateurism:
So lately as 1923, as a faithful pupil of the classical school who did not at that time doubt
what he had been taught and entertained on this matter no reserves at all, I wrote: ‘If there
is one thing that Protection can not do, it is to cure Unemployment…. There are some
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arguments for Protection, based upon its securing possible but improbable advantages, to
which there is no simple answer. But the claim to cure Unemployment involves the
Protectionist fallacy in its grossest and crudest form.’ As for earlier mercantilist theory,
no intelligible account was available; and we were brought up to believe that it was little
better than nonsense. So absolutely overwhelming and complete has been the domination
of the classical school.99
Through this narrative of breaking from his economic upbringing, Keynes endeavors to position
his more recent writings as those of a man who has freed himself from the errors of the
profession; who has become an amateur, again, to reform the profession.100
Beyond this rhetoric of rupture and rebirth, it is clear that Keynes’s study of mercantilism
directly inspires his intervention in The General Theory, for the two main lessons he takes from
the earlier theory are that 1) there is a place in the economic system for a macroeconomics—an
economics that thinks about the national economy as something more and different than just an
aggregate of individual economic actors and that 2) the role of the government within this
macroeconomic system should be to regulate the interest rate in such a way as to ensure full
employment.101 Although Keynes argues that “the mercantilists perceived the existence of the
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problem [i.e. how to regulate international trade without also encouraging wars] without being
able to push their analysis to the point of solving it,” he still positions the mercantilist analysis as
being preferable to the classical school, which
ignored the problem, as a consequence of introducing into their premises conditions
which involved its non-existence; with the result of creating a cleavage between the
conclusions of economic theory and those of common sense. The extraordinary
achievement of the classical theory was to overcome the beliefs of the ‘natural man’ and,
at the same time, to be wrong. 102
Keynes’s insistence on the value of common sense, which has formed a repeated refrain to this
point in his book, leads him directly from one heterodoxy—speaking sympathetically of
mercantilism—to another: carefully considering the heterodox theories of economists such as
Hobson,103 Gesell,104 and Douglas.105
This move in isolation must be read as a recourse to amateurism. I have written in the
first chapter about how Hobson specifically was explicitly excluded from the discipline of
Economics by Marshall, and my discussion of Pound, Eliot, and Orage in relation to Gesell and
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Douglas have firmly established the fact that having an interest in these figures is grounds for
dismissal as a professional economist. Moreover, I would argue, the close relation between the
modernist figures I have discussed previously and this roster of heterodox economists provides a
means for drawing together the first two terms I am expounding upon here: an interest in these
economists is both amateur and modernist, by virtue of the fact that they provide the theoretical
underpinning for the group of writers I am defining as Modernist Amateur Economists. To put it
more strongly still, the fact that Keynes pays attention to these figures here, combined with the
fact that the theories of underconsumption that they collectively represent are key to his General
Theory, helps position The General Theory itself as a sort of apotheosis of Modernist Amateur
Economic theory.

“Economist”
Just as “amateur” seems on the surface to be a poor description for the most famous
economist of the twentieth century, “economist” may seem like an obvious, even trite way to
describe John Maynard Keynes. Of course Keynes was an economist. In the context of this
chapter and this dissertation, though, I want to approach this term from a different angle. For all
that I have said about Keynes’s modernism and his amateurism above, Keynes’s final move in
The General Theory—in accordance with his stated purpose at the beginning of it—is to defend
the classical theory that he has been attacking over the course of the book. The result is hugely
consequential in the context of this dissertation. Indeed, I argue that Keynes’s (successful) effort
in The General Theory to inject heterodox, modernist ideas into mainstream, academic
economics is the single most important factor in the ultimate closing down of the moment of
economic theoretical possibility in which the Modernist Amateur Economists I have been
discussing were able to flourish. Keynes’s integration of heterodox, underconsumptionist
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theories into the classical theory—accomplished fully in institutional terms post-war and
posthumously, but in theoretical terms completed here—robbed those heterodox theories of their
potency. To put it in the terms I have been using here, Keynes tactically adopts the experimental,
anti-institutional “face of modernism”—the amateur theories and subject-positions that I have
just surveyed—in the service of the institutionalizing face of modernism: his desire to modify the
neoclassical theory, not to abolish it.
Thus, while Keynes consistently makes the appeals to amateurism that I have discussed
above, he also maintains his positionality as an insider throughout the book, beginning in the
preface. There, he carefully frames The General Theory as an academic book within the
professional discipline of Economics, commenting that it should be read as “an attempt by an
economist to bring to an issue the deep divergences of opinion between fellow economists which
have for the time being almost destroyed the practical influence of economic theory.” 106
Throughout his assaults on the classical theory—critiques which often involve lengthy personal
attacks on other established economists such as Pigou and Hayek 107—Keynes is careful to avoid
a complete break with the discipline. This complex manipulation of tone and voice—maintaining
a level of professional authority while launching a full-scale subversion of the profession in
question—culminates in the final portion of the book. In the middle of Keynes’s elevation of
Mercantilism, he writes:
Regarded as the theory of the individual firm and of the distribution of the product
resulting from the employment of a given quantity of resources, the classical theory has
made a contribution to economic thinking which cannot be impugned. It is impossible to
think clearly on the subject without this theory as a part of one’s apparatus of thought. I
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must not be supposed to question this in calling attention to their neglect of what was
valuable in their predecessors.108
In other words, in Keynes’s view, the classical theory is perfectly accurate in terms of
microeconomics. Its failing is just that it cannot conceive of a macroeconomics. Keynes affirms
this point during his final conclusions and policy recommendations, 109 in which he states:
Our criticism of the accepted classical theory of economics has consisted not so much in
finding logical flaws in its analysis as in pointing out that its tacit assumptions are seldom
or never satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve the economic problems of the actual
world. But if our central controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of output
corresponding to full employment as nearly as is practicable, the classical theory comes
into its own again from this point onwards. 110
These “central controls” are, in a word, macroeconomics, and Keynes’s overall argument in The
General Theory is clearly that we should add a complicating element to the discipline rather than
that we need to start anew.
Whether we read Keynes’s book-long commitment to reconciling his radical ideas with
academic economics as only a tactic to gain acceptance or as a fully earnest project, the reality is
that it worked: Keynes’s ideas were taken up almost immediately within the discipline and were
formalized in 1948 in Paul Samuelson’s textbook Economics.111 Samuelson’s book performs the
reconciliation between Keynes’s theories and the classical theory that Keynes calls for in the
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above passage, establishing for the post-war generation an institutional bifurcation into micro
and macroeconomics. Although the global unemployment problem was solved by one of the
“wholly wasteful forms of loan expenditure” 112—World War II—that Keynes hoped to head off
with his theory, The General Theory has formed a cornerstone of economic and political efforts
to combat income inequality, rampant unemployment, and especially recessions since the
midpoint of the Great Depression.113
The General Theory thus stands, oddly, as both a culmination of Modernist Amateur
Economics and as the death-knell for it. Keynes’s success in harnessing the radical experimental
energy of modernist amateurism also provided a satisfactory enough answer to writers such as
Eliot and most social creditors that they moved on to other interests. 114 If Pound, as we have
seen, is an exception, he is the exception that proves the rule. Keynes’s victory, it seems, was
complete: his work strengthened the theoretical standing of the discipline, silenced most
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dissenters, and solidified his position as not merely an eminent economist, but as one of the great
public intellectuals of his time. And yet the publication of The General Theory did not allay
Woolf’s central criticism of Keynes’s position on unemployment that she laid out in A Room of
One’s Own. Rather, his allegedly exhaustive work on the subject in The General Theory proved
even more conclusively that he was fully blind to the ways that women had been excluded from
the economy. Part of Woolf’s project in Three Guineas, to which I turn now, was to push Keynes
and other economists past the incomplete conclusions of The General Theory, toward a theory
that could account for, and seek to redress, that exclusion.

“enough powder to blow up St Pauls”: Three Guineas as Feminist Scrapbook
In a sense, The General Theory can be read as an attempt to answer the question that
Woolf interrogates in Three Guineas: “How in your opinion are we to prevent war.” 115 For
Keynes, the question is an economic one:
The authoritarian state systems of to-day seem to solve the problem of unemployment at
the expense of efficiency and freedom. It is certain that the world will not much longer
tolerate the unemployment which, apart from brief intervals of excitement, is
associated—and, in my opinion, inevitably associated—with present-day capitalistic
individualism. But it may be possible by a right analysis of the problem to cure the
disease whilst preserving efficiency and freedom.116
“Curing the disease” of fascism, Keynes implies, would go a long way toward preventing war,
and Woolf does not disagree. However, for Woolf, the roots of Fascism lie, not solely in
economic causes, but in toxic masculinity. In reducing the problem to economics, Woolf implies,
Keynes is committing the error that marks all orthodox economic theorization: abstracting
economic issues out of the more complex social matrices that are always informing them.
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And yet Woolf’s answer to the question of how to prevent war is also fundamentally
economic. However, Woolf’s economics—her feminist economics—diverge sharply from
Keynes’s not only theoretically, but formally. Keynes’s book is a propositional argument,
beginning with a large field (economics) and drilling down on a few points to make a narrow, if
incredibly consequential, contribution to that field. The book’s shape is one of narrowing, and its
effect is also of a narrowing, as I have mentioned: narrowing the field of economics from the
range of heterodox theories of the teens, twenties, and thirties, to the neoclassical synthesis of the
forties and beyond. Woolf’s project, by contrast, is one of expansion. Taking a request for
contributions to help prevent the coming war as its starting-point, Woolf’s discussion in Three
Guineas spans a huge range of topics, from education to housing, from literature to patriotism.
Ultimately, Woolf’s expansiveness seeks to counter the narrowness of Keynes’s theories:
Fascism must be stopped in order to prevent war, yes, but we must consider all of the cultural,
social, and economic threads that have gone toward Fascism’s rise if we can hope to dismantle it.
The expansive nature of Woolf’s project in Three Guineas establishes it as an exemplary
amateur work. Melanie Micir and Aarthi Vadde, in their essay “Obliterature: Toward an
Amateur Criticism,” make this connection between amateurism and form explicitly. For Micir
and Vadde,
The eclecticism of Woolf’s amateurism enables her to provide a social portrait wider and
more holistic than a professionalized disciplinary study focused on a single issue or
policy question. Such a holism, with its emphasis on making distinct groups apparent to
and accountable to one another, serves the project of preventing war just as, in Woolf’s
estimation, the siloing of knowledge into university and government offices serves the
project of perpetuating it.117
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This point is a perfect distillation of what I have been arguing in this dissertation about
Modernist Amateur Economics, and the resistance that amateur economics represents to
professional, orthodox attempts to narrow the field. But Micir and Vadde are also helpful here in
further linking that critical impulse not merely to Woolf’s amateurism, but to the “eclecticism”
of her amateurism in Three Guineas. This eclecticism comes through most clearly in the form of
Three Guineas, which stands as a sort of feminist scrapbook.
The origins of Three Guineas in literal scrapbooks are well known.118 However, I want to
follow Micir and Vadde here in positioning Woolf’s engagement with the scrapbook form—a
form that is quintessentially amateurish and traditionally feminine—as central to her critical
project in Three Guineas. As Micir and Vadde argue, “the scrapbooks offer more than
preparatory work for the thwarted “essay-novel” The Pargiters and the revamped project of
Three Guineas. They supply inspiration for the formal design and aesthetic strategy of the
published work.”119 More than this, though, the scrapbooks are central to the content of the
argument itself: “[s]crapbooking informs the work’s structure of address and strategies of textual
arrangement; it incorporates the democratically distributed creativity of cutting and pasting into
Woolf’s biting rebuke of the oligarchic hoarding of educational opportunity in a patriarchal
English society.”120 In the form of the scrapbook, Woolf found a perfect vehicle for her attacks
on toxic masculinity; its political manifestation, fascism; and its everyday instantiation in the
economic and social structures of the patriarchy.
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How does this work, exactly? Woolf’s deployment of the scrapbook form comes through
Three Guineas in a range of ways. The fictional frame of the book focuses on a series of material
objects, all collected together in the book’s pages: the letter from the gentleman to whom Woolf
is writing, the letters from heads of colleges and leaders of women’s societies that she constantly
references, her own letters to these various people, and of course three shiny guineas, waiting to
be mailed. Three Guineas conjures an image of a crowded desk, becoming more and more
cluttered as further pieces of evidence and food for thought are being produced from its drawers.
But this sense of clutter alone is only the beginning: there are five photographs inserted in the
middle of the book, providing visual examples of some of Woolf’s points about men’s vanity
about dress, the ridiculous nature of patriotism, and the ostentation of the church. 121 And then,
there are pages upon pages of footnotes, producing the unavoidable sense that the volume one is
holding is bursting with scraps of information, related to each other only because Woolf has
brought them all together.
The content of the footnotes only confirms this feeling: letters, quotations from
newspapers, passages of novels, Greek plays, poems, the Bible—an incredible range of media is
represented here. And, significantly, a substantial portion of the notes to Three Guineas deals
with economics, specifically economic details. So we get, for instance, an account of “the late
Lord Rosebery,” who, when asked to provide £200 for a scholarship, accidentally sent £2000
instead. The mistake having been called to his attention, he replied that ‘“he thought a good
round sum would be better than a fraction.’” Woolf immediately pastes this casual act of extreme
largesse next to the account books of a representative women’s college from the same time
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period, blandly mentioning that “[t]he entire sum spend at Cheltenham College for Girls in 1854
upon salaries and visiting teachers was £1,300; ‘and the accounts in December showed a deficit
of £400’.”122 Again and again, Woolf uses the footnotes to press home the point that men in
England are at an astronomical financial advantage when it comes to education, which she takes
as the first necessary step to the professions, an economic inequality has set back women’s
progress irreparably.123
This focus on pounds and pence that comes through so strongly in the footnotes raises an
important point in the context of this dissertation: while Three Guineas is centrally concerned
with such topics as patriarchy, feminism, and the relationships of these to the rise of fascism,
Woolf consistently, irresistibly, links these issues together through economics. 124 The economic
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disenfranchisement of women (specifically “educated men’s daughters” 125) is, as in A Room of
One’s Own, the central problem which Woolf seeks to address in Three Guineas, and the central
conceit of the piece, what to do with the three guineas she has to give, both emphasizes the
economic nature of her arguments here and signals that she is talking about economics on a
different level than is Keynes.126 Woolf’s fascination with economics is resolutely at the level of
the household, on the one hand, and on the level of the institution (especially the university) on
the other. For Woolf, it is clear, money is power, and the way that it is spent is deeply significant
of the values held by the spender.
Is what sense, though, is Woolf’s focus on money intelligible as economic theory? My
thinking in this section is deeply indebted to Elena Gualtieri’s essay “Woolf, Economics, and
Class Politics: Learning to Count.” In this essay, Gualtieri argues that Woolf’s perspective on
economics and class underwent a drastic change in the years following 1931—i.e. the same time
in which she was writing The Years and Three Guineas. The reason for this change was a series
of interactions with the Cooperative Women’s Guild and Margaret Llewellyn Davies, who
invited Woolf to attend a meeting of the Guild and then to write an introduction to a volume of
accounts of working women’s lives, Life as We Have Known It (1931). Although Woolf scholars
continue to debate the tone of Woolf’s introduction, Gualtieri argues that the experience proved
foundational to Woolf’s composition of Three Guineas. Gualtieri claims that “[f]rom the letters
collected in Life As We Have Known It Woolf learned that facts could be wielded as weapons, as
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explosive charges against the sclerotic fabric of British society.” 127 If this perception provided
the impetus, the content of those letters, in Gualtieri’s account, showed Woolf the method of
economic analysis that she would need to employ: “[f]rom the working-class women of the
Cooperative Guild she learned the importance of pounds, shillings and pence in shaping
women’s lives.”128 By re-investing the individual coin with the full significance of its economic
and social power, Woolf develops in Three Guineas a distinctively feminist economics.
We can see the inseparability of economic independence from all of Woolf’s other aims
in Three Guineas in the way she talks about the book in her letters and diaries as she is
composing it and thinking about it. Her first mention of the project, from January 1931,
immediately yokes together the themes of female sexuality and economic independence that
form the core of the finished product: “I have this moment, while having my bath, conceived an
entire new book—a sequel to a Room of Ones Own—about the sexual life of women: to be
called Professions for Women perhaps—Lord how exciting!” 129 This first title of Three
Guineas—which would go through an enormous number of titles during its development—
foreshadows the eventual decision to keep an economic signifier in the title, but also shows how
bound together “the sexual life of women” and “Professions for Women” were in Woolf’s mind.
Throughout the seven years between this moment of inspiration and the publication of
Three Guineas, most of Woolf’s references to it prepare us for the book’s scrapbook form,
consisting of incidents and anecdotes that provoke her anger or indignation in various ways. So
her “mind is set running upon A Knock on the Door (whats its name?)” when she reads a
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misogynistic piece by H.G. Wells;130 she finds herself “quivering & itching to write my—whats
it to be called?—‘Men are like that?’—no thats too patently feminist” after feeling that she has
“collected enough powder to blow up St Pauls”;131 and a conversation with E.M. Forster turns
sour when he informs her that a committee that she wished to join had decided that “ladies are
quite impossible,” a phrase that produces a strong reaction:
See how my hand trembles. I was so angry (also very tired) standing. And I saw the
whole slate smeared. I thought how perhaps M. had mentioned my name, & they had said
no no no: ladies are impossible. And so I quieted down & said nothing & this morning in
my bath I made up a phrase in my book on Being Despised… 132
Even if these incidents aren’t directly reflected in the final version of the book, Woolf’s practice
in her diary mirrors that of the footnotes of Three Guineas, which becomes a project of piecing
together the raw material of slights, insults, and omissions into a coherent whole.
Running through it all, moreover, is an even more tightly controlled version of the
conversational tone that Woolf uses to such great effect in A Room of One’s Own.133 Woolf
signals that the conversational nature of the tone is specially designed to lull the reader into a
state of receptiveness, as she writes in her diary: “if I say what I mean in 3 Guineas I must expect
considerable hostility. Yet I so slaver and silver my tongue that its sharpness takes some time to
be felt.”134 Apparently Woolf’s silver tongue had no effect on Keynes, who “thought Three
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Guineas ‘a silly argument and not very well written.”135 Keynes was not alone in disliking Three
Guineas: Micir and Vadde mention that, in contrast to A Room of One’s Own, Three Guineas
was “[p]oorly received by many reviewers and disliked by her fellow Bloomsberries.” As Micir
and Vadde suggest, this “dislike” is directly traceable to Woolf’s “deliberate amateurism,” 136
born not merely out of enthusiasm or interest, but out of bitterness and a desire to be provocative.
We can read between the lines in Keynes’s phrase “silly argument” an accusation both of
amateurism and of (feminine) unseriousness. By linking her very serious, feminist argument to a
resolutely amateur and feminine form, the scrapbook, Woolf sought to needle people like Keynes
in this exact way. Through this combination of form and tone, as we shall see, Woolf enacts the
very kind of creative criticism for which she calls in Three Guineas, and the result is a powerful,
literary expression of feminist Modernist Amateur Economics.

Three Guineas, the Society of Outsiders, and Modernist Amateur Economics
If, as we have established, the economic underpinning of Woolf’s argument in Three
Guineas comes through most clearly in her repeated citations of facts and figures in her
footnotes, the question remains: what, precisely, is her economic argument? In simple terms, it is
an evolution of the argument she put forth in A Room of One’s Own: women need financial and
social independence in order to achieve even footing with men. And yet, the meliorist import of
the timeframe of “another hundred years” that Woolf mentions in several places in the earlier
135
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book undergoes a process of refinement and revision in Three Guineas. While Woolf’s main
theoretical departure from Keynes is, as I have mentioned, her insistence on accounting for the
ways in which women have been excluded from the ideal of “full employment” that so occupies
him in The General Theory, it is her conclusions about the “society of outsiders” that is most
antithetical to the aims and outlook Keynes outlines in his book.
To understand Woolf’s divergence from Keynes, then, we must examine the way she
plays with ideas of progress, gradualism, and revolution in Three Guineas. Woolf’s essay is
famously structured around the conceit of giving three guineas to various causes that she argues
will best help prevent the coming war.137 Her first guinea is to go to a women’s college, and the
first part of the book is concerned with cataloging the ways women have been excluded from
higher education over the centuries. In the course of this discussion, Woolf cites Keynes directly
in a footnote, in a manner that makes her quarrel with him clear. The piece that Woolf cites is an
article published in the Nation, in which Keynes offhandedly mentions a bequest of an
expensive, illuminated book given to Clare College, Cambridge by a benefactor, which was
‘“rumoured [to] cost six thousand pounds to produce.’” Woolf comically juxtaposes Keynes’s
comment here with an article by Vera Brittain in the same issue of the Nation that details how
“students of one of the women’s colleges suffered greatly from ‘cold gloomy ground floor
bedrooms overrun with mice’” by means of inventing a mock-religious vision in which “a band
of students returning at dawn from some festivity about that time saw a cloud in the sky; which
as they gazed assumed the shape of a woman; who, being supplicated for a sign, let fall in a
shower of radiant hail the one word ‘Rats’.” 138 Woolf claims that the apparition’s word must be
137

See Kathryn Simpson, Gifts, Markets and Economies of Desire in Virginia Woolf (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), especially pages 39-48, for a reading of the guineas here as Gifts, and the implications for how
Woolf may have been thinking of Gift Economies in her later work.
138
Woolf, Three Guineas, 374-375 n18.

339

interpreted in light of the condition of women’s colleges, and must stand as well as a suggestion
that as much financial attention should be paid to the basic wellbeing of the students of such
colleges as is currently paid to ornamental books being donated to men’s.
This is probably the oddest moment out of many candidates in the footnotes of Three
Guineas. But besides its manifestly strange account of this apparition, it is not immediately clear
why Keynes should be invoked at all here. Indeed, it seems that Woolf is going out of her way to
associate her friend with a sort of ridiculous anecdote, with the result that he becomes the butt of
a criticism that is, after all, pointed rather at the unnamed benefactor than at Keynes, who is
merely the messenger. However, as we have seen from the excerpts from Woolf’s diary that I
have quoted in this chapter, Woolf’s resentment against Cambridge often comes from her
interactions with the Cambridge men in the Bloomsbury Group, and then manifests as attacks on
them. My reading of this passage is that this is one reason for her citation of Keynes here: Woolf
is seething at the offhand, aloof way in which a graduate of Cambridge cites the very type of
wasteful expenditure that Woolf is arguing is standing in the way of women’s admission into the
colleges and thus the professions.139 And to make matters worse, Keynes is in Woolf’s view “our
greatest living economist,”140 whose blindness in this matter reveals, for Woolf, the inability of
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economics as a discipline to see the social factors behind the impoverishment of an entire class
of women.
I have dwelt at length on this moment in Woolf’s general argument about the exclusion
of women from the universities because of its direct mention of Keynes, but it stands as well for
her general point, the climax of which brings us back to her manipulation of the line between
gradualism and revolutionary rupture. At the end of this first section, Woolf introduces a
conundrum that is central to her essay: if, as she is arguing, Fascism is an inevitable result of
rampant masculinity,141 then it is not good enough for women to simply enter the existing social
and economic order. To illustrate this issue, Woolf lays out “the ‘reality’ on which [the
headmistress of a women’s college’s] eyes were fixed”:
students must be taught to earn their livings. And since that reality meant that she must
rebuild her college on the same lines as the others, it followed that the college for the
daughters of educated men must also make Research produce practical results which will
induce bequests and donations from rich men; it must encourage competition; it must
accept degrees and coloured hoods; it must accumulate great wealth; it must exclude
other people from a share of its wealth; and, therefore, in 500 years or so, that college,
too, must ask the same question that you, Sir, are asking now: ‘How in your opinion are
we to prevent war?’142
Woolf here invokes the long view—500 years—but in the opposite way that she did in Room.
Rather than securing a better position for women through a “century” of progress, 500 years of
institutional stability will instead lead us to the same situation as we face in the present.
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Progressivism and gradualism has been replaced by a strong sense of circularity, a sort of
business cycle of Fascism and conflict.
Woolf is repulsed by this prospect, and says as much:
An undesirable result that seemed; why then subscribe a guinea to procure it? That
question at any rate was answered. No guinea of earned money should go to rebuilding
the college on the old plan; just as certainly none could be spent upon building a college
upon a new plan; therefore the guinea should be earmarked ‘Rags. Petrol. Matches.’ And
this note should be attached to it. ‘Take this guinea and with it burn the college to the
ground. Set fire to the old hypocrisies. Let the light of the burning building scare the
nightingales and incarnadine the willows. And let the daughters of educated men dance
round the fire and heap armful upon armful of dead leaves upon the flames, and let their
mothers lean from the upper windows and cry ‘Let it blaze! Let it blaze! For we have
done with this ‘education’!’143
Woolf’s call for burning down the college proves to be a feint, at least in the immediate
aftermath of this passage, but this remains a striking image, to say the least. Dissatisfied with the
certain failure of gradualism, Woolf puts forth an energetic image of violent revolution, which
doubles as an expression of modernist ideals: “Set fire to the old hypocrisies” and “scare the
nightingales”—an image I am taking as a reference to old poetic conventions, via Keats in
particular. Moreover, the image of the mothers, trapped in the burning building and yet
encouraging their daughters to “[l]et it blaze,” emphasizes both the longstanding nature of the
problem Woolf is describing and the violence it has done over the years: even if older
generations will be destroyed by this one’s revolution, it is still better than remaining trapped in
the system that has passed for education for women for so long. 144
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Woolf swiftly backs down from this revolutionary language, but its invocation is both
important locally and constitutive of a growing revolutionary discourse in the rest of the text.
Although Woolf here bows to the inescapable fact that since “we have said that the only
influence which the daughters of educated men can at present exert against war is the
disinterested influence that they possess through earning their livings,” and since “[i]f there were
no means of training them to earn their livings, there would be an end of that influence,” the only
option in the present is to “send a guinea to the honorary treasurer of the college rebuilding fund,
and let her do what she can with it.” But her call for a more revolutionary solution, she assures
her interlocuter, “is not empty rhetoric,” even if at present “there is something hollow about it, as
is shown by a moment’s conflict with fact.”145 In the next section, Woolf proves that her claim
here is also not “empty rhetoric,” as she continues to develop the image of burning various
buildings and institutions down in her discussion of independent housing and entrance into the
professions.
If economics forms a subtext of the first section of Three Guineas, it comes pointedly to
the fore in the second, as Woolf examines the dual questions of how and why women have been
excluded from the professions and how they might enter them in the future without promoting
war. After tracing the history of women’s rights to earn money and own property, Woolf comes
to a summary statement:
we seem to have arrived at three facts which are indisputable and must have great
influence upon our inquiry how we can help you to prevent war. The first is that the
daughters of educated men are paid very little from the public funds for their public
services; the second is that they are paid nothing at all from the public funds for their
private services; and the third is that their share of the husband’s income is not a fleshand-blood share but a spiritual or nominal share, which means that when both are clothed
these emotionally charged moments in Three Guineas helps us see the radical import of the essay, even as Woolf’s
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and fed the surplus fund that can be devoted to causes, pleasures or philanthropies
gravitates mysteriously but indisputably towards those causes, pleasures and
philanthropies which the husband enjoys, and of which the husband approves. It seems
that the person to whom the salary is actually paid is the person who has the actual right
to decide how the salary shall be spent.146
In light of this situation, Woolf concludes that it is imperative for women to seek financial
independence. But this raises a further problem. If women are able to make serious inroads into
the professions, it seems clear to her that “we may change our position from being the victims of
the patriarchal system, paid on the truck system, with £30 or £40 a year in cash and board and
lodging thrown in, to being the champions of the capitalist system,” 147 a state of affairs that is
just as unsatisfactory. And it is here that Woolf begins to make her famous proposal that women
form a society of outsiders. In answer to her question, “[h]ow can we enter the professions and
yet remain civilized human beings; human beings, that is, who wish to prevent war?,” 148 Woolf
claims:
If you refuse to be separated from the four great teachers of the daughters of educated
men—poverty, chastity, derision and freedom from unreal loyalties—but combine them
with some wealth, some knowledge, and some service to real loyalties then you can enter
the professions and escape the risks that make them undesirable. 149
Woolf’s claim here—that one can avoid the corrupting influence of capitalism simply by
changing one’s attitude about it—may seem naïve, but it forms the core of her political and
economic intervention in Three Guineas. It is also, I would argue, a complex rather than a naïve
moment. Through this suggestion, Woolf asserts her deeply held philosophical belief that human
beings have free will and can act upon it—an idea to which Keynes gestures in his discussion of
irrationality in The General Theory but that economic discourses of aggregates and “impersonal
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forces” tend to ignore.150 It might be easy to dismiss this idea from the cynical perspective of the
present, but it must be taken on its own terms to understand the radical import of Three Guineas.
Likewise, while Woolf’s ultimate decision to send her second guinea to the feminist
society that she had casually recommended burning to the ground in the opening pages of this
section,151 “not to burn the house down, but to make its windows blaze,” 152 might read as an antirevolutionary sentiment, her language and her commitment to independence from the capitalist
system suggests otherwise. Indeed, the fiery specter from the first section of Woolf’s essay has
here been harnassed and moved inside the house, and the mothers from the first passage return
here with approval, “laugh[ing] from their graves, ‘It was for this that we suffered obloquy and
contempt! Light up the windows of the new house, daughters! Let them blaze!’” 153 Woolf’s
image here is no longer one of bacchanalian destruction; rather, it is an affirmation of the
powerful potential of the society of outsiders that she will outline explicitly in the following
section. And in economic terms, it is a declaration of independence: since women have been
excluded from the economy and from economic analysis, the only solution is to join the
professions without participating in the capitalist economy that otherwise are fueled by those
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professions. One can see why Keynes, having been obsessed for years with solving the
unemployment problem and achieving, in his words, “capitalism, wisely managed,” 154 would
have been exasperated at this concept.
In the final section, Woolf names and expounds upon the society of outsiders, turning the
implications of the second section into explicit, manifesto-like declarations. Importantly, the
society of outsiders finds its raison d’etre in the cumulative weight of all of the evidence that
Woolf has gathered in her scrapbook to this point, 155 an examination of which must show any
daughter of an educated man “that her sex and class has very little to thank England for in the
past; not much to thank England for in the present; while the security of her person in the future
is highly dubious.”156 The outcome of this realization is Woolf’s outsider’s famous declaration
that “as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is
the whole world.”157 Woolf pairs this anti-patriotic message with a broader statement about what
she means by the society of outsiders:
Broadly speaking, the main distinction between us who are outside society and you are
inside society must be that whereas you will make use of the means provided by your
position—leagues, conferences, campaigns, great names, and all such public measures as
your wealth and political influence place within your reach—we, remaining outside, will
experiment not with public means in public but with private means in private. Those
experiments will not be merely critical but creative.158
This recourse to the public/private distinction, which Woolf has been explicitly decrying
throughout Three Guineas, pointing to it in several footnotes as a hallmark of Fascist and
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authoritarian societies,159 is striking, to say the least. But it is clear that Woolf is not calling for
women to stay out of the public sphere, out of the professions; merely that the work that the
society of outsiders will do to prevent the coming war (but more broadly to fight totalitarianism)
will be done in the domestic and artistic realms. It is also clear that Three Guineas itself is one of
these “private experiments,” “not merely critical but creative.” This self-reflexive quality of the
volume, which embraces a traditionally domestic form, the scrapbook, for revolutionary means,
both shows future Outsiders a way forward and works to undermine the idea that domestic forms
and spaces cannot have an impact on the public sphere.
If this seems to be the final “message” of Three Guineas, it remains to be seen where the
essay leaves us in terms of economics. To answer that question, I want to revisit the final phrase
of Woolf’s anti-patriotic declaration, often lost in the hubbub over the first two parts: “As a
woman my country is the whole world.” Woolf herself returns to this concept at the end of the
essay. After coming to earth for a moment while contemplating photographs of a war zone—yet
another entry in her endlessly-expanding scrapbook—Woolf writes:
But we have not laid that picture [of the horrors of war] before you in order to excite once
more the sterile emotion of hate. On the contrary it is in order to release other emotions
such as the human figure, even thus crudely in a coloured photograph, arouses in us who
are human beings. For it suggests a connection and for us a very important connection. It
suggests that the public and the private worlds are inseparably connected; that the
tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other. But the
human figure even in a photograph suggests other and more complex emotions. It
suggests that we cannot dissociate ourselves from that figure but are ourselves that figure.
It suggests that we are not passive spectators doomed to unresisting obedience but by our
159
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thoughts and actions can ourselves change that figure. A common interest unites us; it is
one world, one life.160
Besides making explicit the fact that her calls for private experiments in private does not
represent a retreat from the exigencies of the present, the final note in this passage gestures
toward the same kind of internationalism as does her declaration of anti-patriotism. And, I argue,
this closing note of internationalism offers us a way into a consideration of the ultimate
economic import of Woolf’s essay, while also bringing Keynes back into the picture.
For internationalism is where Keynes ends up in The General Theory as well: in the
belief that a world-wide adoption of his theories will end the need for war and usher in an era of
international prosperity. He writes:
But if nations can learn to provide themselves with full employment by their domestic
policy…there need be no important economic forces calculated to set the interest of one
country against that of its neighbours…there would no longer be a pressing motive why
one country need force its wares on another or repulse the offerings of its neighbor…
International trade would cease to be what it is, namely, a desperate expedient to maintain
employment at home by forcing sales on foreign markets and restricting purchases…but a
willing and unimpeded exchange of goods and services in conditions of mutual
advantage.161
If Three Guineas and The General Theory end with similar ideals of internationalism in view,
however, their conclusions are fundamentally different in almost every other way. For Keynes,
this international situation can only be achieved through a coordinated effort by governments
throughout the world to implement his policies.162 While he is not calling for a Marxist-style
centralization of power, Keynes’s argument, at bottom, is that the policy of allowing people to do
as they will is disastrous in terms of economics. The system is too big and too advantageous as
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currently constructed to those who already have large amounts of money. Keynes’s attacks on
laissez-faire are also an attack on individualism in economics.
Woolf, on the other hand, is pinning her analysis of the capitalist system on the idea,
already mentioned, that men and women have the ability to effect that system by their individual
decisions. Her suggestion, the society of outsiders, depends upon a large number of women
individually, rationally, deciding to join together in an alternative collective. Woolf is not,
ultimately, recurring to a sort of radical idea of laissez-faire either. But at the same time, she is
contesting Keynes’s belief that the fate of the economic system depends on coming together as
first national and then international wholes. One can see that Keynes would have seen Three
Guineas as working against the kind of system he was proposing in The General Theory, in
opposition to the concepts of the common good and, indeed, macroeconomics that he put forth
there.
And yet my contention here is that Woolf is herself proposing a kind of feminist
macroeconomics, as well as a serious challenge to the current, nation-based world system.
Although she doesn’t use the phrase, it is clear that she is advocating for a kind of “nation” of
outsiders, operating on their own economic principles of “poverty, chastity, derision and freedom
from unreal loyalties.”163 And for Woolf, these are very much economic principles: it is through
embracing them that women can enter the professions “and yet remain civilized beings,” 164 and
this is the most important goal of an economy in Woolf’s view. In this way, Three Guineas
extends Woolf’s implicit argument from A Room of One’s Own, that economic theory has gone
too far in abstracting itself away from other realms of knowledge. It is only by reconceiving of
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society and the economy altogether, Woolf claims here, that we can build a world in which it is
possible “to assert ‘the rights of all—all men and women—to the respect in their persons of the
great principles of Justice and Equality and Liberty’.”165

Conclusion
I close this chapter with this reading of Three Guineas and The General Theory in part
because of the implications that pairing them together holds for our understanding of the shape
of the period. Throughout this dissertation, I have conceived of the period 1890-1950 as a
moment of openness and possibility, a moment in which the direction of economics and the
economy were perceived as being up for grabs. The theoretical weakness of neoclassical theory,
its inability to explain recessions or conceive of involuntary unemployment, encouraged a range
of modernist writers and other public intellectuals to produce amateur theories of their own.
Keynes was no different: receiving his degree in the early years of the twentieth century,
Keynes’s professionalization coincided very nearly with the birth of the discipline as such. But,
due in part to his own intellectual curiosity and in part to his Bloomsbury social circle, Keynes
was able to harness the energy of and grains of truth within heterodox thought to offer a solution
to the theoretical problems facing neoclassical economics that could be readily assimilated into
economic orthodoxy.
Keynes’s General Theory, its near-immediate mathematization and institutionalization,
and the new, global economic challenges of World War II had the cumulative effect of taking
Britain and the world generally out of this moment of openness and onto the track we’ve been on
since then. This is not to say that everything that’s happened in economic theory since World
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War II is or was inevitable; that is not the model of economic history I am working with or
endorsing. But the post-war neoclassical synthesis did have the effect of consolidating expertise
and authority within the profession, while rendering it essentially impossible for amateur and
heterodox economists to be taken seriously. Even innovations within the field, like behavioral
economics, are now ultimately in the service of improving the accuracy of models or
mathematical formulas, not in providing alternative ways of thinking about the economy. 166
And yet, as Three Guineas certainly indicates, this disciplinary consolidation did not
solve all economic problems once and for all. Quite the opposite: the neoclassical synthesis
definitely improved the explanatory power of neoclassical theory, but the economic history of the
post-45 period shows that the discipline still has trouble handling such glaring problems as
recessions and income inequality. And if the former problem was considered “solved” prior to
the 2008 financial crisis,167 the latter has gone the way of the early critics of institutional
economics: neoclassical economics has, as John Maloney writes of this earlier moment,
“resolved this [issue] not by a successful answer…, but by capturing a dominant position in
which it could largely ignore its critics.” 168 The economic argument of Woolf’s essay has
similarly been ignored, as the persistence of gender-based wage gaps into the present illustrates.

166

Michelle Chihara and Matt Seybold lodge this complaint about behavioral economics in their introduction to The
Routledge Companion to Literature and Economics: “Many behaviorists have turned their attention to social issues
and seem to promise an awareness of capitalism’s intrinsic inequality, but ultimately they deliver their more accurate
predictive instruments into the service of a quietist ‘optimization’ of the regime that creates injustice.” See Michelle
Chihara and Matt Seybold, “Introduction,” in The Routledge Companion to Literature and Economics, ed. Matt
Seybold and Michelle Chihara (New York: Routledge, 2019), 9.
167
Paul Krugman begins his book The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 with a survey of
claims by major economists that the problem of recessions has been solved. Krugman quotes a speech by Nobel
laureate Robert Lucas from 2003, in which Lucas declared: the “central problem of depression-prevention…has
been solved, for all practical purposes.” Lucas’s comments reflected a generally-held belief that while the business
cycle had not disappeared, “the cycle had been tamed, to the point that the benefits of any further taming were
trivial.” See Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: Norton, 2009),
9.
168
John Maloney, Marshall, Orthodoxy and the Professionalisation of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 4.

351

Indeed, Woolf’s essay hasn’t been taken up by economists at all. Nor has its economic argument
been taken as central to it by literary critics. However, it has remained one of Woolf’s most
provocative and impactful works: an exemplary analysis of the patriarchy and how it works and
a powerful call for gender equality in the university and the professions. In reading Three
Guineas as in part a response to The General Theory—and thus to the direction the field was
going at a dizzyingly fast rate in 1938—we can see the enduring value of Modernist Amateur
Economics: always questioning the economic orthodoxy, even if that orthodoxy was brand new,
always pushing economists to consider their subject in light of broader cultural frameworks,
always refusing to be satisfied—for good or ill—with the world as it was.
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Coda: The Return to Keynes and the Afterlives of Modernist
Amateur Economics
“Someone said: ‘The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they
did’. Precisely, and they are that which we know.” – T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual
Talent.”1
“As readers may have gathered, I believe not only that we’re living in a new era of depression
economics, but also that John Maynard Keynes—the economist who made sense of the Great
Depression—is now more relevant than ever. Keynes concluded his masterwork, The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, with a famous disquisition on the importance of
economic ideas: ‘Soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or
evil.’” – Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008.2
“Yesterday @tressiemcphd said that if there’s an ideology that has indoctrinated academia it’s
not CRT it’s economics. She’s 100% right. Economic ideas are used as cover and filler for
harmful and half-baked ideas across all disciplines and for egregious administrative decisions.” –
Carliss Chatman, tweet.3
“Umm, that’s not the way the world works,” said Jerome. “I study economics and I can tell you
that isn’t the way the world works.” – Zadie Smith, On Beauty.4

In the immediate wake of the 2008 financial crisis, noted Keynesian economist and Nobel
laureate Paul Krugman reissued his 2000 book The Return of Depression Economics in a new
edition, now titled The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008.5 In this new
book, Krugman explicitly advocates returning to Keynesian economics (especially expanded
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government spending) as a way out of the financial crisis. For Krugman, the crisis proved that
“for the first time in two generations, failures on the demand side of the economy—insufficient
private spending to make use of the available productive capacity—have become the clear and
present limitation on prosperity for a large part of the world.” 6 This new failure of demand went
against the dominant trend of economics in the several decades leading up to 2008, which
increasingly focused—disastrously, of course—on the supply side. These problems with demand
mirrored those that caused the Great Depression, and Krugman argued that we must return to the
work of “the economist who made sense of the Great Depression” and to “relearn the lessons our
grandfathers were taught by the Great Depression” if we were to escape from the financial
crisis.7 Ultimately, for Krugman, “[t]he true scarcity in Keynes’s world—and ours—[is] not of
resources, or even of virtue, but of understanding.” Recalling Keynes’s conclusion to The End of
Laissez-Faire,8 Krugman concludes his book by asserting that
We will not achieve the understanding we need, however, unless we are willing to think
clearly about our problems and to follow those thoughts wherever they lead. Some people
say that our economic problems are structural, with no quick cure available; but I believe
that the only important structural obstacles to world prosperity are the obsolete doctrines
that clutter the minds of men.9
Krugman’s argument here—that we should return to Keynes because of the extensive parallels
between the economic crisis he sought to solve and the one in the then-present—was taken up by
many economists in the post-2008 moment.10 But this concluding sentiment strikes one as
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puzzling: to what “obsolete doctrines” is Krugman referring, especially in the midst of
advocating a return to Keynesian theories that had been considered defunct since the stagflation
crises of the 1970s? 11
It seems likely that “supply-side economics” is the referent of Krugman’s phrase
“obsolete doctrines.” Offering a brief entre into the recent history of economic debates over the
causes of and solutions to recessions, Krugman cites the over-confident assertions of various
famous economists—Robert Lucas and Allen Greenspan, especially—that “the central problem
[of recessions] has been solved,” 12 as well as various recent recessions across the world that call
such assurances into question. Krugman argues that recessions are still a major issue that the
discipline of economics, in its shift to the supply-side, has forgotten how to address. Further
attention to Krugman’s claims, however, reveals that the heart of neoclassical, mathematicized
economics—the most “obsolete doctrine” of all—is repeatedly asserted. Indeed, in a piece in
which Krugman casually applies Eliot’s line “not with a bang but with a whimper” to the fall of
the Soviet Union—an event that he hails as tolling a death-knell for socialism—he implicitly and
unthinkingly dismisses the poetic and the literary as meaningful areas of human endeavor. 13 In
discussing the causes of recessions, Krugman asserts, blandly: “[t]he only way to make sense of
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any complex system, be it global weather or the global economy, is to work with models.” 14
After giving an example of such a model, Krugman concludes: “[t]he theoretical models
economists use, mainly mathematical constructs, often sound far more complicated than this; but
usually their lessons can be translated into simple parables like that [which he has just given,]
(and if they can’t, often this is a sign that something is wrong with the model).” 15 These
comments seem banal, standard expressions of neoclassical economic doctrine. But they are also,
frankly, astounding. The only way to make sense of complex systems is to work with
simplified—and simplifying—models? And if your model remains too complex and cannot be
translated into “a simple parable,” there is something wrong with the model?
Surely one of the compelling features of works of art is that they embody complexity in a
different way than Krugman is describing. Insisting, as he does, that complexity can only be
understood through simplification, through abstraction into a model, elides all of the humanistic
disciplines in a stroke of the pen. Most fields in the humanities do not use models, and yet they
certainly involve making sense of complex systems of meaning. And the aesthetic works that
many of these fields study—novels, poems, paintings, films—cannot be understood as “models”
either. In this way, we can see that Krugman is parroting the concept that has always been at the
heart of neoclassical economics: that economics can be abstracted from larger social and cultural
discursive fields. Such a view goes directly against the ethos of the Modernist Amateur
Economist, who insists on the inextricability of economic and broader cultural concerns. And yet
here it is: aggressive economic abstraction, even in a book that is advocating for a return to
Keynes and a break with contemporary supply-side economics; even in a book that is conceding
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that we have once again found ourselves in an economic crisis that professional economists had
been busy declaring impossible for decades. In light of Krugman’s unflinching endorsement of
the discredited theory of neoclassical economics, his stern comments in his conclusion about
“obsolete doctrines” that “clutter the minds of men” are, in a word, hypocritical. Ultimately, if
neoclassical economics cannot fathom economics as part of a cultural context, it is not merely
supply-side economics that constitute “structural obstacles to world prosperity,” but rather
neoclassical economics itself.
Keynes, of course, would not have agreed wholeheartedly with this last point. Even
though he positioned himself strongly against the turn to econometrics in the 30s and 40s, he
never repudiated the neoclassical theory entirely. And, as his theories became widely accepted
and macroeconomics became fully integrated into the discipline, Keynes saw himself vindicated:
his gamble of embracing elements of heterodox theory paid off fully. But while Keynes would
object to viewing neoclassical economics as an obsolete theory, he likely would also balk at the
reduction of his theories to “demand-side economics.” In the account I give in this dissertation,
Keynes represents the institutionalizing “face of modernism” in his project of rehabilitating the
neoclassical theory. However, as I have shown, he gets to this point via the path of the Modernist
Amateur Economist as well. His quarrel with neoclassical theory is the same as that of the other
Modernist Amateur Economists: neoclassical economics had become an unhelpful abstraction
that fails to deal with “the economic society in which we happen to live.” 16 As we have seen, The
General Theory insists that we put economics back in the context of the social and cultural
matrix that informs and indeed constitutes it.

16

John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936; New York: Harcourt,
1964), 3.

357

However, as Woolf’s critiques make clear, Keynes’s attachment to the neoclassical
theory caused him to put forth a limited version of this kind of intervention. The result is that if
we think of “modernist economics” as being synonymous with Keynes and Keynesianism, we
remain locked in the respectable, orthodox line of neoclassical theory. And while Keynes has
emerged in this dissertation as substantially more in line with other Modernist Amateur
Economists than with people like Krugman, the shallow nature of Krugman and his ilk’s “return
to Keynes” shows that Keynes perhaps hid his heterodox influences a bit too well. While in
Keynes’s General Theory underconsumptionist theories, Gesselite monetary theories, neomercantilism, and Fabian socialist ideals remain hidden in the “economic underworld,” 17
recovering the broader context of heterodox theorization from which they emerged, as I have
done in this dissertation, allows us to see the inadequacy of the way Keynes is remembered by
present-day economists. We should not be surprised by this. We need only to look at the
epigraph to my introduction to see Krugman’s statement of his approach to drawing inspiration
from historical economists. There, Krugman declares: “my basic reaction to discussions about
What Minsky Really Meant—and, similarly, to discussions about What Keynes Really Meant—
is, I Don’t Care…This is economics, not Talmudic scholarship.” 18 Now, Krugman is right that it
would be a mistake to treat The General Theory like scripture. But his own pseudo-religious
invocation—“this is economics”—suggests, I think, that he could stand to pay a bit more
attention to the major thrust of Keynes’s book, that which calls into question the idea that
economic theory can offer definitive answers even to economic questions. It is one thing to claim
that some aspects of Keynes’s book are no longer relevant. Of course that’s the case; it was
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written 80 years ago. But it’s quite another to ignore the central argument of the book, without
which the conclusions Krugman draws regarding policy and theory lose their meaning.
While Keynes stands in some sense as a culmination of Modernist Amateur Economics,
when viewed through the lens of the post-2008 return to Keynes, we can see that the context of
heterodox economic theory in which Keynes formulated his own theories has been forgotten.
One aspect of my project in this dissertation has been to restore a sense of that context to our
understanding of Keynes, and thus of economics. But I have also sought to dwell on the
widespread nature of Modernist Amateur Economic writings being produced by Keynes’s peers:
Woolf, Shaw, Orage, Pound, Eliot. Ultimately, my project has been to expand our understanding
of literary modernism to include these imaginative, modernist approaches to solving economic
problems. However, the persistence of those economic problems in the 2008 moment and
beyond helps suggest the implications that my project holds for our understanding of the
afterlives of modernism as well.
In thinking about these “afterlives,” I want to return to an essay I discussed at some
length in the introduction, David James and Urmila Seshagiri’s “Metamodernisms.” There,
James and Seshagiri argue for a conception of modernism as temporally bounded. In an effort to
resist the voracious temporal expansion that Mao and Walkowitz set off in “The New Modernist
Studies,” James and Seshagiri argue that we must understand modernism as belonging to a
period, thereby giving us “a rubric for reading contemporary literature’s relationship to
modernism.”19 Specifically, restoring a sense of modernism as a period “offers a clear premise
for tracing how a significant body of late twentieth- and twenty-first-century literature
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consciously responds to modernist impulses, methods, and commitment.” 20 The result, James
and Seshagiri insist, is an enrichment of our understanding of both fields:
Without a temporally bounded and formally precise understanding of what modernism
does and means in any cultural moment, the ability to make other aesthetic and historical
claims about its contemporary reactivation suffers. Further, our conception of the
contemporary itself deserves a rigorous periodization of any modern instance from which
it follows. Fading one domain into the other, we run the risk of assuming modernism to
be inherently positive, transportable across time, and transferable to the work of
contemporary writers. And the self-conscious designation of a modernist period works
against the reductive, presentist conception of contemporary literature as a mere branch
of modernist studies rather than a domain whose aesthetic, historical, and political
particulars merit their own forms of intellectual inquiry. 21
We might expand James and Seshagiri’s definitions here beyond literature, too: our
contemporary economic moment, with its returns to Keynes and frequently-recurring
comparisons to the Great Depression, nevertheless should be understood as separate from the
moment of Modernist Amateur Economic theorization. The moment of “openness” in economic
theory that the failures of the neoclassical theory afforded and to which Modernist Amateur
Economists responded is gone. And the extremes to which financialization have pushed the
contemporary economy would seem now to be beyond the ken of any amateur economist.
And yet, what I do want to assert here in conclusion is that if we take up James and
Seshagiri’s argument about the relation between the modernist and the contemporary and
combine it with the new conception of modernist writers as being centrally interested in the
economic problems of the day that I have laid out in this dissertation, we can see Modernist
Amateur Economists as intriguing, fruitful examples for contemporary writers to draw upon as
they face the different, though eerily similar, economic crises of the present day. And “crisis” is
the right word here: as Krugman himself admits, the fallout from 2008 has called the legitimacy
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of the field of economics into question in ways that haven’t occurred since the Great Depression.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Krugman writes, “the public has understandably
concluded either that economists don’t understand recessions or that demand-side remedies have
been discredited.” While I doubt that much of “the public” is thinking the latter of these two
things, we have certainly been thinking the former. And the relative success of political
candidates in the United States running explicitly as Socialists or as Democratic Socialists
refutes Krugman’s smug claims in his first chapter that the 1990s ushered in “the collapse of
socialism, not merely as a ruling ideology, but as an idea with the power to move men’s minds.”
“Who now can use the words of socialism with a straight face?,” Krugman asks. 22 As it turns out,
a lot of people can, and one reason for that is surely the repeated failures of capitalism to solve
such problems as recessions, income inequality, health care markets—the list goes on.
And, more to the point, this list has considerable overlap with the list of economic
problems facing “the public” from 1890-1940. Are we seeing a new “opening” of the discursive
field surrounding economics in the present as capitalism’s abuses continue to mount? That
remains to be seen. What is clear is that scholars of Contemporary Literature have recently begun
to focus heavily on the interrelation between Contemporary Literature and Economics. Scholars
such as Sarah Brouillette, in Postcolonial Writers in the Global Literary Marketplace (2007) and
Literature and the Creative Economy (2014), Annie McClanahan, in Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis,
and Twenty-First Century Culture (2017), Paul Crosthwaite, in The Market Logics of
Contemporary Fiction (2019), and Nicky Marsh, in Credit Culture: The Politics of Money in the
American Novel of the 1970s (2020) have laid out ways in which contemporary works of
literature (or, in McClanahan’s case, horror films) have been written in response to but also
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constituted by the economic situation in which they were produced. 23 As the dates of publication
of these books indicate, Contemporary Literature and Economics is a growing subfield, a sense
that is strengthened in perusing The Routledge Companion to Literature and Economics. The
four essays in that volume that make up its final section, titled “Contemporary Culture,” point to
the variety of directions Contemporary Literature and Economics promises to go in the near
future, with titles like “‘The Real Home of Capitalism’: The AOL Time Warner Merger and
Capital Flight,” “Hamilton, Credit, and the American Enterprise,” “Global Finance and Scale:
Literary Form and Economics in Mohsin Hamid’s How to Get Filthy Rich in Rising Asia,” and
“Behavioral Economics and Genre.”24 A survey of the “Contributors” list of this volume
promises as well a range of forthcoming monographs on Contemporary Literature and
Economics, from Laura Finch’s Intimate Economies: Financial Citizenship and Literary Form in
the Contemporary Novel to Michelle Chihara’s Behave: The Cultural Turn to Behavioral
Economics 2006-2016, to Alissa G. Karl’s Novels, Machines and the 20th Century Economic
Imaginary.25 All of this scholarship is urgent and exciting, but it also indicates the degree to
which contemporary scholars are unknowingly echoing Modernist Amateur Economists in
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insisting on the imbrication of economic issues with the broader social contexts out of which
those issues arise.
I say “unknowingly” here because while this list shows that there is extensive work being
done on the relationship between contemporary literature and economics and James and
Seshagiri’s essay demonstrates a similar level of engagement with contemporary literature and
economics, these two elements have not yet, to my knowledge, been brought together. But surely
one of the things that contemporary writers are picking up and playing with in their engagements
with modernist literature is the Modernist Amateur Economic theorization that appears there.
Indeed, it makes sense that our contemporary economic crises are one of the factors that have
prompted so many contemporary writers to return to modernist sources. As literary figures who
lived through some of the only economic crises that can hope to approximate those of the current
moment—the 1926 General Strike, the Great Depression, World War II and its aftermath—
modernist writers naturally offer examples of literary responses to economic upheaval. In
recovering the extent of those interests and the seriousness of Modernist Amateur Economists’
attempts to reckon with the economic crises of the day, I suggest that these modernist writers
represent models for contemporary writers in terms of how to imagine economic solutions that
are independent of orthodox economic theory. Like economists who returned to Keynes after the
2008 financial crisis, it would make sense that literary writers interested in producing
imaginative responses to that crisis would similarly return to the work of Modernist Amateur
Economists—even if they are not explicitly thinking of them in this way. Unlike those
economists who returned to Keynes only to put forth slight variations on the deeply flawed
neoclassical theories that helped cause the financial crisis, contemporary literary figures, in
returning to Modernist Amateur Economic theorization, have an opportunity to re-open the
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imaginative space that those writers claimed, in an effort to influence the direction of economic
theory. In the present moment, we need approaches to economic problems driven by
imagination, not by dogma and orthodoxy. Drawing on the example of Modernist Amateur
Economists, contemporary writers have a chance to put forth these kinds of solutions, even if
they remain imaginative or even imaginary.
At the same time, some of the Modernist Amateur Economists I have examined in this
dissertation stand not (or not only) as models, but as warnings. For the global state of economic
crisis is far from the only parallel between the current moment and the moment of modernism. In
the aftermath of the apparent failures of democracy in the US in the 2016 presidential election
and in the UK with Brexit, not to mention the recent success of right-wing populism throughout
the world, conditions seem conducive to anti-democratic movements like those the modernists
witnessed and frequently supported in the 1920s and 1930s. In “Tradition and the Individual
Talent,” Eliot wrote: “Someone said: ‘The dead writers are remote from us because we know so
much more than they did’. Precisely, and they are that which we know.” 26 In drawing inspiration
from “the dead writers” whose Modernist Amateur Economic theorization helped lead them to
totalitarian politics, hopefully contemporary writers will be able to avoid those pitfalls because
“we know so much more than they did”—about fascism, about the aestheticization of violence,
about the consequences of anti-democratic movements. And yet the second part of Eliot’s
quotation also rings true here: “Precisely, and they are that which we know.” Returning to these
modernists and their creative, amateur contributions to economic theory can help us, as literary
critics, as contemporary writers, as amateur economists in our own right, approach the economic
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problems of today through the more capacious, imaginative lens that they put forth a century
ago.
What does that look like? In closing, I want to turn to an especially fruitful example of a
major contemporary writer, Zadie Smith, engaging with an exemplary work of Modernist
Amateur Economics, E.M. Forster’s Howards End (1910). In her novel On Beauty (2005), which
is a rewriting of Howards End, Smith reworks most of the elements of Forster’s novel, resulting
in a rich, complex work that touches on themes of race in a transatlantic context, the challenges
facing modern universities, and, as the title suggests, conflicting understandings of the nature of
beauty. That said, one of the major themes of Forster’s novel which Smith picks up concerns the
state of economic theory, as well as the material effects of such theories on people’s real lives. In
concluding this dissertation with a reading of Forster’s Modernist Amateur Economic
theorization in Howards End and Smith’s engagement with it in On Beauty, I hope to suggest
how Modernist Amateur Economics continue to inform the present, even as we face economic
challenges that modernist writers would have found both immensely strange and uncomfortably
familiar.

E.M. Forster’s Howards End and Zadie Smith’s On Beauty
E.M. Forster’s novel Howards End was formative to my concept of the Modernist
Amateur Economist and holds a special place in the genealogy of this dissertation. 27 In turning to
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it and to On Beauty here, I am returning as well to the originating concept of my project as a
whole, which is that the figures I have termed Modernist Amateur Economists are of particular
interest because of the way they bring their literary sensibilities to bear on economic questions.
In reading these novels as meaningfully containing economic theory, I want to emphasize a final
time that the theorization that emerges from these literary spaces is different from theory in its
usual sense. These novels, I argue, give their writers a sort of imaginative theoretical space in
which to play with and, most importantly, develop economic insights and, ultimately, a kind of
(Modernist Amateur Economic) theory.
To turn to the novels themselves: written in 1910, Howards End predates Keynes’s own
movement away from laissez-faire economics, and yet Forster’s novel gets right at the heart of
the growing divide between those who conceive of economics as obeying its own laws, free from
human intervention, and those who refuse to allow it to be abstracted in this way. The novel is
structured around this dichotomy, with the Wilcox family standing in for Laissez-Faire
capitalism and the Schlegel sisters, in their valorization of art and culture above all else, standing
as advocates for some version of welfare economics. Between these two extremes, we have
Leonard Bast, the representative of the class over which the Schlegels and Wilcoxes are battling:
not the “very poor,” whom, Forster’s narrator assures us, “are unthinkable, and only to be
approached by the statistician or the poet,” but the class of “gentlefolk.” More specifically,
Leonard stands “at the extreme verge of gentility. He was not in the abyss, but he could see it,
and at times people whom he knew had dropped in, and counted no more.” 28 It is this class,
exemplified in Leonard, on which the debate Forster stages over economic theory hinges.
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Within the Wilcox/Schlegel dichotomy, it is Henry who most explicitly espouses
neoclassical economic theory, and Margaret who puts forth welfare economics. The latter’s
moment of theorization comes first in the novel, at a discussion society meeting on the
theoretical topic of how a millionaire ought to dispose of her money upon dying. During the
debate that follows, we are told that Margaret “would talk of Mr. Bast and of no one else.” 29
Breaking from her assigned role as spokesperson for “the Society for the Preservation of Places
of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty,” Margaret argues that the best way to improve society is
“to give as many poor men as you can three hundred a year each.” Responding to the charge that
such a handout would “pauperize” its recipients, Margaret argues that “A big windfall would not
pauperize a man. It is these little driblets, distributed among too many, that do the harm.” 30
Ultimately, Margaret claims, an increase in the economic stability of the many will improve both
the physical and intellectual level of society as a whole:
Give them a chance. Give them money. Don’t dole them out poetry, books and railway
tickets like babies. Give them the wherewithal to buy these things. When your socialism
comes it may be different, and we may think in terms of commodities instead of cash. Till
it comes give people cash for it is the warp of civilization, whatever the woof may be.
The imagination ought to play upon money and realize it vividly, for it’s the—the second
most important thing in the world. It is so slurred over and hushed up, there is so little
clear thinking—oh, political economy, of course, but so few of us think clearly about our
own private incomes, and admit that independent thoughts are in nine cases out of ten the
result of independent means. Money: give Mr. Bast money, and don’t bother about his
ideals. He’ll pick those up himself.31
Margaret, very careful to emphasize that she is not talking about socialism, is nevertheless
advocating here for a major redistribution of income from the wealthy to the poor. In other
words, she is calling for a version of welfare economics—not necessarily representing a total
break from neoclassical theory, but still requiring an expansion of the role of government in
29
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fighting income inequality. We can see Margaret’s antagonistic position in relation to
neoclassical theory in her dismissal of the effectiveness of “political economy,” which, in her
reading, fails to help us think clearly about the interrelations between money and those other
things that make us human—“independent thoughts.” We can see in Margaret, then, the essence
of the shared insight of the Modernist Amateur Economists I have discussed in this dissertation:
that economics, abstracted from the larger cultural field, fails to account for most of the truly
important things in life.
Henry Wilcox represents the opposite view. Importantly, his explicit declarations of his
economic philosophy also center on Leonard Bast. When, owing to Henry’s bad advice, Bast
quits his steady job, the Schlegel sisters, led by Helen, seek to hold Henry responsible for Bast’s
misfortune. Henry will have none of this: “It’s part of the battle of life…No one’s to blame.” 32
When these statements are met with more outrage, Henry recurs to a decidedly neoclassical
explanation of how the economy works:
“Point me out a time when desire for equality has made [the poor] happier. No, no. You
can’t. There always have been rich and poor. I’m no fatalist. Heaven forbid! But our
civilization is moulded by great impersonal forces’ (his voice grew complacent; it always
did when he eliminated the personal), ‘and there always will be rich and poor. You can’t
deny it’ (and now it was a respectful voice)—‘and you can’t deny that, in spite of all, the
tendency of civilization has on the whole been upward.” 33
Henry’s supreme belief in the market—the “great impersonal forces” that have caused “the
tendency of civilization” “on the whole” to have been “upward”—allows him to justify his
ruinous indifference to Leonard, even if the Schlegels are not satisfied. “‘Don’t ever discuss
political economy with Henry,’” Margaret tells Helen. “‘It’ll only end in a cry.’” Helen isn’t
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finished yet, though. In words hearkening back to Shaw’s in his essay “Economic” and
anticipating Keynes’s in The End of Laissez-Faire, Helen observes, bitterly:
“But he must be one of those men who have reconciled science with religion…I don’t
like those men. They are scientific themselves, and talk of the survival of the fittest, and
cut down the salaries of their clerks, and stunt the independence of all who may menace
their comfort, but yet they believe that somehow good—it is always that sloppy
‘somehow’—will be the outcome, and that in some mystical way the Mr. Basts of the
future will benefit because the Mr. Basts of today are in pain.” 34
Margaret, who is already engaged to Henry at this point, defends him: “He is such a man in
theory. But oh, Helen, in theory!”—implying that Henry isn’t really as callous as Helen is
making him out to be. Helen disagrees, turning the word “theory” on its head: “But oh, Meg,
what a theory!” This “theory,” of course, is the neoclassical one they have just been debating,
and the weight of Helen’s disapproval falls heavily on both the theory itself and Henry, its
representative.
But what of Leonard Bast, the unwitting object of so much debate? Although Leonard is
not present at either of these scenes where he is being discussed, Forster importantly does give
him an opportunity to weigh in with his perspective on the matter. Having, at the urging of
Helen, crashed Evie Wilcox’s wedding to ask Margaret to intercede on Leonard’s behalf with
Henry, and meeting some resistance, Leonard, now “near the abyss,” proclaims:
“I shall never get work now. If rich people fail at one profession, they can try another.
Not I. I had my groove, and I’ve got out of it…Poetry’s nothing, Miss Schlegel. One’s
thoughts about this and that are nothing. Your money, too, is nothing, if you’ll understand
me…It’s no good. It’s the whole world pulling. There always will be rich and poor.” 35
Leonard’s direct quotation of Henry (from a conversation at which he was not present), prompts
the reader to measure the stark difference in meaning in the sentence when spoken by Leonard
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and by Henry. Where the sentiment helps Henry to justify his own wealth and to put aside any
moral questions regarding the economic inequality that so benefits him, in Leonard’s mouth, this
sentence is bitter. More than this, though, Henry utters this sentiment in an effort of abstraction
that mirrors the narrator’s earlier comments about the poor. There will always be rich and poor
and, the implication is clear, the poor are “unthinkable.” Not so for Leonard. He is the poor, and
now that he has lost his job that’s all he’ll ever be again. Leonard’s quotation of Henry helps us
see the stakes of economic abstraction, and the devastating consequences of “eliminating the
personal.”
And yet, in the following scene, Forster has Leonard paraphrase Margaret’s speech to the
discussion club, to nearly the same effect. Talking to Helen about his ruined life, Leonard baldly
states: “I see one must have money…Miss Schlegel, the real thing’s money, and all the rest is a
dream.”36 “All the rest” encapsulates all of Leonard’s pretensions to culture: his Ruskin, his
nighttime walks, his trips to the symphony hall. Helen tries to counter Leonard’s point, arguing:
“You’re still wrong. You’ve forgotten Death…If we lived forever, what you say would
be true…Injustice and greed would be the real thing if we lived for ever. As it is, we must
hold to other things, because Death is coming. I love Death—not morbidly, but because
He explains. He shows me the emptiness of Money. Death and Money are the eternal
foes. Not Death and Life.”37
Leonard is impressed by this speech, but the only reaction to it that he can muster in the context
of his economic situation is to think: “Death, Life and Materialism were fine words, but would
Mr. Wilcox take him on as a clerk? Talk as one would, Mr. Wilcox was king of this world, the
superman, with his own morality, whose head remained in the clouds.” 38 At the end of the day,
Leonard agrees with Margaret: “the real thing’s money.” But the only way to attain it, in an
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economic system ruled by the Mr. Wilcoxes of the world, is by working. Any attempt to rise
above the status Leonard has achieved through his profession is doomed not merely to failure,
but to disaster.
In Leonard Bast, then, Forster confronts the reader with the realities of the economic
system prevailing in England in 1910. People like Leonard, Forster shows us, are caught in
between the two sides of the economic debate for and against some form of welfare. And while
the debaters debate, people like Leonard suffer. To put it another way, Leonard Bast is a
refutation of attempts, explicit or implicit, to discuss economic questions in abstract terms. And,
moreover, Forster is accusing both sides of the debate of doing precisely this. Henry’s recourse
to abstraction is obvious: Leonard is “your clerk,” the victim of “impersonal forces” that merely
represent “the battle of life.” But we can see, too, that Margaret and Helen consistently think of
Leonard in equally abstract terms, from using him as a stand-in for all of the working poor in
their discussion club to their references to “the Mr. Basts of today” and “the Mr. Basts of the
future” in their argument with Henry. Ultimately, all three of these characters persist in reducing
Leonard to an abstraction, as a representative of his socioeconomic class and the economic
problems that class poses. And this reduction does real violence to Leonard, first in depriving
him of his employment and then of his life itself. That Leonard’s life ends when he is
simultaneously attacked by a sword-wielding Charles Wilcox and crushed under the weight of
the Schlegels’s falling bookcase dramatizes they way in which the debate the novel stages over
what to do with this abstraction of Leonard can never save Leonard, only destroy him.
Leonard’s death is the crux of the novel, tying together some of Forster’s schemas and
dichotomies and blowing others apart. Of the many things we might take away from this
moment, one is particularly important for our understanding of Forster’s Modernist Amateur
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Economic theorization: because the blame for Leonard’s death lies with both the Schlegels and
the Wilcoxes, and indeed because of both families’ proclivity for economic theorization, Forster
is clearly not unambiguously endorsing either theory. While his political sensibilities are
certainly closer to the Schlegel sisters, part of his project here is to problematize the welfare
theories that they espouse, just as much as he is condemning Henry’s laissez-faire hypocrisies.
Forster is clear that we must not abstract economics from broader social contexts. His novel
represents an effort to lay out the stakes of such an insight, as well as a struggle to show why the
available options are inadequate to achieving it. But there is no clear third option here: Forster’s
novel is not putting forth a different theory. Rather, like Shaw’s plays or even Anand’s
Untouchable, Forster is using the medium of the novel to think about the economic problems that
so concern him. While Forster does not produce a new economic theory in Howards End, it is
precisely this kind of effort, thinking through the relation between economics and Leonard’s “all
the rest,” that is at the heart of Modernist Amateur Economics.
Read in this way, Howards End represents an important work in the archive of Modernist
Amateur Economics that I have begun to build in this dissertation. But I am turning to it here
because it is also a work of Modernist Amateur Economics that has been taken up explicitly by a
contemporary novelist. On Beauty is, in Smith’s words, an “hommage” to Forster, “to whom all
my fiction is indebted, one way or the other.” 39 But besides homage—or “rewriting,” “update,”
or, a term that I find apt, “remix”—Smith’s novel is also a reading of Forster’s: a work of
creative criticism that helps bring out the economic themes of the original in a fresh way by
placing them in the contemporary moment. On Beauty precedes the 2008 financial crisis, but it
still deals with the deep economic problems caused by America’s racist history, globalization
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and uneven development, and the commodification of art. The novel—as with Forster’s—is
much richer than I have space here to convey, but I want to focus on some of the elements of
Smith’s engagement with economics to show how Forster’s Modernist Amateur Economics have
inspired a major contemporary writer to grapple with her own economic moment.
In On Beauty, then, the scene of Howards End has shifted: instead of middle-class
London society, we are in a New England college town, the fictional Wellington, Massachusetts.
But although the setting is in America, On Beauty is not an American novel, but a transatlantic
one, with the scene frequently shifting from England to New England and back again. The varied
ancestries of the two central families, the Schegelian Belseys and the Wilcoxian Kippses, widens
the novel’s geographic reach even further. We learn that Kiki Belsey is descended from African
slaves, and that the Belseys owe their family home to an historical act of largesse through which
Kiki’s grandmother was given the house. 40 Howard Belsey, by contrast, is the (white) son of an
English butcher who has escaped his father’s line of work by becoming an academic. On the
other side of the equation, we have the imperious Monty Kipps, who has emigrated to England
from Trinidad, and his wife, Carlene, who we learn was an original passenger on the Windrush.41
The racial complexity of On Beauty is certainly a contrast from Howards End, and Smith is
clearly primarily interested in thinking about economic issues through the lens of race.
Accordingly, while Smith preserves the sharp dichotomy between the conservative Kippses and
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the liberal Belseys, the specifics of the debates that occur between them have to do not with
laissez-faire versus welfare economics, but with affirmative action.
And yet Smith is definitively viewing affirmative action as an economic issue. This point
becomes clear in the only substantial interaction in the novel between Monty Kipps, the Henry
Wilcox character, and Kiki Belsey, the Margaret Schlegel of the piece. Toward the end of the
novel, the pair walk to campus, and begin to discuss Monty’s forthcoming lecture series that is to
be about the persecution of conservatives on college campuses. One aspect of Kipps’s obviously
bad-faith argument is an attack on affirmative action, especially as it has manifested at
Wellington in the form of “discretionary students”—students who are not enrolled at the college
but whom professors have, at their discretion, allowed to take their courses. In response to Kipps
calling affirmative action a “demoralizing philosophy,” Kiki objects: “‘I mean, I certainly wasn’t
done any favours in my life—nor was my mother, nor was her mother…and nor were my
children…I always gave them the opposite idea, you know? Like my mamma said to me: You
gotta work five times as hard as the white girl sitting next to you. And that was sure as hell
true.’”42 Monty is unimpressed by Kiki’s point here, declaring: “‘Opportunity…is a right—but it
is not a gift. Rights are earned. And opportunity must come through the proper channels.
Otherwise the system is radically devalued.’”43 We can hear clear echoes here of Henry Wilcox:
“proper channels,” “the system,” “radically devalued”—the phrases inexorably recall Henry’s
comments about “great impersonal forces” and “the [upward] tendency of civilization.” 44
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Kiki, too, feels the injustice of Monty’s reply, and points to the unique racial history of
America:
“But,” protested Kiki, “isn’t the whole point that here, in America—I mean I accept the
situation is different in Europe—but here, in this country, that our opportunities have
been severely retarded, backed up or however you want to put it, by a legacy of stolen
rights—and to put that right, some allowances, concessions and support are what’s
needed? It’s a matter of redressing the balance—because we all know it’s been
unbalanced a damn long time.”45
Monty refuses to concede this point, arguing that affirmative action contributes to “a culture of
victimhood”—but Kiki’s point, in the context of the rest of the novel, has been made. And it
would certainly seem that Smith is on Kiki’s side. The novel’s extended focus on the economic
hardships being faced by a variety of Caribbean immigrants, lured to America by the American
Dream but also victims of a newer form of American imperialism, and indeed of globalization
itself, positions Smith as being in sympathy with Kiki’s comments about “stolen rights” and
“redressing the balance.” 46 Smith’s treatment of these Caribbean immigrants forms a significant
backdrop to the more prominent debate over discretionary students and affirmative action, which
centers on two African American characters, Chantelle and, more importantly, one of Smith’s
Leonard Bast characters, Carl.
For Leonard is clearly present in On Beauty in not one, but two characters: Kiki’s
youngest son Levi, who is dissatisfied with his life in a college town and longs to be from “the
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street,” and Carl, a young spoken word artist and rapper whose status as a “discretionary student”
draws various Belseys to him for different reasons. Carl and Levi are tied together in various
ways, and their reciprocal, intersecting trajectories help emphasize that parallels Smith is
asserting between the plight of the Caribbean immigrants Levi befriends and the debate over
affirmative action that Carl represents. Carl is from “the street” of Boston, but he mirrors
Leonard Bast in striving to occupy cultural spaces traditionally closed to people of his class. The
Belseys first encounter him at a public Mozart concert in Boston; then Zora Belsey runs into him
at the Wellington gym. After hearing Carl perform at the Bus Stop, a local poetry club, Professor
Claire Malcolm invites him to join her exclusive poetry seminar at Wellington, which he does.
Then, as the controversy over discretionary students heats up, Carl is given a job in the library
archiving the university’s collection of Black music in an effort to legitimize his student status.
So, as a result merely of attending a public cultural event, Carl finds himself with a job he loves,
an employee of Wellington University, and an exemplar of the American Dream.
Levi, by contrast, goes in the opposite direction. At the beginning of the novel, Levi has a
weekend job at a record store (a job that mirrors Carl’s eventual archivist work). After trying and
failing to organize a walkout with his coworkers when the company for which he works decrees
that everyone has to work on Christmas, Levi quits this job and takes up with a group of Haitian
street vendors, selling bootleg DVDs. As Carl drifts away from performance spaces like the Bus
Stop, Levi and his new Haitian friends start organizing marches and Bus Stop performances to
raise awareness about the plight of Haitian immigrants in America. With about thirty pages
remaining in the novel, it seems like Carl and Levi have switched places: Carl has claimed
Levi’s birthright, and vice versa. However, the novel’s conclusion shakes up this understanding.
In it, Levi and his friends steal a Haitian painting from Monty Kipps’s office. Monty
376

immediately accuses Carl of the theft and attempts to use the incident to convince the university
board to ban “discretionary students.” While Carl is never accused to his face—he has apparently
already decided that Wellington is not the place for him after learning of Zora’s self-interested
motivations for championing his cause—the implication is that Carl’s future at Wellington is
ruined because of his origins and Monty’s unfounded accusations. Meanwhile Levi, who actually
stole the painting, is unaffected by the fallout from doing so. In America, Smith implies, at the
end of the day what matters most are origins, and the privileges attached to those origins—
affirmative action or no. Although it is clear that Smith, like Forster, is generally on the left
politically, the Belsey family’s complicity in Carl’s ruin puts her in a similar position as Forster
in Howards End. Neither Monty’s anti-affirmative action model nor Kiki’s arguments for it can
save Carl, who is ultimately destroyed by larger cultural factors that the bare bones of economics
continue to refuse to take into account.
There is much more to be said about the treatment of economics in both of these novels.
From the central struggle over the titular country house of Howards End, to Smith’s conversion
in her novel of that life-changing inheritance into a stolen, Haitian painting worth $300,000, the
implications of Smith’s reworking of Forster’s Modernist Amateur Economic theorization
continue to ramify. And indeed, that Smith is constantly reworking Forster’s theories to meet the
new economic challenges of the 2005 moment emphasizes the material differences between the
two books and the historical contexts in which they were written. However, Smith’s very act of
rewriting Forster reveals that she is asking us to see parallels between the specific problems she
is addressing—globalization, uneven development, systemic racism, affirmative action—and the
ones Forster was—welfare economics vs. laissez-faire. If On Beauty was not structured around
extensive parallels to Howards End, it would still be about these economic issues. But by
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bringing in Forster, Smith’s treatment of economic issues (and their imbrication with the
complex array of what Forster and the other Bloomsberries liked to call “personal relations”),
takes on more significance. Like Forster, Smith does not bring us to a definitive answer to the
problems she raises. But in drawing on this modernist writer, Smith signals a willingness to
continue thinking about the kinds of economic problems that Forster and the other Modernist
Amateur Economics struggled with in their time, and which still remain unresolved more than a
century later. It is this willingness to apply literary methods to economic problems, and to use
literary works as vehicles to think through and ultimately imagine alternative solutions to those
problems, that stands as the lasting legacy of the figure of the Modernist Amateur Economist.
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